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At least 487 records · Page 27

CY2020 Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (January 2020–December 2020, Revision 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat (FF), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada (Figure 1-1). This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]); and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water use. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (NNSA/NFO, 2016) and its ensuing Records of Technical Change (ROTCs).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Section 110 Evaluation of Three Sites Associated with the Grable Test, Area 5, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This report presents the results of a Section 110 recordation of the 280mm Atomic Gun emplacement and command post (CP) (26NY16244), an associated Flash Observation Point that was used to refine the gun’s firing range (26NY16243), and troop trenches used for Exercise Desert Rock V (26NY16242). All three of these resources are directly associated with the Grable test, a specific test in the Upshot-Knothole series of aboveground nuclear detonations. The Grable test occurred at 8:30 a.m. on May 25, 1953, in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Desert Research Institute (DRI) recommends 26NY16244 and 26NY16242 eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under a combination of the Secretary of the Interior’s Significance Criteria A and D at the national level of significance and related to the era of Nuclear Testing and the Cold War. All three of these resources are recommended as contributing elements to the Frenchman Flat Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D204).

280mm Atomic Gun↗

Source Physics Experiment: Rock Valley Interferometric Synthetic Aperture RADAR Earthquake Detection Study

Seismic signals from 1993 show a series of magnitude (Mw) 3.7 or less seismic events in Rock Valley on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Historic synthetic aperture radar images of that location were found that could provide interferometric synthetic aperture radar (InSAR) measures of the ground height during 1993. Given this historic SAR imagery, we explore answering the question if ground movement from the 1993 Rock Valley earthquake activity could be sensed by remote sensing means. Finding earthquake surface movement would assist in locating the Rock Valley fault and the 1993 earthquake hypocenter where the Source Physics Experiment Phase III series of experiments will be conducted. In this report, we show that InSAR can sense very small height differences, and for the European Radar Satellite-1 InSAR collections during 1992 and 1993 over Rock Valley earth surface movements were measured with 8 mm uplift and 12.5 mm subsidence over isolated areas. One of these earth movement areas coincides with an InSAR image pair coherence drop between March 5, 1993 and June 18, 1993. The coherence drop is over an approximately 13 square km area south southeast of Skull Mountain centered at 36° 43' 30" N latitude and 116° 05' 00" W longitude. Measured small surface movement and a loss of InSAR coherence may be caused by the series of earthquakes. The location of these InSAR detections may also coincide with water drainage or erosion displacement. There are no records to disambiguate the earthquake and erosion earth surface motion possibilities. Therefore, the InSAR findings of earth surface movement by InSAR are inconclusive.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Photographic Mitigation Documentation Related to the Engine Assembly and Disassembly Facility, Area 25, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This letter report provides documentation in partial fulfillment of the mitigation of adverse effects to the Engine Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (E-MAD) facility, a major component of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Construction of the E-MAD facility began in 1962 for the purpose of disassembling and maintaining nuclear-powered rocket engines. Once the building was complete in 1967, the E-MAD facility remained in continuous operation until the nuclear rocket program was terminated in 1973. The mothballed facility was repurposed in 1977 for spent nuclear fuel handling and packaging activities. By the mid-1980s, all activities at the E-MAD facility had ceased (Reno et al. 2019). This submission is intended to comply with Stipulation III.D.1 of the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-20NA25534 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Corrective Action Activities and Demolition of the Engine Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly Facility and the Test Cell C Historic District, Major Components of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station Historic District Located in Area 25 at the Nevada National Security Site Nye County (hereafter referred to as the MOA). Stipulation III.D.1 states the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) will submit the existing supplementary collection of the large-format, black-and-white photographic prints taken during the 1996 Historic American Engineering Record (HAER) documentation of the E-MAD facility to the Nuclear Testing Archive (NTA), located on the second floor of the Rogers Building at Desert Research Institute (DRI) in Las Vegas, Nevada.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Testbeds for test Readiness: Strategic Snapshot

Test bed engineering, monitoring for underground explosive and nuclear testing will be needed if the United States returns to a test posture of nuclear device testing. To maintain and rebuild the capability of test readiness, agile cost-effective test beds are needed and LANL as well as NNSS are the perfect locations to do this. Shallow and deep boreholes should be created to research containment science, diagnostic placement and optimization, coupling and emplacement science, tracer use for fracture and cratering research, and validation of test article performance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Special Issue of Nuclear Science and Engineering celebrates the Tenth Anniversary of Operations at NCERC

The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) is a general-purpose critical experiment facility, the only one in the US and one a few that remain operational throughout the world. NCERC is located at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly known as the Nevada Test Site, and is operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This year, NCERC celebrated its 10th year of operation. To commemorate the first ten years of operations and experiments, a special issue of Nuclear Science and Engineering was prepared with papers focusing on each of the four critical assemblies and one on Radiation Test Object (RTO) measurements.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Compilation and Evaluation of Data from Groundwater Impounded within the U12n and U12t Tunnels, Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas, Nevada National Security Site

The Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) conducted routine physical and geochemical monitoring of water impounded behind impermeable structures placed within the U12n and U12t tunnels on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site [NTS]). Desert Research Institute (DRI) conducted a semiquantitative evaluation of pressure data to determine the extent to which the tunnels have been inundated and a qualitative evaluation of monitored geochemical parameters to determine if trends exist that were indicative of hydrologic and/or geochemical processes operating behind the tunnel plugs. Data were also evaluated to determine if monitored radiological parameters exceeded primary standards associated with the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (40 C.F.R. § 141.66).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Effects of Intrusive Confining Units on Groundwater Flow at Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site

Geological, geophysical, hydrogeological, and hydrological evidence indicates that feeder dikes to lava flows play a role as confining units in the groundwater flow system underlying the Pahute Mesa area of underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Of geological significance, the Pahute Mesa testing area is largely situated within the Silent Canyon caldera, which includes both tuffs and lavas that were fed by (and are connected to) intrusive rock units such as feeder dikes prior to and during volcanic eruptions (Orkild et al., 1968; Byers et al., 1976). Groundwater modeling results presented in this report support extension of “pool-dam” and “breach scenario” concepts presented in Jackson and Fenelon (2018) and Jackson et al. (2021) to low-permeability intrusive confining units (ICUs) such as feeder dikes that are expected to dissect and ring the caldera. As laterally extensive, steeply-dipping, and sub-parallel planar structures, ICUs can be expected to further compartmentalize groundwater flow in the volcanic aquifers systems at Pahute Mesa beyond the stratigraphically-defined tuff confining units (TCUs). ICUs provide an explanation for changes in water levels before and after the Cheshire test, detonated 2/14/76 (USDOE, 2015), and the unusually high horizontal gradient southwest of Cheshire. These ICU concepts are supported by groundwater modeling results presented in this report. The evidence and groundwater modeling results indicate that the downgradient extent of radionuclide contamination in some areas of Pahute Mesa could be overestimated by ignoring the confining effects of ICUs. On the other hand, contaminant extent could be underestimated by not considering transient flow effects and/or the re-equilibrated flow field caused by breaching of an ICU by an underground nuclear test.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

3D orthorhombic earth model effects on seismic source characterization

Most earth materials are anisotropic with regard to seismic wave-speeds, especially materials such as shales, or where oriented fractures are present. However, the base assumption for many numerical simulations is to treat earth materials as isotropic media. This is done for simplicity, the apparent weakness of anisotropy in the far field, and the lack of well-characterized anisotropic material properties for input into numerical simulations. One approach for addressing the higher complexity of actual geologic regions is to model the material as an orthorhombic medium. We have developed an explicit time-domain, finite-difference (FD) algorithm for simulating three-dimensional (3D) elastic wave propagation in a heterogeneous orthorhombic medium. The objective of this research is to investigate the errors and biases that result from modeling a non-isotropic medium as an isotropic medium. This is done by computing “observed data” by using synthetic, anisotropic simulations with the assumption of an orthorhombic, anisotropic earth model. Green’s functions for an assumed isotropic earth model are computed and then used an inversion designed to estimate moment tensors with the “observed” data. One specific area of interest is how shear waves, which are introduced in an anisotropic model even for an isotropic explosion, affect the characterization of seismic sources when isotropic earth assumptions are made. This work is done in support of the modeling component of the Source Physics Experiment (SPE), a series of underground chemical explosions at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Digitizer Evaluation Process [Slides]

The equipment we use for measurements are involved in multi-million dollar experiments. The experiments at the NNSS involve single shot experiments with high channel count.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

New Optical Designs for Radiation Imaging Systems [Slides]

Presentation to be presented during the first annual Prompt Radiation Detection and Imaging Workshop, hosted by the NNSS Dynamic Instruments Team, April 25–28, 2022, at NLV C-01 Auditorium and via Webex.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Big Hole Drilling Support for Nuclear Testing, 1985-1992: An Architectural Survey of the Area 1 Subdock, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) planned to demolish two buildings at the Area 1 Subdock at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet environmental management mission requirements. A review was conducted under Title 54 United States Code (USC) § 306101 (commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. As a result, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was developed to mitigate the effects of the building demolitions. Stipulation III.B of the MOA requires an architectural survey of the Area 1 Subdock. Prior to this survey, the Subdock had not been systematically recorded. Therefore, an area of approximately 33 hectares (81 acres) was surveyed for historic properties by Desert Research Institute personnel. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the potential Area 1 Subdock Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D377), including the identification of its contributing components. This district is recommended as eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A and C. It contains 14 primary resources which include individual buildings, structures, storage yards, and infrastructure. Of these resources, all except one are recommended as elements that contribute to the district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1985 through 1992. Four of the resources (B18847, B18848, S2772, S2773) are recommended as individually eligible for the NRHP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

How nuclear weapons tests were named

What do Galileo, Husky Pup, Turquoise and Barracuda have in common? They are names of nuclear weapons tests conducted at what is now called the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Over 1,000 U.S. nuclear tests were conducted at various sites between 1945 and 1992, and each of the tests was inaugurated with a name, as documented in the Lab’s vast weapons test collections housed in the National Security Research Center (NSRC). To protect the classified information about nuclear weapons and maintain security, nuclear weapons tests were assigned names. This has been true from the beginning with Trinity, the first atomic bomb test in 1945. Lab Director J. Robert Oppenheimer later said the test name may have been inspired by his love of poetry.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Effects of Intrusive Confining Units on Groundwater Flow at Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site

Geological, geophysical, hydrogeological, and hydrological evidence indicates that feeder dikes to rhyolitic lava flows may play a role as confining units in the groundwater flow system underlying the Pahute Mesa (PM) area of underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (Figure 1). Of geological significance, the PM testing area is largely situated within the Silent Canyon caldera complex (SCCC), which includes both tuffs and lavas that were fed by (and are connected to) intrusive rock units such as feeder dikes prior to and during volcanic eruptions (Orkild et al., 1968; Byers et al., 1976a). Groundwater modeling results presented in this report support extension of “pool-dam” and “breach scenario” concepts presented in Jackson and Fenelon (2018) and Jackson et al. (2021) to low-permeability intrusive confining units (ICUs) such as feeder dikes that are expected to dissect and ring silicic calderas. As laterally extensive, steeply-dipping, and sub-parallel planar structures, ICUs may further compartmentalize groundwater flow in some areas of the volcanic aquifer system at PM. ICUs may explain unusually high horizontal hydraulic gradient southwest of Cheshire. Breaching of an ICU within which the Cheshire test was emplaced may explain changes in water levels before and after the Cheshire test was detonated in the U-20n emplacement hole on 2/14/76 (USDOE, 2015b). This analysis of the effects of ICUs on groundwater flow at PM addresses a need to evaluate uncertainty in the conceptual model or structural aspects of hydrologic source term (HST) or corrective action unit (CAU) models for groundwater flow and contaminant transport (FFACO, 1996, as amended). At Cheshire and possibly other test locations at PM, downgradient extent of radionuclide contamination may be overpredicted by not including the confining effects of ICUs. On the other hand, contaminant extent may be underpredicted by not considering transient flow effects and/or the re-equilibrated flow field caused by breaching of an ICU by an underground nuclear test. Near Cheshire, the effects of ICUs may be most apparent and impactful to the groundwater flow system at PM because of an unusual combination of thickness, extent, and frequency of dikes transecting the saturated CHLFA4 aquifer and feeding into the overlying unsaturated rhyolite lava of Windy Wash. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 present geological, geophysical, hydrogeological, and hydrological evidence for ICUs at PM. Chapters 5 and 6 examine effects of ICUs on groundwater flow including analysis by groundwater modeling.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Contaminant Transport Parameters for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model of Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

This document presents a summary and framework of available transport data and other information directly relevant to the development of the groundwater transport model for Central and Western Pahute Mesa (PM) corrective action units (CAU). This model is referred to as the “PM CAU transport model” in this document. Central and Western PM are two areas of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) that historically were used for underground nuclear testing. These nuclear tests resulted in groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the underground test areas. As a result, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program is currently conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) of the PM underground test areas. This work is a part of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Unclassified Source Term and Radionuclide Data for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model for Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

This report documents the evaluation of information and data available on the unclassified source term and radionuclide (RN) contamination for Central and Western Pahute Mesa (PM): Corrective Action Units (CAUs) 101 and 102. The Central and Western PM CAUs constitute two areas of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) used for underground nuclear testing (Figure 1-1). Eighty-five underground nuclear tests were conducted at the PM CAUs between 1965 and 1992 (NNSA/NFO, 2015b). Underground nuclear tests deposit radioactive elements in the subsurface, resulting in groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the underground test locations. At the PM CAUs, the testing resulted in more than 2.68 × 10 7 curies (Ci) of radioactivity (decay-corrected to September 30, 2012) remaining underground (Finnegan et al., 2016). Of the 85 underground nuclear tests conducted at the PM CAUs, three were shallow tests detonated within 200 meters (m) of the surface and referred to as the “near-surface tests”; the remaining 82 were detonated deeper than 200 m below ground surface (bgs) and are referred to as the “deep underground tests” in this document.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗