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478 records · Page 27

Results from a Field Trial of the Radio Frequency Based Cylinder Accountability and Tracking System at the Global Nuclear Fuel Americas Fuel Fabrication Facility

The Cylinder Accountability and Tracking System (CATS) is a tool designed for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to improve overall inspector efficiency through real-time unattended monitoring of cylinder movements, site specific rules-based event detection, and the capability to integrate many types of monitoring technologies. The system is based on the tracking of cylinder movements using (radio frequency) RF tags, and the collection of data, such as accountability weights, that can be associated with the cylinders. This presentation will cover the installation and evaluation of the CATS at the Global Nuclear Fuels (GNF) fuel fabrication facility in Wilmington, NC. This system was installed to evaluate its safeguards applicability, operational durability under operating conditions, and overall performance. An overview of the system design and elements specific to the GNF deployment will be presented along with lessons learned from the installation process and results from the field trial.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

BN-350 unattended safeguards system current status and initial fuel movement data

The Unattended and Remote Monitoring (UNARM) system at the BN-350 fast breeder reactor facility in Aktau, Kazakhstan continues to provide safeguards monitoring data as the spent fuel disposition project transitions from wet fuel storage to dry storage casks. Qualitative data from the initial cask loading procedures has been released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is presented here for the first time. The BN-350 fast breeder reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan, operated as a plutonium-producing facility from 1973 W1til 1999. Kazakhstan signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 1994, and shortly afterwards the IAEA began safeguarding the reactor facility and its nuclear material. Slnce the cessation of reactor operations ten years ago, the chief proliferation concern has been the spent fuel assemblies stored in the pond on-site. By 2002, all fuel assemblies in wet storage had been repackaged into proliferation-resistant canisters. From the beginning, the IAEA's safeguards campaign at the BN-350 included a constant unattended sensor presence in the form of UNARM which monitors nuclear material activities at the facility in the absence of inspector presence. The UNARM equipment at the BN-350 was designed to be modular and extensible, allowing the system to adapt as the safeguards requirements change. This has been particularly important at the BN-350 due to the prolonged wet storage phase of the project. The primary function of the BN-350 UNARM system is to provide the IAEA with an independent, radiation-centric Containment and Surveillance (C&S) layer in addition to the standard seals and video systems. The UNARM system has provided continuous Continuity of Knowledge (COK) data for the BN-350's nuclear material storage areas in order to ensure the validity of the attended measurements during the lifetime of the project. The first of these attended measurements was characterization of the spent fuel assemblies. This characterization utilized the Spent Fuel Coincidence Counter (SFCC) instrument [ref] to measure neutron multiplicity and calculate Pu mass. These calculated masses were then compared to modeling simulation of the assemblies as well as declarations from the facility in order to baseline the amount of material under IAEA safeguards [ref]. Once the baseline was established, bundles of four or six assemblies were repackaged into proliferati n-resistant canisters. This provided an additional physical barrier to material diversion and provided further protection by choosing assemblies for each canister so that the overall dose rate met self-protection requirements. Each of the canisters were then characterized using a similar technique to the SFCC, but with the Spent Fuel Attribute Monitor (SPAM) instnunent (ref). The data from these measurements were then used to calculate an attribute proportional to the total Pu mass in each canister. This attribute was then compared to the know Pu mass of each assembly in order to verify the accuracy of SPAM. In the event that COK is lost, the SPAM detector remains positioned to reverify Pu content of individual canisters without requiring the canister to be opened.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NGSI student activities in open source information analysis in support of the training program of the U.S. DOE laboratories for the entry into force of the additional protocol

In 2008 a joint team from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) consisting of specialists in training of IAEA inspectors in the use of complementary access activities formulated a training program to prepare the U.S. Doe laboratories for the entry into force of the Additional Protocol. As a major part of the support of the activity, LANL summer interns provided open source information analysis to the LANL-BNL mock inspection team. They were a part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's (NGSI) summer intern program aimed at producing the next generation of safeguards specialists. This paper describes how they used open source information to 'backstop' the LANL-BNL team's effort to construct meaningful Additional Protocol Complementary Access training scenarios for each of the three DOE laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Detection of Anomalous Gamma-Ray Spectra for On-Site Inspection

This work aims to solve some of the technical and logistical challenges inherent in performing On Site Inspection activities under the authority of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Inspectors require equipment that can reliably identify the radionuclide signatures of nuclear test explosions amid a background of environmental contamination. Detection of these radiation anomalies by mobile search teams in the air or on the ground can narrow the search field and target specific areas for more detailed inspection or sampling. The need to protect confidential information of the inspected State Party, especially regarding past nuclear testing activities, suggests that full access to measured gamma-ray spectra should be limited. Spectral blinding techniques---in which only a fraction of the information derived from the spectra is displayed and stored---have the potential to meet the needs of both the OSI team and the State Party. In this paper, we describe one such algorithm that we have developed for identifying anomalous spectra from handheld, mobile, or aerial sensors. The algorithm avoids potential sensitivities by reducing the gamma-ray spectrum into a single number that is displayed and stored. A high value indicates that the spectrum is anomalous. The proposed technique does not rely on identifying specific radionuclides, operates well in the presence of high background variability, and can be configured to ignore specific spectral components. In previous work, the algorithm has proven very effective in classifying gamma-ray spectra as anomalous or not, even with poor statistical information. We performed a limited simulation of an airborne search scenario to demonstrate the potential algorithm for OSI missions. The technique successfully detected an injected source of interest whose count rate was an order of magnitude below background levels. We also configured the algorithm to ignore 137Cs as irrelevant to the mission. The resulting alarm metrics were unaffected by the presence of injected 137Cs contamination.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF{sub 6} feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load cell data; (8) hardware and software implementation for process load cell data collection; (9) costs associated with unattended monitoring of load cells (for both operator and inspector) weighed against the potential benefits of having access to such data; (10) results from field tests of load cell data collection systems in operating facilities; and (11) use of unattended load cell data to increase efficiency of on-site inspection schedules and activities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Overview of the latest nondestructive assay technology

Nondestructive Assay (NDA) techniques are an important tool for the safeguarding of nuclear materials. NDA techniques are used by inspectors from both domestic agencies and international agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency as well as site level nuclear material management programs to verify that inventories of nuclear materials. This technology has been in development for over 40 years and significant improvements in detector capabilities, electronics processing and data analysis has lead to new detection capabilities and greatly improved quantification of nuclear materials. Many of the improvements over the last decade have resulted from improved computing power. This has lead to the ability to collect and analyze data in ways not possible only years ago. This poster will present some of the improvements of nondestructive assay technologies over the past several years and the implementation of these technologies in nuclear safeguards programs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Results from the 2010 INMM International Containment and Surveillance Workshop focused on Concepts for the 21st Century

The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) held an International Workshop, 'Containment & Surveillance (C/S): Concepts for the 21st Century,' June 6-11, 2010, at the Oak National Laboratory, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development and Office of Nonproliferation and International Security sponsored the event. The workshop focused on determining concepts and needs for 21st century containment and surveillance (C/S) systems that support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and future arms control agreements. Panel discussions by subject matter experts and international practitioners addressed daily topical themes encompassing the following areas of C/S: authentication; tagging, sealing, and containment verification; and surveillance systems. Each panel discussion was followed by a question-and-answer session with the audience and an afternoon breakout session. The facilitated breakout sessions were used to compile information and determine future needs. Individuals attending the workshop included C/S experts and practitioners; IAEA and arms control inspectors; technology providers; vendors; students; and individuals with an interest in, or desire to learn about, future C/S system needs. The primary goal of the workshop was to produce a document that details the future research and development needs for C/S systems that support nuclear safeguards and arms control missions. This talk will present a compilation of the information obtained from breakout sessions at the workshop.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An international study on THM modelling of the full-scale heater experiment at Mont Terri laboratory

We present results from an international model comparison study of the Full-Scale Emplacement (FE) experiment in Opalinus Clay at the Mont Terri Laboratory, Switzerland. Based on a provided parameter set the teams decided which parameters they adopted for their models, whether they considered the excavation and the ventilation phase in addition to the heating phase and if they included technical features like the shotcrete or the EDZ. The teams were able to reproduce the measured parameters temperature, relative humidity and pore pressure. The modelled results for temperature agree very closely between the teams especially in the sensors in Opalinus Clay. All teams were able to reproduce the redistribution of water in the bentonite backfill due to heating. The evolution of the relative humidity showed similar trends with differences in the intensity of the dry out effect. To model the pore pressure evolution is more complex because it comprises the full interaction of the coupled THM processes. The spread between the pore pressure modelled by the teams was larger, with some teams overestimating the pressure increase due to heating and some teams overestimating the extent of drainage. The agreement of modelled results with measurements improves with larger distance to the heater. We conclude that the EDZ and the shotcrete potentially influence the behaviour of the rock causing higher differences closer to the heater. Further research is needed to better implement those influences into the models. Based on the calibrated models, the future evolution of temperature, relative humidity and pore pressure was predicted over the next 10 years following a change of the heat power applied in 2023 and 2024. Again, the predicted temperatures agree very closely between the teams. Most teams do not expect an increase in relative humidity during the next 10 years after the initial dry-out.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Idaho Explosive Detection System

Learn how INL researchers are making the world safer by developing an explosives detection system that can inspect cargo. For more information about INL security research, visit http://www.facebook.com/idahonationallaboratory

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗