A Presentation on Fleet-Based Control Room Modernization project to Jon Kvalem, Institute for Energy Technology in Halden, Norway
This STIMS submittal is so that my PowerPoint presentation slides can be reviewed and approved for release.
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This STIMS submittal is so that my PowerPoint presentation slides can be reviewed and approved for release.
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A number of years ago, Duke Energy and the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a collaboration to support Duke’s digital upgrade activities for the main control rooms at three of their commercial nuclear power stations. The collaboration specifically focused on the human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of Duke’s plans to upgrade the legacy turbine control systems (TCS) at their Brunswick, Robinson, and Harris plants. This TSC upgrade involved installing a common digital control system (DCS), or distributed instrumentation and control (I&C) system platform, which multiple digital plant control systems can be integrated onto as the control rooms are modernized over time. Given the breadth and depth of the scope of this upgrade, DOE researchers at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) with expertise in human factors collaborated with Duke throughout the entire HFE life cycle to help ensure the upgrade was performed in a manner consistent with regulatory human factors review criteria, such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model (NUREG 0711, 2012). This paper describes the HFE researchers performed through the early and middle phases of these TCS upgrades. Specific HFE activities include: 1) the development of a human factors program management plan, 2) performing an operational experience review, 3) evaluating the design human system interface while it was still in the early stages of development, and 4) developing a framework to help map these HFE activities to NUREG-0711 to help understand and catalog the value of different types and phases of human performance data collection. These four HFE activities are described in more detail below.
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This poster provides an update on enhancements to the Future Automotive System Technology Simulator (FASTSim) and data updates to the Transportation Secure Data Center (TSDC).
This presentation summarizes the objectives, approach, and findings of a 3-year project led by INL as part of DOE's SMART Mobility Laboratory Consortium. The presentation will be given to the general public via Zoom during the FY20 Vehicle Technologies Office Annual Merit Review on June 3, 2020.
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Interim results from the Athena project show that Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport could achieve up to 50% energy savings with targeted shuttle bus electrification.
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The work involves quantitative analysis of costs associated with capture of carbon dioxide at fossil fuel fired power plants, transmission of gas through pipelines, and underground storage. The costs are then assembled and ranked such that a complete characterization of every power plant and storage site is produced.
Presentation for UAE-Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation Visit
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The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.