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At least 487 records · Page 27

A burnup credit approach for margin estimation of loaded boiling water reactor canisters in UNF-ST-DARDS

This paper discusses the modeling approach applied in the Used Nuclear Fuel Storage, Transportation, and Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST-DARDS) to take credit for the reduced reactivity associated with the burnup of boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel for canister-specific as-loaded criticality analysis. Burnup credit is routinely used for the analysis of pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage (wet), transportation, and disposal. The fresh fuel assumption has historically been applied to BWR SNF criticality analyses for dry storage and transportation, and the peak reactivity method of burnup credit has been applied to pool storage. The fresh fuel assumption ignores the credit for gadolinium burnable absorbers in BWR fuel, as well as the burnup of the fuel, and is therefore conservative. This work employs the framework traditionally used for PWR burnup credit analyses and applies available data and recently published regulatory guidance to justify a new approach to model the as-loaded burnup and enrichment of SNF assemblies in currently loaded dry casks. The following features of this criticality analysis approach are presented in this paper: (1- selection of axial burnup profiles for BWR fuel from publicly available sources using methods derived from recently published research, (2- justification of the selected axial burnup profiles as relevant to all types of BWR fuel, (3- justification for modeling the fuel assemblies with a uniform axial and radial enrichment, and (4- justification for modeling the axial void profile and control blade insertion during depletion. This analysis approach was used to evaluate 153 already-loaded BWR casks at 8 sites as a function of time in UNF-ST-DARDS. Finally, the results of the as-loaded criticality safety margin assessments are presented. The results show the k{sub eff} calculated for storage and transportation cases range from 0.71 to 0.83, and the eigenvalues calculated for the disposal cases range from 0.85 to 1.03, though the highest cases are dominated by very limiting hypothetical damaged fuel assumptions. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis for a combined depletion and criticality calculation chain of a BWR FA

This paper examines the prerequisites and boundary conditions for extending burnup credit from pressurized water reactors to boiling water reactors with validated depletion codes by performing uncertainty and sensitivity analyses on a modern boiling water reactor fuel assembly design. We developed a computational chain consisting of an axial boiling water reactor axial irradiation model, followed by a series of depletion calculations and a three-dimensional criticality calculation. The irradiation model puts into relation the profiles of power, burnup and moderator density of the fuel assembly at 24 axial locations. In a simplified fashion it also includes the insertion of control blades. The depletion calculations of the fuel assembly were performed in axial slices with the 2D-depletion code HELIOS 1.12. The criticality calculations were done in 3D-geometry with KENO-Va from the SCALE 6.2.1 package, in which several fuel assemblies are placed into a generic transport cask. For the uncertainty and sensitivity analyses a Monte Carlo sampling based approach is used applying the GRS tool SUnCISTT. We performed several generic investigations testing the capabilities and the limitations of the whole computational chain. The impact of variations of the irradiation model on the resulting reactivity of the fuel assemblies inside a transport cask or storage pool was investigated using an uncertainty and sensitivity analysis on the whole computational chain. Geometrical uncertainties were also included in the evaluation and a parameter study on the use of control blades during irradiation was performed. The goal was to develop the procedures and tools to be able to obtain quantitative uncertainty data which can be used in the future to derive conservative irradiation profiles without unnecessary excess reactivity margins. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Updating the Dry Transfer System - 18110

The Dry Transfer System (DTS) was examined for its ability to be redesigned in order to meet needs associated with repackaging used/spent nuclear fuel (UNF/SNF) from existing storage cask systems into alternative systems, while also incorporating design advances based on some lessons learned from Orano's dry UNF handling facility (T0) located at the La Hague recycling plant. In this redesign, the DTS is envisioned to provide some flexibility through the ability to perform repackaging activities from multiple differently designed cask systems, including those with canisters that will require cutting and welding activities, and potentially with waste packages designed for disposal. The redesigned DTS is also intended to provide some operational flexibility by providing lag storage and include a means for examining UNF/SNF during repackaging, using some features implemented at the T0 facility at La Hague. This paper provides a summary of: the original DTS design, which was evaluated by the NRC and portions of which were cold-tested at Idaho National Lab; the lag storage system designed for the DTS, which is able to flexibly handle different fuel assembly designs while providing structural support for design basis events (e.g., seismic); the incorporation of lessons learned from the La Hague T0 facility into the DTS design to facilitate dry handling of UNF/SNF; and identification of other challenges towards designing a complete system. A revised DTS is envisioned to provide an important tool for the future management of UNF/SNF in preparation for transportation, re-storage, re-transportation, and/or disposal and also provides a means for repackaging UNF/SNF in case recovery from a cask/canister system is necessary (e.g., due to extended storage or a transportation event). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Long-term Prediction of Spent Fuel Storage Canisters - Issues and Approaches - 18112

The considerations involved in aging management of stainless steel canisters used in dry cask storage of spent fuel are discussed in this paper in a probabilistic framework. The two important modes of degradation in the long-term performance of the casks are localized corrosion and stress corrosion cracking initiating from the external surface. These degradation modes are determined by the evolution of the electrochemical behavior and the strain rate of the stainless steel. Laboratory data suggest that Type 304L/316L stainless steels should suffer from localized corrosion and SCC under salt deposits. However, field inspection of the canisters has not indicated extensive pitting or stress corrosion cracking. This discrepancy can be understood in terms of the joint probabilities of various factors that must come together to cause these failure modes. A Bayesian network approach is suggested as the framework for modeling the probability of failure of canisters and long-term management of aging. The gaps in knowledge to conduct a Bayesian network analysis are discussed. (authors)

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Developments in the Regulatory Framework of Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) in Germany - 18137

According to article 6 of the German Atomic Energy Act, storage of nuclear fuel requires a license granted by the competent authority in this field, which is the Federal Office for Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BfE). In 1995, a license for storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and vitrified high level waste (HAW) was granted for the interim storage facility in Gorleben. Dry Interim storage at the NPP sites in its current form started in 2002 in the interim storage facility next to the nuclear power plant NPP Lingen. Since this time twelve NPPs erected their own storage facilities additionally to the three central storage facilities (Ahaus, Gorleben and Rubenow). In all of these facilities the concept of dry storage in metallic dual purpose casks (DPCs) is implemented. The actual storage licenses for SNF and the HAW (which is stored in Gorleben and Rubenow) are limited to 40 years after closing the transport and storage cask. The first license to expire will be the storage license for the interim storage facility in Gorleben in the year 2034. In Germany the decision about a repository site will be taken in the year 2031. To enable the utilities to hand over the SNF and HAW to the repository regime while the current licenses are still valid would require a very fast process licensing and construction of the required facilities at this location. As a delay cannot be excluded, necessary preparations have to be taken on the side of the regulator. In the German Atomic Energy Act precautions have already been taken and consulting the German parliament (Bundestag) is mandatory if inevitable events would require an extension of the currently licensed interim storage period. The new structure with the Federal Office BfE, and two companies for final disposal 'Bundesgesellschaft fuer Endlagerung' (BGE mbH) and interim storage 'Bundesgesellschaft fuer Zwischenlagerung' (BGZmbH) was established in 2017. The Federal Office for Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BfE) is responsible for regulation in the field of nuclear disposal since 30.07.2016. So the package design approval for DPCs and the storage licenses for SNF will be granted by this office. Furthermore, it is the regulator for the repository and will finally grant a license for the German deep geological repository. Site selection and construction and operation of the repository will be the responsibility of BGE. On January 1, 2018, the BGZ will take over all remaining interim storage facilities operating under a license due to article six of the Atomic Energy Act. (authors)

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Cataloguing Past Incidents in Transporting Spent Nuclear Fuel

Shipments of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high level radioactive waste (HLW) have a history of more than 50 years, during which tens of thousands of tons of material have been transported in tens of thousands of shipments worldwide. The vast majority of these have been completed without incident. This safety record has been made possible by establishing robust regulatory requirements for the casks used in transport, studying past shipments and incidents, and improving equipment and procedures to lessen the probability and impacts of future events. The authors recently collected a wide array of publicly available information on transportation incidents involving SNF and HLW worldwide. This presented a challenge, as no international or US databases currently exist which are dedicated to SNF and HLW transportation incidents. Thus, sources for this research included national database reports from nations that publish them; technical reports and archival journal papers focused on the solutions to particular transportation problems; and news reports of SNF and HLW transportation incidents, including transportation accidents and protests of shipments. Based on the survey of past transportation incidents, of which several representative descriptions are included in this paper, the authors conclude that (1) the casks in which SNF and HLW are shipped are able to contain their radioactive cargoes in severe accidents because of their robust construction and their being in compliance with regulatory requirements; and (2) most incidents in transporting SNF and HLW have been minor ones, primarily resulting from procedural compliance deficiencies. Furthermore, recent incidents suggest that public information and engagement challenges outweigh technical challenges in SNF and HLW transportation, since the most significant challenges surrounding shipments in recent years have been the results of public demonstrations and protests. This paper discusses some SNF and HLW transportation incidents, as well as the process used in cataloguing them. In general, there have been few transportation incidents worldwide in the history of transporting SNF and HLW. The transportation of SNF and HLW has an excellent safety record; by learning from past incidents, shippers of SNF and HLW can continue to make safe shipments while avoiding mistakes made in the past. Despite the safe and successful record of SNF and HLW transportation, information on its record is not easy to find. Few incidents are detailed as thoroughly as the truck accident that occurred in 1971. Several anti-nuclear organizations publish pamphlets that make reference to transportation accidents involving radioactive material and imply that transporting SNF and HLW is an intrinsically dangerous activity whose history is fraught with accidents. The absence of a clear, complete, official record on transportation incidents allows these claims to continue to be unanswered and uncorrected. For these reasons, it would be beneficial to develop a database detailing incidents involving SNF and HLW internationally. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Developing Materials for Extreme Environments and Their Use in Nuclear Waste Canisters and Reactors - 20559

The paper focuses on the development of materials which can be utilized in extreme industrial environments. The paper discusses the advancement of materials and their application in components which are utilized in extreme industrial environments as such that of the nuclear field and especially in the nuclear waste field. Nuclear power plants have become an indispensable part of the electricity generation, medical, food processing and many other industries. Though burning small amount of fuel as compared to conventional power plants, they also create waste which is not easy to handle as other types of wastes. The nuclear waste sitting at the bottom of spent fuel tanks around the globe has raised public concerns on how it will be dealt with. Europe has started to give an answer by working on geological repositories. Though till yet, waste has been cooled in spent fuel tanks and after processing, is precisely placed in nuclear waste canisters and casks and transported to sites across the country for further cooling and storage. Though in all this process there had been a great deal of advancement on the type of casks and canisters used and the processes for transporting nuclear material and waste. Often reports about radioactive material leakage, moisture content inside barrels etc. has surfaced. Be it official or unofficial report, there seems a technical failure on how the nuclear waste has been stored and placed at facilities around the globe. The other aspect of this material development is to be beneficial for nuclear reactors. As the technology gets advanced, nuclear reactors change their titles from Gen II to Gen III and so on. The new fleet of upcoming reactors will be exceptionally safer, reliable and more efficient. But these benefits will also bring drawbacks with them. As these reactors will operate at high temperature (above 800 degree Celsius) they also ask for advancement in materials used in the reactor core, fuel used, reactor control etc. The paper tries to answer such concerning questions. The work shows the study done on different material that can be better candidates for extreme environments. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fission Product Gas Monitoring During Fuel Drying Operations - 20094

The goal of the project was to devise and implement a method of accurately qualifying any noble gas emitted during fuel drying operations (part of the dry fuel storage process) in order to provide the data needed to validate the off-site dose calculations. The imputes of the project was the NRC publishing Information Notice 18-01, 'Noble Fission Gas Releases During Spent Fuel Cask Loading Operations' in February 2018. The information notice describes some industry events that occurred during vacuum drying operations as part of a dry fuel campaign. The solution was devised by Fort Calhoun Station staff in partnership with Mirion Technologies technical staff. The monitoring was accomplished by directing all the effluent from the fuel storage cask vacuum drying machine through a sample chamber containing a compact ISOCS characterized CZT based gamma spectrometer connected to a Mirion Data Analyst. This resulted near real-time quantification of the radionuclides of concern. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

The NAC LWT for Research Reactor Spent Fuel Shipments - 20126

The NAC Legal Weight Truck (LWT) Cask is a Type B(U)F-96 transportation package originally designed for shipment of PWR and BWR spent fuel assemblies. Its versatile design provides maximum flexibility and cost-efficiency to support shipment of a wide range of spent fuel. This cask has been used for research reactor fuel shipments in over a dozen countries and counting. It has supported multiple domestic research reactor spent fuel shipments. These contents are licensed by the U.S. NRC and have been validated for use around the world. These shipments need the capability to be loaded and unloaded in a pool, in a dry facility or in a parking lot. In this paper, the analysis, design changes and operations to meet these specific content challenges will be presented. The paper provides a technical overview of the NAC LWT and identifies the design features and technology advancements making the NAC LWT readily adaptable and flexible solution for packaging research reactor spent fuel. (authors)

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Damaged Fuel in the United States - 20325

Throughout the history of commercial nuclear power plant operations in the U.S., many fuel assemblies have lost the capability to perform all of their desired functions. Since they can no longer be handled, stored, or transported in accordance with established regulations, they are classified as damaged fuel. The causes of these failed assemblies are diverse and plant-specific. The majority of these failed assemblies are contained in damaged fuel cans to be used in conjunction with storage and/or transportation systems. These systems have a limited number of slots that can be filled with damaged fuel cans. A damaged fuel can is generally a stainless-steel container that confines damaged spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and is closed at one end by mesh endpoints that allow gaseous and liquid media to escape but minimize the dispersal of gross particulate material. Out of extreme caution, a few reactors have loaded high burnup fuel into damaged fuel cans. Damaged fuel is not licensed for storage or transport in the U.S. because relevant regulations do not specify exactly how to classify damaged fuel. Instead, these regulations license/certify packages that specify approved contents. Damaged fuel must be included among the approved contents to be considered acceptable. In many cases, damaged SNF is encapsulated in damaged fuel cans to ensure it can confine gross fuel particles, debris, and/or damaged assemblies to known volumes within loaded casks. A damaged fuel can may then be utilized in the same way as an assembly in a storage and transportation system. Some storage cask systems utilize top and bottom plugs to confine debris in damaged fuel. The most recent domestic documentation on damaged SNF was published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), which used data from U.S. reactors compiled from 1968 to June 30, 2013, to produce Form GC-859, 'Nuclear Fuel Data Survey.' According to this form, there were 136,821 boiling water reactor (BWR) SNF assemblies and 104,647 pressurized water reactor (PWR) SNF assemblies, for a combined total of 241,468. Of these, 4,521 were classified as failed. Some were also disassembled and the fuel rods or pieces of fuel rods combined to make consolidated assemblies. These consolidated assemblies may include damaged fuel or were perhaps consolidated as part of a demonstration project. The GC-859 data includes 2,550 consolidated assemblies containing 0 - 264 entire fuel rods. These consolidated assemblies could be placed in single assembly canisters and stored in the spent fuel pool. For dry storage and transportation, a single assembly canister is generally placed in each damaged fuel can. In addition to the consolidated assemblies, 2,391 un-canistered fuel rod pieces exist, which were removed from 494 assemblies. (authors)

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Dry Canister Storage System Inspection and Robotic Delivery System Development

EPRI is working to develop and demonstrate technologies capable of inspecting welded stainless steel canisters used in dry cask storage systems in situ, without the need to remove them from their concrete casks. This involves the coupling of specialized cameras and inspection devices with small remotely operated vehicles (ROVs). The objective is to demonstrate the capability to identify any presence of (or precursors to) stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and other anomalies that may require additional investigation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Dose Rate Investigation for Cobalt Isotope Rods Retrieval Campaign

GE-Hitachi (GEH) partnered with Exelon for a first of a kind program to generate cobalt-60 (Co-60) sources at Clinton Power Station (CPS). The cobalt targets are placed within the fuel bundle, double encapsulated in metal rods, and irradiated in the Boiling Water Reactor for activation. After the bundle is discharged, the Co-60 sources are harvested for medical and industrial applications. In order to ensure safe shipment of the Co-60 sources, shielding evaluations are required. As required by 10 CFR 71, a licensing basis evaluation was performed and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and approved as a Letter Authorization. This 10 CFR 71 evaluation utilizes bounding design inputs to demonstrate compliance with the regulatory limits. The retrieval campaign of the Co-60 rods involves disassembly of the bundle/rods, loading into a material basket, and then loading the material basket into GEHitachi's Model 2000 cask that is part of the Type B Transportation Package. As part of conservative decision making, CPS wanted confidence that measurements taken at various locations around the material basket loaded with Co-60 rods are consistent or bounded by the dose rate calculations performed by GEH. This would ensure that after all loading operations are completed, and the Model 2000 package is in the shipping configuration (i.e., cask drained and secured within the Model 2000 overpack), the dose rates would meet 10 CFR 71 shipping requirements. In addition, dose rate predictions were used to develop an ALARA plan at CPS to ensure radiological safety of the workers. To support CPS, a second, more realistic shielding evaluation was performed to verify the as planned loading. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Using temperature and flow fields to detect gas leakage from canisters containing spent nuclear fuel: Applications to RAMM-TM

The multi-physics STAR-CCM+ code has been used to simulate the temperature and flow fields in canister gas leakage experiments conducted by using a 1/4.5-scale model storage cask. The simulations were conducted at Argonne National Laboratory’s Laboratory Computing Resource Center, utilizing high-performance computing resources. Development of STAR-CCM+ simulation models for the 1/4.5-scale model cask is described herein, followed by validation of the simulation results against experimental data. Canister depressurization and thermal response during gas leakage are discussed, along with analyses of the leakage path and allowable leakage rate. The insights gained from the STAR-CCM+ simulations and leakage analyses will help guide future experiments and actual industry applications of Argonne’s Remote Area Modular Monitoring system for canister surface temperature measurement (RAMM-TM) to enable effective aging management of spent fuel during extended dry storage, as well as help reduce risks to public safety and health and protect the environment.

Canister gas leakage↗

Laser ablation spectrometry for studies of uranium plasmas, reactor monitoring, and spent fuel safety

Nuclear security is one of the defining challenges of our time. Nuclear threats range from deliberate dispersal of radioactive material to contaminate the vital infrastructure to diversion and smuggling of special nuclear material for clandestine nuclear programs and nuclear terrorism, respectively. There is an associated need to develop and sustain the nuclear forensics capabilities, which requires the understanding of complex processes that occur in plasmas of nuclear materials. The area of nuclear safety has seen a resurgence of public interest, and there is a concomitant need to safely store used nuclear fuel and detect structural material failure in nuclear power systems, especially in innovative reactor designs envisioned for future adoption. Laser-produced plasmas are complicated extreme environments that can generate intense and rich, highly specific signatures of nuclear and radiological materials, which can then be explored in a wide range of applications. They include interdiction and rapid detection of nuclear materials, including their isotopic composition, detection over long distances, laboratory simulation of weapons effects, monitoring the condition of structural materials in dry cask storage containers, and novel instrumentation for nuclear power systems. We present a compilation of recent representative examples of the application of laser spectroscopy, and laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy in particular, to nuclear safety and security problems. A case is made that spectroscopic techniques based on laser-produced plasmas offer complementary, and sometimes unique, capabilities that motivate the continued exploration of their efficient production and understanding of the signatures they produce

(020.3260) Isotope shifts, (140.3440) Laser-induce↗

Development of Streamlined Nuclear Safety Analysis Tool for Spent Nuclear Fuel Applications

To understand the changing nuclear and mechanical characteristics of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or used nuclear fuel (UNF) and the different storage, transportation, and disposal systems at various stages within the waste management system, different types of analyses are required. These analyses require the use of assorted tools and numerous types of data. Using the appropriate modeling and simulation (M&S) parameters and selecting from the diversity of analytic tools to conduct SNF analyses can be a tedious, error-prone, and time-consuming undertaking for analysts and reviewers alike. A new, integrated data and analysis system was designed to simplify and automate performance of accurate, efficient evaluations for characterizing the input to the overall U.S. nuclear waste management system—the UNF-Storage, Transportation & Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS). A relational database has been assembled to provide a standard means by which UNF-ST&DARDS can succinctly store and retrieve M&S parameters for specific SNF analysis. A library of various analysis model templates is used to communicate M&S parameters for the most appropriate M&S application. A process manager facilitates performance of actual as-loaded, assembly-specific, and cask-specific evaluations. Interactive visualization capabilities facilitate data analysis and results interpretation. To date, UNF-ST&DARDS has completed (1) explicit depletion and decay analysis of every fuel assembly (~245 000) discharged from commercial U.S. reactors through June 2013, with 13 cooling time steps (results include isotopic compositions for 142 isotopes, and radiation and thermal source terms); (2) SNF radiation dose rate evaluations at 1 m for all the fuel assemblies discharged through June 2013; and (3) criticality, shielding, thermal, and containment analyses of hundreds of loaded casks. In conclusion, UNF-ST&DARDS also provides various automated report generation capabilities with dynamic figure and table update capabilities based on changes to the Unified Database.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Process and equipment development for hot isostatic pressing treatability study

Battelle Energy Alliance (BEA), LLC, has developed processes and equipment for a pilot-scale hot isostatic pressing (HIP) treatability study to stabilize and volume reduce radioactive calcine stored at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). In 2009, the U. S. Department of Energy signed a Record of Decision with the state of Idaho selecting HIP technology as the method to treat 5,800 yd^3 (4,400 m^3) of granular zirconia and alumina calcine produced between 1953 and 1992 as a waste byproduct of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. Since the 1990s, a variety of radioactive and hazardous waste forms have been remotely treated using HIP within INL hot cells. To execute the remote process at INL, waste is loaded into a stainless-steel or aluminum can, which is evacuated, sealed, and placed into a HIP furnace. The HIP simultaneously heats and pressurizes the waste, reducing its volume and increasing its durability. Two 1 gal cans of calcine waste currently stored in a shielded cask were identified as candidate materials for a treatability study involving the HIP process. Equipment and materials for cask-handling and calcine transfer into INL hot cells, as well as remotely operated equipment for waste can opening, particle sizing, material blending, and HIP can loading have been designed and successfully tested. These results demonstrate BEA’s readiness for treatment of INL calcine.

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Structural dynamics modeling of spent nuclear fuel during hypothetical package drop events

The response of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to hypothetical package drop events is of particular interest in the scope of spent fuel storage and transportation because of the mechanical shock encountered in such scenarios. Previous testing and modeling by the U.S. Department of Energy has demonstrated that the shock and vibration environment of normal shipping and handling conditions (excluding package drop events) is relatively benign and does not challenge the integrity of spent nuclear fuel. Cask drop events are worth considering because SNF packages are required to withstand free drops onto unyielding surfaces as part of their licensing basis. The acceleration experienced during drop events can be orders of magnitude higher, and thus more advanced models are needed to encompass potential nonlinear behavior of the fuel, such as spacer grid buckling and rod-to-rod impact. This work describes a number of finite element models developed to calculate the response of spent nuclear fuel to various hypothetical drop events that have been validated by package and fuel assembly drop tests conducted in the last decade. Sensitivity of the model response to factors such as package drop orientation, secondary impacts, and irradiated material properties as well as their potential impacts to fuel cladding integrity, was also investigated. Cask drops are not expected as a regular occurrence during SNF transportation, but this work helps raise the understanding of SNF mechanical loads to the point of consistency with the package design requirements.

Kadooka, Kevin↗

AN ESTIMATE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MECHANICAL LOADS IN THE GENERAL 30 CM PACKAGE DROP SCENARIO

The US Department of Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program is performing research to determine the mechanical loading conditions applied to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) during normal conditions of transport to inform mechanical tests of SNF and close an important knowledge gap related to the practical disposition of SNF in the US. Researchers at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have completed an extensive finite element study to characterize and estimate the potential mechanical loads on SNF during a hypothetical 30 cm drop of an SNF transportation package. This modeling study is validated with test data collected by the SFWST program during a physical test campaign that included one-third scale package drop tests and full-scale single fuel assembly drop tests. The test campaign was led by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and included international collaboration with Equipos Nucleares S.A, S.M.E (ENSA) and Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM). The key contribution of the modeling study is to go beyond the limitations of the limited number of physical tests to estimate the impact response to variations in impact angle, initial gap conditions, fuel assembly design, burnup and other parameters that affect the mechanical loads. The methodology of this study included a classic parametric study to calculate the impact response of highly detailed fuel assemblies over many combinations of parameters. Models of a 17x17 pressurized water reactor fuel assembly and a generic 10x10 boiling water reactor fuel assembly were both used in this study to cover the major fuel assembly types in the US inventory. Over 2,000 impact responses were calculated. The results of the parametric study were evaluated using traditional methods and basic statistics. The results were also used to construct a damage model using multiple nonlinear regression techniques to predict the mechanical loads over the full range of all input parameters. The damage model was found to work very well for all impact angle cases where the cask came to rest on its side. It was concluded that end drop cases where the cask remained vertical (instead of tipping over onto its side) were not sufficiently characterized by the current set of parametric study cases to include in the damage model, but it was not a priority to fully investigate that range because the highest mechanical loads were observed in the broader range of side impact cases. This modeling work provides sufficient insight into the mechanical loads on SNF during a hypothetical 30 cm package drop that, when considered along with the physical test data collected by the SNL-led team, the SFSWT program can consider the knowledge gap closed.

Klymyshyn, Nicholas A.↗