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At least 469 records · Page 26
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

A Technology Pathway for Airbreathing, Combined-Cycle, Horizontal Space Launch Through SR-71 Based Trajectory Modeling

Access to space is in the early stages of commercialization. Private enterprises, mainly under direct or indirect subsidy by the government, have been making headway into the LEO launch systems infrastructure, of small-weight-class payloads of approximately 1000 lbs. These moderate gains have emboldened the launch industry and they are poised to move into the middle-weight class (roughly 5000 lbs). These commercially successful systems are based on relatively straightforward LOX-RP, two-stage, bi-propellant rocket technology developed by the government 40 years ago, accompanied by many technology improvements. In this paper we examine a known generic LOX-RP system with the focus on the booster stage (1st stage). The booster stage is then compared to modeled Rocket-Based and Turbine-Based Combined Cycle booster stages. The air-breathing propulsion stages are based on/or extrapolated from known performance parameters of ground tested RBCC (the Marquardt Ejector Ramjet) and TBCC (the SR-71/J-58 engine) data. Validated engine models using GECAT and SCCREAM are coupled with trajectory optimization and analysis in POST-II to explore viable launch scenarios using hypothetical aerospaceplane platform obeying the aerodynamic model of the SR-71. Finally, and assessment is made of the requisite research technology advances necessary for successful commercial and government adoption of combined-cycle engine systems for space access.

Kloesel, Kurt J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Modern Load Relief Guidance Scheme for Space Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle load relief algorithms are concerned with realizing a reduction of transient bending moments near maximum dynamic pressure. Traditional approaches to load relief typically use inner-loop acceleration feedback to reduce the wind-induced angle of attack. When implemented in the inner loop, load relief bandwidth is necessarily limited by the achievable stability margins, and when acceleration feedback is employed, by the uncertainty associated with structural modes that couple with the body-mounted accelerometer. The structure of inner loop load relief increases the dimensionality of the flight control gain and filter optimization problem. Most importantly, classical load relief laws do not take advantage of high-rate and high-accuracy GPS-aided inertial velocity data that is readily available from modern strap down IMUs. In this paper, a novel load relief guidance scheme is described that uses direct angle-of-attack feedback in a clever mechanization. The steering commands are determined by examining the wind-perturbed dynamics of a launch vehicle with respect to a gravity turn ascent trajectory. An angle of attack estimate is derived from GPS-aided inertial data and pre-launch range wind measurements, and it is shown that a reduction worst-case rigid-body loads can be realized without requiring air data. The algorithm also includes a high-rate navigation data preprocessing scheme that operates directly on the IMU delta-theta and delta-velocity measurements in order to produce a filtered acceleration estimate at the vehicle center of mass. The outer-loop guidance scheme simplifies the design process for the classical inner-loop autopilot. Algorithm performance is demonstrated using Monte Carlo analysis of a representative liquid booster in a production high fidelity launch vehicle simulation.

NESC↗
NASA NTRS1993

Heavy-lift vehicle-launched Space Station method and apparatus

Methods and apparatus are provided for a single heavylift launch to place a complete, operational space station on-orbit. A payload including the space station takes the place of a Shuttle Orbiter using the launch vehicle of the Shuttle Orbiter. The payload includes a forward shroud, a core module, a propulsion module, and a transition module between the core module and the propulsion module. The essential subsystems are pre-integrated and verified on Earth. The core module provides means for attaching international modules with minimum impact to the overall design. The space station includes six control moment gyros for selectably operating in either LVLH (local-vertical local-horizontal) or SI (solar inertial) flight modes.

Wade, Donald C.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRS2001

NASA's Space Launch Initiative Targets Toxic Propellants

When manned and unmanned space flight first began, the clear and overriding design consideration was performance. Consequently, propellant combinations of all kinds were considered, tested, and, when they lifted the payload a kilometer higher, or an extra kilogram to the same altitude, they became part of our operational inventory. Cost was not considered. And with virtually all of the early work being performed by the military, safety was hardly a consideration. After all, fighting wars has always been dangerous. Those days are past now. With space flight, and the products of space flight, a regular part of our lives today, safety and cost are being reexamined. NASA's focus turns naturally to its Shuttle Space Transportation System. Designed, built, and flown for the first time in the 1970s, this system remains today America's workhorse for manned space flight. Without its tremendous lift capability and mission flexibility, the International Space Station would not exist. And the Hubble telescope would be a monument to shortsighted management, rather than the clear penetrating eye on the stars it is today. But the Shuttle system fully represents the design philosophy of its period: it is too costly to operate, and not safe enough for regular long term access to space. And one of the key reasons is the utilization of toxic propellants. This paper will present an overview of the utilization of toxic propellants on the current Shuttle system.

Hurlbert, Eric↗
NASA NTRS1995

Heavy-lift vehicle-launched Space Station method and apparatus

Methods and apparatus are provided for a single heavy-lift launch to place a complete, operational space station on-orbit. A payload including the space station takes the place of a shuttle orbiter using the launch vehicle of the shuttle orbiter. The payload includes a forward shroud, a core module, a propulsion module, and a transition module between the core module and the propulsion module. The essential subsystems are preintegrated and verified on Earth. The core module provides means for attaching international modules with minimum impact to the overall design. The space station includes six control moment gyros for selectably operating in either LVLH (local-vertical local-horizontal) or SI (solar inertial) flight modes.

Wade, Donald C.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Estimating the Cost of NASA's Space Launch Initiative: How SLI Cost Stack Up Against the Shuttle

NASA is planning to replace the Space Shuttle with a new completely reusable Second Generation Launch System by approximately 2012. Numerous contracted and NASA in-house Space Transportation Architecture Studies and various technology maturation activities are proceeding and have resulted in scores of competing architecture configurations being proposed. Life cycle cost is a key discriminator between all these various concepts. However, the one obvious analogy for costing purposes remains the current Shuttle system. Are there credible reasons to believe that a second generation reusable launch system can be accomplished at less cost than the Shuttle? The need for a credible answer to this question is critical. This paper reviews the cost estimating approaches being used by the contractors and the government estimators to address this issue and explores the rationale behind the numbers.

Hamaker, Joseph H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Launch System Engine Out Capabilities

NASA's SLS is being developed with the primary purpose of returning people to the Moon and eventually landing people on Mars. With these lofty goals, ensuring mission completion is paramount even in the event of an in-flight mishap. One possible mishap is the loss of an engine in flight. While SLS was not required to show full engine out capability, the program took an ``assess to'' approach to see when the launch vehicle could complete the mission after an engine failure versus when the launch vehicle targets required a down-mode to an alternate mission target to ensure at least some flight objectives were complete, or at a minimum ensure safe return of Orion and the Crew. While this paper will focus on Artemis I, an uncrewed mission, some comparisons will be made to how the engine out capability will change for the subsequent Crewed flights of SLS and Orion.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Ground Wind Loads on the Space Launch System’s Mobile Launcher Crew Access Arm

An aerodynamic database for the crew access arm during deployment is generated. While initial attempts used data derived from wind tunnel testing, limitations lead to the use of computational fluid dynamics to improve analysis. This computational data compared favorably to the experimental data increasing confidence in both. Further analysis lead to simplification showing the ability to build the database with a single relative wind variable which takes into account both arm deployment angle and wind direction. Eventually geometric simplifications and conservative results lead to the use of simulations of the CAA alone to build the database.Finally these static conditions are then compared to a dynamic simulation where the CAA rotates into position to test the quasi-steady state assumptions used to generate the database. The dynamic case showed an increase in the moment of interest but within acceptable bounds for now.

SLS↗
NASA NTRS1991

Summary of aerothermal test results from the first flight of the Pegasus air-launched space booster

Temperature measurements were obtained on the Pegasus booster from launch through Mach 8.0. The majority of sensors were thin-foil temperature gages installed near the surface within the vehicle's ablating thermal protection system. These gages were distributed on the wing surfaces and on the wing-body fairing or fillet. Temperature time histories from these installations are presented. In addition, thermocouples were installed on the surface of nonablating plugs located on the fairing. These sensors were more responsive to changes in flight conditions than the foil gages and allowed a derivation of convective heat flux. A heating rate magnification of 2 was found in the vicinity of the wing shock interaction.

Noffz, Gregory K.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Space launch systems - Current United States plans and the next logical steps through 2000

The United States space transportation plans are discussed with emphasis on returning the Titan and the Shuttle to operational status. In particular, Shuttle enhancements via advanced solid rocket boosters and replacement of solid rocket boosters by liquid rocket boosters are examined. The Shuttle-C vehicle is then discussed as the next logical step that could provide a heavy launch capability in the early 1990s. The Shuttle-C will provide assured and flexible access to space for large Centaur-class payloads, for Space Station assembly, and for planetary missions.

Branscome, Darrell R.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Friction Plug Welding of 2195 Al-Cu-Li for Manned Space Launch Vehicles

Friction Plug Welding (FPW) is currently being studied for use on the Space Transportation System's Super Light weight External Tank. This process has demonstrated the potential to solve on of Al-Li 2195's most challenging aspects repair welding. The current weld repair process is successful, but is labor intensive and inconsistent. Technology advances in FPW and tooling designs will be presented. The results of plug welding optimization, production implementation, considerations and cost benefit analysis are discussed. Among the tests to be discussed are tensile, surface crack tension, simulated service, liquid oxygen compatibility results and methods of repairing plug repairs. Tool design, computerized process control equipment and database record retention and analyses may also be addressed.

Takeshita, Riki P.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Effectiveness of Loan Guarantees versus Tax Incentives for Space Launch Ventures

Over the course of the past few years, several new and innovative fully or partiailly reusable launch vehicle designs have been initiated with the objective of reducing the cost of space transportation. These new designs are in various stages hardware development for technology and system demonstrators. The larger vehicles include the Lockheed Martin X-33 technology demonstrator for VentureStar and the Space Access launcher. The smaller launcher ventures include Kelly Space and Technology and Rotary Rocket Company. A common denominator between the new large and small commercial launch systems is the ability to obtain project financing and at an affordable cost. Both are having or will have great difficulty in obtaining financing in the capital markets because of the dollar amounts and the risk involved. The large established companies are pursuing multi-billion dollar developments which are a major challenge to finance because of the size and risk of the projects. The smaller start-up companies require less capital for their smaller systems, however, their lack of corporate financial muscle and launch vehicle track record results in a major challenge to obtain financing also because of high risk. On Wall Street, new launch system financing is a question of market, technical, organizational, legal/regulatory and financial risk. The current limit of acceptable financial risk for Space businesses on Wall Street are the telecommunications and broadcast satellite projects, of which many in number are projected for the future. Tbc recent problems with Iridium market and financial performance are casting a long shadow over new satellite project financing, making it increasingly difficult for the new satellite projects to obtain needed financing.

Scottoline, S.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Space Launch System Update

NASA has a phased approach to ensure our nation's leadership in space exploration, beginning in Earth orbit, developing our skills in lunar space, and extending those skills and technologies to a human mission to Mars. We're currently in Phase 0, using the ISS to better understand living and working in space. You may have heard about our "twin study" with astronauts Scott and Mike Kelly that's giving us valuable information on the effects of microgravity environments on the human body during long stays in LEO. During Phase 1 in the 2020s, SLS will be used to lift the pieces of a "deep space gateway" outpost to lunar orbit. Developing and operating the gateway will get us to Mars in a step-by-step fashion, with lessons learned in each phase of the process informing the next steps. First step of moving humans farther into the solar system is completing and flying SLS and Orion.

Cobb, Sharon↗
NASA NTRS2013

The Space Launch System: NASA's Exploration Rocket

Powerful, versatile, and capable vehicle for entirely new missions to deep space. Vital to NASA's exploration strategy and the Nation's space agenda. Safe, affordable, and sustainable. Engaging the U.S. aerospace workforce and infrastructure. Competitive opportunities for innovations that affordably upgrade performance. Successfully meeting milestones in preparation for Preliminary Design Review in 2013. On course for first flight in 2017.

Blackerby, Christopher↗