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At least 469 records · Page 26

Development of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model for BWR Shutdown Modes 4 and 5 Integrated in SPAR Model

Nuclear plant operating experience and several studies show that the risk from shutdown operation during modes 4, 5, and 6 can be significant This paper describes development of the standard template risk evaluation models for shutdown modes 4, and 5 for commercial boiling water nuclear power plants (BWR). The shutdown probabilistic risk assessment model uses full power Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model as the starting point for development. The shutdown PRA models are integrated with their respective internal events at-power SPAR model. This is accomplished by combining the modified system fault trees from SPAR full power model with shutdown event tree logic. For human reliability analysis (HRA), the SPAR HRA (SPAR-H) method is used which requires the analysts to complete relatively straight forward worksheet, including the performance shaping factors (PSFs). The results are then used to estimate HEP of interest. The preliminary results indicate the risk is dominated by the operator’s ability to diagnose the events and provide long term cooling.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Near-Earth Phase Risk Comparison of Human Mars Campaign Architectures

A risk analysis of the launch, orbital assembly, and Earth-departure phases of human Mars exploration campaign architectures was completed as an extension of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) originally carried out under the NASA Constellation Program Ares V Project. The objective of the updated analysis was to study the sensitivity of loss-of-campaign risk to such architectural factors as composition of the propellant delivery portion of the launch vehicle fleet (Ares V heavy-lift launch vehicle vs. smaller/cheaper commercial launchers) and the degree of launcher or Mars-bound spacecraft element sparing. Both a static PRA analysis and a dynamic, event-based Monte Carlo simulation were developed and used to evaluate the probability of loss of campaign under different sparing options. Results showed that with no sparing, loss-of-campaign risk is strongly driven by launcher count and on-orbit loiter duration, favoring an all-Ares V launch approach. Further, the reliability of the all-Ares V architecture showed significant improvement with the addition of a single spare launcher/payload. Among architectures utilizing a mix of Ares V and commercial launchers, those that minimized the on-orbit loiter duration of Mars-bound elements were found to exceed the reliability of no spare all-Ares V campaign if unlimited commercial vehicle sparing was assumed

Manning, Ted A.↗

Risk-Informed Safety Analysis for Accident Tolerant Fuels

Accident Tolerant Fuels (ATF) are being tested by different nuclear vendors and research organization and their introduction in light water reactors fleet is planned for the second half of the 2020`s. In the framework of the US-DOE Light-Water Reactor Sustainability program, Risk-Informed Safety Analysis pathway (LWRS-RISA), research activities are being conducted at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for developing tools and methods that can help the industry in quantifying the ATF introduction benefits. In this paper we describe the developed risk-informed methodology, the codes improvements and we present some results for selected accidental conditions. The developed methodology combines INL state-of-the-art deterministic Best Estimate tools like RELAP5-3D code, and Probabilistic Risk Analysis tools like RAVEN and SAPHIRE codes. The analyses are performed on a three-loops pressurized water reactor (PWR) simulating accidental conditions like Station Blackout and LB-LOCA and considering near-term ATF (FeCrAl and Chromium-coated clads). Finally, we show, through our methodologies, how the delta-Core Damage Frequency can be assessed.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

SAPHIRE 8 Software Project Plan

This project is being conducted at the request of the DOE and the NRC. The INL has been requested by the NRC to improve and maintain the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluation (SAPHIRE) tool set concurrent with the changing needs of the user community as well as staying current with new technologies. Successful completion will be upon NRC approved release of all software and accompanying documentation in a timely fashion. This project will enhance the SAPHIRE tool set for the user community (NRC, Nuclear Power Plant operations, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) model developers) by providing improved Common Cause Failure (CCF), External Events, Level 2, and Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis capabilities. The SAPHIRE development team at the Idaho National Laboratory is responsible for successful completion of this project. The project is under the supervision of Curtis L. Smith, PhD, Technical Lead for the SAPHIRE application. All current capabilities from SAPHIRE version 7 will be maintained in SAPHIRE 8. The following additional capabilities will be incorporated: • Incorporation of SPAR models for the SDP interface. • Improved quality assurance activities for PRA calculations of SAPHIRE Version 8. • Continue the current activities for code maintenance, documentation, and user support for the code.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Development of Simplified Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model for Seismic Initiating Event

ABSTRACT This paper discusses a simplified method to evaluate seismic risk using a methodology built on dividing the seismic intensity spectrum into multiple discrete bins. The seismic probabilistic risk assessment model uses Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) full power Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model as the starting point for development. The seismic PRA models are integrated with their respective internal events at-power SPAR model. This is accomplished by combining the modified system fault trees from the full power SPAR model with seismic event tree logic. The peak ground acceleration is divided into five bins. The g-value for each bin is estimated using the geometric mean of lower and upper values of that particular bin and the associated frequency for each bin is estimated by taking the difference between upper and lower values of that bin. The component’s fragilities are calculated for each bin using the plant data, if available, or generic values of median peak ground acceleration and uncertainty values for the components. For human reliability analysis (HRA), the SPAR HRA (SPAR-H) method is used which requires the analysts to complete relatively straight forward worksheets that include the performance shaping factors (PSFs). The results are then used to estimate human error probabilities (HEPs) of interest. This work is expected to improve the NRC’s ability to include seismic hazards in risk assessments for operational events in support of the reactor oversight program (e.g., significance determination process).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Integrated Geologic Storage Prefeasibility Study Proximal to Dry Fork Power Station, Powder River Basin, Wyoming

The pre-feasibility study—funded by the Department of Energy CarbonSAFE program (DE-FE0029375)—is centred around Basin Electric’s Dry Fork Station (DFS) in Wyoming’s Powder River Basin. Dry Fork Station, completed in 2011, is a high efficient coal-fired power plant that emits 3.3 million tons of CO2 per annum. The DFS site also host’s the Wyoming Integrated Test Center (ITC) funded by a $15 million investment by the State of Wyoming. The ITC is a public-private partnership test bed for CCS technologies. Geologic storage sites are in immediate vicinity of the DFS providing significant opportunities for co-located source and saline storage. The Powder River Basin (PRB) of Wyoming and Montana, was identified by NETL (2010) as having a “high potential” for commercial-scale carbon sequestration. The basin contains as much as 17,000 feet of sedimentary rock and covers an area of approximately 24,000 square miles. The PRB has a long history of hydrocarbon production and remaining undiscovered reserves. Accumulations and production of hydrocarbons in the basin indicate the presence of reservoir formations with significant pore volumes and impermeable sealing formations. This attribute alone suggests the reservoir and seal characteristics of the formations provide significant opportunities for CO₂ storage in saline reservoirs. Four high quality potential reservoir and sealing complexes have been identified for geologic storage. These formations range in depth from 6,500-9,500 feet underneath DFS including: (1) the Pennsylvanian Minnelusa Formation reservoir and Permian Goose Egg Formation (Opeche Shale) seal; (2) the Jurassic Hulett and Canyon Springs Sandstones of the Sundance Formation sealed by the Late Jurassic Upper Sundance Member and Morrison Formation and (3) the Early Cretaceous Lakota and Dakota, and Muddy Formation reservoirs sealed by the Mowry Shale. The preliminary reservoir characterization results integrate data from petrophysical well logs, core measurements, faults/fractures analysis, artificial penetrations, and published literature to evaluate geologic storage capacity and potential risk, for the Powder River Basin. These reservoir and seal combinations reside within ideal depth constraints and show suitable reservoir and seal characteristics conducive to commercial-scale storage. Specifically, this paper presents 1) high level description of the geologic storage complex 2) a first order risk analysis associated with pre-existing oil and gas wells, and 3) preliminary storage capacity and Area of Review estimates.

Quillinan, Scott↗

Treatment of uncertainties for security-related design aspects of advanced reactors when using a risk-informed licensing approach

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The disCO2ver Platform: Curating Data and Tools for Geologic Carbon Sequestration and Deep Subsurface Research Systems

The U.S. DOE National Energy Technology Laboratory has invested 12+ years of development into the data repository and digital laboratory, the Energy Data eXchange (EDX, edx.netl.doe.gov). Supporting a variety of research areas across the DOE Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, the platform has successfully curated and preserved thousands of data products from DOE research. The Carbon Storage Program has successfully supported data curation, upload, and publishing of data products on EDX for many years, demonstrating a success story of how resources like EDX can effectively help with long term preservation and publishing of DOE data products. EDX continues to shift towards cloud-supported infrastructure, taking a hybrid approach combining on-premises compute and storage integrated with cloud-hosted services. The integration of cloud compute and hybrid architecture enables the development of EDX-hosted platforms that tailor the data and tools hosted on them to a specific community, enables implementation of machine learning tools for data discovery and filtering, and enables the hosting of virtual (online user interface) tools. Geologic carbon sequestration (GCS) research continues to scale up in response to the current administration goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and transition the energy economy. Over the last year, EDX’s disCO2ver platform has been developed in response to the need for access to data products and tools to support the scaling up of GCS research. disCO2ver provides access to data resources and tools, produced by DOE and outside authoritative external resources. The platform also provides a user-access control component for the virtualization and cloud hosting of tools. Tools that need to be virtualized, to eliminate the need for users to download the tool and use local compute resources, is essential to supporting big-data analysis and machine learning that is becoming common place in carbon storage modeling, risk analysis, and data publishing practices. This talk will review the EDX’s disCO2ver platform and the current work ongoing to curate data and tools to support GCS and deep subsurface systems research.

Morkner, Paige↗

Cost/benefit analysis of advanced materials technology candidates for the 1980's, part 2

Cost/benefit analyses to evaluate advanced material technologies projects considered for general aviation and turboprop commuter aircraft through estimated life-cycle costs, direct operating costs, and development costs are discussed. Specifically addressed is the selection of technologies to be evaluated; development of property goals; assessment of candidate technologies on typical engines and aircraft; sensitivity analysis of the changes in property goals on performance and economics, cost, and risk analysis for each technology; and ranking of each technology by relative value. The cost/benefit analysis was applied to a domestic, nonrevenue producing, business-type jet aircraft configured with two TFE731-3 turbofan engines, and to a domestic, nonrevenue producing, business type turboprop aircraft configured with two TPE331-10 turboprop engines. In addition, a cost/benefit analysis was applied to a commercial turboprop aircraft configured with a growth version of the TPE331-10.

Dennis, R. E.↗

Risk-Based Comparison of Carbon Capture Technologies

In this paper, we describe an integrated probabilistic risk assessment methodological framework and a decision-support tool suite for implementing systematic comparisons of competing carbon capture technologies. Culminating from a collaborative effort among national laboratories under the Carbon Capture Simulation Initiative (CCSI), the risk assessment framework and the decision-support tool suite encapsulate three interconnected probabilistic modeling and simulation components. The technology readiness level (TRL) assessment component identifies specific scientific and engineering targets required by each readiness level and applies probabilistic estimation techniques to calculate the likelihood of graded as well as nonlinear advancement in technology maturity. The technical risk assessment component focuses on identifying and quantifying risk contributors, especially stochastic distributions for significant risk contributors, performing scenario-based risk analysis, and integrating with carbon capture process model simulations and optimization. The financial risk component estimates the long-term return on investment based on energy retail pricing, production cost, operating and power replacement cost, plan construction and retrofit expenses, and potential tax relief, expressed probabilistically as the net present value distributions over various forecast horizons.

Engel, David W.↗

Initial Probabilistic Evaluation of Reactor Pressure Vessel Fracture with Grizzly and Raven

The Grizzly code is being developed with the goal of creating a general tool that can be applied to study a variety of degradation mechanisms in nuclear power plant components. The first application of Grizzly has been to study fracture in embrittled reactor pressure vessels (RPVs). Grizzly can be used to model the thermal/mechanical response of an RPV under transient conditions that would be observed in a pressurized thermal shock (PTS) scenario. The global response of the vessel provides boundary conditions for local models of the material in the vicinity of a flaw. Fracture domain integrals are computed to obtain stress intensity factors, which can in turn be used to assess whether a fracture would initiate at a pre-existing flaw. These capabilities have been demonstrated previously. A typical RPV is likely to contain a large population of pre-existing flaws introduced during the manufacturing process. This flaw population is characterized stastistically through probability density functions of the flaw distributions. The use of probabilistic techniques is necessary to assess the likelihood of crack initiation during a transient event. This report documents initial work to perform probabilistic analysis of RPV fracture during a PTS event using a combination of the RAVEN risk analysis code and Grizzly. This work is limited in scope, considering only a single flaw with deterministic geometry, but with uncertainty introduced in the parameters that influence fracture toughness. These results are benchmarked against equivalent models run in the FAVOR code. When fully developed, the RAVEN/Grizzly methodology for modeling probabilistic fracture in RPVs will provide a general capability that can be used to consider a wider variety of vessel and flaw conditions that are difficult to consider with current tools. In addition, this will provide access to advanced probabilistic techniques provided by RAVEN, including adaptive sampling and parallelism, which can dramatically decrease run times.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Physical Security Timeline Analysis in Support of Advanced Reactor Demonstration and Deployment

This report presents the regulatory requirements and directions on the physical security of advanced nuclear reactors in USA. Presently, a rule is being proposed that allows for a performance-based analysis. In determining the physical security requirements for an advanced reactor, new tools may be desired to conduct a performance-based analysis. These tools should incorporate dynamic analysis methods to provide as much realism as possible. In comparison, the security requirements for existing light water reactors (LWRs) are much more prescriptive and the analysis conducted to establish the required physical security strategies were more easily performed with static analysis. In order to achieve the cost goals that advanced reactors require for adoption; the nuclear security force required should not be excessive. Dynamic physical security analysis methods and tools have been developed by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. This report details how the dynamic risk analysis tools developed in the LWRS program using the dynamic risk modelling tool, EMRALD, may be adapted for use in analyzing the physical security designs for advanced reactors accounting for variable performance-based requirements. This report provides an example analysis of a hypothetical SFR using publicly available information and generic assumptions to demonstrate the methods and potential presentation and analysis of the results. No actual plant information is used in this example analysis. Future work in this area will create additional models that can be adapted for any advanced reactor concept and use various security features to create a physical security system that provides adequate protection from radiological theft and sabotage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Concurrent Cisplatin and Radiation Versus Cetuximab and Radiation for Locally Advanced Head-and-Neck Cancer

Purpose: To compare concurrent cisplatin (CDDP) and radiation (RT) with cetuximab (C225) and RT for locally advanced head-and-neck cancer (LAHNC). Methods and Materials: This study retrospectively compared 174 consecutive, newly diagnosed LAHNC patients definitively treated from March 1, 2006, to April 1, 2008, with single-agent CDDP/RT (n = 125) or C225/RT (n = 49). We excluded patients who received additional concurrent, induction, or adjuvant systemic therapy; weekly cisplatin; prior head-and-neck radiotherapy; or primary surgical resection. Outcomes were analyzed by the Kaplan-Meier method, Cox model, and competing-risks analysis tools. Results: The C225/RT patients were older and had decreased creatinine clearance. At a median follow-up of 22.5 months for living patients, the 2-year locoregional failure rate was 5.7% for CDDP/RT and 39.9% for C225/RT (p < 0.0001). The 2-year failure-free survival (FFS) and overall survival (OS) rates were 87.4% vs. 44.5% (p < 0.0001) and 92.8% vs. 66.6% (p = 0.0003), respectively, in favor of CDDP/RT. When the Cox proportional hazards model was used for multivariate analysis, treatment with CDDP/RT predicted for improved locoregional control (p < 0.0001), FFS (p < 0.0001), and OS (p = 0.01). Late Grade 3 or 4 toxicity or feeding tube dependence 9 months after completion of RT was observed in 21% of patients in the CDDP/RT cohort and 24% in the C225/RT cohort (p = 0.66). Conclusions: In this study of LAHNC patients, CDDP/RT achieved better locoregional control, FFS, and OS than C225/RT. Although the results were upheld on multivariate analysis, they must be interpreted cautiously because of the retrospective nature of the study and significant differences in patient selection. There was no statistically significant difference in late Grade 3 or 4 effects or feeding tube dependence.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Design and development of a space station hazardous material system for assessing chemical compatibility

As the Space Station nears reality in funding support from Congress, NASA plans to perform over a hundred different missions in the coming decade. Incrementally deployed, the Space Station will evolve into modules linked to an integral structure. Each module will have characteristic functions, such as logistics, habitation, and materials processing. Because the Space Station is to be user friendly for experimenters, NASA is anticipating that a variety of different chemicals will be taken on-board. Accidental release of these potentially toxic chemicals and their chemical compatibility is the focus of this discourse. The Microgravity Manufacturing Processing Facility (MMPF) will contain the various facilities within the U.S. Laboratory (USL). Each facility will have a characteristic purpose, such as alloy solidification or vapor crystal growth. By examining the proposed experiments for each facility, identifying the chemical constituents, their physical state and/or changes, byproducts and effluents, those payloads can be identified which may contain toxic, explosive, or reactive compounds that require processing or containment in mission peculiar waste management systems. Synergistic reactions from mixed effluent streams is of major concern. Each experiment will have it own data file, complete with schematic, chemical listing, physical data, etc. Chemical compatibility information from various databases will provide assistance in the analysis of alternate disposal techniques (pretreatment, separate storage, etc.). Along with data from the Risk Analysis of the Proposed USL Waste Management System, accidental release of potentially toxic and catastrophic chemicals would be eliminated or reduced.

Congo, Richard T.↗

Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge

This viewgraph presentation reviews Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge. The Wing Leading Edge Impact Detection System (WLE IDS) and the Impact Analysis Process are also described to monitor WLE debris threats. The contents include: 1) Risk Management via SHM; 2) Hardware Overview; 3) Instrumentation; 4) Sensor Configuration; 5) Debris Hazard Monitoring; 6) Ascent Response Summary; 7) Response Signal; 8) Distribution of Flight Indications; 9) Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA); 10) Model Correlation; 11) Impact Tests; 12) Wing Leading Edge Modeling; 13) Ascent Debris PRA Results; and 14) MM/OD PRA Results.

Yap, Keng C.↗

RAVEN User Manual

RAVEN is a generic software framework to perform parametric and probabilistic analysis based on the response of complex system codes. The initial development was aimed to provide dynamic risk analysis capabilities to the Thermo-Hydraulic code RELAP-7, currently under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Although the initial goal has been fully accomplished, RAVEN is now a multi-purpose probabilistic and uncertainty quantification platform, capable to agnostically communicate with any system code. This agnosticism includes providing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). These APIs are used to allow RAVEN to interact with any code as long as all the parameters that need to be perturbed are accessible by inputs files or via python interfaces. RAVEN is capable of investigating the system response, and investigating the input space using Monte Carlo, Grid, or Latin Hyper Cube sampling schemes, but its strength is focused toward system feature discovery, such as limit surfaces, separating regions of the input space leading to system failure, using dynamic supervised learning techniques. The development of RAVEN has started in 2012, when, within the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the need to provide a modern risk evaluation framework became stronger. RAVEN principal assignment is to provide the necessary software and algorithms in order to employ the concept developed by the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) program. RISMC is one of the pathways defined within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. In the RISMC approach, the goal is not just the individuation of the frequency of an event potentially leading to a system failure, but the closeness (or not) to key safety-related events. Hence, the approach is interested in identifying and increasing the safety margins related to those events. A safety margin is a numerical value quantifying the probability that a safety metric (e.g. for an important process such as peak pressure in a pipe) is exceeded under certain conditions. The initial development of RAVEN has been focused on providing dynamic risk assessment capability to RELAP-7, currently under development at the INL and, likely, future replacement of the RELAP5-3D code. Most the capabilities that have been implemented having RELAP-7 as principal focus are easily deployable for other system codes. For this reason, several side activaties are currently ongoing for coupling RAVEN with software such as RELAP5-3D, etc. The aim of this document is the explanation of the input requirements, focalizing on the input structure.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

On the Importance of Accounting for Competing Risks in Pediatric Cancer Trials Designed to Delay or Avoid Radiotherapy: I. Basic Concepts and First Analyses

Purpose: In trials designed to delay or avoid irradiation among children with malignant brain tumor, although irradiation after disease progression is an important event, patients who have disease progression may decline radiotherapy (RT), or those without disease progression may opt for elective RT. To accurately describe the cumulative need for RT in such instances, it is crucial to account for these distinct events and to evaluate how each contributes to the delay or advancement of irradiation via a competing risks analysis. Methods and Materials: We describe the summary of competing events in such trials using competing risks methods based on cumulative incidence functions and Gray's test. The results obtained are contrasted with standard survival methods based on Kaplan-Meier curves, cause-specific hazard functions and log-rank test. Results: The Kaplan-Meier method overestimates all event-specific rates. The cause-specific hazard analysis showed reduction in hazards for all events (A: RT after progression; B: no RT after progression; C: elective RT) among children with ependymoma. For event A, a higher cumulative incidence was reported for ependymoma. Although Gray's test failed to detect any difference (p = 0.331) between histologic subtypes, the log-rank test suggested marginal evidence (p = 0.057). Similarly, for event C, the log-rank test found stronger evidence of reduction in hazard among those with ependymoma (p = 0.005) as compared with Gray's test (p = 0.086). Conclusions: To evaluate treatment differences, failing to account for competing risks using appropriate methodology may lead to incorrect interpretations.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

RAVEN Theory Manual

RAVEN is a software framework able to perform parametric and stochastic analysis based on the response of complex system codes. The initial development was aimed at providing dynamic risk analysis capabilities to the thermohydraulic code RELAP-7, currently under development at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Although the initial goal has been fully accomplished, RAVEN is now a multi-purpose stochastic and uncertainty quantification platform, capable of communicating with any system code. In fact, the provided Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) allow RAVEN to interact with any code as long as all the parameters that need to be perturbed are accessible by input files or via python interfaces. RAVEN is capable of investigating system response and explore input space using various sampling schemes such as Monte Carlo, grid, or Latin hypercube. However, RAVEN strength lies in its system feature discovery capabilities such as: constructing limit surfaces, separating regions of the input space leading to system failure, and using dynamic supervised learning techniques. The development of RAVEN started in 2012 when, within the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the need to provide a modern risk evaluation framework arose. RAVEN’s principal assignment is to provide the necessary software and algorithms in order to employ the concepts developed by the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) program. RISMC is one of the pathways defined within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. In the RISMC approach, the goal is not just to identify the frequency of an event potentially leading to a system failure, but the proximity (or lack thereof) to key safety-related events. Hence, the approach is interested in identifying and increasing the safety margins related to those events. A safety margin is a numerical value quantifying the probability that a safety metric (e.g. peak pressure in a pipe) is exceeded under certain conditions. Most of the capabilities, implemented having RELAP-7 as a principal focus, are easily deployable to other system codes. For this reason, several side activates have been employed (e.g. RELAP5-3D, any MOOSE-based App, etc.) or are currently ongoing for coupling RAVEN with several different software. The aim of this document is to provide a set of commented examples that can help the user to become familiar with the RAVEN code usage.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗