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AGR-3/4 Final Data Qualification Report for ATR Cycles 151A through 155B-1

This report provides the qualification status of experimental data for the entire Advanced Gas Reactor 3/4 (AGR 3/4) fuel irradiation. AGR-3/4 is the third in a series of planned irradiation experiments conducted in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the AGR Fuel Development and Qualification Program, which supports development of the advanced reactor technology under the INL ART Technology Development Office (TDO). The main objective of AGR-3/4 irradiation is to provide a known source of fission products for subsequent transport through compact matrix and structural graphite materials due to the presence of designed-to-fail fuel particles. Full power irradiation of the AGR 3/4 test began on December 14, 2011 (ATR Cycle 151A), and was completed on April 12, 2014 (end of ATR Cycle 155B) after 369.1 effective full power days of irradiation. The AGR-3/4 test was in the reactor core for eight of the ten ATR cycles between 151A and 155B. During the unplanned outage cycle, 153A, the experiment was removed from the ATR northeast flux trap (NEFT) location and stored in the ATR canal. This was to prevent overheating of fuel compacts due to higher than normal ATR power during the subsequent Powered Axial Locator Mechanism cycle, 153B. The AGR 3/4 test was inserted back into the ATR NEFT location during the outage of ATR Cycle 154A on April 26, 2013. Therefore, the AGR-3/4 irradiation data received during these 2 cycles (153A and 153B) are irrelevant and their qualification status isnot included in this report. Additionally, during ATR Cycle 152A the ATR core ran at low power for a short enough duration that the irradiation data are not used for physics and thermal calculations. However, the qualification status of irradiation data for this cycle is still covered in this report. As a result, this report includes data from 8 ATR Cycles: 151A, 151B, 152A, 152B, 154A, 154B, 155A, and 155B, as recorded in the Nuclear Data Management and Analysis System (NDMAS). The AGR 3/4 data streams addressed in this report include thermocouple (TC) temperatures, sweep gas data (flow rates, pressure, and moisture content), and Fission Product Monitoring System (FPMS) data (release rates, release to birth rate ratios [R/Bs], and particle failure counts) for each of the twelve capsules in the AGR 3/4 experiment. During Outage Cycle 155A, fourteen flow meters were installed downstream from fourteen FPMS monitors to measure flows from the monitors; qualification status of these data are also included in the report. The final data qualification status for these data streams is determined by a Data Review Committee (DRC) composed of AGR technical leads, Sitewide Quality Assurance (QA), and NDMAS analysts. For ATR Cycles 151A through 154B, the DRC convened on February 12, 2014, reviewed the data acquisition process, and considered whether the data met the requirements for data collection as specified in QA approved INL ART TDO data collection plans. The DRC also examined the results of NDMAS data testing and statistical analyses, and confirmed the qualification status of the data as given in this report. The qualification status of AGR-3/4 irradiation data during the first six cycles were previously reported in INL/EXT-14-31186 document. This report presents data qualification status for the entire AGR-3/4 irradiation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

IEA Bioenergy Countries' Report: Bioenergy policies and status of implementation

This report was prepared from IEA statistical data, information from IRENA, and IEA Bioenergy Tasks’ country reports, combined with data provided by the IEA Bioenergy Executive Committee. All individual country reports were reviewed by the national delegates to the IEA Bioenergy Executive Committee, who have approved the content. In the first section of each country report, national renewable energy targets are presented (first table in each country report), and the main pieces of national legislation are discussed. In the second section of each country report the total primary energy supply (TPES) by resources and the contribution of bioenergy are presented. All data is taken from IEA statistics for the year 2014. Where 2014 data was not available, 2013 data was used. It is worth noting that data reported in national statistics can differ from the IEA data presented, as the reporting categories and definitions are different. In the third section of each country report, the research focus related to bioenergy is discussed. Relevant funding programs, major research institutes and projects are described. In the fourth section, recent major bioenergy developments are described. Finally, in the fifth section, links to sources of information are provided.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

2015 Wind Technologies Market Report

Annual wind power capacity additions in the United States surged in 2015 and are projected to continue at a rapid clip in the coming five years. Recent and projected near-term growth is supported by the industry’s primary federal incentive—the production tax credit (PTC)—having been extended for several years (though with a phase-down schedule, described further on pages 68-69), as well as a myriad of state-level policies. Wind additions are also being driven by improvements in the cost and performance of wind power technologies, yielding low power sales prices for utility, corporate, and other purchasers. At the same time, the prospects for growth beyond the current PTC cycle remain uncertain: growth could be blunted by declining federal tax support, expectations for low natural gas prices, and modest electricity demand growth. This annual report—now in its tenth year—provides a detailed overview of developments and trends in the U.S. wind power market, with a particular focus on 2015. The report begins with an overview of key installation-related trends: trends in U.S. wind power capacity growth; how that growth compares to other countries and generation sources; the amount and percentage of wind energy in individual states; the status of offshore wind power development; and the quantity of proposed wind power capacity in various interconnection queues in the United States. Next, the report covers an array of wind power industry trends: developments in turbine manufacturer market share; manufacturing and supply-chain developments; wind turbine and component imports into and exports from the United States; project financing developments; and trends among wind power project owners and power purchasers. The report then turns to a summary of wind turbine technology trends: turbine size, hub height, rotor diameter, specific power, and IEC Class. After that, the report discusses wind power performance, cost, and pricing trends. In so doing, it describes trends in project performance, wind turbine transaction prices, installed project costs, and operations and maintenance (O&M) expenses. It also reviews the prices paid for wind power in the United States and how those prices compare to short-term wholesale electricity prices and forecasts of future natural gas prices. Next, the report examines policy and market factors impacting the domestic wind power market, including federal and state policy drivers as well as transmission and grid integration issues. The report concludes with a preview of possible near-term market developments. This edition of the annual report updates data presented in previous editions while highlighting key trends and important new developments from 2015. The report concentrates on larger, utility-scale wind turbines, defined here as individual turbines that exceed 100 kW in size.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Moisture Monitoring at Area G, Technical Area 54, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2016 Status Report

Hydrological characterization and moisture monitoring activities provide data required for evaluating the transport of subsurface contaminants in the unsaturated and saturated zones beneath Area G, and for the Area G Performance Assessment and Composite Analysis. These activities have been ongoing at Area G, Technical Area 54 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory since waste disposal operations began in 1957. This report summarizes the hydrological characterization and moisture monitoring activities conducted at Area G. It includes moisture monitoring data collected from 1986 through 2016 from numerous boreholes and access tubes with neutron moisture meters, as well as data collected by automated dataloggers for water content measurement sensors installed in a waste disposal pit cover, and buried beneath the floor of a waste disposal pit. This report is an update of a nearly identical report by Levitt et al., (2015) that summarized data collected through early 2015; this report includes additional moisture monitoring data collected at Pit 31 and the Pit 38 extension through December, 2016. It also includes information from the Jennings and French (2009) moisture monitoring report and includes all data from Jennings and French (2009) and the Draft 2010 Addendum moisture monitoring report (Jennings and French, 2010). For the 2015 version of this report, all neutron logging data, including neutron probe calibrations, were investigated for quality and pedigree. Some data were recalculated using more defensible calibration data. Therefore, some water content profiles are different from those in the Jennings and French (2009) report. All of that information is repeated in this report for completeness. Monitoring and characterization data generally indicate that some areas of the Area G vadose zone are consistent with undisturbed conditions, with water contents of less than five percent by volume in the top two layers of the Bandelier tuff at Area G. These data also indicate that other areas of the vadose zone are affected by waste disposal activities that have been ongoing at Area G since 1957, a period of nearly 60 years. In some areas, water content profiles indicate increases in water content to depths of tens of meters, especially in areas covered by asphalt and structures.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Oak Ridge Reservation: Annual Site Environmental Report for 2015

The Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site Environmental Report is prepared annually and presents summary environmental data to (1) characterize environmental performance, (2) summarize environmental occurrences reported during the year, (3) confirm compliance with environmental standards and requirements, and (4) highlight significant program activities. The report fulfills the requirement contained in DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting (DOE 2004) that an integrated annual site environmental report be prepared. The results summarized in this report are based on data collected prior to and through 2015. This report is not intended to nor does it present the results of all environmental monitoring associated with the ORR. Data collected for other site and regulatory purposes, such as environmental restoration/remedial investigation reports, waste management characterization sampling data, and environmental permit compliance data, are presented in other documents that have been prepared in accordance with applicable DOE guidance and/or laws and are referenced herein as appropriate. Environmental monitoring on the ORR consists primarily of two major activities: effluent monitoring and environmental surveillance. Effluent monitoring involves the collection and analysis of samples or measurements of liquid and gaseous effluents at the points of release to the environment; these measurements allow the quantification and official reporting of contaminant levels, assessment of radiation and chemical exposures to the public, and demonstration of compliance with applicable standards and permit requirements. Environmental surveillance consists of direct measurements and collection and analysis of samples taken from the site and its environs exclusive of effluents; these activities provide information on contaminant concentrations in air, water, groundwater, soil, foods, biota, and other media. Environmental surveillance data support determinations regarding environmental compliance and, when combined with data from effluent monitoring, support chemical and radiation dose and exposure assessments of the potential effects of ORR operations, if any, on the local environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Environmental Report 2016

The purposes of the Environmental Report 2016 are to record LLNL’s compliance with environmental standards and requirements, describe LLNL’s environmental protection and remediation programs, and present the results of environmental monitoring. Specifically, the report discusses LLNL’s EMS; describes significant accomplishments in pollution prevention; presents the results of air, water, vegetation, and foodstuff monitoring; reports radiological doses from LLNL operations; summarizes LLNL’s activities involving special status wildlife, plants, and habitats; and describes the progress LLNL has made in remediating groundwater contamination. Environmental monitoring at LLNL, including analysis of samples and data, is conducted according to documented standard operating procedures. Duplicate samples are collected and analytical results are reviewed and compared to internal acceptance standards. This report is prepared for DOE by LLNL’s Environmental Functional Area (EFA). Submittal of the report satisfies requirements under DOE Order 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting,” and DOE Order 458.1, “Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment.” The report is distributed in electronic form and is available to the public at https://saer.llnl.gov/, the website for the LLNL annual environmental report. Previous LLNL annual environmental reports beginning with 1994 are also on the website.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Final Report on CFD and Thermal-Mechanical Stress Analysis of PWR Surge Line under Transient Condition Thermal Stratification and an Evolutionary Cyclic Plasticity Based Transformative Fatigue Evaluation Approach without Using S~N Curve: Rev. 1

This report presents an evolutionary cyclic plasticity based transformative approach for fatigue evaluation of safety critical components. This approach is generic which can be used not only for the present generation light water reactor components (which is our focus) but also for advanced reactor components. The approach is based on the fundamental concept of time-evolution of progressive fatigue damage rather than the end-of-life data based conventional S~N curve approaches. Series of fatigue tests on 316 stainless steel uniaxial specimens were conducted under strain-controlled and stress-controlled cyclic loading in two different environment such as in-air at 300 °C and PWR coolant water condition at 300 °C. Material models are developed to capture the uniaxial test data and are subsequently programmed into commercially available ABAQUS code to transform the uniaxial material behavior to multiaxial loading domain. The developed evolutionary cyclic-plasticity approach is verified by both analytical and 3D-FE modeling of uniaxial fatigue test specimens. Results show that the developed material models can capture the time-dependence of material hardening and softening with great accuracy. In addition, results show that the material models not only can capture the material behavior under constant amplitude loading but also can capture the load-sequence effect under variable and random amplitude loading. The ANL developed approach is one of its kind, which shows first in the fatigue research community that fatigue evaluation of a component (in our case verified for laboratory scale fatigue test specimens with great accuracy) can be performed for its entire fatigue life, including the hardening and softening behavior, without using a conventional S~N curve based approach. Additionally results are presented related to fatigue evaluation of real reactor components such as of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) surge line (SL), under upset transient conditions. SLs of PWR experience complex thermal stratification due to the mixing of differential temperature flow from hot leg and pressurizer. A detailed parametric study of thermal stratification in SL is performed through both standalone computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis and fluid-structure-interaction based coupled CFD and heat transfer analysis. Results show that the mass flow rate in SL substantially affects the extent of its thermal stratification. The resulting thermal boundaries conditioned are used as inputs for thermal-mechanical stress analysis and component level fatigue evaluation. Fatigue evaluation of SL pipe under example loading conditions was performed using the above-mentioned evolutionary-plasticity based approach and ASME code (for in-air life) and NUREG-6909 (for PWR environment life) based approaches. Results show that the evolutionary plasticity based approach estimate substantially different life compared to the conventional ASME based approach. To show the entirety of the proposed evolutionary fatigue-modeling framework, this report includes the results presented in semi-annual March report (ANL/LWRS-17/01). Sections 2-5 of March report are directly included as Sections 2-5 in this report, without any significant changes. However, Sections 6-9 of this report present the work performed during March-September of 2017. Whereas, Sections 1 and 10 present the organization of this report and the summary and future work, respectively. This report (ANL/LWRS-17/03 Rev. 1) is a slightly revised version of the earlier published report (ANL/LWRS-17/03). In this revised version, some of the results and associated discussion have been corrected/updated.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

2018 Annual Site Environmental Report

Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (the Laboratory’s) annual site environmental reports are prepared annually by the Laboratory’s environmental organizations, as required by U.S. Department of Energy Order 231.1B, Administrative Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting, and Order 458.1, Administrative Change 3, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment. The following chapters in this report discuss our success in complying with environmental laws, regulations, and orders (Chapter 2, Compliance Summary); how we manage the Laboratory’s environmental performance (Chapter 3, Environmental Programs); how we monitor for air emissions of radioactive materials and climate conditions (Chapter 4, Air Quality); how we monitor for effects of Laboratory operations on groundwater quality (Chapter 5, Groundwater Monitoring); how we monitor the movement of chemicals and radionuclides by storm water runoff and the levels of chemicals and radionuclides in deposited sediment (Chapter 6, Watershed Quality); how we monitor for the presence, levels, and effects of chemicals and radionuclides in plants, animals, soil, and vegetation (Chapter 7, Ecosystem Health); and finally, what radionuclide dose or risk from chemical exposure members of the public may experience as a result of Laboratory operations (Chapter 8, Public Dose and Risk Assessment). This report follows plain language guidelines, as required for federal agencies by the Plain Language Act of 2010. More information about plain language can be found at http://www.plainlanguage.gov/index.cfm. You will notice we have substantially reduced the use of acronyms and abbreviations and are using active voice and personal pronouns. We hope you find this report useful. If you have suggestions for improving this report, additional questions, or want a copy of this report, please contact us at envoutreach@lanl.gov, or call the Communications Office at 505-665-7000. This report, its supplemental tables, and the 2018 Annual Site Environmental Report Summary are available at http://www.lanl.gov/environment/environmental-report.php. Note: This document has been revised since it was initially published on September 23, 2019. The revisions included corrections to figure and table references, changes in heading levels, adding blank pages where appropriate, and changes of an editorial nature.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

2019 LANL Radionuclide Air Emissions Report

In June 2020, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) submitted letter ESHQSS: 20-025 to Region 6 of the Unites States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This letter transmitted the 2019 LANL Radionuclide Air Emissions Report to the EPA. This report summarizes LANL operations, air emissions of radionuclides, and subsequent off-site dose consequence from these emissions for calendar year 2019. This report is issued to meet requirements of 40 CFR 61 Subpart H, National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities. This regulation, called the Radionuclide NESHAP, establishes a limit of 10 millirem per year to the maximally exposed member of the public and requires an annual report to be submitted to the appropriate EPA Region by June 30th of each year. LANL’s off-site dose from airborne emissions of radionuclides in 2019 was 0.43 millirem. The normal practice is to issue this report directly to EPA Region 6 in June of each year, and then after the report is accepted by the EPA, re-issue the report for inclusion in the LANL Electronic Public Reading Room (EPRR). This second part is usually done in July of each year, but this step was overlooked in July 2020 due to other commitments. We regret this error. This omission was noted in late 2020; we are submitting the 2019 LANL Radionuclide Air Emissions Report to the EPRR now in December 2020. Aside from the addition of this cover sheet explaining the delay, the report is unchanged from the version submitted to EPA Region 6 in June.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Annual Site Environment Report for Calendar Year 2023 - Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

This report provides the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the public with information on the level of radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants (if any) that are added to the environment as a result of Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory’s (PPPL) operations. This report fulfills the annual public reporting requirements of DOE Order 231.1B. The results of PPPL’s 2023 environmental surveillance and monitoring program are presented and discussed. The report also summarizes environmental initiatives, assessments, and community involvement programs that were undertaken in 2023. This report provides the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the public with information on the level of radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants (if any) that are added to the environment as a result of Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory’s (PPPL) operations. This report fulfills the annual public reporting requirements of DOE Order 231.1B. The results of PPPL’s 2023 environmental surveillance and monitoring program are presented and discussed. The report also summarizes environmental initiatives, assessments, and community involvement programs that were undertaken in 2023. In 2023, PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program measured tritium in the air at onsite sampling stations. Using highly sensitive air monitors, PPPL is capable of detecting small changes in the ambient levels of tritium. The operation of monitors located on D-site is used to demonstrate compliance with the National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) regulations. Also included in PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program, are water monitoring – ground, surface, and waste waters. PPPL’s radiological monitoring program characterized the background levels of tritium in the environment and those data are presented in this report. Ground water monitoring continued under New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s (NJDEP) Site Remediation Program regulations. PPPL monitored for non-radiological contaminants, mainly volatile organic compounds (components of common degreasing solvents). In 2023, PPPL complied with permit limits for surface water and sanitary wastewater discharges. PPPL was honored with an award for EPEAT-certified electronics purchasing from the Global Electronics Council on July 27, 2023.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

NASA's New Technology Reporting System: A Review and Future Prospects

This report represents a systematic effort to describe how NASA's new technology reporting system operates today, and how that system might be enhanced. Although the system has run for more than two decades, it is not well documented in terms of organization, operational practices, or other program benchmarks. The study seeks to identify and assess incentives or disincentives to reporting, program management, program follow through, and the feasibility of various means for improving the general process. Initially, it was hoped that the study team might uncover the kind of information that would permit the determination of some 'average' sequence of events (or a time line) from the point of identifying a solution to technical 'need' to the point where its solution was actually reported to NASA. Information regarding this objective proved to be too elusive, primarily because early probes revealed that con- tractor awareness of the new technology requirements generally was too poor to provide useful information. The report that follows is based primarily upon documents furnished by NASA Headquarters, by Field Center technology utilization officers, and interviews with persons knowledgeable about the system. Visits were made to seven Field Centers: Ames Research Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Johnson Space Center, Langley Research Center, Lewis Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center. Other documents were furnished by officials of major aerospace corporations. Detailed interviews were conducted with Field Center technology utilization officials, project engineers or scientists, patent counsels, and other Field Center officials who had knowledge about the new technology reporting system. Interviews also were conducted with knowledgeable officials from a number of the primary aerospace companies. Numeric data was obtained from regular NASA reports, from original sources such as, NASA Tech Briefs, or from contractor reports. I am indebted to dozens of persons in both NASA and industry who took time to assist in the data collection by being interviewed, and through answering follow up questions on the telephone. Individuals interviewed and their affiliations are shown in Appendix A. I am most grateful to them for their kind assistance. A note of thanks is due to the other members of the DRI study team: Jody Briles, Kathy Hirst, and Joel Johnson. The responsibility for this report, its accuracy, and the nature of the observations and conclusions rest solely with the author. Text or citations in the numbered footnotes are to be found at the end of each chapter.

Chapman, Richard L.↗

Aviation Safety Reporting System: Process and Procedures

The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was established in 1976 under an agreement between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). This cooperative safety program invites pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, and others to voluntarily report to NASA any aviation incident or safety hazard. The FAA provides most of the program funding. NASA administers the program, sets its policies in consultation with the FAA and aviation community, and receives the reports submitted to the program. The FAA offers those who use the ASRS program two important reporting guarantees: confidentiality and limited immunity. Reports sent to ASRS are held in strict confidence. More than 350,000 reports have been submitted since the program's beginning without a single reporter's identity being revealed. ASRS removes all personal names and other potentially identifying information before entering reports into its database. This system is a very successful, proof-of-concept for gathering safety data in order to provide timely information about safety issues. The ASRS information is crucial to aviation safety efforts both nationally and internationally. It can be utilized as the first step in safety by providing the direction and content to informed policies, procedures, and research, especially human factors. The ASRS process and procedures will be presented as one model of safety reporting feedback systems.

Connell, Linda J.↗

TOPEX Radar Altimeter Engineering Assessment Report Final Update-Side B Turn-On to End-of-Mission on October 9, 2005

This is the thirteenth and final report in a series of TOPEX Radar Altimeter Engineering Assessment Reports. The initial TOPEX Radar Altimeter Engineering Assessment Report, in February 1994, presented performance results for the NASA Radar Altimeter on the TOPEX/POSEIDON spacecraft, from its launch in August 1992 to February 1994. Since the time of that initial report and prior to this report, there have been eleven interim supplemental Engineering Assessment Reports, issued in March 1995, May 1996, March 1997, June 1998, August 1999, September 2000, June 2001, March 2002, May 2003, April 2004 and September 2005. The sixth supplement in September 2000 was the first assessment report that addressed Side B performance, and presented the altimeter performance from Side B turn-on until the end of calendar year 1999. This report extends the performance assessment of Side B to the final collection of data on October 9, 2005, and includes the performance assessment of Jason-1, the TOPEX follow-on mission, launched on December 7, 2001. This report provides some comparisons of Side A and Side B performance.

Lockwood, Dennis W.↗

Space Shuttle Guidance, Navigation, and Rendezvous Knowledge Capture Reports

This document is a catalog and readers guide to lessons learned, experience, and technical history reports, as well as compilation volumes prepared by United Space Alliance personnel for the NASA/Johnson Space Center (JSC) Flight Dynamics Division.1 It is intended to make it easier for future generations of engineers to locate knowledge capture documentation from the Shuttle Program. The first chapter covers observations on documentation quality and research challenges encountered during the Space Shuttle and Orion programs. The second chapter covers the knowledge capture approach used to create many of the reports covered in this document. These chapters are intended to provide future flight programs with insight that could be used to formulate knowledge capture and management strategies. The following chapters contain descriptions of each knowledge capture report. The majority of the reports concern the Space Shuttle. Three are included that were written in support of the Orion Program. Most of the reports were written from the years 2001 to 2011. Lessons learned reports concern primarily the shuttle Global Positioning System (GPS) upgrade and the knowledge capture process. Experience reports on navigation and rendezvous provide examples of how challenges were overcome and how best practices were identified and applied. Some reports are of a more technical history nature covering navigation and rendezvous. They provide an overview of mission activities and the evolution of operations concepts and trajectory design. The lessons learned, experience, and history reports would be considered secondary sources by historians and archivists.

John L Goodman↗

2011 NASA Range Safety Annual Report

Welcome to the 2011 edition of the NASA Range Safety Annual Report. Funded by NASA Headquarters, this report provides a NASA Range Safety overview for current and potential range users. As is typical with odd year editions, this is an abbreviated Range Safety Annual Report providing updates and links to full articles from the previous year's report. It also provides more complete articles covering new subject areas, summaries of various NASA Range Safety Program activities conducted during the past year, and information on several projects that may have a profound impact on the way business will be done in the future. Specific topics discussed and updated in the 2011 NASA Range Safety Annual Report include a program overview and 2011 highlights; Range Safety Training; Range Safety Policy revision; Independent Assessments; Support to Program Operations at all ranges conducting NASA launch/flight operations; a continuing overview of emerging range safety-related technologies; and status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety responsibilities. Every effort has been made to include the most current information available. We recommend this report be used only for guidance and that the validity and accuracy of all articles be verified for updates. Once again the web-based format was used to present the annual report. We continually receive positive feedback on the web-based edition and hope you enjoy this year's product as well. As is the case each year, contributors to this report are too numerous to mention, but we thank individuals from the NASA Centers, the Department of Defense, and civilian organizations for their contributions. In conclusion, it has been a busy and productive year. I'd like to extend a personal Thank You to everyone who contributed to make this year a successful one, and I look forward to working with all of you in the upcoming year.

Dumont, Alan G.↗

Pilot Critical Incident Reports as a Means to Identify Human Factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft

It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. Participants were asked to only report incidents that could be included in a public document. During each focus group session, a note taker produced a de-identified written record of the incident narratives. At the end of the session, participants reviewed each written incident report, and made edits and corrections as necessary. The incidents were later analyzed to identify contributing factors, with a focus on design issues that either hindered or assisted the pilot during the events. A total of 90 incidents were reported. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Pilots participated willingly and enthusiastically in the study, and generally had little difficulty recalling critical incidents. The results suggest that pilot interviews can be a productive method of gathering information on incidents that might not otherwise be reported. Some of the issues described in the reports have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. In other cases, incident reports involved human factors that are poorly understood, and have not yet been the subject of extensive study. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

Relationship Between Carbon Dioxide Levels and Reported Congestion and Headaches on the International Space Station

Congestion is commonly reported during spaceflight, and most crewmembers have reported using medications for congestion during International Space Station (ISS) missions. Although congestion has been attributed to fluid shifts during spaceflight, fluid status reaches equilibrium during the first week after launch while congestion continues to be reported throughout long duration missions. Congestion complaints have anecdotally been reported in relation to ISS CO2 levels; this evaluation was undertaken to determine whether or not an association exists. METHODS: Reported headaches, congestion symptoms, and CO2 levels were obtained for ISS expeditions 2-31, and time-weighted means and single-point maxima were determined for 24-hour (24hr) and 7-day (7d) periods prior to each weekly private medical conference. Multiple imputation addressed missing data, and logistic regression modeled the relationship between probability of reported event of congestion or headache and CO2 levels, adjusted for possible confounding covariates. The first seven days of spaceflight were not included to control for fluid shifts. Data were evaluated to determine the concentration of CO2 required to maintain the risk of congestion below 1% to allow for direct comparison with a previously published evaluation of CO2 concentrations and headache. RESULTS: This study confirmed a previously identified significant association between CO2 and headache and also found a significant association between CO2 and congestion. For each 1-mm Hg increase in CO2, the odds of a crew member reporting congestion doubled. The average 7-day CO2 would need to be maintained below 1.5 mmHg to keep the risk of congestion below 1%. The predicted probability curves of ISS headache and congestion curves appear parallel when plotted against ppCO2 levels with congestion occurring at approximately 1mmHg lower than a headache would be reported. DISCUSSION: While the cause of congestion is multifactorial, this study showed congestion is associated with CO2 levels on ISS. Data from additional expeditions could be incorporated to further assess this finding. CO2 levels are also associated with reports of headaches on ISS. While it may be expected for astronauts with congestion to also complain of headaches, these two symptoms are commonly mutually exclusive. Furthermore, it is unknown if a temporal CO2 relationship exists between congestion and headache on ISS. CO2 levels were time-weighted for 24hr and 7d, and thus the time course of congestion leading to headache was not assessed; however, congestion could be an early CO2-related symptom when compared to headache. Future studies evaluating the association of CO2-related congestion leading to headache would be difficult due to the relatively stable daily CO2 levels on ISS currently, but a systematic study could be implemented on-orbit if desired.

Cole, Robert↗

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗