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Under IER-305, critical experiments were done with and without molybdenum sleeves on 7uPCX fuel rods. The experiments were done in new critical assembly hardware designed to support the 7uPCX fuel in a 1.55 cm triangular-pitched array.
During two weeks of Field Testing at the Idaho National Laboratory INTEC Cask Farm in July and August 2024, the LLNL Dry Storage Cask Scanner Array was lifted on top of an MC-10 dry storage fuel cask and operated to acquire neutron and gamma-ray data from the 24 fuel bundle positions. Neutron and gamma-ray data acquisition scans across the top of the cask of varying dwell times were performed July 15-18, 2024 and August 19-22, 2024 to evaluate the ability of the scanner data to reveal asymmetries in the fuel positions that reflect asymmetries in the MC-10 cask fuel bundle loading. The MC-10 cask 24 position fuel bundle loading at the INTEC Cask Farm is well documented, including the locations of six empty fuel bundle positions. This loading presents an opportunity to test the ability of the scanner system to detect diversion of spent fuel bundles as well as to validate the MC-10 cask MCNP modeling. The cask scanner array consists of six Stilbene crystal scintillator detectors and a linear actuator frame that moves the six detectors across the MC-10 dry storage cask to obtain data above each of the 24 fuel bundle positions. The detectors are connected to a pulse-shape discrimination data acquisition system capable of generating separate neutron and gamma-ray spectra for each detector and for each scan position. From the prior single detector Field Test in 2021 and iteration with MCNP modeling, the neutron and gamma-ray data were analyzed in multiple energy regions to identify an analysis method that would provide the strongest and most consistent signature of the asymmetric MC-10 cask fuel loading1 . From both the 2021 Field Test and the current Field Test results, the neutron capture gamma-ray count rate around 2.2 MeV provides the strongest signature of the asymmetric MC-10 cask fuel loading and has qualitative agreement with MCNP calculations. Counting all gamma-rays produces a similar signature. Neutrons emerging from the cask top are moderated and captured by the hydrogen in the polyethylene moderator and scintillator detector, producing a 2.2 MeV gamma ray which is seen in the scintillator gamma-ray spectrum. The count rate in the 2.2 MeV gamma-ray region is ~50 c/s, which is ~1000x higher than the ~0.05 n/s rate in the > 4MeV neutron region, and ~50x greater than the ~1 n/s rate in the neutrons > 500 keV region. Analysis of the 2.2 MeV neutron-capture Compton-scattered gamma-rays produces a statistically significant signature of the INTEC Cask Farm MC-10 asymmetric fuel loading. MCNP simulations indicate that the average neutron energy spectrum offers the potential to detect a large asymmetry from several missing bundles as well as individual missing fuel bundles. Testing this feature will require measurements on a cask with single missing elements.
IER-516, Zirconium Test Assembly (ZTA), is a campaign to design, execute, and document a series of high-fidelity critical benchmark experiments to validate current and future zirconium (Zr) and zirconium hydride (ZrH x ) nuclear data evaluations. ZTA is a collaborative project between Los Alamos National Laboratory and the French Autoritè de Sûretè Nuclèaire et de Radioprotection. The experiments will be fueled with highly enriched uranium (HEU), and utilize the Comet critical assembly machine at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center. A total of ten preliminary critical experiments were designed and optimized for Zr and ZrHx nuclear data sensitivities using the MCNP-Particle Swarm Optimization methodology in the thermal, epithermal, intermediate, and fast neutron energy regions.
The commercial nuclear industry is pursuing advancements in fuel and reactor design that increase the uranium enrichment above 5 wt. % 235 U. These advancements will necessitate the ability to transport bulk quantities of UF 6 at increased enrichments. Currently, the 30B cylinder is the primary container used by the industry for UF 6 storage and transportation and has a long history of successful shipments. This container can support up to 2,277 kg of UF 6 at a maximum enrichment of 5 wt. % 235 U. Previous evaluations have assessed the potential impact of criticality safety for 30B transport at higher enrichments but assumed moderator intrusion would not require evaluation. Although current regulations allow for the exception of moderator intrusion for UF 6 packages through the design and quality control of the package content, this exception is limited to enrichments up to 5 wt. % 235 U. Thus, an investigation of moderator intrusion into a 30B cylinder should be performed. Moderator intrusion into a 30B cylinder is a unique condition for criticality safety evaluation in transportation because of the violent chemical reactions that occur between UF 6 and H 2 O. The resulting intrusion is strongly dependent on the breach size, breach location, breach interface solid/ullage of the UF 6 content, the UF 6 distribution (which is temperature dependent), and temperature/pressure conditions which are dynamic in accident conditions. Additionally, the complexity of the HF-UO 2 F 2 -H 2 O interface that occurs during the event can influence the potential solubility of uranium in the system, as well as influence the amount of UF 6 reaction with H 2 O. With the operating experience from Orano Federal Services LLC, the UF 6 chemical expertise from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and the criticality safety expertise from ORNL, this paper evaluates the neutronic conditions (i.e., k eff ) that apply the understood chemistry and experimental conditions that occur during moderator intrusion of a breached 30B cylinder under postulated accidents. This report examines the historical evaluations of UF 6 transport and expands these evaluations for the enrichments expected for nuclear industry advancement. These simulations primarily feature a homogeneous mixture of UF 6 and H 2 O as an infinite media system and as a sphere with water reflection given an impurity limit of 0.5 wt. % UF 6 . This report demonstrates that this H/U limit is valid up to 8 wt. % enrichment for both H 2 O and HF as the moderating mixture. The water-reflected homogeneous mixed spheres evaluated demonstrate the amount of safety margin applied by restricting the 30B cylinder impurity limit to 0.5 wt. %. Additionally, this report evaluates moderator ingress scenarios of a 30B cylinder. The 30B cylinder simulations vary the cylinder orientation, the mass of UF 6 in the system, the mass of H 2 O in the system, and how much H 2 O has reacted with UF 6 . The moderator ingress of a 30B cylinder was evaluated for the water-reflected homogeneous mixed spheres to demonstrate the amount of safety margin applied by restricting the 30B cylinder impurity limit to 0.5 wt. %. These simulations are standard practice and are independent of the UF 6 -H 2 O reaction. This work also explored more complex simulations that layer the H 2 O over the UF 6 , which incorporates the amount of reacted UF 6 as a separate layer and considers solubility limits of UO 2 F 2 in H 2 O as it is produced. This approach is intended to simulate the postulated event of a large hairline crack occurring on a submerged cylinder. Finally, this work considers the potential of H 2 O mixing into the UF 6 solid heterogeneously using a sponge-like model. The water ingress into the UF 6 is treated as random size spheres, and the reaction products form into a layer over the spheres.
Each layer consisted of a 6 by 6 matrix of either these fuel-filled containers or solid blocks of copper of the same outer dimensions. An example of this arrangement, along with one of the copper inner reflectors, is shown in Figure 1.4. This figure shows the same aluminum containers from Figure 1.3 but with the aluminum containers completely closed. The lifting rings shown on the copper inner reflector were only for assembly and were not present for the measurement (in which the holes were filled with copper plugs). Figure 1.5 shows the loading arrangement of the aluminum containers, along with aluminum shims around the container arrays to ensure a tight fit between these layers and the surrounding reflectors. All plates were in the same orientation; none were rotated in any fashion. Additional loading information for the PAHN plates and plate loading respective to the room entrance are provided in Figures 1.6 and 1.7, respectively.
A series of criticality safety analyses was performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to assess the CURIO NuCycle process based on information provided in late 2023 and early 2024. Each of the segments of the NuCycle process is considered separately, although some interface considerations are necessary. A separate detailed final report that includes proprietary analysis details has been provided to Curio; this report provides a high-level summary to document the closure of this cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA), identified as NFE-23-09571.
This report is the fifth volume in a series documenting the validation of SCALE 6.3 with ENDF/B-VII.1 libraries for nuclear criticality safety, reactor physics, radiation shielding, and spent nuclear fuel applications. This fifth volume, which focuses on validating SCALE capabilities that impact spent nuclear fuel applications, provides an update of the similar validation reported for SCALE 6.2.4.
The majority of the NCSP budget goes to Integral Experiments. The goal is to produce needed integral data for criticality safety needs in DOE, largely resulting in ICSBEP benchmarks. NCSP has a well defined process for allocating funding through proposals and expert review. NCSP is a fairly small program and funding is prioritized for experiments that would address DOE criticality safety needs. The majority of the currently identified DOE criticality safety needs are HEU and Pu systems. NCSP has a formal mechanism to ensure quality and benefit through the phase gates and approvals within the CED process.
Abstract not provided.
Criticality safety analyses are completed on a transportation cask used for microreactor assembly shipment to provide an example of model and analysis to industry for reproducing this type of study on their microreactor fuel shipment. The fuel assembly considered is based on a gas-cooled microreactor (GC-MR), which utilizes HALEU fuel in the form of TRISO particles and utilizes various design options considered in industry designs. Various versions of this GC-MR assembly were studied, with and without YH2 moderator, providing similar conclusions. The shipment cask design is revised based on an existing design ES-3100, developed by Y-12 for the transport of highly enriched uranium (HEU), but is enlarged to hold the GC-MR fuel assembly. Criticality safety analysis for the cask/GC-MR fuel assembly package was performed using the CSAS6 sequence of SCALE6.3.2, utilizing the ENDF/B-VII.1 based continuous energy neutron library, and the analysis strictly follows the guideline from NRC reference reports. Different scenarios, e.g. normal operation, undamaged cask with water flooded, damaged cask with optimal water moderation, have been analyzed and it could be concluded the package would always have a large margin of subcriticality even packed in an infinite array. Sensitivity and similarity analyses are also performed using the TSUNAMI sequence of SCALE6.3.2, and the similarity analysis uses all the experiments from the ICSBEP Handbook with Intermediate and Mixed Enriched Uranium (IEU) and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) systems together with additional ones that are sponsored by the DNCSH program. These similarity analyses indicate that dry cases have no similar benchmark experiments (ck values greater than 0.8), which may become problematic if more assemblies are shipped together (or a fully loaded core is shipped) and margin to criticality is reduced. However, the damaged cask models with flooded assemblies exhibited similarities to many experiments with ck values greater than 0.8.
This plan proposes a strategy for licensing a transportable nuclear power plant, containing its unirradiated and irradiated fuel, as a transportation package for maritime transport using a probabilistic risk assessment framework in order to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR Part 71. It is anticipated that initially, the deterministic transportation package licensing approach will be challenging due to the functional requirements of the transportable nuclear power plant. As such, a partial exemption request from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission coupled with applied compensatory measures are anticipated in support of providing equivalent safety to the public, worker, and environment. A plan is outlined as to how this would be demonstrated and a pathway is primarily outlined using the accompanying low accident rates which in turn support very low probabilities of release for a maritime application. Wherever possible, the proposed plan is supported by actual accident (casualty) data. Additional supporting information regarding a highway transportation probabilistic risk assessment in support of the Project Pele demonstration reactor that is currently under development is also referenced and discussed.
We review data and evaluations for neutron-induced fission for the actinides 233 U, 238 Pu, 240 Pu and 242 Pu. These isotopes are part of common nuclear fuel cycles, especially for modern fast reactors. We focus on incident neutrons in the energy range of 100 keV to 20 MeV and compare the experimental data from the literature to the major evaluated libraries ENDF/B-VIII.1, JENDL-5, and JEFF-3.3, as well as to LLNL’s ENDL-2009.5 library. Based on the assessment of the fission cross sections, we provide recommendations on which library to use. Additional assessments covering other reaction channels will be provided separately.
As energy demand rises, nuclear energy, particularly from reactors that use tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuels, has gained attention due to the fuel’s enhanced resistance to radiation damage and high temperatures. This report investigates the modeling capabilities of the Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS) for TRISO fuels, focusing on the gamma signatures of TRISO particles, which have not been extensively explored. Using the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code as a benchmark, we developed both homogeneous and heterogeneous models of TRISO pebbles to analyze gamma spectra. Our findings reveal that the homogeneous and heterogeneous models produced different gamma signatures. Additionally, the GADRAS heterogeneous model significantly reduces computation times compared to MCNP, enabling effective modeling of gamma signatures for safeguards applications. This advancement is essential for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in detecting anomalies and potential smuggling attempts in TRISO reactor fuel elements.
This document describes lessons learned during my nearly 20 years of experience in International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) meetings and in the development of several evaluations employing the IPEN/MB-01 reactor. The evaluations cover a wide range of possible configurations at the reactor core of this facility. Most of the evaluations are related to critical configurations, although two of them concern subcritical measurements. Examples of the evaluations submitted and approved for ICSBEP publication are the critical configurations employed in the standard core; critical configurations employing heavy reflectors composed of stainless steel, nickel, and carbon steel; and critical configurations employing the standard fuel rods and fuel rods composed of UO 2 -Gd 2 O 3 , among several others. Additionally, this document addresses good practices for the development of ICSBEP evaluations; the intention is to help beginners who are going to start evaluations for ICSBEP. The sections of the ICSBEP evaluation are described and illustrated with several examples.
Neutronics analyses have been used to assist in the design, development, and qualification of miniature fuel (MiniFuel) experiments irradiated in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) since their conception almost a decade ago. In recent years, upon completion of a MiniFuel target’s irradiation, neutronics analyses that reflect the as-built, as-irradiated conditions of an experiment have also been performed to validate postirradiation examination (PIE) efforts. Several radiation transport and depletion/activation software wrapper programs have been developed to increase the fidelity of these calculations; at ORNL, a program called HFIRCON is the primary software method employed. However, the utilization of these wrapper programs comes at a cost. To produce accurate results, the radiation transport portion of these analyses requires significant time and resources to execute. Therefore, this report discusses an alternative methodology for calculating some of the desired output for PIE validation—specifically, the output used in evaluating the experiment’s fuel burnup—without complete reliance on ORNL’s wrapper program. The alternative method is not a new software but rather a procedure for utilizing the depletion/activation software, SCALE, in conjunction with limited input data and reasonable assumptions to bypass most of the radiation transport calculations and thereby reduce the time required for the completion of a standard analysis.
There is growing interest in high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for use in advanced nuclear reactors as a high-energy fuel source. The primary objectives of this report are to identify the security risks that directly result from HALEU and to identify the gaps and challenges it presents from a theft and sabotage perspective. This study focuses on HALEU security risks for the front end of the fuel cycle and includes a review of the supply chain, fuel fabrication, and transport for terrestrial reactors.
The phases in uranium-silicide binary system were evaluated in regards to their stabilities, phase boundaries, crystal structures, and phase transitions. The results from this study were used in combination with a well assessed literature to optimize the U-Si phase diagram using the CALPHAD method. A thermodynamic database was developed, which could be used to guide nuclear fuel fabrication, could be incorporated into other nuclear fuel thermodynamic databases, or could be used to generate data required by fuel performance codes to model fuel behavior in normal or off-normal reactor operations. The U 3 Si 2 and U 3 Si 5 phases were modeled using the Compound Energy Formalism model with 3 sublattices to account for the variation in composition. The crystal structure used for the USi phase was the tetragonal with an I4/mmm space. Above 450°C, the U 3 Si 5 phase was modeled. The composition of the USi 2 phase was adjusted to USi 1.84 . The calculated invariant reactions and the enthalpy of formation for the stoichiometric phases were in agreement with experimental data.
A method for recycling molten salt from electrorefining processes, the method having the steps of collecting actinide metal using a first plurality of cathodes from an electrolyte bath, collecting rare earths metal using a second plurality of cathodes from the electrolyte bath, inserting the collected actinide metal and uranium into the bath, and chlorinating the inserted actinide metal and uranium. Also provided is a system for recycling molten salt, the system having a vessel adapted to receive and heat electrolyte salt, a first plurality of cathodes adapted to be removably inserted into the vessel, a second plurality of cathodes adapted to be removably inserted into the vessel, an anode positioned within the vessel so as to be coaxially aligned with the vessel, and a vehicle for inserting uranium into the salt.