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At least 469 records · Page 26

International Space Station End-of-Life Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Although there are ongoing efforts to extend the ISS life cycle through 2028, the International Space Station (ISS) end-of-life (EOL) cycle is currently scheduled for 2020. The EOL for the ISS will require de-orbiting the ISS. This will be the largest manmade object ever to be de-orbited, therefore safely de-orbiting the station will be a very complex problem. This process is being planned by NASA and its international partners. Numerous factors will need to be considered to accomplish this such as target corridors, orbits, altitude, drag, maneuvering capabilities, debris mapping etc. The ISS EOL Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) will play a part in this process by estimating the reliability of the hardware supplying the maneuvering capabilities. The PRA will model the probability of failure of the systems supplying and controlling the thrust needed to aid in the de-orbit maneuvering.

Duncan, Gary↗

International Space Station End-of-Life Probabilistic Risk Assessment

The International Space Station (ISS) end‐of‐life (EOL) cycle is currently scheduled for 2020, although there are ongoing efforts to extend ISS life cycle through 2028. The EOL for the ISS will require deorbiting the ISS. This will be the largest manmade object ever to be de‐orbited therefore safely deorbiting the station will be a very complex problem. This process is being planned by NASA and its international partners. Numerous factors will need to be considered to accomplish this such as target corridors, orbits, altitude, drag, maneuvering capabilities etc. The ISS EOL Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) will play a part in this process by estimating the reliability of the hardware supplying the maneuvering capabilities. The PRA will model the probability of failure of the systems supplying and controlling the thrust needed to aid in the de‐orbit maneuvering.

Duncan, Gary W.↗

Tethered Satellite System Contingency Investigation Board

The Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis (STS-46) on July 31, 1992. During the attempted on-orbit operations, the Tethered Satellite System failed to deploy successfully beyond 256 meters. The satellite was retrieved successfully and was returned on August 6, 1992. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate Administrator for Space Flight formed the Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) Contingency Investigation Board on August 12, 1992. The TSS-1 Contingency Investigation Board was asked to review the anomalies which occurred, to determine the probable cause, and to recommend corrective measures to prevent recurrence. The board was supported by the TSS Systems Working group as identified in MSFC-TSS-11-90, 'Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Contingency Plan'. The board identified five anomalies for investigation: initial failure to retract the U2 umbilical; initial failure to flyaway; unplanned tether deployment stop at 179 meters; unplanned tether deployment stop at 256 meters; and failure to move tether in either direction at 224 meters. Initial observations of the returned flight hardware revealed evidence of mechanical interference by a bolt with the level wind mechanism travel as well as a helical shaped wrap of tether which indicated that the tether had been unwound from the reel beyond the travel by the level wind mechanism. Examination of the detailed mission events from flight data and mission logs related to the initial failure to flyaway and the failure to move in either direction at 224 meters, together with known preflight concerns regarding slack tether, focused the assessment of these anomalies on the upper tether control mechanism. After the second meeting, the board requested the working group to complete and validate a detailed integrated mission sequence to focus the fault tree analysis on a stuck U2 umbilical, level wind mechanical interference, and slack tether in upper tether control mechanism and to prepare a detailed plan for hardware inspection, test, and analysis including any appropriate hardware disassembly.

Source record↗

Post-Shuttle EVA Operations on ISS

The EVA hardware used to assemble and maintain the ISS was designed with the assumption that it would be returned to Earth on the Space Shuttle for ground processing, refurbishment, or failure investigation (if necessary). With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, a new concept of operations was developed to enable EVA hardware (EMU, Airlock Systems, EVA tools, and associated support equipment and consumables) to perform ISS EVAs until 2016 and possibly beyond to 2020. Shortly after the decision to retire the Space Shuttle was announced, NASA and the One EVA contractor team jointly initiated the EVA 2010 Project. Challenges were addressed to extend the operating life and certification of EVA hardware, secure the capability to launch EVA hardware safely on alternate launch vehicles, and protect EMU hardware operability on orbit for long durations.

West, Bill↗

Optimization of Second Fault Detection Thresholds to Maximize Mission POS

In order to support manned spaceflight safety requirements, the Space Launch System (SLS) has defined program-level requirements for key systems to ensure successful operation under single fault conditions. To accommodate this with regards to Navigation, the SLS utilizes an internally redundant Inertial Navigation System (INS) with built-in capability to detect, isolate, and recover from first failure conditions and still maintain adherence to performance requirements. The unit utilizes multiple hardware- and software-level techniques to enable detection, isolation, and recovery from these events in terms of its built-in Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) algorithms. Successful operation is defined in terms of sufficient navigation accuracy at insertion while operating under worst case single sensor outages (gyroscope and accelerometer faults at launch). In addition to first fault detection and recovery, the SLS program has also levied requirements relating to the capability of the INS to detect a second fault, tracking any unacceptable uncertainty in knowledge of the vehicle's state. This detection functionality is required in order to feed abort analysis and ensure crew safety. Increases in navigation state error and sensor faults can drive the vehicle outside of its operational as-designed environments and outside of its performance envelope causing loss of mission, or worse, loss of crew. The criteria for operation under second faults allows for a larger set of achievable missions in terms of potential fault conditions, due to the INS operating at the edge of its capability. As this performance is defined and controlled at the vehicle level, it allows for the use of system level margins to increase probability of mission success on the operational edges of the design space. Due to the implications of the vehicle response to abort conditions (such as a potentially failed INS), it is important to consider a wide range of failure scenarios in terms of both magnitude and time. As such, the Navigation team is taking advantage of the INS's capability to schedule and change fault detection thresholds in flight. These values are optimized along a nominal trajectory in order to maximize probability of mission success, and reducing the probability of false positives (defined as when the INS would report a second fault condition resulting in loss of mission, but the vehicle would still meet insertion requirements within system-level margins). This paper will describe an optimization approach using Genetic Algorithms to tune the threshold parameters to maximize vehicle resilience to second fault events as a function of potential fault magnitude and time of fault over an ascent mission profile. The analysis approach, and performance assessment of the results will be presented to demonstrate the applicability of this process to second fault detection to maximize mission probability of success.

Anzalone, Evan↗

Long life assurance study for manned spacecraft long life hardware. Volume 1: Summary of long life assurance guidelines

A long life assurance program for the development of design, process, test, and application guidelines for achieving reliable spacecraft hardware was conducted. The study approach consisted of a review of technical data performed concurrently with a survey of the aerospace industry. The data reviewed included design and operating characteristics, failure histories and solutions, and similar documents. The topics covered by the guidelines are reported. It is concluded that long life hardware is achieved through meticulous attention to many details and no simple set of rules can suffice.

Source record↗

Reversionary Control Modes for the Mitigation of Failures in a Partially Turboelectric Aircraft Propulsion System

In support of emission and fuel burn reduction goals, the aviation industry is actively pursuing the advancement of electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) technology. This includes turboelectric and hybrid electric propulsion designs that combine gas turbine engine and electrical system hardware. Such architectures exhibit a high degree of coupling between subsystems. This drives the need for system-level control strategies to ensure the safe, coordinated, and efficient operation of all subsystems. The design and certification of any aircraft propulsion system requires that all potential subsystem failures are identified, and the hazards posed by these failures are appropriately mitigated. This requirement is particularly challenging for EAP systems due to their integrated nature. One approach to assist in EAP failure mitigation is the inclusion of automated reconfiguration capabilities within the propulsion control system. Such control modes, referred to as reversionary control modes, are designed to automatically detect failures and activate backup control modes upon failure detection. This paper covers the design and evaluation of reversionary control mode logic developed for a partially turboelectric propulsion concept. Test results from a real-time hardware-in-the-loop evaluation of the concept are also presented and discussed. The results show that the developed reversionary control logic can successfully detect and mitigate subsystem failures in a representative environment that includes actual electrical system hardware.

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion↗

Reversionary Control Modes for the Mitigation of Failures in a Partially Turboelectric Aircraft Propulsion System

In support of emission and fuel burn reduction goals, the aviation industry is actively pursuing the advancement of electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) technology. This includes turboelectric and hybrid electric propulsion designs that combine gas turbine engine and electrical system hardware. Such architectures exhibit a high degree of coupling between subsystems. This drives the need for system-level control strategies to ensure the safe, coordinated, and efficient operation of all subsystems. The design and certification of any aircraft propulsion system requires that all potential subsystem failures are identified, and the hazards posed by these failures are appropriately mitigated. This requirement is particularly challenging for EAP systems due to their integrated nature. One approach to assist in EAP failure mitigation is the inclusion of automated reconfiguration capabilities within the propulsion control system. Such control modes, referred to as reversionary control modes, are designed to automatically detect failures and activate backup control modes upon failure detection. This paper covers the design and evaluation of reversionary control mode logic developed for a partially turboelectric propulsion concept. Test results from a real-time hardware-in-the-loop evaluation of the concept are also presented and discussed. The results show that the developed reversionary control logic can successfully detect and mitigate subsystem failures in a representative environment that includes actual electrical system hardware.

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion↗

Reversionary Control Modes for the Mitigation of Failures in a Partially Turboelectric Aircraft Propulsion System

In support of emission and fuel burn reduction goals, the aviation industry is actively pursuing the advancement of electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) technology. This includes turboelectric and hybrid electric propulsion designs that combine gas turbine engine and electrical system hardware. Such architectures exhibit a high degree of coupling between subsystems. This drives the need for system-level control strategies to ensure the safe, coordinated, and efficient operation of all subsystems. The design and certification of any aircraft propulsion system requires that all potential subsystem failures are identified, and the hazards posed by these failures are appropriately mitigated. This requirement is particularly challenging for EAP systems due to their integrated nature. One approach to assist in EAP failure mitigation is the inclusion of automated reconfiguration capabilities within the propulsion control system. Such control modes, referred to as reversionary control modes, are designed to automatically detect failures and activate backup control modes upon failure detection. This paper covers the design and evaluation of reversionary control mode logic developed for a partially turboelectric propulsion concept. Test results from a real-time hardware-in-the-loop evaluation of the concept are also presented and discussed. The results show that the developed reversionary control logic can successfully detect and mitigate subsystem failures in a representative environment that includes actual electrical system hardware.

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion↗

Maximum likelihood failure detection techniques applied to the shuttle orbiter reaction control subsystem

A technique for on-board detection and identification of hard failures and leaks of the shuttle orbiter reaction control subsystem jets, during the orbital flight phase, is presented. The method uses gimbal angle and linear accelerometer measurements from the orbiter inertial measurement unit and requires no additional hardware. Extended Kalman filters with residual traps are employed for state estimation, and generalized likelihood ratio tests for jet failure identification. Rigid body simulation results indicate identification times of less than 2 seconds for hard jet failures and less than 70 seconds for jet leaks.

Deckert, J. C.↗

Branch recovery with compiler-assisted multiple instruction retry

In processing systems where rapid recovery from transient faults is important, schemes for multiple instruction rollback recovery may be appropriate. Multiple instruction retry has been implemented in hardware by researchers and also in mainframe computers. This paper extends compiler-assisted instruction retry to a broad class of code execution failures. Five benchmarks were used to measure the performance penalty of hazard resolution. Results indicate that the enhanced pure software approach can produce performance penalties consistent with existing hardware techniques. A combined compiler/hardware resolution strategy is also described and evaluated. Experimental results indicate a lower performance penalty than with either a totally hardware or totally software approach.

Alewine, N. J.↗

Learning from Space Entrepreneurs

The early days of rocketry and space exploration in the United States were marked by incredibly rapid progress: a seemingly endless parade of firsts. Not coincidentally, this period also saw more than its fair share of failure, especially in the infamous "kaputnik" days prior to the successful launch of Explorer. Without a standard canon of known quantities to turn to, the early pioneers of rocketry and space flight were forced to dream up new ideas that ranged from the elegant to the bizarre and to accept the fact that the price of radical progress is occasional failure. Nowadays, rapid prototyping and testing have slowed, as we rely more and more on the extensive knowledge pined by our predecessors and on the embarrassment of riches modern engineers get from computational modeling and computer assisted design. In many cases, this leads to much improved or phenomenally more efficient designs. It also, however, fosters a culture so terrified of failure that we over-engineer and overanalyze everything, often tweaking designs for decades before a new system takes flight. (This is not a problem unique to rockets; the same phenomenon seems to have occurred in high-performance jets.) This is one reason why it was possible for President Kennedy to dream of the completion of the Mercury and Gemini missions and a successful landing on the moon in under a decade, while returning to the moon may take nearly twice as long. Lacking access to the tremendous computational resources of the national space program-and, just as importantly, removed from the harsh judgment of public shareholders or congressional appropriations committees-the hungry entrepreneurs who compete for our prizes tend not to display such fear of failure. Instead, most of them follow a rapid "build, test, fly" program. They are willing to throw a handful of concepts against the wall and see what sticks. They often go from drawing on the back of a napkin to firing engines or even flying vehicles in a matter of weeks or months, learning valuable lessons along the way. Indeed, our teams have repeatedly learned many of the most valuable lessons after only a few moments of working with real hardware-lessons that could never have been learned from a CAD drawing, like finding the failure modes of different welding practices or tracking down the interference between an onboard camera and a GPS unit. As Paul Breed, the leader of a Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge team (playfully called Unreasonable Rocket), is fond of saying, "In computer simulations the plumbing never leaks. In real life, it always does."

Pomerantz, William↗

Static stability of the Space Station solar array FASTMast structure

The combined loads test of the 3-Bay FASTMast marks the end of the Lewis Research Center (LeRC) effort to characterize the behavior of the principal Space Station solar array support structure. The primary objective of this test and analysis effort was to develop a method to predict structural stability failure modes under flight-like applied loads. Included at the beginning of this report is a brief historical perspective of the hardware design development and FASTMast structural stability problem evolution. Once an understanding of the solution process has been established, test and analysis details are presented and related to the postulated failure theories. The combined load test series subjected the structure to a combination of transverse, moment, and torsion loads similar to that expected in the service environment. Nonlinear finite element (FE) models were developed and large displacement analyses were performed to support the test effort and failure mode predictions. Details of the test configuration as well as test and analysis results are presented. The results were then critiqued to establish valid and successful support of the failure mode assessments. Finally, study conclusions are drawn and recommendations for safe operation of the FASTMast structure are presented for consideration.

Shaker, John F.↗

Hypersonic Inflatable Aerodynamic Decelerator (HIAD) Technology Development Overview

The successful flight of the Inflatable Reentry Vehicle Experiment (IRVE)-3 has further demonstrated the potential value of Hypersonic Inflatable Aerodynamic Decelerator (HIAD) technology. This technology development effort is funded by NASA's Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) Game Changing Development Program (GCDP). This paper provides an overview of a multi-year HIAD technology development effort, detailing the projects completed to date and the additional testing planned for the future. The effort was divided into three areas: Flexible Systems Development (FSD), Mission Advanced Entry Concepts (AEC), and Flight Validation. FSD consists of a Flexible Thermal Protection Systems (FTPS) element, which is investigating high temperature materials, coatings, and additives for use in the bladder, insulator, and heat shield layers; and an Inflatable Structures (IS) element which includes manufacture and testing (laboratory and wind tunnel) of inflatable structures and their associated structural elements. AEC consists of the Mission Applications element developing concepts (including payload interfaces) for missions at multiple destinations for the purpose of demonstrating the benefits and need for the HIAD technology as well as the Next Generation Subsystems element. Ground test development has been pursued in parallel with the Flight Validation IRVE-3 flight test. A larger scale (6m diameter) HIAD inflatable structure was constructed and aerodynamically tested in the National Full-scale Aerodynamics Complex (NFAC) 40ft by 80ft test section along with a duplicate of the IRVE-3 3m article. Both the 6m and 3m articles were tested with instrumented aerodynamic covers which incorporated an array of pressure taps to capture surface pressure distribution to validate Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model predictions of surface pressure distribution. The 3m article also had a duplicate IRVE-3 Thermal Protection System (TPS) to test in addition to testing with the Aerocover configuration. Both the Aerocovers and the TPS were populated with high contrast targets so that photogrammetric solutions of the loaded surface could be created. These solutions both refined the aerodynamic shape for CFD modeling and provided a deformed shape to validate structural Finite Element Analysis (FEA) models. Extensive aerothermal testing has been performed on the TPS candidates. This testing has been conducted in several facilities across the country. The majority of the testing has been conducted in the Boeing Large Core Arc Tunnel (LCAT). HIAD is continuing to mature testing methodology in this facility and is developing new test sample fixtures and control methodologies to improve understanding and quality of the environments to which the samples are subjected. Additional testing has been and continues to be performed in the NASA LaRC 8ft High Temperature Tunnel, where samples up to 2ft by 2ft are being tested over representative underlying structures incorporating construction features such as sewn seams and through-thickness quilting. With the successful completion to the IRVE-3 flight demonstration, mission planning efforts are ramping up on the development of the HIAD Earth Atmospheric Reenty Test (HEART) which will demonstrate a relevant scale vehicle in relevant environments via a large-scale aeroshell (approximately 8.5m) entering at orbital velocity (approximately 7km/sec) with an entry mass on the order of 4MT. Also, the Build to Print (BTP) hardware built as a risk mitigation for the IRVE-3 project to have a "spare" ready to go in the event of a launch vehicle delivery failure is now available for an additional sub-orbital flight experiment. Mission planning is underway to define a mission that can utilize this existing hardware and help the HIAD project further mature this technology.

Hughes, Stephen J.↗

Analysis of Full-Test tools and their limitations as applied to terminal junction blocks

Discovery of unlocked contacts in Deutsch Block terminal junctions in Solid Rocket Booster flight hardware prompted an investigation into pull test techniques to help insure against possible failures. Internal frictional forces between socket and pin and between wire and grommet were examined. Pull test force must be greater than internal friction yet less than the crimp strength of the pin or socket. For this reason, a 100 percent accurate test is impossible. Test tools were evaluated. Available tools are adequate for pull testing.

Smith, J. L.↗

ALS rocket engine combustion devices design and demonstration

Work performed during Phase one is summarized and the significant technical and programmatic accomplishments occurring during this period are documented. Besides a summary of the results, methodologies, trade studies, design, fabrication, and hardware conditions; the following are included: the evolving Maintainability Plan, Reliability Program Plan, Failure Summary and Analysis Report, and the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis.

Arreguin, Steve↗

Real-Time Simulation for Verification and Validation of Diagnostic and Prognostic Algorithms

To verify that a health management system (HMS) performs as expected, a virtual system simulation capability, including interaction with the associated platform or vehicle, very likely will need to be developed. The rationale for developing this capability is discussed and includes the limited capability to seed faults into the actual target system due to the risk of potential damage to high value hardware. The capability envisioned would accurately reproduce the propagation of a fault or failure as observed by sensors located at strategic locations on and around the target system and would also accurately reproduce the control system and vehicle response. In this way, HMS operation can be exercised over a broad range of conditions to verify that it meets requirements for accurate, timely response to actual faults with adequate margin against false and missed detections. An overview is also presented of a real-time rocket propulsion health management system laboratory which is available for future rocket engine programs. The health management elements and approaches of this lab are directly applicable for future space systems. In this paper the various components are discussed and the general fault detection, diagnosis, isolation and the response (FDIR) concept is presented. Additionally, the complexities of V&V (Verification and Validation) for advanced algorithms and the simulation capabilities required to meet the changing state-of-the-art in HMS are discussed.

Aguilar, Robet↗

Adaptive Inner-Loop Rover Control

Adaptive control technology is developed for the inner-loop speed and steering control of the MAX Rover. MAX, a CMU developed rover, is a compact low-cost 4-wheel drive, 4-wheel steer (double Ackerman), high-clearance agile durable chassis, outfitted with sensors and electronics that make it ideally suited for supporting research relevant to intelligent teleoperation and as a low-cost autonomous robotic test bed and appliance. The design consists of a feedback linearization based controller with a proportional - integral (PI) feedback that is augmented by an online adaptive neural network. The adaptation law has guaranteed stability properties for safe operation. The control design is retrofit in nature so that it fits inside the outer-loop path planning algorithms. Successful hardware implementation of the controller is illustrated for several scenarios consisting of actuator failures and modeling errors in the nominal design.

Kulkarni, Nilesh↗