Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “federated computing”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 469 records · Page 26

Identification of Safety Metrics for Airport Surface Operations

A large fraction of safety incidents occurs on the ground during airport surface operations. Although these incidents are mostly non-fatal with a few exceptions, they are high profile incidents that remain a source of concern for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), major airlines, and other stakeholders of the National Airspace System (NAS). These incidents have historically been mitigated by implementing changes to regulations, policies, and procedures over time. This approach has minimized but not eliminated the risk of occurrence of safety incidents. It is thus important to develop integrated techniques to assess, model, and prevent these incidents by analyzing the risk and likelihood of occurrence and communicating results of the analysis to decision-making personnel who can mitigate and prevent incidents in real time. The work presented in this paper builds on a previously developed architecture for safety, Real-Time Safety Monitoring (RTSM), to enable monitoring and prediction of the safety of the NAS. In the RTSM framework, hazards to flight are translated to safety metrics such as wake vortex encounters or loss of separation, that can be modeled and analyzed offline and also predicted and monitored in real time (online). The intent of this paper is to integrate predictable incidents that occur during surface and ground operations into the safety portfolio of the RTSM project by (i) identifying suitable information sources from which ground incidents can be studied, (ii) developing safety metrics correlated with surface operations, and (iii) recommending suitable data sources that can be quantified and used for the computation of pertinent safety metrics.

safety↗

Mercury Toolset for Spatiotemporal Metadata

Mercury (http://mercury.ornl.gov) is a set of tools for federated harvesting, searching, and retrieving metadata, particularly spatiotemporal metadata. Version 3.0 of the Mercury toolset provides orders of magnitude improvements in search speed, support for additional metadata formats, integration with Google Maps for spatial queries, facetted type search, support for RSS (Really Simple Syndication) delivery of search results, and enhanced customization to meet the needs of the multiple projects that use Mercury. It provides a single portal to very quickly search for data and information contained in disparate data management systems, each of which may use different metadata formats. Mercury harvests metadata and key data from contributing project servers distributed around the world and builds a centralized index. The search interfaces then allow the users to perform a variety of fielded, spatial, and temporal searches across these metadata sources. This centralized repository of metadata with distributed data sources provides extremely fast search results to the user, while allowing data providers to advertise the availability of their data and maintain complete control and ownership of that data. Mercury periodically (typically daily) harvests metadata sources through a collection of interfaces and re-indexes these metadata to provide extremely rapid search capabilities, even over collections with tens of millions of metadata records. A number of both graphical and application interfaces have been constructed within Mercury, to enable both human users and other computer programs to perform queries. Mercury was also designed to support multiple different projects, so that the particular fields that can be queried and used with search filters are easy to configure for each different project.

Wilson, Bruce E.↗

First Look at Quartic-in-Spin Binary Dynamics at Third Post-Minkowskian Order

We compute the conservative and radiation-reaction contributions to classical observables in the gravitational scattering between a spinning and a spinless black hole to the fourth order in spin and third order in the gravitational constant. The conservative results are obtained from two-loop amplitudes for the scattering process of a massive scalar with a massive spin-𝑠 field (𝑠=0, 1, 2) minimally coupled to gravity, employing the recently introduced spin interpolation method to resolve all spin-Casimir terms. The two-loop amplitude exhibits a spin-shift symmetry in both probe limits, which we conjecture to be a sign of yet unknown integrability of Kerr orbits through the quartic order in spin and to all orders in the gravitational constant. We obtain the radial action from the finite part of the amplitude and use it to compute classical observables, including the impulse and spin kick. This is done using the recently introduced covariant Dirac brackets, which allow for the computation of classical scattering observables for general (nonaligned) spin configurations. Finally, employing the radiation-reaction amplitude proposed by Alessio and Di Vecchia, together with the Dirac brackets, we obtain radiation-reaction contributions to observables at all orders in spin and beyond the aligned-spin limit. We find agreement with known results up to the quadratic order in spin for both conservative and radiation-reaction contributions. Our results advance the state of the art in the understanding of spinning binary dynamics in general relativity and demonstrate the power and simplicity of the Dirac bracket formalism for relating scattering amplitudes to classical observables.

general relativity↗

Identification of Safety Metrics for Airport Surface Operations

A large fraction of safety incidents occurs on the ground during airport surface operations. Although these incidents are mostly non-fatal with a few exceptions, they are high profile incidents that remain a source of concern for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), major airlines, and other stakeholders of the National Airspace System (NAS). These incidents have historically been mitigated by implementing changes to regulations, policies, and procedures over time. This approach has minimized but not eliminated the risk of occurrences. It is thus important to develop integrated techniques to assess, model, and prevent these incidents by analyzing the risk and likelihood of occurrence and communicating results of the analysis to decision-making personnel who can mitigate and prevent incidents in real time. The research presented in this report builds on prior work of researchers at the NASA Ames Research Center who developed an automated framework, Real-Time Safety Monitoring (RTSM), to enable monitoring and prediction of the safety of the NAS. In the RTSM framework, hazards to flight are translated to safety metrics such as wake vortex encounters or loss of separation, that can be modeled and analyzed offline and also predicted and monitored in real time (online). The intent of this report is to integrate predictable incidents that occur during surface and ground operations into the safety portfolio of the RTSM project by (i) identifying suitable information sources from which ground incidents can be studied, (ii) developing safety metrics correlated with surface operations, and (iii) recommending suitable data sources that can be quantified and used for the computation of pertinent safety metrics.

ground operations↗

NASA Center for Climate Simulation (NCCS) Presentation

The NASA Center for Climate Simulation (NCCS) offers integrated supercomputing, visualization, and data interaction technologies to enhance NASA's weather and climate prediction capabilities. It serves hundreds of users at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, as well as other NASA centers, laboratories, and universities across the US. Over the past year, NCCS has continued expanding its data-centric computing environment to meet the increasingly data-intensive challenges of climate science. We doubled our Discover supercomputer's peak performance to more than 800 teraflops by adding 7,680 Intel Xeon Sandy Bridge processor-cores and most recently 240 Intel Xeon Phi Many Integrated Core (MIG) co-processors. A supercomputing-class analysis system named Dali gives users rapid access to their data on Discover and high-performance software including the Ultra-scale Visualization Climate Data Analysis Tools (UV-CDAT), with interfaces from user desktops and a 17- by 6-foot visualization wall. NCCS also is exploring highly efficient climate data services and management with a new MapReduce/Hadoop cluster while augmenting its data distribution to the science community. Using NCCS resources, NASA completed its modeling contributions to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCG) Fifth Assessment Report this summer as part of the ongoing Coupled Modellntercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5). Ensembles of simulations run on Discover reached back to the year 1000 to test model accuracy and projected climate change through the year 2300 based on four different scenarios of greenhouse gases, aerosols, and land use. The data resulting from several thousand IPCC/CMIP5 simulations, as well as a variety of other simulation, reanalysis, and observationdatasets, are available to scientists and decision makers through an enhanced NCCS Earth System Grid Federation Gateway. Worldwide downloads have totaled over 110 terabytes of data.

Webster, William P.↗

Summary of Expansions and Updates in GREET ® 2022

The GREET ® (Greenhouse gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy use in Technologies) model has been developed by Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) with the support of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and other federal agencies. GREET is a life cycle analysis (LCA) tool, structured to systematically examine the energy and environmental effects of a wide variety of transportation fuels and vehicle technologies in major transportation sectors (i.e., road, air, marine, and rail) and other end-use sectors, and energy systems. Argonne has expanded and updated the model in various sectors in GREET 2022, and this report provides a summary of the release.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

HELIUM LEAK TEST MODELING OF A SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL CANISTER

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is considering the development of one or more federal consolidated interim storage facilities (CISFs) to be used to store commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at locations in the U.S. One of the first technical challenges of a CISF is performing an inspection of SNF canisters upon their receipt to confirm they can be placed into the CISF’s licensed storage configuration. The canister receipt inspection is critical to CISF site operations. The test is conceived as being a helium (He) leak check, intended to confirm that the confinement boundary of a SNF canister is intact. SNF canisters are filled with He when they are sealed, so detection of a He leak indicates that a through-wall flaw has occurred in the canister confinement boundary. Other measurements are planned to occur upon canister receipt in addition to the He leak check such as krypton-85 measurements, which would indicate confinement breaches of one or more fuel rods in addition to a breach of the SNF canister. However, the He leak check has been identified as one of such high importance and has such significant technical challenges that a full-scale demonstration is needed to confirm the He leak test’s viability and to assist in planning relative to its operational requirements. A modeling methodology for simulating the He detection test was developed to help inform the test plan and the design of the test vessels. To develop the modeling methodology a detailed computational fluid dynamics (CFD) benchmark model was constructed to compare against leak rate test data from a transportation package for radioactive material. This report is focused on modeling efforts to simulate the benchmark leak test.

Suffield, Sarah R.↗

Microgrid Hardening Design Toolkit User Guide: Software v0.29

Microgrid Hardening Design Toolkit helps microgrid stakeholders assess community-specific natural hazard risks to microgrid components and provides mitigation strategies to reduce those risks. Using census tract location inputs and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Risk Index dataset, the tool provides a ranked list of the highest risk hazards for a selected community and hazard-specific mitigation options for microgrid components. It also provides risk twin communities with similar hazard risk profiles and includes a radar-chart to visually compare risk profiles across communities. The toolkit is expected to help users quickly understand community-specific hazard risks and make decisions for microgrid hardening.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Validation of the NLR Pumped Storage Hydropower Cost Model

The National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) first released its pumped storage hydropower (PSH) cost model in 2023 as the most detailed bottom-up PSH cost model available to the public. It is available both as a spreadsheet and an interactive web tool, enabling users with a variety of PSH interests to transparently characterize costs of alternative PSH sites and designs. The PSH cost model cannot replace detailed site-level studies and design, but it is important to validate it against other industry PSH cost estimates. The initial model methodology report validated the cost model for a single proposed site, the Eagle Mountain Project in California. This slide deck documents an expanded validation exercise using cost data from six other sites: Goldendale (Washington), Seminoe (Wyoming), Gordon Butte (Montana), Swan Lake (Oregon), White Pine (Oregon), and Lewis Ridge (Kentucky). It compares itemized costs from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) applications and other reported costs with NLR PSH cost model outputs after customizing inputs for each site. The validation exercise finds that the NLR model's conservative indirect cost assumptions often drive overall cost overestimation, with direct cost comparisons typically agreeing more closely. All cost model estimates are well within an Association for the Advancement of Cost Engineering (AACE) Class 5 estimation range (-50% to +100%), with five within the AACE Class 4 range (-30% to +50%) and four being within 15%. This result is considered reasonable performance for a parametric model applied at a preliminary design stage.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

California Energy Systems for the 21st Century (CES-21) Program, CRADA TC02200 (Final Report)

The following report representsthe culmination of a five-year Cybersecurity Research and Development (R&D) program performed by California’s Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and funded by the IOUs’ electricity ratepayers as authorized by California Legislation and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The cybersecurity R&D, which was intensely technical in nature, was broken into three major workstreams: 1. The development of a modeling & simulation platform, to explore the potential effects of various threat and response scenarios at grid scale; 2. The establishment of a physical testbed with separate substation instances from each of the IOUs, to evaluate threats and responses on actual substation equipment; 3. The development of a research package consisting of several capabilities to support the industry’s evolution towards automated threat response and other next-generation cybersecurity techniques Throughout the program, there was extensive collaboration between the program team and national laboratories, federal departments, academic institutions and industry organizations. Several of the tools developed through the program have been made available to the open source community, to enable faster adoption and continued development of important cybersecurity capabilities. While this program began to develop much of the foundation for automated threat response, much work remains to be done, and this report recommends a series of next steps. While the Executive Summary below has been simplified as much as possible, the very technical nature of the subject matter would make further reduction difficult without causing meaning to be lost. Due to the sensitive nature of the research, some topics are intentionally covered at a high level to protect the research and therefore the electric grid and customers of California and the Nation. For further detail, clarification or questions we suggest discussion with the program team.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Characterizing the Impact of GPU Power Management on an Exascale System

As GPU-accelerated high-performance computing (HPC) systems approach exascale performance, controlling energy consumption without compromising throughput is essential. Architectures such as the AMD MI250X-based Frontier supercomputer provide runtime mechanisms like frequency and power capping, enabling energy tuning without modifying application code. Although both target energy reduction, they operate via distinct hardware control paths and influence workloads differently. We present a comprehensive evaluation of these strategies on a leadership-class system using diverse HPC proxy applications representative of production workloads. Our study analyzes performance–energy trade-offs across multiple capping levels, node counts (1 and 32), and application profiles. Results show that frequency capping generally achieves higher energy efficiency and scalability, with gains of up to 13.2% without performance loss, while power capping is more effective for single-node runs or bursty GPU utilization. We also provide practical guidelines to help system administrators and users balance energy efficiency and performance in large-scale scientific workloads.

Costa, Mariana [Universidade Federal do Rio Grande↗

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security 2024 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program was established to provide research support addressing near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), Physical Protection System (PPS), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A, PPS, and Cybersecurity designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARSS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARSS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Large-scale parametric modeling of spent nuclear fuel dynamics in the 30 cm package drop scenario

Packages used to transport spent nuclear fuel (SNF) are required by the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 71.71 to demonstrate satisfactory performance during a drop scenario. While the CFR is meant to ensure safe package function, it does not evaluate survival of the SNF within. The U.S. Department of Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program is working on closing the knowledge gap related to the response of SNF to external mechanical loads, including the hypothetical 30 cm package drop scenario in the CFR. In support of this effort, LS-DYNA finite element simulations were developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to model generic drop scenarios at both the package and fuel assembly level. The models were validated against one-third scale package and full scale fuel assembly drop test data and were exercised to predict fuel cladding strains in a narrow range of model configurations. This work describes a large-scale parametric study conducted by PNNL using the previously developed and validated PWR finite element model, with the addition of a new generic BWR assembly model. The motivation for the parametric study was to characterize the broad range of SNF responses in the 30 cm package drop scenario. This was accomplished by varying the drop orientation, fuel assembly type (17x17 PWR and 10x10 BWR), burnup, cladding temperature, spacer grid buckling load, package mass, impact limiter stiffness, and mechanical gap conditions within the basket. A MATLAB framework was developed to automate LS-DYNA model generation and execution on PNNL institutional computing resources. In total, over 2000 simulations were performed. For each simulation, the SNF response was quantified in terms of permanent grid deformation, fuel rod contact pressure, and strains within the fuel rods, guide tubes, and water rods. The results provide valuable insight into the range of responses that could be reasonably expected from SNF in the hypothetical drop scenario, as well as the sensitivity to each input parameter. The results of this parametric study are a key component of the testing and modeling strategy the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program is using to close the external loads knowledge gap.

Kadooka, Kevin↗

Ensuring US National Aeronautics Test Capabilities

U.S. leadership in aeronautics depends on ready access to technologically advanced, efficient, and affordable aeronautics test capabilities. These systems include major wind tunnels and propulsion test facilities and flight test capabilities. The federal government owns the majority of the major aeronautics test capabilities in the United States, primarily through the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DoD). However, changes in the Aerospace landscape, primarily the decrease in demand for testing over the last 20 years required an overarching strategy for management of these national assets. Therefore, NASA established the Aeronautics Test Program (ATP) as a two-pronged strategic initiative to: (1) retain and invest in NASA aeronautics test capabilities considered strategically important to the agency and the nation, and (2) establish a strong, high level partnership with the DoD. Test facility utilization is a critical factor for ATP because it relies on user occupancy fees to recover a substantial part of the operations costs for its facilities. Decreasing utilization is an indicator of excess capacity and in some cases low-risk redundancy (i.e., several facilities with basically the same capability and overall low utilization). However, low utilization does not necessarily translate to lack of strategic importance. Some facilities with relatively low utilization are nonetheless vitally important because of the unique nature of the capability and the foreseeable aeronautics testing needs. Unfortunately, since its inception, the customer base for ATP has continued to shrink. Utilization of ATP wind tunnels has declined by more than 50% from the FY 2006 levels. This significant decrease in customer usage is attributable to several factors, including the overall decline in new programs and projects in the aerospace sector; the impact of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) on the design, development, and research process; and the reductions in wind tunnel testing requirements within the largest consumer of ATP wind tunnel test time, the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD). Retirement of the Space Shuttle Program and recent perturbations of NASA's Constellation Program will exacerbate this downward trend. Therefore it is crucial that ATP periodically revisit and determine which of its test capabilities are strategically important, which qualify as low-risk redundancies that could be put in an inactive status or closed, and address the challenges associated with both sustainment and improvements to the test capabilities that must remain active. This presentation will provide an overview of the ATP vision, mission, and goals as well as the challenges and opportunities the program is facing both today and in the future. We will discuss the strategy ATP is taking over the next five years to address the National aeronautics test capability challenges and what the program will do to capitalize on its opportunities to ensure a ready, robust and relevant portfolio of National aeronautics test capabilities.

Marshall, Timothy J.↗

Er Al :Al 2 ⁢O 3 for telecom-band photonics: Electronic structure and optical properties

Er-doped Al 2 ⁢O 3 is a promising host for telecom-band integrated photonics. Here, in this study, we combine ab initio calculations with a symmetry-resolved analysis to elucidate substitutional Er on the Al site (Er Al ) in 𝛼−Al 2 ⁢O 3 . First-principles relaxations confirm the structural stability of Er Al . We then use the local trigonal crystal-field symmetry to classify the Er-derived impurity levels by irreducible representations and to derive polarization-resolved electric-dipole selection rules, explicitly identifying the symmetry-allowed 𝑓−𝑑 hybridization channels. Kubo-Greenwood absorption spectra computed from Kohn-Sham states quantitatively corroborate these symmetry predictions. Furthermore, we connect the calculated intra-4⁢𝑓 line strengths to Judd-Ofelt theory, clarifying the role of 4⁢𝑓−5⁢𝑑 admixture in enabling optical activity. Notably, we predict a characteristic absorption near 1.47 µ⁢m (telecom band), relevant for on-chip amplification and emission. To our knowledge, a symmetry-resolved first-principles treatment of Er:Al 2 ⁢O 3 with an explicit Judd-Ofelt interpretation has not been reported, providing a transferable framework for tailoring rare-earth dopants in wide-band-gap oxides for integrated photonics. Our results for the optical spectra are in good agreement with experimental data. The resulting symmetry-based selection rules translate directly to polarization-dependent coupling in Al 2 ⁢O 3 integrated photonic waveguides and resonators, enabling device-level design of TE/TM-mode interaction with Er emitters in the 1.5-µ⁢m telecom band.

Er-doped Al2O3↗

Applying the Risk Management Framework: The Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager

As part of a multiyear effort, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has dedicated resources to understand and identify cybersecurity weaknesses in distributed energy resources (DERs) by performing assessments. Due to a lack of standardization and rapidly increasing adoption of DERs, there is a critical need to address cybersecurity needs for DER systems in an interactive way. Furthermore, federal agencies, which are required to obtain an authority to operate, are challenged by the complexities of including their DERs. To help meet this need, in early 2020, NREL released the Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework (DERCF) and accompanying Web application. This process is supported by the Risk Management Framework (RMF) developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. This project, referred to as the DERCF RMF application, expands on the existing DERCF work to include methods that support walking a user through the seven RMF steps. The tool will be available for download at no cost from [link ]. The purpose of this paper is to describe the steps the DERCF team at NREL took to understand Steps 1-5 of the RMF process. Additionally, this document will identify future work on the first five steps as well as a plan for Steps 6 and 7.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗