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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 469 records · Page 26
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Machine Learning-based False Data Injection Attack Detection and Localization in Power Grids

Cyberattacks on critical infrastructures can be catastrophic and bring nations to their knees. Therefore, detecting these attacks is crucial and challenging. This paper presents a novel approach for detecting and locating cyberattacks affecting an electrical power system. The adversary employs a man-in-the-middle technique to inject false data into the communication between distributed energy resources (DER) and Microgrid Controller (MGC) with the goal of disrupting power delivery. The approach for detection and localization is based on integrating multiple machine learning-based anomaly detection models that combine network traffic data and grid measurements. Experiments are performed to assess the method's performance using a hardware-in-the-loop real-time simulation testbed which includes Modbus TCP/IP communication. Power system topology and operating conditions are based on actual topology and real-world data provided by the Holy Cross Energy utility network. Results confirm that the method can be successfully employed for detecting and localizing cyberattacks.

Leao, Bruno P.↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Privacy-Preserving Strategy for the Trust Layer of the Energy Grid of Things Distributed Energy Resource Management System

Emergent from the shadows of the traditional grid flaws, the Smart Grid (SG) idea was born and led by government mandates toward cleaner energy production. The SG represents the next generation of electricity distribution systems that subsume recent technological innovations. It uses digital communication between its components and entities to attain more automation, self-sufficiency, and reliability. Unfortunately, this relatively new concept is not flawless; the intrinsic reliance on increased digital communication spreads open attack paths for adversaries. Therefore, finding solutions that address information exchange vulnerabilities has become imperative. The Energy Grid of Things (EGoT) is Portland State University’s (PSU’s) implementation of a Distributed Energy Resource Management System (DERMS). The EGoT DERMS requires access to customers’ information to achieve operational objectives. The system’s access to customers’ information needs to be restricted such that it does not violate customers’ privacy. Applying privacy protection models such as K-anonymity to EGoT DERMS sub-components safeguards that privacy. This thesis work proposes a strategy to ensure communication in the EGoT DERMS is privacy-preserving and secure. Specifically, it provides an approach to applying the Mondrian Algorithm to ensure data within the system excludes Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and provides means for securing the communication according to industry standards (IEEE 2030.5). Results suggest that the generalization hierarchy derived for the EGoT DERMS exhibits an Identical Generalization Hierarchy structure. Guarantees of sameness manifested in the test feeder topology would not hold in real-world scenarios. This thesis work proposes a strategy to ensure communication in the EGoT DERMS is privacy-preserving and secure. Specifically, it provides an approach to applying the Mondrian Algorithm to ensure data within the system excludes Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and provides means for securing the communication according to industry standards (IEEE 2030.5). Results suggest that the generalization hierarchy derived for the EGoT DERMS exhibits an Identical Generalization Hierarchy structure. Guarantees of sameness manifested in the test feeder topology would not hold in real-world scenarios.

Alsiad, Mohammed↗
DOE OSTI2025

Provable Security and Resilience in Critical Infrastructure – Next Steps

With the conclusion of the Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project on Provable Security and Resilience (PSaR) in Critical Infrastructure, we present forward-looking technical concepts and strategies that build on the project’s outcomes and INL’s long-standing expertise in infrastructure protection. The challenge is to protect critical infrastructure and functions much more efficiently at scale than capable adversaries can attack at scale. After summarizing progress and ongoing work we’ll discuss what are the challenges that remain and what are new/emerging technologies, strategies, and processes to meet those challenges. Finally, we’ll layout concepts that integrate with other protection work in the coming year and beyond. For example, building secure function-specific platforms based on the seL4 microkernel, and considering the successes of Cyber-Informed Engineering as a model for engage, collaboration, and adoption. We look forward to your feedback and collaboration as we refine and expand this vision.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Distributed State Estimation Over Time-Varying Graphs: Exploiting the Age-of-Information

Here, we study the problem of designing a distributed observer for an LTI system over a time-varying communication graph. The limited existing work on this topic imposes various restrictions either on the observation model or on the sequence of communication graphs. In contrast, we propose a single-time-scale distributed observer that works under mild assumptions. Specifically, our communication model only requires strong-connectivity to be preserved over non-overlapping, contiguous intervals that are even allowed to grow unbounded over time. We show that under suitable conditions that bound the growth of such intervals, joint observability is sufficient to track the state of any discrete-time LTI system exponentially fast, at any desired rate. We also develop a variant of our algorithm that is provably robust to worst-case adversarial attacks, provided the sequence of graphs is sufficiently connected over time. The key to our approach is the notion of a "freshness-index" that keeps track of the age-of-information being diffused across the network. Such indices enable nodes to reject stale estimates of the state, and, in turn, contribute to stability of the error dynamics.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Security Enhancements for Distributed Energy Resource Systems Interconnected with Distribution Networks: Final Technical Report

The revised IEEE 1547 Standard defines new complex communication-adjustable voltage and frequency regulation and ride-through characteristics, while maintaining the general antiislanding requirement for unintentional islanding situations. Unintentional islanding is prohibited while intentional islanding is specifically allowed, thus effectively enabling microgrid operation mode. Further, IEEE 1547-2018 Standard introduces new requirements in terms of interoperability so that the DER plant/circuit segments may be seamlessly integrated with the utility networks but at the same time become vulnerable to a cyber-attack. Traditional cybersecurity measures including encryption, authentication and role-based access control may not be fully implementable to all communication protocols specified in the IEEE 1547 Standard. Therefore, in this project we have identified, researched, implemented and tested several cyberphysical approaches that rely mostly on the behavior of the DER circuit and may help with validating the incoming command and control action potentially coming through an insecure communications channel. Additionally, we have built semantic models and communications profiles for DER facilities and have implemented lightweight IEC 61850 based publisher-subscriber GOOSE messaging mechanism, with security extensions in terms of authentication and encryption. The project proposed information models for integration into UCA OpenFMB 2.0 profiles focusing on grid code compliance.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Experimental Study of Transport Behavior of Swellable Microgel Particles in Superpermeable Channels for Conformance Control

Summary Gel treatment is an effective way to attack excessive water production during oil development. The transport behavior of gel materials in reservoirs is of crucial importance to the effectiveness of gel treatments. The aim of this paper is investigating the transport behavior of swellable micrometer-sized preformed particle gels (PPGs, or microgels) through superpermeable (super-K) channels. Sandpacks with permeabilities ranging from 27 to 221 darcies were used to mimic the super-K channels. Multiple pressure sensors were applied along the sandpack models to monitor the propagation behavior of the microgels. The tested microgel particles could transport through the super-K channels, and a higher driving pressure gradient was required when the particle/pore size ratio was larger. The pressure gradient distribution along the super-K channels was relatively uniform when the particle/pore ratio was low (less than 1.3). However, the inlet section would show increasingly higher pressure gradients as the particle/pore ratio was increased, indicating increased difficulty in propagation. The propagation of the gel particles was significantly slower compared with the carrying fluid. The delayed propagation behavior was more pronounced when the particle/pore ratio was higher. The injection pressure was much less sensitive to the injection flow rate compared with a Newtonian fluid. The gel dispersion exhibited an apparent shear thinning (pseudoplastic) behavior when transporting through the porous channels. Breakage of the gel particles was observed especially at high superficial velocities. The particle breakage was partially responsible for the apparent shear thinning behavior. The breakage phenomenon was in favor of deep placement of the gel particles. The channel permeabilities were significantly reduced by the microgels, bringing sufficient resistance to subsequent waterflooding (more than 99.5%). At given matching size conditions, softer gels were more likely to establish in-depth placement and uniform water blocking capacity in the channels. The microgel particles exhibited salinity-responsive behavior to the post-brine flush. The gel particles could shrink and reswell according to the salinity of the injected water. Possibilities were discussed to use this salinity-responsive behavior. Also, the microgels exhibited a particular disproportionate permeability reduction (DPR) effect. After gel injection, the channel permeability to water flow was reduced by more than 20 to 92 times of the permeability to oil flow. This work provides important support to understand the transport behavior of gel particles in super-K channels. The achievements are helpful for gel product selection and gel treatment design.

Engineering↗
DOE OSTI2022

Memory forensic analysis of a programmable logic controller in industrial control systems

In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are used to automate physical processes such as nuclear plants and power grid stations, and are often subject to cyber attacks. As in conventional IT domain, the memory analysis of the PLCs can help answer important forensic questions about the attack, such as the presence of malicious firmware, injection of modified control logic (the program running on the PLC), and manipulation of I/O devices (e.g., sensors and actuators). Unlike conventional IT domain, PLCs have heterogeneous hardware architecture, proprietary firmware and control software, making it challenging to employ a unified framework for their memory forensics. For merely extracting artifacts of forensic importance, reverse-engineering the firmware is a tedious task, and the effort needs to be repeated for every PLC model. As a community, a step-wise approach to tackle this challenge is to analyze the memory of specific PLCs, and subsequently find a generic framework applicable to all PLCs. Our work is a step forward in this direction. By following a methodology that focuses on the functional layer of PLCs instead of reverse engineering the firmware, we analyze the digital forensic artifacts available in a common PLC, Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61. Before diving into the memory dump, we analyze the PLC control software to create a list of important artifacts that are sure to exist in the PLC memory dump. The approach employs a setup where PLC control software RSLogix-5000 is connected to the PLC, and the memory dump can be obtained as and when needed. We create test cases that sequentially highlight each category of artifacts, followed by an examination of the resultant impact on memory. After attaining the listed artifacts, we employ conventional string and known data searches to extract interesting information present in this PLC's memory. The memory analysis profile, presented as a Python library and shared with the community, can help a forensic investigator to readily extract forensic artifacts from the same model's controller. The adopted approach may help researchers in creating memory profile of other PLCs, and ultimately formulating a generic PLC memory analysis framework.

Rais, Muhammad Haris↗
DOE OSTI2023

PathTrace and MPVEASI: A Path Analysis Comparative Validation Study

Developed in 2018, PathTrace is a software package built with the intention of making path analysis simple and intuitive. PathTrace is a top-down pathway analysis software where a user is able to explore vulnerable pathways into a facility. The intention of utilizing a software tool like PathTrace is to characterize an existing physical protection system (PPS) and to upgrade the system to achieve a high level of response interruption, or probability of interruption (P I ) of the adversary. There are four steps for conducting path analysis using PathTrace. The first step is to identify an image to use to build the model and scale the model within PathTrace using a section of known distance (wall or fence perimeter, for example). The scaling process will produce a grid of cells through which the user is able to build a model. The second step is to fill out the grid of cells with four categories of materials: Barriers, Detection Areas, Jumps, and Targets. These materials apply associated delay and detection values to the cells in which they are applied. The third step is to represent the adversary and response forces. The adversaries are represented by their capabilities in interacting with the materials identified in step two, and the response is represented by how quickly they will be able to respond to an adversary attack. Finally, the user is able to take all of the information from the previous three steps and perform a Most Vulnerable Path (MVP) analysis. In this stage, the user is able to visualize vulnerable adversary pathways and reason about how to upgrade these pathways to provide a high level of P I .

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2020

Mechanisms of Enhanced Antibacterial Activity by Reduced Chitosan-Intercalated Nontronite

Previous studies have documented the antibacterial activity of certain iron-containing clays. However, the repulsion between negatively charged bacteria and the clay surface makes this process inefficient. The objective of this study is to improve the bactericidal efficiency of clays by reversing their surface charge from negative to positive. To achieve this objective, here positively charged chitosan, a nontoxic and biodegradable polymer, was intercalated into nontronite NAu-2. Chitosan-intercalated NAu-2 (C-NAu-2) was chemically reduced to obtain reduced C-NAu-2 (rC-NAu-2). Relative to reduced nontronite (rNAu-2), the antibacterial activity of rC-NAu-2 is higher and more persistent over a pH range of 6–8. The close spatial association between positively charged rC-NAu-2 and negatively charged bacteria increases the chances of cell membrane attack by extracellular ROS, the influx of soluble Fe 2+ into the bacterial cell, and the yield of intracellular ROS. All these factors contribute to the enhanced antibacterial activity of rC-NAu-2. In contrast to rNAu-2 treated E. coli cells, where membrane damage and intracellular ROS/Fe accumulation are restricted to the polar regions, the close bacteria–clay association in rC-NAu-2 results in nonselective membrane damage and more uniform intracellular ROS/Fe distribution across whole bacterial cells. These results advance the antibacterial model by highlighting the importance of bacteria–clay interactions to the antibacterial activity of Fe-bearing clays.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

An End-to-End Framework for Verifying and Validating Manufacturing Design Integrity

Cyber attacks on networked automated manufacturing systems can severely impact part quality. In fact, malicious modifications may be introduced at any point during the manufacturing lifecycle. Therefore, it is vital to verify and validate that manufactured parts conform to their designs. This chapter describes a formal, end-to-end framework that verifies and validates the design integrity of manufactured parts by considering all potential points of alteration during precision manufacturing processes. The framework prevents unauthorized changes to computer-aided designs, verifies the correctness of translations from CAD models to G-code, maintains the integrity of G-code transferred to manufacturing machines, verifies the runtime execution of G-code and part geometry, and considers the contexts of manufacturing machine operations and how manufactured parts could be altered.

Jablonski, Matthew [Cybersecurity Manufacturing In↗
DOE OSTI2025

Modeling Cyber Supply Chain Incidents with Multilayered Graph Motifs

As noted within the literature, supply chain includes people and organizations---manufacturers, integrators, and third-party vendors---that are involved in one or more stages of a product lifecycle. Since supply chains, by definition, include organizations and people, supply chain risk management activities must consider dependencies between an organization's business processes and third-party resources. Just as adversarial tactics can be implemented via techniques implemented via networked computer systems, so can such tactics be expressed via legal business relationships. A cyber incident may have an exponential impact downstream, for example, by leveraging a product's distribution channel (e.g. malicious updates in SolarWinds, buggy updates in CrowdStrike). Similarly, legitimate and legal business relationships also affect the attack surface exposure of systems, enabling long-term persistence and/or unknown impacts to product quality that are hard to detect. This paper catalogs several recent digital supply chain incidents and applies a multilayered network formalism to develop structural indicators (graph motifs) that reflect potentially-adversarial behavior. Finally, we compare and contrast the characteristics of adversarial tactics (e.g. Loss of Availability, Data Collection) that leverage cyber-physical dependencies to those that leverage legal organizational relationships.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Performance of Refractory Liners for Molten Chloride Salt Thermal Energy Storage Systems

A chloride-based molten-salt system that uses a ternary blend of MgCl2/KCl/NaCl is investigated to provide higher temperature thermal energy storage capability. Despite higher thermal stability, molten chlorides present several unique challenges, including the design of internal refractory-ceramic liners to prevent the corrosion and thermal stress of alloy tank shells. This work discusses issues and potential solutions related to containment of molten chloride salt, specifically the optimization of the refractory material at the molten salt interface (hot face). The down-selected hot face candidate limits permeation of salt through the material and forms a highly stable secondary surface phase in equilibrium with the molten salt. A mortar is created using the corrosion resistant hot face brick. Brick and mortar composite are subjected to mechanical stress/strain analysis, in order to calculate composite material properties and better inform thermomechanical models. The U.S. Department of Energy Generation 3 (DOE Gen3) program seeks to develop higher efficiency CSP plants that can provide cost-competitive, flexible power in the U.S. electric grid. The proposed Gen3 Liquid Pathway CSP plant closely resembles the configuration of current nitrate salt power towers with two-tank storage (Gen2). The differences between Gen2 and Gen3 include the types of compatible materials used in salt storage tank construction. Stainless steel loses strength at Gen3 temperatures, and although nickel superalloys would be capable of withstanding sustained high temperatures, these materials are prohibitively expensive at scale. Uninsulated tank shells also pose a significant risk as common steels are highly susceptible to chemical attack from molten chloride salt. To address these concerns, refractory-ceramic based containment materials are proposed to line the inside of the hot and cold storage tanks. In doing so, stainless or carbon steel shells may be used in construction depending on the level of insulation provided. The composition of the internal liner requires careful consideration to maximize the efficacy of multiple parameters including corrosion resistance, strength at operating temperature, durability, and cost. This is particularly true for the material at the interface with the salt, known as the "hot face", which is responsible for protecting the insulating layers between the tank shell and the hot face brick layer. The molten salt in this system is superheated over 300 °C above its freeze temperature. Therefore, unlike other industrial processes which use refractory-lined vessels, it is not expected that a freeze plane will develop in the hot face. Therefore, the hot face must be designed to withstand chemical corrosion and inhibit permeation of molten salt into the insulating layers. A down selection was performed to identify a hot face candidate best equipped to maintain thermal, mechanical, and chemical integrity when exposed to molten salt over extended periods of time. Long-duration chemical capability experiments were conducted with the down selected hot face refractory fully immersed in molten chloride salt for up to 3000 hours. The average salt penetration does not exceed 100 microns. When extrapolated to 20 and 30 years of continuous exposure, the expected salt penetration depth is approximately 2.0 mm and 2.9 mm, respectively. A magnesium-rich secondary phases develops at the salt/refractory interface. X-ray diffraction identifies the material as forsterite (Mg2SiO4), which is reported to form synthetically in molten chloride salt solutions. These results suggest the selected hot face will adequately inhibit salt permeation. While there is optimism that the hot face brick will inhibit salt permeation, mortar joints are typically the weakest point of a refractory brick liner. From a thermochemical perspective, differing thermal expansion coefficients may result in the mortar and brick to grow independent of each other, creating gaps through which molten salt can penetrate. To address this issue, NREL has developed an in-house mortar composed of the down selected hot face brick that has been shown to be compatible with the salt. Compressive stress/strain analyses have been performed on the brick/ mortar composites to generate stress/strain curves. Modulus of elasticity and Poisson's ratio of the composite may be calculated from the stress/strain curves, in order to provide more representative data to finite element mechanical models for accurate approximation of stress on the tank shell and the amount of thermal expansion expected within the tank liner.

41 EE - Solar Energy Technologies Office (EE-4S)↗
DOE OSTI2020

Observed volatilization behavior of silicon carbide in flowing hydrogen above 2000 K

In this work, the intrinsic compatibility of silicon carbide (SiC) and hydrogen (H 2 ) at high temperatures (2000-2473 K) and pressure near one atmosphere was evaluated through a combination of thermodynamic calculations and hot hydrogen exposure testing. Thermodynamic calculations predict the decomposition of SiC in a hydrogen environment to form free silicon (Si) and free carbon (C). Free Si is predicted to vaporize from the surface as a volatile species, while free C may interact with H 2 to form the hydrocarbons CH 4 (T < 2100 K) or C 2 H 2 (T > 2100 K). Coupons of high purity chemical vapor deposition (CVD) β-SiC were exposed to slowly flowing hydrogen at temperatures ranging between 2000 and 2473 K. SiC experienced active attack as the result of H 2 exposure, exhibiting linear weight loss kinetics and an Arrhenius dependence of weight loss on exposure temperature. The linear volatilization constant was experimentally evaluated to correspond with an activation energy of 370 ± 18 kJ/mol. Due to the dependence of observed corrosion rates on gas velocity, corrosion of SiC in flowing H 2 was determined to be governed by external mass transfer of volatile Si species through the boundary layer. Experimentally derived mass losses were in good agreement with mass losses predicted by a boundary layer limited gas diffusion model.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because it can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of other cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

cyber-physical systems↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because they can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

alfalfa↗
DOE OSTI2023

Assessing the Impact of Cybersecurity Attacks on Energy Systems

This paper investigates the cyber resiliency of future power systems with high penetration of distributed energy resources using advanced distributed and (or) hierarchical control architectures. Specifically, we simulate cyberattacks on three prototypical use cases, and we identify attack scenarios that are the most damaging to the overall system performance. We show that these attacks can have a significant impact on grid operation. Results provide additional insights into the robustness of the system to the most common cyberattacks.

buildings↗