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National Security Science and Technology Initiative: Air Cargo Screening

The non-intrusive inspection (NII) of consolidated air cargo carried on commercial passenger aircraft continues to be a technically challenging, high-priority requirement of the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), the Transportation Security Agency and the Federal Aviation Administration. The goal of deploying a screening system that can reliably and cost-effectively detect explosive threats in consolidated cargo without adversely affecting the flow of commerce will require significant technical advances that will take years to develop. To address this critical National Security need, the Battelle Memorial Institute (Battelle), under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with four of its associated US Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories (Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, Idaho, and Brookhaven), conducted a research and development initiative focused on identifying, evaluating, and integrating technologies for screening consolidated air cargo for the presence of explosive threats. Battelle invested $8.5M of internal research and development funds during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. The primary results of this effort are described in this document and can be summarized as follows: (1) Completed a gap analysis that identified threat signatures and observables, candidate technologies for detection, their current state of development, and provided recommendations for improvements to meet air cargo screening requirements. (2) Defined a Commodity/Threat/Detection matrix that focuses modeling and experimental efforts, identifies technology gaps and game-changing opportunities, and provides a means of summarizing current and emerging capabilities. (3) Defined key properties (e.g., elemental composition, average density, effective atomic weight) for basic commodity and explosive benchmarks, developed virtual models of the physical distributions (pallets) of three commodity types and three explosive benchmarks combinations, and conducted modeling and simulation studies to begin populating the matrix of commodities, threats, and detection technologies. (4) Designed and fabricated basic (homogeneous) commodity test pallets and fabricated inert stimulants to support experiments and to validate modeling/simulation results. (5) Developed/expanded the team's capabilities to conduct full-scale imaging (neutron and x-ray) experiments of air cargo commodities and explosive benchmarks. (6) Conducted experiments to improve the collection of trace particles of explosives from a variety of surfaces representative of air cargo materials by means of mechanical (air/vibration/pressure), thermal, and electrostatic methods. Air cargo screening is a difficult challenge that will require significant investment in both research and development to find a suitable solution to ensure the safety of passengers without significantly hindering the flow of commodities. The initiative funded by Battelle has positioned this group to make major contributions in meeting the air cargo challenge by developing collaborations, developing laboratory test systems, improving knowledge of the challenges (both technical and business) for air cargo screening, and increasing the understanding of the capabilities for current inspection methods (x-ray radiography, x-ray backscatter, etc.) and potential future inspection methods (neutron radiography, fusion of detector modalities, advanced trace detection, etc.). Lastly, air cargo screening is still an issue that will benefit from collaboration between Department of Energy Laboratories and Battelle. On January 7, 2010, DHS Secretary Napolitano joined White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs and Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security John Brennan to announce several recommendations DHS has made to the President for improving the technology and procedures used to protect air travel from acts of terrorism. (This announcement followed the 25 Dec'09 Delta/Northwest Airlines Flight 253 terror attack.) Secretary Napolitano outlined five recommendations DHS will pursue to enhance the safety of the traveling public. One of the five recommendations, read as follows: 'Establish a partnership on aviation security between DHS and the Department of Energy and its National Laboratories in order to develop new and more effective technologies to deter and disrupt known threats and proactively anticipate and protect against new ways by which terrorists could seek to board an aircraft.' In conclusion, it appears very timely that Battelle and its DOE lab partners initiated a serious collaboration on the air cargo topic, and that we should continue to work toward future collaboration in response to the government's needs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Comparison of Results from Recent NNSA and CEA Measurements of the 239 Pu(n, f) Prompt Fission Neutron Spectrum

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)/DP French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA)/DAM agreement on cooperation on fundamental science is a U.S.-French collaborative effort to combine intellectual and experimental resources and further the relevant nuclear science. Recently, both the NNSA and CEA experimental teams performed high-statistics measurements of the 239 Pu(n, f) prompt fission neutron spectrum (PFNS) at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, both of which were recently published in the journal Physical Review C. These separate measurements used the same experimental area and a common neutron detector array, but differ in many aspects, including background assessments, data acquisition systems and philosophies, fission detectors, and PFNS extraction techniques. Hence, some aspects of the experimental methods and associated uncertainties are highly correlated while others are independent. The results from both measurements broke new ground for PFNS measurements given their higher accuracy and more detailed study of corrections necessary for the measured quantity compared to existing literature measurements, and both will significantly impact PFNS nuclear data evaluations for the foreseeable future. Here, the focus of this work is to document a comparison of the results from these distinct measurements in terms of the acquired data, the PFNS results, and the measured average PFNS energies. While systematic differences between the PFNS results are present on the 1–3% level, the acquired data relative to each respective measurement at low incident neutron energies are in remarkable agreement, as are the conclusions regarding the magnitude and position of features in the PFNS relating to second-chance fission, third-chance fission, and pre-equilibrium neutron emission.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

The Livewire Data Platform

The Livewire Data Platform makes it easy to search and share transportation and mobility-related data. The Livewire Data Platform supports the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy’s Energy Efficient Mobility Systems (EEMS) Program goal of providing an affordable, efficient, safe, and accessible transportation future where mobility is decoupled from energy consumption. The Livewire Data Platform will function as a repository for all EEMS data and will support the following objectives: (1) EEMS partners with relevant data can catalog, document, and share project datasets via file-based sharing or Application Programming Interface (API) and can provides access management and usage auditing for those resources. (2) EEMS partners can securely search, discover and access shared datasets, their metadata, and available API’s. (3) External partners and researchers can discover EEMS capabilities and collaborate with EEMS partners.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Explosives Threat Assessment Working Group Terminology

This document contains a summary list of definitions for distribution to sites working with and working within the Department of Homeland Security’s Explosives Threat Assessment working group. The purpose of this list is to provide a unified framework for discussion between the various collaborating teams.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Tonlé Sap Food Security and Agriculture: Evaluating the Effects of Land Use and Hydrological Change on Ecosystem Vitality using Remotely-Sensed Data in the Tonlé Sap Lake Basin

Tonlé Sap Lake, the largest lake in Southeast Asia, is a critical source of fish and freshwater resources for the region. The health of this freshwater system is under pressure from accelerating dam construction, intensifying agriculture, deforestation, and changing climate patterns, forcing tradeoffs between immediate food security and the long-term vitality and productivity of the ecosystem. Efficient freshwater system monitoring is crucial to navigating these challenges. In collaboration with Conservation International, the Cambodian Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, and the Tonlé Sap Authority, we developed and tested remotely-sensed proxies for sub-indicators of the Freshwater Health Index (FHI), which is typically calculated using in situ datasets. We used landcover datasets derived from Landsat 5 Thematic Mapper (TM), Landsat 7 Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus (ETM+), Landsat 8 Operational Land Imager (OLI), PROBA-V Vegetation sensor (VGT), Sentinel-2 Multispectral Imager (MSI), Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR), and Envisat Medium Resolution Imaging Spectrometer (MERIS) as inputs to calculate land cover naturalness and bank modification. Additionally, we created a lake-level time series using a collection of altimetry data sources to estimate deviation from natural flow. We observed a decrease in landcover naturalness and a breakdown in the volume and regularity of annual lake levels from 2000-2020, reflecting increased pressure on water supply and agricultural productivity. At least 8% of forested areas in the basin were lost and rice harvest intensity increased over the course of the study period. These results will help our partners make informed decisions regarding freshwater management. Furthermore, our remotely-sensed FHI analysis can be replicated in other regions, providing decision makers with a snapshot of freshwater health in data-scarce environments.

Marco Vallejos↗

Joint the Center for Applied Scientific Computing

The Center for Applied Scientific Computing serves as Livermore Lab’s window to the broader computer science, computational physics, applied mathematics, and data science research communities. In collaboration with academic, industrial, and other government laboratory partners, we conduct world-class scientific research and development on problems critical to national security. CASC applies the power of high-performance computing and the efficiency of modern computational methods to the realms of stockpile stewardship, cyber and energy security, and knowledge discovery for intelligence applications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

The TRANSCEND University Consortium: An Overview - 20106

The UK government is committed to nuclear energy having an important role in delivering a secure, low-carbon and affordable energy future. Projections indicate that between now and 2035, ∼14 GW of new nuclear generating capacity may be built. Successful delivery of this strategy recognises the need for research and development, skills development and international collaboration as key enablers. One key area is the decommissioning and clean-up of all civil nuclear licensed sites and the implementation of geological disposal of highly active wastes, with a central component being a joined-up approach to nuclear R and D across government, industry and academia which benefits the UK economy and ensures the security of supply. Essential to public acceptance of this strategy remains a demonstrable ability to safely manage and dispose of waste, with acceptance directly linked to having scientifically robust routes for its safe clean-up and disposal. There therefore remains an ongoing need for further research in the areas of decommissioning, immobilisation and management of nuclear waste, and there is significant government and stakeholder support for such research. Given the needs of both new nuclear power generation and legacy wastes, there is a requirement to develop innovative approaches to waste management and decommissioning. Following on from earlier, highly successful projects supported by UK Research and Innovation's Energy Programme, the work of the TRANSCEND (Transformative Science and Engineering for Nuclear Decommissioning) consortium is part of the response to these needs, providing support to a strong and internationally leading group of researchers in this key technology area. The consortium is a collaboration between 11 universities, supported by 8 key industry partners, with a total funding of UK Pounds 9.5 M from the UK Engineering and Physical Research Council, the universities and key project partners. The research being carried out is multidisciplinary and covers both fundamental and applied topics, with 40 research projects clustered in four technical themes: integrated waste management; site decommissioning and remediation; spent fuels; and nuclear materials. Key aims of the consortium are to extend and further develop a relevant academic skill base in the UK associated with the needs of nuclear waste management and decommissioning, to train the next generation of UK researchers, equipping them with skills and experiences relevant to nuclear waste management and decommissioning issues, and to carry out cutting-edge research that has the potential to provide new and innovative pathways to better management of both legacy and future nuclear wastes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of interinstitutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action— particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of inter-institutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action—particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Aperture center energy showcase

Sandia and Forest City have established a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA), and the partnership provides a unique opportunity to take technology research and development from demonstration to application in a sustainable community. A project under that CRADA, Aperture Center Energy Showcase, offers a means to develop exhibits and demonstrations that present feedback to community members, Sandia customers, and visitors. The technologies included in the showcase focus on renewable energy and its efficiency, and resilience. These technologies are generally scalable, and provide secure, efficient solutions to energy production, delivery, and usage. In addition to establishing an Energy Showcase, support offices and conference capabilities that facilitate research, collaboration, and demonstration were created. The Aperture Center project focuses on establishing a location that provides outreach, awareness, and demonstration of research findings, emerging technologies, and project developments to Sandia customers, visitors, and Mesa del Sol community members.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Advanced Transmission Technologies –GETs and HPCs Session 3: HPCs and Building Actions Plans to Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Provable Security and Resilience in Critical Infrastructure – Next Steps

With the conclusion of the Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project on Provable Security and Resilience (PSaR) in Critical Infrastructure, we present forward-looking technical concepts and strategies that build on the project’s outcomes and INL’s long-standing expertise in infrastructure protection. The challenge is to protect critical infrastructure and functions much more efficiently at scale than capable adversaries can attack at scale. After summarizing progress and ongoing work we’ll discuss what are the challenges that remain and what are new/emerging technologies, strategies, and processes to meet those challenges. Finally, we’ll layout concepts that integrate with other protection work in the coming year and beyond. For example, building secure function-specific platforms based on the seL4 microkernel, and considering the successes of Cyber-Informed Engineering as a model for engage, collaboration, and adoption. We look forward to your feedback and collaboration as we refine and expand this vision.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Collaborative Approaches in Developing Environmental and Safety Management Systems for Commercial Space Transportation

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) licenses and permits U.S. commercial space launch and reentry activities, and licenses the operation of non-federal launch and reentry sites. ASTs mission is to ensure the protection of the public, property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States during commercial space transportation activities and to encourage, facilitate, and promote U.S. commercial space transportation. AST faces unique challenges of ensuring the protection of public health and safety while facilitating and promoting U.S. commercial space transportation. AST has developed an Environmental Management System (EMS) and a Safety Management System (SMS) to help meet its mission. Although the EMS and SMS were developed independently, the systems share similar elements. Both systems follow a Plan-Do-Act-Check model in identifying potential environmental aspects or public safety hazards, assessing significance in terms of severity and likelihood of occurrence, developing approaches to reduce risk, and verifying that the risk is reduced. This paper will describe the similarities between ASTs EMS and SMS elements and how AST is building a collaborative approach in environmental and safety management to reduce impacts to the environment and risks to the public.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)↗

Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. • Life-cycle cost analysis can be a useful tool in safeguards design. • An important obstacle to straight forward application of life-cycle cost analysis is that there is no single organization responsible for the entire life-cycle cost of the facility. • The Safeguards Effectiveness Report (SGER) is proposed as a focus for the safeguards design activities, and is intended to be a living document that contains increasing safeguards relevant scope and content as the facility design emerges. Further work is required in a number of areas. The authors note that other studies supported by NGSI are addressing the development of requirements and performance criteria, as well as contributing to the design toolkit through the development of technology, methodology, and safeguards guidelines for designers. With respect to further development of the SBD design process, the authors recommend: • In the short term, conduct a workshop with interested industry representatives, to ensure that their perspectives and needs are factored into further development. • In the short term, provide NGSI SBD project documents to IAEA, and support them in the conduct of an ‘SBD Workshop II.” • In the medium term, continue to support the SBD demonstration work started with the Next Generation Nuclear Plant project. • In the longer term, conduct further studies to examine the integration of SBD into projects with concurrent consideration of physical security and safety.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NCSP – AWE Collaboration [Slides]

Several points of collaboration between NCSP and AWE are noted, including the CIDAAS IS589 installation plan, CIDAAS testing, nuclear verification and detector physics, nuclear material control and nuclear security, and hands on criticality safety training.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Preliminary Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of the UTA–2 Subcritical Linear Accelerator–Driven System

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s mission includes establishing a reliable supply of 99 Mo without highly enriched uranium. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) supports this objective through collaborative research and development with industrial partners. Niowave Inc., a current partner, is currently designing a subcritical linear accelerator-driven system (ADS) and preparing for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s licensing process. Niowave’s system has the potential to efficiently supply medical radioisotopes. The technology includes a superconducting electron accelerator and a pile of both natural and low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets. The process fissions uranium and many valuable isotopes can then be extracted from the targets. Niowave is currently iterating through conceptual and detailed design processes for several system sizes. This report discusses UTA–2, which is at the demonstration stage. UTA–2 will validate numerical modeling results with experimental measurements before progressing to the detailed design of UTA–3, the commercial-sized ADS. The thermal-hydraulic behavior of the UTA–2 core design was numerically investigated using STAR-CCM+, as described in this report. STAR-CCM+, a state-of-the-art computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software that was commercially developed by Siemens, has an extensive user base and a set of validation studies. It is also compliant with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers’ Nuclear Quality Assurance 1 standard. Three cases are investigated in this report. Case 1 quantified the temperature field within the UTA–2 assembly and water tank using only conduction as the method of thermal energy transport. This simplified approach was overly conservative and yielded wetted cladding temperatures above the coolant saturation temperature. In this case, the maximum temperature of the wetted cladding surface of the highest power rod exceeded the saturation temperature of water by 63.8°C. Because of the overly conservative approach taken in Case 1 and its negative subcooled margin, buoyancy-driven natural circulation flow physics were implemented in Case 2. Adding coolant motion significantly distributed the thermal energy of the system through convective heat transfer. This relatively small amount of convective heat transfer significantly reduced system temperatures and increased the subcooled margin from –63.8 to 61.3°C. This margin confirmed that no boiling was expected during normal operation of UTA–2 at 230 W. Case 3 had no additional physics models but considered an overpower event during which the power of each LEU and natural uranium rod was at its respective peak values. This resulted in a study with the total assembly power equal to 176% of the nominal power of 230 W considered in Cases 1 and 2. The resulting natural circulation flows were slightly enhanced. The subcooled margin decreased slightly to 46.3°C, which is still a significant margin to local boiling of the water within the tank. This margin confirmed that no boiling was expected during an abnormal operation of UTA–2 at 406 W.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Cultivating a culture of inclusivity in heliophysics

A large number of heliophysicists from across career levels, institution types, and job titles came together to support a poster at Heliophysics 2050 and the position papers for the 2024 Heliophysics decadal survey titled “Cultivating a Culture of Inclusivity in Heliophysics,” “The Importance of Policies: It’s not just a pipeline problem,” and “Mentorship within Heliophysics.” While writing these position papers, the number of people who privately shared disturbing stories and experiences of bullying and harassment was shocking. The number of people who privately expressed how burned out they were was staggering. The number of people who privately spoke about how they considered leaving the field for their and their family’s health was astounding. And for as much good there is in our community, it is still a toxic environment for many. If we fail to do something now, our field will continue to suffer. While acknowledging the ongoing growth that we as individuals must work toward, we call on our colleagues to join us in working on organizational, group, and personal levels toward a truly inclusive culture, for the wellbeing of our colleagues and the success of our field. This work includes policies, processes, and commitments to promote: accountability for bad actors; financial security through removing the constant anxiety about funding; prioritization of mental health and community through removing constant deadlines and constant last-minute requests; a collaborative culture rather than a hyper-competitive one; and a community where people can thrive as whole persons and do not have to give up a healthy or well-rounded life to succeed.

mental health↗