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People come to work, wanting, expecting, and planning to do a good job, but people tend to do what makes sense to them in their context. Understanding basic human factors and establishing controls to prevent common human factors issues helps ensure that a criticality accident will never happen again.
This project leveraged advances in machine learning based data analysis techniques and untargeted analytical methods for organic analysis to progress nuclear nonproliferation technologies beyond current capabilities. The developed approaches can be used to detect and identify complex chemical fingerprints of facilities of interest. These techniques have been developed for fields such as metabolomics and genomics but have not been applied to nuclear nonproliferation applications. Adaptation of these techniques for volatile organic compound analysis has far reaching application within the scientific community including environmental chemistry, atmospheric physics, and climate sciences.
The following “INECP Case Studies” document contains two case studies: Corrosion-Resistant Valves and Case Study: Dual-Use Items for Gas Centrifuge. The content of both of these case studies was approved for unlimited release in 2013. The case studies have been reorganized or slightly altered to make them more easily presentable during virtual or in-person International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) programmatic trainings and engagements. The document also contains the original case studies with LA-UR release numbers. The original studies were included in the document as a reference for derivative classification and export control.
The goal of this project is to develop high-resolution decay energy spectroscopy (DES) of actinides using magnetic microcalorimeters (MMCs). This requires testing different techniques to fully enclose a source inside an absorber and coupling it to an MMC with optimized energy resolution and speed. The goal is to develop DES with MMCs to allow its transfer to the IAEA Nuclear Materials Laboratory (NML).
Physical security during World War II was important to maintaining the secrecy of the Manhattan Project, the government’s wartime effort to create the atomic bomb. In a perceived race against Nazi Germany to do so, physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, the Lab’s first director, and General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, needed a secluded place to build the clandestine Lab.
Quantum sensing has the potential to provide ultrasensitive measurements of physical phenomenon. Unlike quantum computing, quantum sensing is available now, though in general at research laboratories. A notable commercially-available quantum sensing device is the ubiquitous Superconducting Quantum Interference Device (SQUID), which can measure faint magnetic fields such as found in the human brain. Quantum sensing is used for direct measurement of environmental phenomenon, such as electromagnetic fields and accelerations, which then are used for certain applications. For example, quantum sensing of accelerations is useful for Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) applications. It is not clear, however, how quantum sensing can be useful for nuclear safeguards. This report provides first a background in quantum sensing, followed by a survey of potential safeguards utilizations of quantum sensing. Several potential safeguards applications are identified and explored.
When designing a product intended to perform a certain function and satisfy some set of criteria, the standard engineering method to assess its ability to perform is to test it. This nearly universal concept works consistently, assuring proper function and generally avoiding or mitigating the consequence of failure to within acceptable limits. What would happen if the product developers were told that they must continue to certify and validate the performance without testing it, that the landscape in which the product must serve its purpose is constantly evolving, and that the product in question is the United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile? This is the position the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) finds itself in; the reliability of the stockpile must be verified without actually testing it to see if it works as intended.
This report discusses the progress on the collaboration between Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) and Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) on the sodium fire research in fiscal year (FY) 2021 and is a continuation of the FY2020 progress report. In this report, we only report the changes made to the current sodium pool fire model in MELCOR. We modified and corrected many control functions to enhance the current model from the FY2020 report. This year’s enhancements relate to better agreement of the suspended aerosol measurement from JAEA’s F7 series tests. Staff from Sandia and JAEA conducted the validation studies of the sodium pool fire model in MELCOR. To validate this pool fire model with the latest enhancement, JAEA sodium pool fire experiments (F7-1 and F7-2) were used. The results of the calculation, including the code-to-code comparisons are discussed as well as suggestions for further model improvement. Finally, recommendations are made for new MELCOR simulations for FY2022.
The historical evolution of safeguards implementation, Four safeguards strengthening measures implemented by the IAEA post-Iraq, The importance of an additional protocol
Outreach is an important element for a State to successfully bring into force its safeguards agreement and protocols. Outreach is key to implementing safeguards obligations.
Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.
The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.
Bibliographies are included for the following panels: Panel 1: Taking Stock of Transatlantic Deterrence: Evaluating Progress and Anticipating Emerging Issues and Panel 2: Nuclear Burden Sharing: How Important to Transatlantic Security?
This report summarizes the outcomes of a 3-year NA-22 exploratory project to research the feasibility of tagging uranium materials, especially nuclear fuels, for nuclear nonproliferation purposes. The experimental focus was on metallic uranium forms under prospective surface and bulk tagging manufacturing and detection scenarios. This study showed that a large number of tags (drawn from an even larger menu of options) could be successfully imparted and detected in both as-built and degraded conditions. These results pave the way for additional R&D studies of surface and bulk tagging of metallic forms of uranium.
RAP is the nation’s premier first-response resource for advising Federal, state, local and tribal decision-makers on steps to take to evaluate and minimize the hazards of a radiological or nuclear incident. RAP support ranges from giving technical information or advice over the telephone to sending highly trained personnel with state-of-the-art equipment to the incident site where team members help identify, characterize and minimize any radiological or nuclear hazards.
This document provides instructions for the use of the Safeguards Knowledge Repository (SKR). SKR was developed through a multi-laboratory collaboration funded by the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241).
This report describes newly developed external environment wind effects models of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage systems. The primary purpose of these wind effects models is to better understand particle deposition on SNF canisters in the context of chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking. The goal of this effort is to further the understanding and improve the wind effects model of the Nuclear Horizontal Modular Storage (NUHOMS ® ) Advanced Horizontal Storage Module–High Seismic (AHSM-HS) storage system in support of the planned Canister Deposition Field Demonstration (CDFD) project (Durbin et al. 2021, Suffield et al. 2021). The steps in this wind effects investigation begin with a validation case of comparing experimental data with a STAR-CCM+ computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model of the Belowground Vertical Dry Cask Simulator (BVDCS) with the external environment explicitly modeled. Next, a test case is performed with the AHSM-HS models comparing solar-loading strategies for a standalone and wind effects model in STAR-CCM+ and a standalone model in ANSYS Mechanical Parametric Design Language (APDL). The final portion of this study compares results of the validation exercise with applications of wind effects models for two horizontal storage systems, a site specific NUHOMS ® horizontal storage module and a NUHOMS ® AHSM-HS.
In FY2020, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and the Sanghani Center for Artificial Intelligence and Data Analytics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University entered a collaboration funded by Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development. The project’s mission was to take the first steps toward developing a demonstration prototype system that uses multiple machine learning and data analytics methods on largescale open data sources to identify new, developing, and/or undeclared nuclear programs. Given the SRNL team’s on-site perspective of events culminating in the DOE’s decision to pursue the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF), the team targeted the identification of events and indicators in retrospective datasets that pointed to the activity of “fissile core fabrication at the Savannah River Site” prior to the official announcement in May of 2018. A preliminary modeling pipeline was developed in FY20 that showed the datasets contained adequate signal for continuation of efforts. In FY21, a modular demonstration prototype modeling pipeline has continued in development for two text-based data sources: a broad internet archive (Webhose Ltd.) and a decahose Twitter database (i.e., a global sampling of one in every ten Tweets). The techniques that have been developed rely on graph theory and anomaly detection to identify contextual shifts in key words and phrases at various points in time such that indicators of events of interest could be identified and subsequently, events could be extracted from the corpuses. The foundational concept behind the approaches is that contextual shifts in key words and phrases can act as indicators of events of interest. Both datasets have proven successful in extracting events of interest related to pit production at the Savannah River Site prior to the official announcement. In addition, the pipelines have generated a wide range of events broadly summarized as: the awarding of DOE contracts at major sites, DOE investments in various programs, accidents at DOE national laboratories, speculations about the fate of pit production in the DOE complex, domestic and international shipments and receipts of nuclear materials at DOE sites, termination of non-proliferation agreements with Russia, termination of MOX, new weapons development approvals/testing, nuclear posture reviews, major DOE cleanup/production milestones, political opinions, and nuclear watch groups’ opinions, among many others.