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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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459 records · Page 26
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 36: Hot Topics in US Commercial Low-Level Waste Management

This panel focused on emerging issues in commercial LLW management in the US from the perspective of active members of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum, Inc. State, compact, federal and industry officials shared their views on a variety of timely and significant topics related to low-level radioactive waste management, disposal and related issues. Session no. 36 Co-Chairs, Patricia Holahan and Daniel Shrum, introduced the panelists and provided a summary of the purpose of the session. This Panel Session focused on several current and emerging issues impacting the commercial Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) management in the US from the perspective of active members of the Low-Level Waste Forum, Inc., States, Compact, as well as Federal and nuclear industries. The panelists provided different perspectives on number of key issues such as: LLW disposal facility status and updates (e.g.; in terms of disposal capacity, plans, and waste acceptance conditions). The panelists also addressed waste disposal rates and potential impacts of ongoing regulatory developments by the NRC and the concerned States. Other timely topics pertaining to the revision of 10CFR Part 61, the Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) and Transuranic (TRU) waste, and Very Low-Level Waste (VLLW) disposal issues were also addressed at this Session. Panelists with presentations: Hot Topics in US Commercial LLW Management (Joe Weismann); Texas LLRW Compact (David Carlson); Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Commission (John Salsman); Barnwell LLRW Disposal Facility (Benjamin Smith, Bill Carver)

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DOE OSTI2025

Integrating Safety, Security, and Nuclear Operations for Advanced Reactors

The traditional separation between safety, security, and operations teams has created significant barriers to achieving optimal outcomes. When security considerations are introduced late in the design process, they often conflict with already-established architectural, operational, or engineering parameters. Retrofitting security measures can lead to increased costs, schedule delays, and compromises in security effectiveness. For instance, the need to retrofit physical barriers or surveillance systems often results in trade-offs that could have been avoided with earlier input from security professionals. Delayed integration can also affect regulatory processes and result in licensing delays. Security reviews conducted at later stages frequently identify gaps that necessitate significant redesign efforts, impacting not only scope, schedule, and budget, but also adding risk and lowering stakeholder confidence in the project. This paper aims to address these challenges by identifying practical opportunities for integrating security considerations seamlessly with design and operations teams throughout the entire lifecycle of nuclear facilities—from conceptual design to commissioning and beyond. The research emphasizes the value of early and continuous collaboration among stakeholders to ensure that security measures are robust, operationally effective, and cost-efficient. By examining case studies, analyzing past incidents, and leveraging best practices from other high-security industries, this study highlights actionable strategies for bridging the gap between safety, security, and operations teams.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗
NASA NTRS2015

Subscale Validation of the Subsurface Active Filtration of Exhaust (SAFE) Approach to NTP Ground Testing

Brief History of NTP: Project Rover Began in 1950s by Los Alamos Scientific Labs (now Los Alamos National Labs) and ran until 1970s Tested a series of nuclear reactor engines of varying size at Nevada Test Site (now Nevada National Security Site) Ranged in scale from 111 kN (25 klbf) to 1.1 MN (250 klbf) Included Nuclear Furnace-1 tests Demonstrated the viability and capability of a nuclear rocket engine test program One of Kennedys 4 goals during famous moon speech to Congress Nuclear Engines for Rocket Vehicle Applications (NERVA) Atomic Energy Commission and NASA joint venture started in 1964 Parallel effort to Project Rover was focused on technology demonstration Tested XE engine, a 245-kN (55-klbf) engine to demonstrate startup shutdown sequencing. Hot-hydrogen stream is passed directly through fuel elements potential for radioactive material to be eroded into gaseous fuel flow as identified in previous programs NERVA and Project Rover (1950s-70s) were able to test in open atmosphere similar to conventional rocket engine test stands today Nuclear Furance-1 tests employed a full scrubber system Increased government and environmental regulations prohibit the modern testing in open atmosphere. Since the 1960s, there has been an increasing cessation on open air testing of nuclear material Political and national security concerns further compound the regulatory environment

Test Facilities↗
DOE OSTI2024

Integrated Off-gas System: A Preconceptual Design of an Integrated Off-Gas Treatment System

The U.S. has a vested interest in the advancement of nuclear energy to achieve aggressive net-zero goals, with reprocessing and recycling of used nuclear fuels (UNF) playing a vital role. It will not be possible to meet U.S. regulatory requirements without robust off-gas treatment, so it is crucial to advance treatment technologies to facilitate the design of future reprocessing facilities. For many years, teams of researchers across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratory complex have been investigating off-gas treatment technologies for the capture and removal of volatile radionuclides (i.e., 85 Kr, Xe, 14 C, and 129 I) and oxides of nitrogen (NO X ) that are produced from reprocessing. These investigations have been focused on developing individual technologies for the capture of Kr, Xe, iodine, and CO 2 . Capture technologies for each constituent were tested independently from one another by utilizing nonradioactive surrogates to simulate simplified off-gas streams. The tests have been relatively small, laboratory-scale experiments of up to approximately 1 L/minute total gas flow rate. To increase the readiness of these technologies for deployment, an integrated test system with a larger-scale capacity is needed to bridge the gap between promising bench scale and fully scalable UNF reprocessing off-gas treatment. This document contains the goals, design basis, functional requirements, preconceptual design, and cost estimates for an integrated off-gas demonstration system for the capture and removal of NO x , Kr, Xe, CO 2 , and iodine at 10× higher throughput than earlier laboratory studies. The order-of-magnitude cost estimate for this system is approximately $\$$886,000. Next phases include conceptual design, detailed design, fabrication, and commissioning.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Annual Status Report (FY 2024): Performance Assessment for the Integrated Disposal Facility

The purpose of this Annual Summary Report (ASR) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 is to evaluate the continued adequacy of the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) Performance Assessment (PA) and Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS). This report consolidates relevant monitoring data, modeling analyses, and regulatory reviews to demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the PA objectives and performance measures will be met, as required under DOE O 435.1. The ASR follows the guidance in DOE-STD-5002-2017, which provides a framework for maintaining the validity of the DAS through periodic assessment of facility performance and compliance with waste disposal requirements. The IDF is a near-surface disposal facility designed to receive and permanently dispose of low-level waste (LLW) and mixed low-level waste (MLLW) generated from Hanford Site operations. The facility consists of two double-lined disposal cells equipped with leak detection and leachates recovery systems to ensure environmental protection. Waste planned for disposal includes vitrified low-activity waste (LAW) and solid secondary waste (SSW) from the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). At the end of FY 2024, the IDF had not yet received any waste, as it remains in a pre-operational state. Disposal activities will begin with the hot commissioning of the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility using the Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) approach in Calendar Year (CY) 2025. This ASR justifies the continued adequacy of the PA and DAS by reviewing key documents and data sources. these sources are listed in Table A-2 in Appendix A.4): The Operating Disposal Authorization Statement (ODAS) for the IDF (DOE-EM, 2021) remains in effect, with no outstanding conditions or key issues affecting its implementation. Based on the comprehensive review of PA analyses, monitoring data, and regulatory compliance activities, this ASR concludes that the IDF remains in compliance with DOE O 435.1, and there is reasonable assurance that the PA performance objectives will be met once disposal operations commence in CY 2025.

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DOE OSTI2024

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Sampling and Analysis Plan for Investigation of Undeclared Nuclear Activities - 20104

The nuclear-centered energy policy in South Korea is moving towards a nuclear-free era. It also facilitates an action or progress on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) launched a new R and D project which attempts to verify nuclear activities via analyzing environmental samples. Environmental samples possibly contain significant radiological information relevant to past undeclared activities. In order to precisely verify them, it is essential to provide 1) the concrete information of target facilities, 2) appropriate methodologies and procedures, and 3) well-suited instrumentation and equipment corresponding to sample signatures. It is also important to provide scientific reliability or validity in any process such as sample collection, handling, transportation and laboratory analysis. Therefore, the information of nuclear facilities (fuel fabrication plant, graphite moderated reactor, reprocessing plant) in North Korea are reviewed in order to determine parameters for appropriate sampling methods representing a facility's characteristics. Secondly, a sampling procedure for radioactive elements is being developed based on international and domestic standards such as ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials), KS (Korean industrial Standards), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) manuals. The procedure contains some specific information including sampling process, sampling tools, amount of sample, sample identification, and other related information. Developing the qualified national guidelines is most important since sampling and analyzing results can be used as evidences of nuclear activities. The guideline developed through this work will clearly define various methodologies such as document verification, sampling procedures, collection methods, sample storage criteria, chain of custody, and transportation conditions. The final objective of this work is to establish the infrastructure and regulatory framework for assessment of nuclear activities, and provide a national guideline for sampling and analysis. This will bring confidence in the results and play a critical role in complete denuclearization progress in South Korea. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Considerations for Regulation and Practical Implementation of Analyses of Inadvertent Human Intrusion - 20169

Recommendations from the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identify the need to consider potential inadvertent human intrusion into a near-surface radioactive waste disposal facility when developing limits for radionuclide concentrations that can be disposed. The recommendations also provide perspective on expectations for performance criteria and general assumptions for such analyses. Inadvertent human intrusion analyses are conducted to address the potential failure of institutional controls and loss of memory of a disposal facility. The analyses consider potential consequences of human actions that result in unknowingly bringing waste to the surface. Inadvertent human intrusion scenarios consider potential impacts to someone involved in an activity that actually disturbs the waste (e.g., drilling or excavation of a basement) or that exposes the person to emanations from the waste (e.g., radioactive gases) and also for the case where there may be longer term exposures to waste that has been brought to the surface. In practice, inadvertent human intrusion analyses have proven to be a critical consideration for the development of waste classification systems and for the determination of disposal requirements and limitations on wastes that can be disposed at shallow depths. The IAEA implemented a project on Human Intrusion in the context of Disposal of Radioactive waste (HIDRA) to further explore the regulatory expectations and practical implementation of analyses of potential inadvertent human intrusion. The paper begins with a discussion of international recommendations related to consideration of inadvertent human intrusion and then summarizes examples of some topical considerations related to addressing inadvertent human intrusion that are being discussed as part of the second phase of the HIDRA project. The topical considerations are planned to be addressed in a formal IAEA publication. All information in this paper simply reflects on-going project discussions and no formal recommendations are implied for these topical considerations at this time. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Investigation of Non-Nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform Sites - 20447

The Plowshare Program was initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency to the US Department of Energy (DOE), to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear devices. 'Vela Uniform,' part of the broader Project Vela, was designed to use nuclear and other explosions to increase the capability of the United States to detect nuclear tests through seismicity. There were underground nuclear tests conducted off the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as part of the Plowshare Program (e.g., the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site) and the Vela Uniform Program (e.g., Project Shoal, Nevada, Site) at which the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) has been conducting long-term surveillance and maintenance since fiscal year (FY) 2006. There are many additional locations, particularly for the Plowshare Program, that were considered for nuclear tests or used for non-nuclear tests off the NNSS. Some were only named on paper, but at 30 sites, field work such as drilling test wells and conducting tests using conventional explosives was done. A Plowshare nuclear explosion had been proposed at Project Chariot but was canceled in 1962. In 1992, the discovery of soils contaminated with radionuclides from tracer experiments led to a cleanup by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the Project Chariot, Alaska, Site, which was completed in 1994. Following the cleanup of the Project Chariot site, EM was concerned that there might be environmental liabilities at other Plowshare or Vela Uniform sites where field investigations were done, even if the nuclear test was never conducted. The EM Program at the Nevada Site Office began examining records and visiting selected locations that were evaluated for Plowshare and Vela Uniform non-nuclear tests. In total, 161 Plowshare and 14 Vela Uniform sites or proposed projects were identified. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) created summaries of the work carried out at these sites and developed a collection of unclassified documents for them. Preliminary investigations had been conducted at these sites by both LM and EM since the early 2000's. In 2016, in preparation for accepting responsibility for the sites, LM started a program to determine if there were any environmental or safety liabilities associated with them. In 2019, LM formally accepted responsibility for these sites off the NNSS where non-nuclear explosive tests were conducted or where underground nuclear tests were proposed as part of the Plowshare and Vela Uniform programs but were never conducted. LM responsibilities will include maintaining institutional knowledge of the sites, responding to public inquiries, and addressing any concerns at each site. To minimize risk associated with site management, LM has archived all historical records compiled by DRI and has performed limited investigations at sites identified by the prior studies as having a higher potential liability. Preserving records related to site operations reduces the risk of doing unnecessary site investigations in the future caused by the loss of institutional knowledge. During the investigations, some maintenance needs were identified and will be addressed by the end of FY 2021. At the end of FY 2021, investigations, maintenance, and archiving activities will be complete. Remnants of test activities found at sites include craters, mud pits, debris, and open boreholes. Open boreholes are being plugged and abandoned in accordance with state regulatory standards. Other issues are being addressed in accordance with land owner requests and preferences as well as state regulations. Archiving activities include the development of project summaries identifying key operational details and current condition to allow site managers to be easily briefed. The LM experience at non-nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform sites applies to other programs where there is the potential for liability associated with the non-nuclear aspects of nuclear programs. This may include support activities or early phases of planned nuclear projects. Preserving institutional knowledge enables land managers to adequately address any concerns associated with operations and lowers risk. (authors)

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