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NASA NTRS2012

Cognitive Bias in the Verification and Validation of Space Flight Systems

Cognitive bias is generally recognized as playing a significant role in virtually all domains of human decision making. Insight into this role is informally built into many of the system engineering practices employed in the aerospace industry. The review process, for example, typically has features that help to counteract the effect of bias. This paper presents a discussion of how commonly recognized biases may affect the verification and validation process. Verifying and validating a system is arguably more challenging than development, both technically and cognitively. Whereas there may be a relatively limited number of options available for the design of a particular aspect of a system, there is a virtually unlimited number of potential verification scenarios that may be explored. The probability of any particular scenario occurring in operations is typically very difficult to estimate, which increases reliance on judgment that may be affected by bias. Implementing a verification activity often presents technical challenges that, if they can be overcome at all, often result in a departure from actual flight conditions (e.g., 1-g testing, simulation, time compression, artificial fault injection) that may raise additional questions about the meaningfulness of the results, and create opportunities for the introduction of additional biases. In addition to mitigating the biases it can introduce directly, the verification and validation process must also overcome the cumulative effect of biases introduced during all previous stages of development. A variety of cognitive biases will be described, with research results for illustration. A handful of case studies will be presented that show how cognitive bias may have affected the verification and validation process on recent JPL flight projects, identify areas of strength and weakness, and identify potential changes or additions to commonly used techniques that could provide a more robust verification and validation of future systems.

Larson, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Psychology of Cost Estimating

Cost estimation for large (and even not so large) government programs is a challenge. The number and magnitude of cost overruns associated with large Department of Defense (DoD) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs highlight the difficulties in developing and promulgating accurate cost estimates. These overruns can be the result of inadequate technology readiness or requirements definition, the whims of politicians or government bureaucrats, or even as failures of the cost estimating profession itself. However, there may be another reason for cost overruns that is right in front of us, but only recently have we begun to grasp it: the fact that cost estimators and their customers are human. The last 70+ years of research into human psychology and behavioral economics have yielded amazing findings into how we humans process and use information to make judgments and decisions. What these scientists have uncovered is surprising: humans are often irrational and illogical beings, making decisions based on factors such as emotion and perception, rather than facts and data. These built-in biases to our thinking directly affect how we develop our cost estimates and how those cost estimates are used. We cost estimators can use this knowledge of biases to improve our cost estimates and also to improve how we communicate and work with our customers. By understanding how our customers think, and more importantly, why they think the way they do, we can have more productive relationships and greater influence. By using psychology to our advantage, we can more effectively help the decision maker and our organizations make fact-based decisions.

Price, Andy↗
NASA NTRS2016

Utilizing the ISS Mission as a Testbed to Develop Cognitive Communications Systems

The ISS provides an excellent opportunity for pioneering artificial intelligence software to meet the challenges of real-time communications (comm) link management. This opportunity empowers the ISS Program to forge a testbed for developing cognitive communications systems for the benefit of the ISS mission, manned Low Earth Orbit (LEO) science programs and future planetary exploration programs. In November, 1998, the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) started the ISS Antenna Manager (IAM) project to develop a single processor supporting multiple comm satellite tracking for two different antenna systems. Further, the processor was developed to be highly adaptable as it supported the ISS mission through all assembly stages. The ISS mission mandated communications specialists with complete knowledge of when the ISS was about to lose or gain comm link service. The current specialty mandated cognizance of large sun-tracking solar arrays and thermal management panels in addition to the highly-dynamic satellite service schedules and rise/set tables. This mission requirement makes the ISS the ideal communications management analogue for future LEO space station and long-duration planetary exploration missions. Future missions, with their precision-pointed, dynamic, laser-based comm links, require complete autonomy for managing high-data rate communications systems. Development of cognitive communications management systems that permit any crew member or payload science specialist, regardless of experience level, to control communications is one of the greater benefits the ISS can offer new space exploration programs. The IAM project met a new mission requirement never previously levied against US space-born communications systems management: process and display the orientation of large solar arrays and thermal control panels based on real-time joint angle telemetry. However, IAM leaves the actual communications availability assessment to human judgment, which introduces unwanted variability because each specialist has a different core of experience with comm link performance. Because the ISS utilizes two different frequency bands, dynamic structure can be occasionally translucent at one frequency while it can completely interdict service at the other frequency. The impact of articulating structure on the comm link can depend on its orientation at the time it impinges on the link. It can become easy for a human specialist to cross-associate experience at one frequency with experience at the other frequency. Additionally, the specialist's experience is incremental, occurring one nine-hour shift at a time. Only the IAM processor experiences the complete 24x7x365 communications link performance for both communications links but, it has no "learning capability." If the IAM processor could be endowed with a cognitive ability to remember past structure-induced comm link outages, based on its knowledge of the ISS position, attitude, communications gear, array joint angles and tracking accuracy, it could convey such experience to the human operator. It could also use its learned communications link behaviors to accurately convey the availability of future communications sessions. Further, the tool could remember how accurately or inaccurately it predicted availability and correct future predictions based on past performance. The IAM tool could learn frequency-specific impacts due to spacecraft structures and pass that information along as "experience." Such development would provide a single artificial intelligence processor that could provide two different experience bases. If it also "knew" the satellite service schedule, it could distinguish structure blockage from schedule or planet blockage and then quickly switch to another satellite. Alternatively, just as a human operator could judge, a cognizant comm system based on the IAM model could "know" that the blockage is not going to last very long and continue tracking a comm satellite, waiting for it to track away from structure. Ultimately, once this capability was fully developed and tested in the Mission Control Center, it could be transferred on-orbit to support development of operations concepts that include more advanced cognitive communications systems. Future applications of this capability are easily foreseen because even more dynamic satellite constellations with more nodes and greater capability are coming. Currently, the ISS fully employs a 300 million bit-per-second (Mbps) return link for harvesting payload science. In the coming eighteen months, it will step up to 600 Mbps. Already there is talk of a 1.2 billion bit-per-second (Gbps) upgrade for the ISS and laser comm links have already been tested from the ISS. Every data rate upgrade mandates more complicated and sensitive communications equipment which implies greater expertise invested in the human operator. Future on-orbit cognizant comm systems will be needed to meet greater performance demands aboard larger, far more complicated spacecraft. In the LEO environment, the old-style one-satellite-per-spacecraft operations concept will give way to a new concept of a single customer spacecraft simultaneously using multiple comm satellites. Much more highly-dynamic manned LEO missions with decades of crew members potentially increase the demand for communications link performance. A cognizant on-board communications system will meet advanced communications demands from future LEO missions and future planetary missions. The ISS has fledgling components of future exploration programs, both LEO and planetary. Further, the Flight Operations Directorate, through the IAM project, has already begun to develop a communications management system that attempts to solve advanced problems ideally represented by dynamic structure impacting scheduled satellite service. With an earnest project to integrate artificial intelligence into the IAM processor, the ISS Program could develop a cognizant communications system that could be adapted and transferred to future on-orbit avionics designs.

Jackson, Dan↗
NASA NTRS2016

A Carbonaceous Chondrite Based Simulant of Phobos

In support of an ESA-funded concept study considering a sample return mission, a simulant of the Martian moon Phobos was needed. There are no samples of the Phobos regolith, therefore none of the four characteristics normally used to design a simulant are explicitly known for Phobos. Because of this, specifications for a Phobos simulant were based on spectroscopy, other remote measurements, and judgment. A composition based on the Tagish Lake meteorite was assumed. The requirement that sterility be achieved, especially given the required organic content, was unusual and problematic. The final design mixed JSC-1A, antigorite, pseudo-agglutinates and gilsonite. Sterility was achieved by radiation in a commercial facility.

simulant↗
NASA NTRS2016

Confidence Intervals for Laboratory Sonic Boom Annoyance Tests

Commercial supersonic flight is currently forbidden over land because sonic booms have historically caused unacceptable annoyance levels in overflown communities. NASA is providing data and expertise to noise regulators as they consider relaxing the ban for future quiet supersonic aircraft. One deliverable NASA will provide is a predictive model for indoor annoyance to aid in setting an acceptable quiet sonic boom threshold. A laboratory study was conducted to determine how indoor vibrations caused by sonic booms affect annoyance judgments. The test method required finding the point of subjective equality (PSE) between sonic boom signals that cause vibrations and signals not causing vibrations played at various amplitudes. This presentation focuses on a few statistical techniques for estimating the interval around the PSE. The techniques examined are the Delta Method, Parametric and Nonparametric Bootstrapping, and Bayesian Posterior Estimation.

Rathsam, Jonathan↗
NASA NTRS2016

SC-228 Inclusion of DAA Warning Alert for TCAS Interoperability

This white paper summarizes NASA research results that have informed Special Committee 228 (SC-228) discussions and decisions regarding the inclusion of a warning-level alert within the detect and avoid (DAA) alerting structure for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). For UAS, the removal of the pilot from onboard the aircraft has eliminated the ability of the ground-based pilot in command (PIC) to use out-the-window visual information to make judgments about a potential threat of a loss of well clear with another aircraft. As a result, the DAA traffic display will be the primary source of information that the PIC can use to execute the three primary well clear functions: 1) detect a potential loss of well clear, 2) determine a resolution maneuver, and 3) upload that maneuver to the aircraft via the ground control station (GCS). In addition, pilots are required to coordinate with air traffic control (ATC) prior to maneuvering off of their approved flight plan. In determining an appropriate resolution maneuver to avoid a loss of well clear, the PIC must decide both when and how to maneuver, and both the timeliness and the accuracy (i.e., correctness) of the maneuver are critical to reducing the likelihood and/or severity of a loss of well clear. Alerting information is one of three critical components of the DAA display, along with traffic information elements (e.g., relative heading, speed and altitude) and maneuver guidance. Alerting information and maneuver guidance, in particular, have been found to have a significant impact, both statistically and practically, on pilots' ability to avoid and minimize the severity of losses of well clear While all three display components are key to pilots performing the traffic avoidance task of remaining well clear, in general, alerting information provides crucial information about when a resolution maneuver is required while maneuver guidance assists the pilot in determining how best to maneuver. A fundamental task of the DAA alerting system is to provide critical timing information to the pilot about the potential for a loss of well clear with another aircraft. This is done by employing both temporal and spatial thresholds that indicate to the pilot the likelihood and imminence of a loss of well clear. The design of the DAA alerting thresholds is a balancing act between eliciting the desired pilot response in real loss of well clear threat events and reducing excessive, unnecessary, and/or uncoordinated UAS maneuvering within the air traffic environment; larger thresholds, both spatially and temporally, may increase the likelihood of a pilot avoiding a loss of well clear, but it can also increase the frequency of maneuvering - especially in cases where a maneuver is not actually needed to maintain well clear. A series of human in the loop (HITL) simulations have been conducted as part of NASA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. The purpose of these HITLs has been to provide empirical results in order to inform development of the minimum human-machine interface requirements for the DAA system. This white paper will present those results which provide evidence of a human performance benefit (in terms of response times and ability to remain well clear of other aircraft) of the DAA warning alert both with and without a collision avoidance system on board the aircraft.

TCAS interoperability↗
NASA NTRS2016

Uncertainty Analysis of the NASA Glenn 8x6 Supersonic Wind Tunnel

This paper presents methods and results of a detailed measurement uncertainty analysis that was performed for the 8- by 6-foot Supersonic Wind Tunnel located at the NASA Glenn Research Center. The statistical methods and engineering judgments used to estimate elemental uncertainties are described. The Monte Carlo method of propagating uncertainty was selected to determine the uncertainty of calculated variables of interest. A detailed description of the Monte Carlo method as applied for this analysis is provided. Detailed uncertainty results for the uncertainty in average free stream Mach number as well as other variables of interest are provided. All results are presented as random (variation in observed values about a true value), systematic (potential offset between observed and true value), and total (random and systematic combined) uncertainty. The largest sources contributing to uncertainty are determined and potential improvement opportunities for the facility are investigated.

Error↗
NASA NTRS2017

General Nobile and the Airship Italia: No Second-In-Command

The airship Italia, commanded by General Umberto Nobile, crashed during its return flight from the North Pole in 1928. Prior work has demonstrated the possibility that this crash was fatigue-related, due to significant sleep-deprivation on the part of its Commander, and to resulting errors in cognition and judgment. However, the underlying cause of the fatigue was likely due to the fact that the Commander did not have a Second-In-Command on board to take over duties while the Commander was allowed to rest. At that time the Second-In-Command was a formally designated position, and according to Nobiles previous writings was considered to be a necessary crew member on an airship.

Second-In-Command↗
NASA NTRS2019

Methods of Performing Large Scale, Multidimensional Parametric Studies for Space Launch System Mission Analysis

Optimizing a large number of trajectories over a wide range of parameters is a difficult and computationally intensive, particularly when the parametric space has a large number of dimensions. Solving parametric studies like these require good initial conditions for each optimization case, which results in a significant amount of manual interaction and human judgment and can be time consuming. The Space Launch System (SLS) uses POST2 (Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II) to simulate different ascent trajectories and perform mission analysis. SLS mission analysis currently uses two types of large scale, multidimensional parameter spaces. The qualifying factor between these spaces is the grid density, which determines the set of applicable solution methodologies. One type has a relatively low number of dimensions (2-3), but a large number of grid coordinates (2000- 4000), whereas the second type has a relatively low number of grid coordinates (150-350), but a higher number of dimensions (7-10).

Stein, W. B.↗
NASA NTRS2018

An Exploratory Evaluation of UAS Detect and Avoid Operations in the Terminal Environment

New technical standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) detect and avoid (DAA) systems mark recent progress toward realizing the goal of full integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). The DAA system is intended to provide a means of compliance with operating regulations that required pilots on board manned aircraft to remain "well clear" of other aircraft which is accomplished through out-the-window visual acquisition of other aircraft and application of a subjective judgment of safe separation. The requirements for the DAA system, including the specification of a DAA well clear threshold as well as functional requirements for detecting, tracking, alerting and guidance processing, and displays, are specified in DO-365, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA Systems developed within RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Special Committee 228 (SC-228). Intended as the first in a series of phased versions, these requirements are frequently referred to as the "Phase 1" DAA system. The Phase 1 DAA system is limited for use by aircraft transitioning to and from Class A or special use airspace, through Class D, E, and G airspace. In particular, the Phase 1 DAA MOPS are not intended for terminal airspace operations, a critical gap for enabling a full range of UAS operations. The application of the Phase 1 DAA system and DAA well clear threshold within the terminal area is predicted to result in a high number of unnecessary alerts when the UAS is safely separated from other traffic. The goal of the present study was to examine pilot performance and operational issues related to the operation of the Phase 1 DAA system in a terminal area. This experiment was intended as an exploratory study that would be used to inform the development of a new terminal area-specific DAA well clear definition, and associated alerting and guidance requirements. The two main objectives of this study were to: 1) characterize pilot behavior in the terminal environment with the Phase 1 DAA system, and 2) investigate the effect of modifications to the Phase 1 DAA alerting and guidance structure. In particular, the authors were interested in determining whether the removal of specific alerting and guidance levels, without changing the DAA well clear definition or alerting thresholds, would impact pilot performance while conducting terminal operations. The results indicate that the Phase 1 well clear definition and alerting and guidance resulted in frequent alerting that degraded pilots' ability to discriminate between encounters where another aircraft was safely separated versus when a maneuver was necessary. The resulting impact on pilot performance was slower response times and higher frequency and severity of losses of DAA well clear compared to those observed for experiments examining pilot performance in the en route environment. There was no significant effect of alerting and guidance display configuration on pilot performance.

terminal area↗
NASA NTRS2018

An Exploratory Evaluation of UAS Detect and Avoid Operations in the Terminal Environment

New technical standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) detect and avoid (DAA) systems mark recent progress toward realizing the goal of full integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). The DAA system is intended to provide a means of compliance with operating regulations that required pilots on board manned aircraft to remain "well clear" of other aircraft which is accomplished through out-the-window visual acquisition of other aircraft and application of a subjective judgment of safe separation. The requirements for the DAA system, including the specification of a DAA well clear threshold as well as functional requirements for detecting, tracking, alerting and guidance processing, and displays, are specified in DO-365, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA Systems developed within RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228). Intended as the first in a series of phased versions, these requirements are frequently referred to as the "Phase 1" DAA system. The Phase 1 DAA system is limited for use by aircraft transitioning to and from Class A or special use airspace, through Class D, E, and G airspace. In particular, the Phase 1 DAA MOPS are not intended for terminal airspace operations, a critical gap for enabling a full range of UAS operations. The application of the Phase 1 DAA system and DAA well clear threshold within the terminal area is predicted to result in a high number of unnecessary alerts when the UAS is safely separated from other traffic. The goal of the present study was to examine pilot performance and operational issues related to the operation of the Phase 1 DAA system in a terminal area. This experiment was intended as an exploratory study that would be used to inform the development of a new terminal area-specific DAA well clear definition, and associated alerting and guidance requirements. The two main objectives of this study were to: 1) characterize pilot behavior in the terminal environment with the Phase 1 DAA system, and 2) investigate the effect of modifications to the Phase 1 DAA alerting and guidance structure. In particular, the authors were interested in determining whether the removal of specific alerting and guidance levels, without changing the DAA well clear definition or alerting thresholds, would impact pilot performance while conducting terminal operations. The results indicate that the Phase 1 well clear definition and alerting and guidance resulted in frequent alerting that degraded pilots' ability to discriminate between encounters where another aircraft was safely separated versus when a maneuver was necessary. The resulting impact on pilot performance was slower response times and higher frequency and severity of losses of DAA well clear compared to those observed for experiments examining pilot performance in the en route environment. There was no significant effect of alerting and guidance display configuration on pilot performance.

Rorie, Conrad↗
NASA NTRS2015

Effects of Acute Stress on Aircrew Performance: Literature Review and Analysis of Operational Aspects

Situational stress can adversely affect the cognition and skilled performance of pilots, as well as experts in other domains. Emergencies and other threatening situations require pilots to execute infrequently practiced procedures correctly and to use their skills and judgment to select an appropriate course of action, often under high workload, time pressure, and ambiguous indications, all of which can be stressful. Our current study, consited of three parts, starting with a critical review of the research literature on the effects of stress on skilled performance, going back to World War II and continuing to recent and more sophisticated studies of the cognitive effects of anxiety. In the second part we analyzed the specific ways stress may have impaired the performance of airline crews in twelve major accidents, selected for diversity of the situations the crews encountered. The third part examined the operational significance and practical implications of the findings from the first two parts, suggested specific ways to reduce the harmful effects of stress on flight crews, and identified aspects requiring further research. Even thought this study focused on flight crews, the findings apply to the effects of stress on the skilled performance of experts in almost any domain.

stress↗
NASA NTRS2018

San Francisco Bar Pilot Fatigue Study

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the extent of fatigue among San Francisco Bar Pilots (Maritime Pilots) and its potential impact on safety, and to make recommendations concerning how the risk of fatigue could be managed. Information was gathered via a literature review, observations of Bar Pilots at work, surveys, a task analysis, and an analysis of dispatch records.The work of San Francisco Bar Pilots involves an unusual mix of activities and job demands. Their work calls for situational awareness, reasoning, communication, and perceptual abilities comparable to those required by airline pilots and air traffic controllers. Errors can have severe consequences for public safety and the environment, as well as significant financial costs. Fatigue is increasingly recognized as a hazard that must be managed by the transportation industry. The reduced sleep quality and quantity experienced by personnel who work at night, in conjunction with human circadian rhythms can lead to an operationally significant level of cognitive impairment. The cognitive impact of fatigue includes functions that are critical to safe maritime piloting, such as vigilance, judgment, reaction time and communication. The surveys distributed to Bar Pilots did not uncover evidence of widespread fatigue. The survey results also suggested that fatigue was not a major concern of Bar Pilots. Bar Pilots had overall low scores on the subjective fatigue measures used in the survey, and generally assessed the safety risk due to fatigue as low. Compared to air traffic controllers, Bar Pilots gave significantly lower ratings on questions concerning the prevalence and impact of fatigue. The application of fatigue modeling software to Bar Pilot dispatch records identified that in most cases, pilot's cognitive effectiveness was predicted to be acceptable during their duty periods. However, these results could not be verified with objective data.The study identified a number of fatigue issues that deserve attention. These include Bar Pilot work periods that frequently infringe on the circadian low, consecutive work periods without a significant break, consecutive periods of night work, unpredictable work schedules, start time variability, the potential for sleep inertia, and the number of pilots on the board at any given time.

fatigue↗
NASA NTRS2014

Investigating the Impacts of a Separation Standard for UAS Operations in Enroute and Transition Airspace

Unmanned aircraft systems will be required to equip with a detect and avoid system in order to satisfy the federal aviation regulations to remain well clear of other aircraft. To comply with regulations in today’s operations manned aircraft must “see and avoid” other aircraft and use subjective judgment to determine whether those aircraft are well clear. For a detect-and- avoid (DAA) system to satisfy the requirement to stay well clear, a quantitative definition of well clear needs to be defined and evaluated. Definitions for the boundary of well clear have been proposed by the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Executive Committee Science and Research Panel (SaRP) and the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 228 on Detect and Avoid Systems. This study investigates the interoperability implications of UAS using proposed well clear definitions as a separation standard for conducting operations in the national airspace system. The first analysis in the study focuses on the effect of variations in well clear definition parameters on the rate of losses of well clear per flight hour. The second analysis considers three well clear definitions and presents the relative state conditions of intruder aircraft as they encroach upon the well clear boundary. The third analysis focuses on the definition of the alerting criteria needed to inform the UAS operator of a potential loss of well clear. All three analyses are conducted in a NAS-wide fast-time simulation environment using UAS aircraft models, proposed UAS missions, and historical air defense radar data to populate the background traffic operating under visual flight rules. The results from the three analyses presented in this study inform the safety case, requirements development, and the operational environment for the DAA minimum operational performance standards.

UAS Seperation Standard↗
NASA NTRS2018

Determination of Uncertainties for Analytically Derived Material Properties to Be Used in Monte Carlo Based Orion Heatshield Sizing

Ablative materials are often used for spacecraft heatshields to protect underlying structures from the extreme environments associated with atmospheric reentry. NASA's Orion EM-1 capsule has been designed to use a molded Avcoat material system. In order to determine the required heatshield thickness, a Monte Carlo approach to the sizing process was proposed. To perform the Monte Carlo simulation, statistical uncertainties on all material property input parameters were required. Obtaining these values for measured properties is straightforward, however input parameters that are derived analytically have historically used uncertainties based on engineering judgment. A MATLAB program was created to use laboratory generated thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) data to calculate uncertainties on the Arrhenius parameters for molded Avcoat. Uncertainties associated with the normalized ablation rate and pyrolysis gas enthalpy were also generated using a wrapper script and the ACE code. These uncertainties could then be tied directly to measured values of individual elemental constituents. The resulting uncertainty values will allow for a probabilistic sizing approach on molded Avcoat with a higher level of confidence in the input parameters.

material property uncertainties↗
NASA NTRS2019

Space Research Project Management Can Benefit from Engineering Technology Selection Methods

Many engineering methods have been developed to help management select technology for a system design or further research. The simplest way to compare technologies is to use a checklist containing all the more or less important selection criteria, so that nothing is overlooked. The criteria usually include cost, safety, reliability and maintainability, and potential problems such as noise generation and microgravity sensitivity. The next step typically is to weight and score all the criteria. The process of weighting and scoring is helpful in bringing out different priorities and reaching a shared point of view. Group technology selection methods are designed to highlight initial disagreements and produce a shared consensus. Often a frank discussion led by management rather than decision analysts can be more effective. The final selection depends on management and engineering judgment and may include programmatic and organizational factors that are beyond the engineering checklist. The objective of engineering technology selection methods is to provide engineering information to assist management in making sound decisions. Project management and technology selection are assumed to use rational engineering analytic methods, but they often do not. The reason is that human insight, intuition, and “gut feel,” rather than logic, more frequently determine our decisions. Project selection and management are strongly influenced by nonrational psychological influences, which can produce unjustified confidence and determination. Nevertheless, there is a strong need for space projects to do rational project analysis and selection. Demonstrating a rational spirit is necessary for a scientific and technical organization. Professional ethics at its best requires an open, honest, and fair process, without damaging politics. Rational analysis can help improve good projects and avoid selecting bad ones. A sanity check using rational analysis guided by a checklist can help avoid egregious and damaging errors.

Jones, Harry W.↗
NASA NTRS2020

A Method and Model to Predict Initial Failure Rates

It has long been well known that actual system reliability typically falls well short of early estimates. Failure rates are often ten or more times higher than anticipated. Many reasons have been given for this, but over-optimism is the fundamental cause of too-favorable reliability predictions. Most forecasts of reliability are essentially best-case scenarios, as are predictions of budget and schedule. Confident engineers assemble estimates bottom-up, including the known factors and ignoring problems that they hope won’t happen. Traditional reliability estimation is based on simply summing up the component failure rates. This ignores most actual failure causes. The way to reduce over-optimism is to use the historical system level failure rate from similar projects. Adjustments should not be made based purely on engineering judgment, but only if there is so logical quantitative justification. The traditional component-based reliability estimate is useful as a lower bound on the system failure rate. The difference between this lower bound component-based reliability and the historical system level reliability indicates how much of the total failure rate is due to system level problems rather than component failures.

Jones, Harry W.↗
NASA NTRS2020

A Method and Model to Predict Initial Failure Rates

It has long been well known that actual system reliability typically falls well short of early estimates. Failure rates are often ten or more times higher than anticipated. Many reasons have been given for this, but over-optimism is the fundamental cause of too-favorable reliability predictions. Most forecasts of reliability are essentially best-case scenarios, as are predictions of budget and schedule. Confident engineers assemble estimates bottom-up, including the known factors and ignoring problems that they hope won't happen. Traditional reliability estimation is based on simply summing up the component failure rates. This ignores most actual failure causes. The way to reduce over-optimism is to use the historical system level failure rate from similar projects. Adjustments should not be made based purely on engineering judgment, but only if there is so logical quantitative justification. The traditional component-based reliability estimate is useful as a lower bound on the system failure rate. The difference between this lower bound component-based reliability and the historical system level reliability indicates how much of the total failure rate is due to system level problems rather than component failures

Jones, Harry W.↗