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At least 469 records · Page 26

The Safe Guards Analysis Toolbox for Non-Proliferation Modeling

As nuclear technology becomes more widely available outside of nuclear weapon armed nations, the importance of preventing the illicit development of nuclear weapons has increased dramatically. A system of nuclear safeguards prevents proliferation; stopping the diversion of nuclear material from civilian facilities for the construction of nuclear weapons. These safeguards function through a combination of accountancy measurements that confirm the locations and amounts of nuclear material, and physical security at every nuclear facility. Safeguards Analysis (SGA) is a computational tool-kit developed using the MATLAB Simulink software suite that simulates a system of nuclear safeguards. The code allows users to examine current safeguards systems for weaknesses and to pinpoint the best locations for improvement. Developed as a modular framework, SGA does not directly model material flows, and relies on an outside code for this information. Instead, it represents a series of safeguards measurements that represent the values inspectors would see. Furthermore, SGA is designed to be modular in design, allowing the user to construct as complex or simple a model as needed: simulating an entire fuel-cycle comprising multiple facilities to a single measurement. SGA's use of outside codes for its material flow information makes it applicable to any model available to the user, as opposed to previous work that applied only to a single scenario. This paper discusses the initial development of SGA and the testing of these modules. The tests described in this paper demonstrate that the different pieces of SGA currently work as intended. Future work on the toolbox will develop and test SGA against a more realistic and complicated scenario using the various tools available in SGA. SGA currently has the pieces to perform analysis on safeguards systems, but needs to be tested on large, multi-MBA, systems to ensure the code is capable of handling such large models, to see the effect large models have on calculation speed, and if further work is needed to improve code efficiency. (authors)

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Safeguards Lessons Learned from the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant - 19502

Once operational, the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) will have an operating throughput of 800 MT of uranium in irradiated LWR fuel per year. In order to establish effective and efficient safeguards at RRP, the safeguards discussion with the IAEA was initiated in 1988. However, at that time there were no available models or guidelines that could be used as a reference and multiple difficulties were recognized for the implementation of safeguards into a large scale reprocessing plant. Therefore, from 1988 to 1992, a multinational forum, referred to as LASCAR (Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards) [1], provided the recommendations on how an effective safeguards approach could be implemented into a large scale reprocessing plant while efficiently using existing resources. During the course of safeguards discussions between the IAEA, the State, and JNFL, the use of operator's equipment and measurement systems (by signal splitting with authentication) for inspections was studied. JNFL also examined incorporating inspection requirements into the process design: to reduce the costs associated with system installation and future system maintenance and to ensure effective, efficient, and credible safeguards implementation into the RRP (this approach has essentially become the 'Safeguards by Design (SBD)' process). From these studies and JNFL's experience of implementing safeguards into a new plant [2], JNFL established and applied signal splitting from operator's equipment as a means for providing inspectors required safeguards information. In addition, the LASCAR findings were utilized to establish the safeguards implemented into the RRP. Safeguards implementation into RRP commenced March 31, 2006. On June 4, 2008, the IAEA approved the 'integrated safeguards approach' for RRP. This paper provides a high level overview of the major safeguards implemented at RRP and the lessons learned from this implementation that can be applied to existing or future similar facilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fortifying Environmental Compliance Strategies at Hanford - 19541

At the Hanford Site, located near Richland, Washington, the Department of Energy is cleaning up legacy radioactive and mixed-waste generated from the Manhattan Project in the 1940's. A major component of cleaning up the waste is maintaining compliance with federal and state environmental regulations. Environmental compliance is also determined through permits, agreements, and consent orders issued by regulating agencies such as the Washington State Department of Health: Office of Radiation Protection, Washington State Department of Ecology Nuclear Waste Program, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Maintaining compliance at Hanford reduces environmental impacts and addresses violations, or non-compliances. The following strategies improve compliance and support the avoidance of enforcement actions. At Hanford, regulatory agency environmental enforcement actions, and their corrective actions, are tracked to completion using databases maintained by inspection subject matter experts. The databases are used to provide the Department of Energy and contractor management with up-to-date status of regulatory agency activity and the required corrective actions. Trending enforcement actions helps target compliance vulnerabilities. Findings and corrective actions that are entered into the databases are then trended by date, location, responsible contractor, agency, and type of compliance issue. The ability to review previous non-compliances in certain locations of the Site, or by general alleged violation, provides the project's environmental contacts with information on what types of issues to look for on pre-inspection walk downs. Finding non-compliances during pre-inspection walk downs allows the contractor to correct the issue and avoid potential fines from regulating agencies. The walk downs are conducted by environmental specialists and project personnel looking for issues that may be viewed as a compliance problem. Using agency checklists and previous inspection correspondence can help to provide valuable information during pre-inspection activities. Training regulatory agency inspectors on Site security requirements, cultural and ecological standards, and inspection protocols allows for increased efficiency and reduces potential miscommunication between regulatory agencies and the regulated contractors. The training also allows the contractors to give the regulating agencies the up-to-date policies and procedures that will be addressed during the inspection. Hanford has pre-identified inspection coordinators within each contractor to assist in coordinating with Department of Energy personnel, projects, and management prior to the inspections. These inspection coordinators notify affected management, accommodate and escort the regulators to locations they ask to inspect, set up requested interviews, and gather requested information that will need to be cleared for public release. These practices make for positive experiences and interactions with the regulating agency personnel and help reduce and eliminate environmental non-compliances, findings, violations, and fines. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

UK regulatory review of the double contingency principle in criticality safety - 14379

The UK's regulatory regime is based on Licence Conditions (LCs) attached to a Nuclear Site Licence (NSL) and is non-prescriptive in nature. The law requires licensees to reduce health and safety risks to workers and the public 'so far as is reasonability practicable' (SFAIRP), and this framework provides licensees with flexibility to achieve this. Guidance for inspectors on the assessment of nuclear safety cases has been published in Office for Nuclear Regulation's (ONR) Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) and supporting Technical Assessment Guides (TAGs). These guidance documents have recently been reviewed in the light of the Fukushima accident. The opportunity has also been taken to reconsider the use of the Double Contingency Principle used in criticality safety cases, an approach commonly regarded as the preferred means of criticality control internationally and featured in the SAPs and TAGs. Licensees in the UK have adopted several approaches in nuclear criticality safety cases based upon a combination of deterministic and probabilistic safety cases using the Double Contingency Principle and Design Basis Analysis. ONR has developed a targeted intervention to sample a number of nuclear safety cases in order to test the adequacy of methodologies used to secure nuclear criticality safety. This paper reports the results of this intervention and considers the need to review the advice currently given by the UK nuclear regulator, including on use of the Double Contingency Principle. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

A Discrete Event Simulation Approach to Nuclear Arms Enterprise Modeling and Analysis

We overview a discrete event simulation of an arms control enterprise developed to familiarize individuals with the challenges of verification and monitoring at the enterprise level. We will review the design of the simulation applied to a notional country’s nuclear arms enterprise. This simulation models how these nuclear weapons move over their lifetime from deployment, storage, maintenance, and dismantlement. With this output information, we then characterize the “ground truth” of the enterprise. Next, based on these data, we built a sophisticated analysis engine designed to provide treaty monitoring and verification information to support partner country inspectors and their evaluation. This tool was designed to be used as a game, enabling teams to compete on developing the best inspection plan to determine if the host country is complying with the conceptual treaty developed for this effort.

Pulliam, Rachel M.↗

Novel Photonuclear Methods to Produce an Argon-37 Standard

The mission of this research is to explore novel photonuclear-based pathways into the production of 37Ar. Above-background detection levels of 37Ar uniquely indicates the occurrence of an underground nuclear explosion, produced from fission neutrons interacting in the surrounding environment through the 40Ca(n,a)37Ar reaction. The half-life of 35 days allows on-site inspectors (OSI) adequate time following the nuclear event to detect 37Ar and verify compliance or defiance of non-proliferation treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). An 37Ar standard would give OSI the ability to calibrate their detectors and measure detector efficiency allowing for the quantification of detected activity, give OSI authentic samples to test detectors in field exercises, and improve models predicting diffusion pathways of 37Ar through the underground environment.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Evaluation of Machine Learning Models for Automated Data Analysis in In-Service Nuclear Power Plant Inspections

The commercial nuclear power industry is facing a potential shortage of certified nondestructive evaluation (NDE) analysts to meet future in-service inspection demands. Automated data analysis (ADA) currently supports human inspectors in tasks such as eddy current evaluations for steam generator examinations. Machine learning (ML) systems are nearing the capability to pass performance demonstration tests for ultrasonic testing (UT) inspections of reactor pressure vessel upper head penetrations in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Current research and development is focused on assisted analysis (AA) of ADA versus fully automated examinations. This presentation will cover assessment of ML flaw detection on dissimilar metal weld (DMW) piping joints.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION FOR TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO PREVENT HIJACKING, THEFT, SABOTAGE, AND MALICIOUS SECURITY EVENTS DURING TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL

The secure transportation of high-consequence materials, including nuclear and radiological assets, is a critical global priority in the face of escalating terrorism, security threats, and violent protests targeting these operations. Effective surveillance detection—the ability to identify, assess, and respond to potential threats across a continuum of scenarios—is paramount in addressing these challenges. This paper outlines a phased, multi-tiered training program designed to strengthen the surveillance detection capabilities of organizations responsible for nuclear material transport. The proposed training program adopts a progressive approach, gradually increasing in technical complexity to provide participants with comprehensive knowledge and tools for implementing robust security strategies. It targets a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including competent authorities, regulators, inspectors, shippers, carriers, law enforcement, and emergency response personnel, equipping them to plan, evaluate, and safeguard nuclear material transportation effectively. Each phase of the program emphasizes distinct elements of the surveillance detection continuum and transport security, focusing on critical topics such as threat identification, adversary task timelines, protective methodologies, and attack mitigation strategies. The training framework is anchored in technical exchanges and scenario-driven courses that reflect real-world complexities and challenges. By addressing the surveillance detection continuum comprehensively—from early threat assessment to active countermeasures—the program reinforces global efforts to secure nuclear assets. It aligns with international security objectives and fosters a strong security culture within participating organizations, ensuring personnel are prepared to counter potential threats and maintain the safe, secure movement of these materials. Ultimately, this initiative aims to enhance preparedness, security, and response capabilities, supporting the global mission to safeguard high-consequence materials against evolving threats.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Optimization of In-Field Alpha Spectrometry for Uranium Enrichment Determination in Uranium Hexafluoride

In response to needs identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) research is underway to develop In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) as a method to allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to collect samples of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at processing facilities to assess and verify uranium enrichment. For sample collection, the IFAS method uses Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers, which contain thin zeolite coatings that trap UF6 gas and convert it to the safer, more stable form uranyl fluoride (UO2F2). For alpha spectrometry, the IFAS instrument employs a large area silicon semiconductor transducer to detect and record alpha particle energy-deposition events. Over the past year optimization work has significantly increased the diameter of useful SUDA samples (from 12.7 mm to 48 mm), improved the manufacturability and reproducibility of SUDA samples, increased the area of the IFAS alpha spectrometer sensor from 1.2 cm to 3.1 cm, and improved source positioning within the IFAS. This paper will report on this optimization work, its impacts on IFAS performance, and future plans for IFAS miniaturization, improvements, and testing.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

In-Field Alpha Spectrometry to Assess Uranium Enrichment In Uranium Hexafluoride

A new In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) system is being developed to allow quick turnaround measurements of uranium enrichment in uranium hexafluoride samples. Samples are collected using specially-designed Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) wafers which have an absorptive thin film of zeolite deposited onto a quartz substrate. The SUDA samples, along with a special holder, are designed to be attached directly to a sampling tap at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant or a uranium conversion facility, allowing gaseous UF6 to come into direct contact with the zeolite. The zeolite absorbs this material and converts it into stable, safe UO2F2 within a few minutes. Once the sample has been collected it is transferred to the IFAS system where a solid-state, silicon alpha spectrometer is used to quantitatively measure the alpha emissions from 234U, 235U, and 238U form the sample. The SUDA samples are designed so that thin-film spectra are produced, and the SUDA samples and IFAS system are designed so that a complete measurement, with a final 235U:Utotal determination of <±2%, can be made in less than eight hours. This short time frame will allow an inspector to get results on-site within one working shift.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Select Proliferation Studies on TRISO-fueled, Heat-Pipe-cooled Microreactors

Nuclear microreactors carry the potential to open up new markets for the nuclear industry, as their expected cost competitiveness in non-traditional market segments (e.g., mines, military bases, extraterrestrial surfaces, and remote areas), and their inherent safety features make them deployable when other power sources are unavailable or difficult to exploit. For countries that have not traditionally participated in nuclear power, microreactors represent a clean energy solution [1]. However, their use, especially in non-weapons states, may entail challenges in terms of maintaining international nuclear safeguards [2]. Furthermore, the deployment locations where microreactors may prove most cost competitive would be difficult to access by state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors [3]. In addition to the isolated nature of potential deployment sites, the low-power characteristic of microreactors suggests that numerous microreactors would need to be deployed to meet energy demands. That, coupled with the unique physics of many current microreactor designs, opens up a new area of research with respect to nonproliferation and safeguards concerns [2]. Whereas traditional facilities are inspected as isolated cases when looking for signs of diversion or misuse; microreactors may need to be assessed in the context of the entire fleet to which they belong. International safeguards necessitate timely detection of any significant quantities (SQs) of material that are being diverted (e.g., 1 SQ of special nuclear material diverted over the course of a 1-year period) [4]. For low-enriched uranium, the IAEA defines 1 SQ as corresponding to 75 kg of 235U. The purpose of the present paper is to explore the detectability threshold for material diversion in microreactors by relying on critical control drum angles, excess reactivity, and the reactor lifetime as the selected operational parameters. For this assessment, a heat-pipe-cooled microreactor was regarded as the base design. While the conclusions reached in this paper are not readily extendable to the design of actual microreactors, the analysis herein enables conclusions to be drawn regarding the level of accuracy needed for reference calculations in order to detect diversion scenarios by utilizing the selected operational parameters (i.e., mainly control drum angles, critical insertion angle, and the reactor lifetime).

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Knowledge Transfer Program for International Nuclear Safeguards

Nuclear safeguards were first announced in 1945 by the U.S., Canadian and British governments as a means to exchange scientific information about peaceful uses of atomic energy and prevent the use of nuclear material for weapons. International nuclear safeguards, now under the provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serves to hold accountable the 140 member countries (States) that have entered into treaties and agreements against the spread of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the IAEA acts as a nuclear materials inspectorate under the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, brought about in 1968, that specifies commitments member States make to the world?s non-proliferation regime. The Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (OINS) is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. Within OINS, the Human Capital Development program recognizes the need to build workforce capacity and safeguards expertise. This includes supporting the education and training of younger generations working in international nuclear safeguards. One of the program?s main concerns is core competencies being lost to retirement or attrition and building knowledge retention pipelines from senior to new professionals. One identified core competency is knowledge gained by individuals who have completed IAEA assignments such as missions to member States to conduct safeguards inspections. Such individuals possess unique knowledge, and efforts are being put forth to effectively capture this knowledge within the national laboratories complex. To this end, we report findings from a one-year mentor-mentee knowledge retention program in which an international safeguards subject matter expert imparted knowledge and skills to a willing professional mentee. The knowledge and skills stem from the mentor?s multi-year assignment at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

VALIDATION OF SPRING OPERATED PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE TIME TO FAILURE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICALLY SUPPORTED MAINTENANCE INTERVALS

The Savannah River Site operates a Relief Valve Repair Shop certified by the National Board of Pressure Vessel Inspectors to NB-23, The National Board Inspection Code. Local maintenance forces perform inspection, testing, and repair of approximately 1200 spring-operated relief valves (SORV) each year as the valves are cycled in from the field. The Site now has over 7000 certified test records in the Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS); a summary of that data is presented in this paper. In previous papers, several statistical techniques were used to investigate failure on demand and failure rates including a quantal response method for predicting the failure probability as a function of time in service. The non-conservative failure mode for SORV is commonly termed 'stuck shut'; industry defined as the valve opening at greater than or equal to 1.5 times the cold set pressure. Actual time to failure is typically not known, only that failure occurred some time since the last proof test (censored data). This paper attempts to validate the assumptions underlying the statistical lifetime prediction results using Monte Carlo simulation. It employs an aging model for lift pressure as a function of set pressure, valve manufacturer, and a time-related aging effect. This paper attempts to answer two questions: (1) what is the predicted failure rate over the chosen maintenance/ inspection interval; and do we understand aging sufficient enough to estimate risk when basing proof test intervals on proof test results?

42 ENGINEERING↗

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either are experts in international safeguards, or understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. The 44 participants represented eight national laboratories, four universities, three government organizations, two international organizations, two professional organizations, and three small companies. The goal of the ERIS workshop was to improve efforts to engage U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. At the workshop's conclusion, participants presented their findings to the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243). The report's major findings are summarized.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

IAEA Inspections for Undeclared and Declared Activities: Is a More Robust Approach Needed?

The United States has long supported a strong international safeguards system and for many years has served as the foremost supplier of technology, equipment, and training to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In doing so, it drew in many instances on DOE sponsored R&D and training that was directed towards domestic safeguards and then adapted for IAEA purposes. This was relatively straightforward because of the strong overlap between the development of nuclear material accountancy measures needed for both domestic and international purposes. Two factors have emerged that have made this strong reliance on domestic measures less and less able to be a source of support for the IAEA. One is the shift by the IAEA safeguards system towards detecting undeclared activities. The second is the shift of domestic attention away from nuclear material accountancy and towards physical protection. As a result, a gap in US sponsored R&D and training relevant to international safeguards has developed. The NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the DOE NA-22 Safeguards R&D program are intended to help fill this gap and, thereby, permit the U.S. to remain as the pre-eminent supplier of technology for international safeguards purposes. In this context, IAEA challenges have been examined from the perspective of detecting the diversion of nuclear material from declared stocks; detecting undeclared production of nuclear material and activities at locations declared under INFCIRC/153; and detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities elsewhere in a state. Of these, the detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities is, perhaps, the IAEA’s most significant challenge. It is a challenge that even the international community finds difficult to meet because of the scope and the geographic scale of the problem, the technical constraints, the knowledge required, and the significant resources needed to deploy effective systems world-wide (e.g., satellite surveillance systems). The IAEA’s success in carrying out this mission hinges on its capability to evaluate the declarations made by the state for completeness, correctness, and consistency in order to detect possible indications of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Three elements go into this evaluation: (1) evaluating the internal consistency of a State’s declaration and comparing it to information gathered by IAEA inspectors on the basis of their access to the locations, facilities, sites, personnel, and documents disclosed in the state’s declarations; (2) comparison of States’ declarations with other information available to the IAEA, including the information it gathers from its review of open sources, including scientific and technical literature and data bases, trade journals, and media reports; and (3) its ability to archive, retrieve, organize, and analyze all available information for indications of potential undeclared nuclear material and activities, and, when warranted, to request states to provide further information and access in order to investigate and clarify any questions or inconsistencies.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

International Workshop on Gamma Spectrometry Analysis Codes for U and Pu Isotopics: Workshop Results and Next Steps

In November 2008, the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) co-hosted the International Workshop on Gamma Spectrometry Analysis Codes for U and Pu Isotopics at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This workshop was conducted in response to needs expressed by the international safeguards community to understand better the capabilities and limitations of the codes; to ensure these codes are sustained; and to ensure updates or revisions are performed in a controlled manner. The workshop was attended by approximately 100 participants. The participants included code developers, code suppliers, safeguards specialists, domestic and international inspectors, process operators, regulators, and programme sponsors from various government agencies. The workshop provided a unique opportunity for code developers, commercial distributors and end users to interact in a hands-on laboratory environment to develop solutions for programmatic and technical issues associated with the various codes. The workshop also provided an international forum for discussing development of an internationally accepted standard test method. This paper discusses the organization of the workshop, its goals and objectives and feedback received from the participants. The paper also describes the significance of the working group's contribution to improving codes that are commonly used during inspections to verify that nuclear facilities are compliant with treaty obligations that ensure nuclear fuel cycle facilities are used for peaceful purposes.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Capacity Utilization Study for Aviation Security Cargo Inspection Queuing System

In this paper, we conduct performance evaluation study for an aviation security cargo inspection queuing system for material flow and accountability. The queuing model employed in our study is based on discrete-event simulation and processes various types of cargo simultaneously. Onsite measurements are collected in an airport facility to validate the queuing model. The overall performance of the aviation security cargo inspection system is computed, analyzed, and optimized for the different system dynamics. Various performance measures are considered such as system capacity, residual capacity, throughput, capacity utilization, subscribed capacity utilization, resources capacity utilization, subscribed resources capacity utilization, and number of cargo pieces (or pallets) in the different queues. These metrics are performance indicators of the system s ability to service current needs and response capacity to additional requests. We studied and analyzed different scenarios by changing various model parameters such as number of pieces per pallet, number of TSA inspectors and ATS personnel, number of forklifts, number of explosives trace detection (ETD) and explosives detection system (EDS) inspection machines, inspection modality distribution, alarm rate, and cargo closeout time. The increased physical understanding resulting from execution of the queuing model utilizing these vetted performance measures should reduce the overall cost and shipping delays associated with new inspection requirements.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗