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At least 469 records · Page 26
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2001

Development of an advanced rocket propellant handler's suit

Most launch vehicles and satellites in the US inventory rely upon the use of hypergolic rocket propellants, many of which are toxic to humans. These fuels and oxidizers, such as hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide have threshold limit values as low as 0.01 PPM. It is essential to provide space workers handling these agents whole body protection as they are universally hazardous not only to the respiratory system, but the skin as well. This paper describes a new method for powering a whole body protective garment to assure the safety of ground servicing crews. A new technology has been developed through the small business innovative research program at the Kennedy Space Center. Currently, liquid air is used in the environmental control unit (ECU) that powers the propellant handlers suit (PHE). However, liquid air exhibits problems with attitude dependence, oxygen enrichment, and difficulty with reliable quantity measurement. The new technology employs the storage of the supply air as a supercritical gas. This method of air storage overcomes all of three problems above while maintaining high density storage at relatively low vessel pressures (<7000 kPa or approximately 1000 psi). A one hour prototype ECU was developed and tested to prove the feasibility of this concept. This was upgraded by the design of a larger supercritical dewar capable of holding 7 Kg of air, a supply which provides a 2 hour duration to the PHE. A third version is being developed to test the feasibility of replacing existing air cooling methodology with a liquid cooled garment for relief of heat stress in this warm Florida environment. Testing of the first one hour prototype yielded data comparable to the liquid air powered predecessor, but enjoyed advantages of attitude independence and oxygen level stability. Thermal data revealed heat stress relief at least as good as liquid air supplied units. The application of supercritical air technology to this whole body protective ensemble marked an advancement in the state-of-the-art in personal protective equipment. Not only was long duration environmental control provided, but it was done without a high pressure vessel. The unit met human performance needs for attitude independence, oxygen stability and relief of heat stress. This supercritical air (and oxygen) technology is suggested for microgravity applications in life support such as the Extravehicular Mobility Unit. c 2001. Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Hazardous Substances↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Ontological Approach to Integrate Commercial Space Operations with an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS)

The emergence of commercial space operations (CSO) is one of many Advanced Air Mobility domains that pose major challenges to in-time safety assurance because of the different architectures used by the operators and other agents. The National Academies recognized the need to improve integration of disparate architectures and recommended that an In-time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS) be developed to provide seamless connectivity across interacting architectures and enable in-time safety assurance. An ontological approach to integrating CSO with IASMS involves in-time Services, Functions, and Capabilities design to manage operational risks and inform changes to design. The resulting integrated architecture provides a common basis for risk management and in-time safety assurance.

K Ellis↗
NASA NTRS1992

Critical soft landing technology issues for future US space missions

A programmatic need for research and development to support parachute-based landing systems has not existed since the end of the Apollo missions in the mid-1970s. Now, a number of planned space programs require advanced landing capabilities for which the experience and technology base does not currently exist. New requirements for landing on land with controllable, gliding decelerators and for more effective impact attenuation devices justify a renewal of the landing technology development effort that existed during the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. A study was performed to evaluate the current and projected national capability in landing systems and to identify critical deficiencies in the technology base required to support the Assured Crew Return Vehicle and the Two-Way Manned Transportation System. A technology development program covering eight landing system performance issues is recommended.

Macha, J. M.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Applications of Anomaly Detection and Precursor Identification in Airspace Operations

As we continue to advance the U.S. National Airspace into the next generation of air traffic, we face challenges in both increase in complexity, as well as, a significant growth in traffic volume. Addressing these challenges, while maintaining the same level of safety is an important application of data mining. Because of these significant shifts in airspace design and usage there is a need to identify current and emergent safety risks along with their potential precursors. In recent years NASA has made advancements in developing scalable methods to address this effort in the Big Data paradigm. Multiple kernel anomaly detection approaches have been employed on both surveillance radar data and flight operational quality assurance data to identify operationally significant safety risks. Additionally, events have been explored with a recently developed precursor identification tool to discover states that reveal an increased probability of a safety event. These tools can be used to discover emerging safety risks that may not be currently monitored, which allows for mitigation tactics to be employed and ultimately make the overall airspace safer. This talk will discuss an overview of these methods and a discussion of the findings.

anomaly detection↗
NASA NTRS2007

Assurance of Complex Electronics. What Path Do We Take?

Many of the methods used to develop software bare a close resemblance to Complex Electronics (CE) development. CE are now programmed to perform tasks that were previously handled in software, such as communication protocols. For instance, Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) can have over a million logic gates while system-on-chip (SOC) devices can combine a microprocessor, input and output channels, and sometimes an FPGA for programmability. With this increased intricacy, the possibility of "software-like" bugs such as incorrect design, logic, and unexpected interactions within the logic is great. Since CE devices are obscuring the hardware/software boundary, we propose that mature software methodologies may be utilized with slight modifications to develop these devices. By using standardized S/W Engineering methods such as checklists, missing requirements and "bugs" can be detected earlier in the development cycle, thus creating a development process for CE that will be easily maintained and configurable based on the device used.

FROM↗
NASA NTRS2020

Autonomous Assessment and Predictive Capabilities for Low-Altitude Urban Flight Operations

The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles in the national airspace will introduce new vehicle types, technologies, and operational paradigms for which safety must be maintained and hazards mitigated. One approach is to attempt to design for possible hazards and unsafe incidents that can occur at different phases of flight (pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight) and during ground operations. Another is to mitigate safety incidents by implementing changes to policies, procedures, regulations, and design to cover personnel, equipment, and aircraft during operations. These and other techniques, not described herein, are typically conservative or adhoc in that they reduce the likelihood of risk after safety incidents have occurred. In this work, the goal is to develop a more predictive capability to monitor and mitigate risk and hazards to safety “in-time” enough for decisions to be made. In line with NASA’s Aeronautics Mission Directorate Strategic Thrust 5 [1] (In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance), the System-Wide Safety (SWS) project under which this work falls, is developing and demonstrating innovative and safety-oriented solutions that enable modernization and aviation transformation. To that effect, this work will detail data-driven efforts on the SWS project to develop a number of safety-critical services for in-time monitoring and mitigation of hazards to low-altitude flight operations. First, hazards to these operations are identified based on previous work by NASA [2,3] and others in the aerospace industry. These hazards include (i) unsafe proximity to other vehicles, property, and people on the ground, (ii) critical system failures such as communication signal/GPS loss, unexpected propulsion system degradation, engine/power failure, and (iii) operational/environmental issues such as severe weather and gusty winds. For these hazards, safety metrics, which can be quantified and assessed are defined, models to monitor and predict them are developed, and flight test data is generated to develop, validate, and test these models, considering the complex interplay of the different hazards that define them [4-6]. In addition, the uncertainty in the non-deterministic effects that cannot be modeled nor predicted and unknown unknowns that arise after design/testing and during operations must be handled in rigorous manner. As a result, for each of the developed safety metrics, their dependencies on one another are characterized and a framework for handling the uncertainties inherent in the modeling, algorithms, and measurements required for prediction is also developed [7]. To that effect, this presentation will describe the safety metrics and services already developed and underway under the System-Wide Safety project that utilize data-driven techniques for the identification of anomalies, precursors, and trends (APTs) to monitor and mitigate hazards to safety, in-time, for urban flight operations in low-altitude airspace.

Okolo, Wendy A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Validation and Verification of Future Integrated Safety-Critical Systems Operating under Off-Nominal Conditions

Loss of control remains one of the largest contributors to aircraft fatal accidents worldwide. Aircraft loss-of-control accidents are highly complex in that they can result from numerous causal and contributing factors acting alone or (more often) in combination. Hence, there is no single intervention strategy to prevent these accidents and reducing them will require a holistic integrated intervention capability. Future onboard integrated system technologies developed for preventing loss of vehicle control accidents must be able to assure safe operation under the associated off-nominal conditions. The transition of these technologies into the commercial fleet will require their extensive validation and verification (V and V) and ultimate certification. The V and V of complex integrated systems poses major nontrivial technical challenges particularly for safety-critical operation under highly off-nominal conditions associated with aircraft loss-of-control events. This paper summarizes the V and V problem and presents a proposed process that could be applied to complex integrated safety-critical systems developed for preventing aircraft loss-of-control accidents. A summary of recent research accomplishments in this effort is also provided.

Belcastro, Christine M.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Hazard Contribution Modes of Machine Learning Components

Amongst the essential steps to be taken towards developing and deploying safe systems with embedded learning-enabled components (LECs) i.e., software components that use ma- chine learning (ML)—are to analyze and understand the con- tribution of the constituent LECs to safety, and to assure that those contributions have been appropriately managed. This paper addresses both steps by, first, introducing the notion of hazard contribution modes (HCMs) a categorization of the ways in which the ML elements of LECs can contribute to hazardous system states; and, second, describing how argumentation patterns can capture the reasoning that can be used to assure HCM mitigation. Our framework is generic in the sense that the categories of HCMs developed i) can admit different learning schemes, i.e., supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning, and ii) are not dependent on the type of system in which the LECs are embedded, i.e., both cyber and cyber-physical systems. One of the goals of this work is to serve a starting point for systematizing L analysis towards eventually automating it in a tool.

Smith, Colin↗
NASA NTRS2015

Software Assurance Challenges for the Commercial Crew Program

This paper will provide a description of some of the challenges NASA is facing in providing software assurance within the new commercial space services paradigm, namely with the Commercial Crew Program (CCP). The CCP will establish safe, reliable, and affordable access to the International Space Station (ISS) by purchasing a ride from commercial companies. The CCP providers have varying experience with software development in safety-critical space systems. NASA's role in providing effective software assurance support to the CCP providers is critical to the success of CCP. These challenges include funding multiple vehicles that execute in parallel and have different rules of engagement, multiple providers with unique proprietary concerns, providing equivalent guidance to all providers, permitting alternates to NASA standards, and a large number of diverse stakeholders. It is expected that these challenges will exist in future programs, especially if the CCP paradigm proves successful. The proposed CCP approach to address these challenges includes a risk-based assessment with varying degrees of engagement and a distributed assurance model. This presentation will describe NASA IV&V Program's software assurance support and responses to these challenges.

Commercial Crew↗
NASA NTRS1990

Software safety - A user's practical perspective

Software safety assurance philosophy and practices at the NASA Ames are discussed. It is shown that, to be safe, software must be error-free. Software developments on two digital flight control systems and two ground facility systems are examined, including the overall system and software organization and function, the software-safety issues, and their resolution. The effectiveness of safety assurance methods is discussed, including conventional life-cycle practices, verification and validation testing, software safety analysis, and formal design methods. It is concluded (1) that a practical software safety technology does not yet exist, (2) that it is unlikely that a set of general-purpose analytical techniques can be developed for proving that software is safe, and (3) that successful software safety-assurance practices will have to take into account the detailed design processes employed and show that the software will execute correctly under all possible conditions.

Dunn, William R.↗
NASA NTRS1958

X-15 auxiliary power units and reaction controls

Electrical and hydraulic power within the X-15 airplane is developed by a monopropellant auxiliary power unit. In addition, airplane altitude control at extreme altitude is by monopropellant rockets. Two duplicate installations are used to provide reliability beyond single-system capabilities to assure continuous availability of aerodynamic flight controls and space-altitude controls. All components have been developed and evaluation tested by the individual suppliers. The principal item, the auxiliary power unit, has completed a 150 hour endurance test comprising 300 typical mission duty cycles. (author)

Wagner, Bruce O↗
NASA NTRS2022

Assurance Equations: A Cost and Criticality Model for Optimizing Quality Assurance Surveillance

The cost of quality vs cost of failure correction has been a long-running topic of discussion within the Aerospace community. It leads directly to concepts of “risk tolerance”, and risk-based decision-making. It would be valuable if there was a way to compute the optimal investment in customer-executed quality assurance activities using defect significance with respect to performance objectives, the activities’ defect detection effectiveness, and the cost-penalty for late discovery of impactful defects. This optimization is particularly of interest to projects whose budget constraints significantly limit their risk management options.The cost to fix defects (i.e., failure correction) escalates as the project matures. There have been studies attempting to determine the relative cost of fixing defects discovered during various phases of a project life cycle with important implications, all of which suggest growth factors are large. The commonly referred to 1:10:100 rule represents a cost multiplier for repair/rework across the Design to Fab to Test hardware development phases. Cost premiums for QA activities also accumulate when they are treated as mandatory (due to schedule drag) or are performed later than their assigned phase.This paper describes the modeling of development phase -dependencies in the conduct of typical customer-executed quality assurance activities. Our initial modeling encompasses:• Distinct phases of the production lifecycle• Multiple kinds of Defects, each with some a-priori likelihood of being present• Each defect’s impact on performance Objectives for a type of hardware• The cost and efficacy of assurance techniques at detecting such Defects• The costs of fixing those Defects detected in a given phase of the production lifecycleThe model captures assurance activities’ abilities to Detect defects. Upon detection it is assumed that the Defect is immediately fixed. Defects that “escape” detection by some activity may thereafter be detected by a later activity, but by then the cost of fixing the Defect may have escalated. Defects are related to the performance Objectives they would detract from, were those Defects to remain present in the operating system.We have constructed and are exploring, a model that relates the importance of hardware system elements to mission objectives, the impact of types of Defects on those hardware types, the cost of customer-executed assurance activities (i.e., supplier controls) and their effectiveness towards reducing an impactful quality escape, and the cost of Defect correction across production phase. We describe the approach taken to select the key model aspects, why they are relevant to our NASA mission, and our efforts to populate it with relevant and contemporary data. We use a notional example to illustrate model design and function.

Plante, Jeannette↗
NASA NTRS1989

CSTI High Capacity Power

The SP-100 program was established in 1983 by DOD, DOE, and NASA as a joint program to develop the technology necessary for space nuclear power systems for military and civil application. During FY-86 and 87, the NASA SP-100 Advanced Technology Program was devised to maintain the momentum of promising technology advancement efforts started during Phase 1 of SP-100 and to strengthen, in key areas, the chances for successful development and growth capability of space nuclear reactor power systems for future space applications. In FY-88, the Advanced Technology Program was incorporated into NASA's new Civil Space Technology Initiative (CSTI). The CSTI Program was established to provide the foundation for technology development in automation and robotics, information, propulsion, and power. The CSTI High Capacity Power Program builds on the technology efforts of the SP-100 program, incorporates the previous NASA SP-100 Advanced Technology project, and provides a bridge to NASA Project Pathfinder. The elements of CSTI High Capacity Power development include Conversion Systems, Thermal Management, Power Management, System Diagnostics, and Environmental Interactions. Technology advancement in all areas, including materials, is required to assure the high reliability and 7 to 10 year lifetime demanded for future space nuclear power systems. The overall program will develop and demonstrate the technology base required to provide a wide range of modular power systems as well as allowing mission independence from solar and orbital attitude requirements. Several recent advancements in CSTI High Capacity power development will be discussed.

Winter, Jerry M.↗
NASA NTRS1959

The Ten Year Plan of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The long term national objectives of the United States in aeronautical and space activities are stated in general terms in the enabling legislation establishing NASA. In operational terms, these objectives, are instructions to explore and to utilize both the atmosphere and the regions outside the earth's atmosphere for peaceful and scientific purposes, while at the same time providing research support to the Department of Defense. These objectives can be attained only by means of a broad and soundly conceived program of research, development and operations in space. In the long run, such activities should make feasible the manned exploration of the moon and the nearby planets, and this exploration may thus be taken as a long-term goal of NASA activities. To assure steady and rapid progress toward these objectives, a NASA Ten Year Plan has been developed and is presented in this document.

Source record↗