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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 451 records · Page 25
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Modernization of B-2 Data, Video, and Control Systems Infrastructure

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) Plum Brook Station (PBS) Spacecraft Propulsion Research Facility, commonly referred to as B-2, is NASA s third largest thermal-vacuum facility with propellant systems capability. B-2 has completed a modernization effort of its facility legacy data, video and control systems infrastructure to accommodate modern integrated testing and Information Technology (IT) Security requirements. Integrated systems tests have been conducted to demonstrate the new data, video and control systems functionality and capability. Discrete analog signal conditioners have been replaced by new programmable, signal processing hardware that is integrated with the data system. This integration supports automated calibration and verification of the analog subsystem. Modern measurement systems analysis (MSA) tools are being developed to help verify system health and measurement integrity. Legacy hard wired digital data systems have been replaced by distributed Fibre Channel (FC) network connected digitizers where high speed sampling rates have increased to 256,000 samples per second. Several analog video cameras have been replaced by digital image and storage systems. Hard-wired analog control systems have been replaced by Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), fiber optic networks (FON) infrastructure and human machine interface (HMI) operator screens. New modern IT Security procedures and schemes have been employed to control data access and process control flows. Due to the nature of testing possible at B-2, flexibility and configurability of systems has been central to the architecture during modernization.

Cmar, Mark D.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Modernization of B-2 Data, Video, and Control Systems Infrastructure

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) Plum Brook Station (PBS) Spacecraft Propulsion Research Facility, commonly referred to as B-2, is NASA's third largest thermal-vacuum facility with propellant systems capability. B-2 has completed a modernization effort of its facility legacy data, video and control systems infrastructure to accommodate modern integrated testing and Information Technology (IT) Security requirements. Integrated systems tests have been conducted to demonstrate the new data, video and control systems functionality and capability. Discrete analog signal conditioners have been replaced by new programmable, signal processing hardware that is integrated with the data system. This integration supports automated calibration and verification of the analog subsystem. Modern measurement systems analysis (MSA) tools are being developed to help verify system health and measurement integrity. Legacy hard wired digital data systems have been replaced by distributed Fibre Channel (FC) network connected digitizers where high speed sampling rates have increased to 256,000 samples per second. Several analog video cameras have been replaced by digital image and storage systems. Hard-wired analog control systems have been replaced by Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), fiber optic networks (FON) infrastructure and human machine interface (HMI) operator screens. New modern IT Security procedures and schemes have been employed to control data access and process control flows. Due to the nature of testing possible at B-2, flexibility and configurability of systems has been central to the architecture during modernization.

Cmar, Mark D.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Need for research and training reactors for advanced reactor designs

Full text of publication follows. Research and training reactors have served a valuable role in helping train workforce for currently operating fleet of light water reactors. These research and training reactors have been used in reactor laboratory classes to familiarize the students with such vital concepts as approach to criticality, reactor period, neutron moderation, reactivity, flux distribution and leakage, etc. As the industry moves toward advanced non-light-water reactor designs, it is critical that research and training reactors be developed and deployed at university campuses to help train the new generation of nuclear and non-nuclear engineers who are likely to design, build, and operate these advanced reactors. Among the designs currently being pursued for nuclear power generation include molten salt, sodium cooled, and gas cooled designs, with options for various fuel forms. Thus, industry and DOE in collaboration with academic institutions should devise plans on how to familiarize the next generation of nuclear workforce with hands-on experience necessary for such designs. These research and training reactors will play a vital role in familiarizing the future workforce with hands-on experience with concepts associated with fast spectrum reactors, gas cooled reactors, and other features not associated with light water reactors. In addition to classical nuclear engineering concepts, these advanced research and training reactors can also be used for hands-on training as well as for research on features being considered in the design of GEN-IV reactors: cyber security for digital control room operations, hybrid energy system, hydrogen generation, district heating, autonomous control... (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education

The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS2014

Cyber Threat Assessment of Uplink and Commanding System for Mission Operation

Most of today's Mission Operations Systems (MOS) rely on Ground Data System (GDS) segment to mitigate cyber security risks. Unfortunately, IT security design is done separately from the design of GDS' mission operational capabilities. This incoherent practice leaves many security vulnerabilities in the system without any notice. This paper describes a new way to system engineering MOS, to include cyber threat risk assessments throughout the MOS development cycle, without this, it is impossible to design a dependable and reliable MOS to meet today's rapid changing cyber threat environment.

ground data↗
DOE OSTI2024

Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL

The clean energy transformation includes the integration of distributed energy resources with the power grid, which has led to a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Power grids infrastructure represents an operational technology environment that has become a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are both software-and hardware-intensive; as a result, there are increasing demands to exploit advances in the commodity of software-hardware infrastructures to improve energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, which leads to vulnerabilities and undesirable outcomes. The use of formal methods to characterize and prove system requirements removes ambiguity, increases automation, and provides high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system-level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.

formal methods↗
DOE OSTI2023

Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL: Preprint

The clean energy transformation led to the integration of distributed energy resources on a top of the grid, and so a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Operational technology environments are becoming a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are software/hardware intensive, have ever increasing demands to exploit advances in commodity of software/hardware infrastructures, and this for good reasons - improving energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, thus undesirable outcomes will surely happen. The use of formal methods will remove ambiguity, increase automation and provide high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.

formal methods↗
NASA NTRS1986

Two-Arm-Manipulator Controller

Shoulder harness allows wearer to control simultaneously and independently two remote manipulator arms and end effectors. Each manipulator arm would have 7 degrees of freedom. Two arm mechanisms of controller moved by operator's arms and hands. Remote manipulator, located elsewhere, responds to operator's arm and hand movements. Adjustable shoulder straps, waist belt, and leg straps hold harness securely on wearer. Mechanisms and harness allow operator to reach almost normally at control station.

Coryell, S.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Post-Shuttle EVA Operations on ISS

The EVA hardware used to assemble and maintain the ISS was designed with the assumption that it would be returned to Earth on the Space Shuttle for ground processing, refurbishment, or failure investigation (if necessary). With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, a new concept of operations was developed to enable EVA hardware (EMU, Airlock Systems, EVA tools, and associated support equipment and consumables) to perform ISS EVAs until 2016 and possibly beyond to 2020. Shortly after the decision to retire the Space Shuttle was announced, NASA and the One EVA contractor team jointly initiated the EVA 2010 Project. Challenges were addressed to extend the operating life and certification of EVA hardware, secure the capability to launch EVA hardware safely on alternate launch vehicles, and protect EMU hardware operability on orbit for long durations.

West, Bill↗
DOE OSTI2019

Risk-informed Physical Security Using Dynamic Force-on-Force Modelling Tools (ABSTRACT)

Physical security requirement of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the US is regulated in a mainly prescriptive manner. This “one size fits all” approach may consequently overlook plant-specific characteristics which are beneficial for the inherent safety and security of the plant. Although a performance-based security measure has been promulgated in 10 CFR 73.55(r), current evaluation methods generally emphasize static and conservative assumptions on physical security uncertainties. This conservatism contributes to the overall operational and maintenance costs, which account to 70% of total operating expenditures for an NPP. This paper describes an ongoing work at the Idaho National Laboratory within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway, which aims to optimize physical protection system with regards to system effectiveness and dollar costs. To achieve this goal, a risk-informed approach to physical security is proposed. This approach leverages the Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool to model facility infiltration and Force-on-Force (FoF) engagement in a dynamic manner. The dynamic FoF analysis was conducted by coupling human performance uncertainties modeled in EMRALD to existing commercial 3-dimensional FoF software, i.e. SCRIBE3D, AVERT and Simajin. Meanwhile, risk analysis was accomplished by coupling the attack outcomes to existing plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model with FLEX strategy. This approach reduces the conservatisms in security modeling and further acknowledges the possibility for plant operators to mitigate the attack outcomes. A sabotage attack on a hypothetical NPP facility was devised to demonstrate the proposed methodology. Dynamic FoF rules were implemented in EMRALD coupled to SCRIBE3D. This dynamic evaluation revealed an additional 21% system effectiveness in protecting the target set relative to the static modelling approach. Furthermore, the conditional core damage probability could be reduced by up to 46% by crediting operator actions in mitigating the sabotage outcomes. We evaluated the relative importance of each component of the physical security posture included in the model and assessed tradeoffs between components to identify potential opportunities for cost reduction while maintaining a specific level of system effectiveness. Results of the cost analysis will be presented in the conference. This study is expected to help NPP operators in allocating resources optimally to satisfy the security requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Securing Small Modular Reactors in Urban Environments

Current small modular reactor (SMR) deployment use cases consider both rural and urban deployments, depending on the operational in-country needs for clean and reliable sources of energy. Many studies have been conducted analyzing security in rural and remote deployment locations, but this study looks at the physical security implications of an SMR placed in an urban environment and its uses for electricity production, district heating, and process heating. SMRs used for electricity production, district heating, and process heating may be key sources of both energy infrastructure and commercial infrastructure within a city and a State. As a result, long-term shutdowns could have a serious impact on a State’s overall energy or commercial production. Therefore, operators may consider further security applications to protect an SMR plant from physical attacks against both radiological sabotage and sabotage acts that could result in the SMR facility being offline for a significant amount of time. In this study, the team designed and analyzed a physical protection system (PPS) for securing an urban SMR facility against acts of radiological sabotage and sabotage acts that could disrupt the facility’s long-term operation. Additionally, this work analyzed the nuanced security issues related to siting an SMR near an urban environment (versus in a rural environment). The result of these analyses includes recommendations for PPSs for urban SMR facilities used for energy production, district heating, and process heating.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

A High-Fidelity Cyber-Physical Testbed-Based Benchmarking Dataset For Testing Operational Technology Specific Intrusion Detection Systems

Quality datasets serve a critical purpose in cyber security research. Data is needed to understand system behavior and develop security controls to protect critical systems. However, for critical infrastructure operational environments there is a lack of available datasets to study because of the high cost and specialized capabilities necessary to generate them. This paper documents the development of a dataset of high fidelity hardware in the loop laboratory simulated models of electric and natural gas distribution systems with real cyber attack test cases. A deep dive discussion for the experimental setup and controls for generating the data is provided along with observations from using the data in evaluating intrusion detection approaches.

Ashok, Aditya↗
NASA NTRS2021

OSIRIS-REx Proximity Operations and Navigation Performanceat (101955) Bennu

The NASA Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, and Security–Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) spacecraft began close proximity operations at the small (500-m diameter) B-type asteroid (101955) Bennu in December 2018 and concluded in May 2021. Hundreds of grams of pristine surface regolith were collected on October 20, 2020, when the OSIRIS-REx spacecraft successfully executed the Touch and Go (TAG) sample collection sequence. The spacecraft touched down within 1 meter of the targeted site on the surface of Bennu. TAG was the culmination of over 2 years of navigation performance refinement as a result of extraordinary interagency teamwork between the Flight Dynamics System (FDS), science and spacecraft teams while in close proximity to Bennu. This paper will discuss the navigation processes, planning and performance during the proximity operations at Bennu.

Peter G. Antreasian↗
DOE OSTI2026

Smart Inverters, Dumb Risk: Taking Control of IBR Security in the Digital Age

This presentation addresses the security challenges posed by Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) in the modern energy landscape. The presentation highlights the vulnerabilities and risks associated with IBRs, including the potential for cyber-attacks, the impact of insecure defaults, and the systemic risks posed by supply chain dependencies. Key topics covered include: 1) The increasing digital transformation in energy systems and the associated security risks. 2) Specific vulnerabilities in IBRs, including weak passwords, hardcoded credentials, and insecure web application interfaces. 3) The implications of persistent connectivity and the strategic risks posed by foreign-manufactured components. 4) The role of regulatory frameworks, such as NERC CIP, in addressing these challenges and the limitations of current oversight. 5) Practical solutions for mitigating risks, including secure design practices, vendor risk assessments, and the importance of strong passwords and role-based access control. The presentation underscores the necessity of a comprehensive, system-of-systems approach to securing IBRs, emphasizing the need for collaboration across various stakeholders, including operators, developers, and regulators, to ensure the resilience and security of the energy grid.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Corrective Action Management Unit Report of Post-Closure Care Activities Calendar Year 2019

The Corrective Action Management Unit (CAMU) at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) consists of a containment cell and ancillary systems that underwent closure in 2003 in accordance with the Closure Plan in Appendix D of the Class 3 Permit Modification (SNL/NM September 1997). The containment cell was closed with wastes in place. On January 27, 2015, the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) issued the Hazardous Waste Facility Operating Permit (Permit) for Sandia National Laboratories (NMED January 2015) to the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and its Management and Operating (M&O) contractor. The current M&O contractor is National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS). The Permit became effective February 26, 2015. The CAMU is undergoing post-closure care in accordance with the Permit, as revised and updated. This CAMU Report of Post-Closure Care Activities documents all activities and results for calendar year (CY) 2019, as required by the Permit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Corrective Action Management Unit Report of Post-Closure Care Activities. Calendar Year 2020

he Corrective Action Management Unit (CAMU) at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) consists of a containment cell and ancillary systems that underwent closure in 2003 in accordance with the Closure Plan in Appendix D of the Class 3 Permit Modification (SNL/NM September 1997). The containment cell was closed with wastes in place. On January 27, 2015, the New Mexico Environment Department issued the Hazardous Waste Facility Operating Permit (Permit) for Sandia National Laboratories (NMED January 2015) to the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and its Management and Operating (M&O) contractor. The current M&O contractor is National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS). The Permit became effective February 26, 2015. The CAMU is undergoing post-closure care in accordance with the Permit, as revised and updated. This CAMU Report of Post-Closure Care Activities documents all activities and results for calendar year (CY) 2020, as required by the Permit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The In-time Aviation Safety Management System Concept for Part 135 Operators

Transformations of the National Airspace System, such as envisioned with Advanced Air Mobility, will enable improvements for managing and assuring safety for Part 135 transportation of passengers and cargo. The purpose of this paper is to describe the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) Concept of Operations (ConOps) and how its innovations such as using predictive analytics could benefit operators for risk management and safety assurance. The National Academies recommended development of an IASMS ConOps to secure a safe future NAS. Part 135 operators are currently not required to have a formal safety management system.

Kyle K. Ellis↗