Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “secure”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 451 records · Page 25

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011

This report was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years reports, called Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs), Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs), and, beginning in 2010, Nevada National Security Site Environmental Reports (NNSSERs), are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx. This NNSSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, 'Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.' Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NSO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2011 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory-Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NSO is responsible for the oversight of TTR ER projects, and the Sandia Site Office of NNSA (NNSA/SSO) has oversight of all other TTR activities. NNSA/SSO produces the TTR annual environmental report available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011 Summary

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) directs the management and operation of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). NNSA/NSO prepares the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) to provide the public an understanding of the environmental monitoring and compliance activities that are conducted on the NNSS to protect the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from nonradiological impacts. The NNSSER is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NNSS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. It is prepared annually to meet the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the information needs of NNSA/NSO stakeholders. This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the NNSSER. It does not contain detailed descriptions or presentations of monitoring designs, data collection methods, data tables, the NNSS environment, or all environmental program activities performed throughout the year. The NNSS is currently the nation's unique site for ongoing national security-related missions and high-risk operations. The NNSS is located about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The approximately 1,360-square-mile site is one of the largest restricted access areas in the United States. It is surrounded by federal installations with strictly controlled access, as well as by lands that are open to public entry.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Architecture of Mercury - Nevada's Atomic Boom Town: An Architectural Survey of Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Rev. 1)

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to modernize the Mercury town site at the Nevada National Security Site in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. These plans include anticipated demolitions, consolidations, and rebuilding at Mercury to be an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. §300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. Prior to the present survey, Mercury had not yet been systematically recorded, and therefore an area of approximately 364 hectares (900 acres) was surveyed for architectural resources by the Desert Research Institute. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing components. This district is recommended eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A and C. It is unevaluated under Criteria B and D at this time. The Mercury Historic District contains 154 individual landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, all except one are recommended as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the land now called the Nevada National Security Site was named the Nevada Test Site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of 1950s-Era Architectural Resources in Blocks 10, 11, and 17, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to modernize the Mercury town site at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. These plans, including anticipated demolitions, consolidations, and rebuilding at Mercury, are considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing components (Reno et al. 2018). This district was recommended eligible to the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP or National Register) under Criteria A and C but was unevaluated under Criteria B and D at that time. The Mercury Historic District contains 154 individual landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, DRI recommends all except one as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the land now called the NNSS was formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This report is concerned with evaluating resources dating to the 1950s in Blocks 10, 11, and 17 in Mercury prior to the proposed demolition of 22 resources in Blocks 10 and 11 as a phase of the larger modernization program mentioned above. Although the Mercury Historic District as a whole is eligible to the National Register, further evaluation of these properties as detailed in this report indicates that none are individually eligible under any of the Secretary of Interior’s Significance Criteria, either at the national or local level. This is one report in the report series "Evaluation, Finding of Effect, and Mitigation Documentation for 1950s-Era Architectural Resources, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada".

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Defining and Computing a Valued Based Cyber Security Measure

In earlier works (Ben-Aissa et al. 2010; Abercrombie et al. 2008; Sheldon et al. 2009), we presented a value based measure of cybersecurity that quantifies the security of a system in concrete terms, specifically, in terms of how much each system stakeholder stands to lose (in dollars per hour of operation) as a result of security threats and system vulnerabilities; our metric varies according to the stakes that each stakeholder has in meeting each security requirement. In this paper, we discuss the specification and design of a system that collects, updates, and maintains all the information that pertains to estimating our cybersecurity measure, and offers stakeholders quantitative means to make security-related decisions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Defining and Computing a Value Based Cyber-Security Measure

In past work, we presented a value based measure of cybersecurity that quantifies the security of a system in concrete terms, specifically, in terms of how much each system stakeholder stands to lose (in dollars per hour of operation) as a result of security threats and system vulnerabilities\; our metric varies according to the stakes that each stakeholder has in meeting each security requirement. In this paper we discuss the specification and design of a system that collects, updates and maintains all the information that pertains to estimating our cybersecurity measure, and offers stakeholders quantitative means to make security-related decisions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Global Security & Strategic Partnership Programs

Long, proud history of expertise in uranium, lithium, high explosives, assembly/disassembly, and nuclear security and a vital part of today’s nuclear security enterprise Integral role in sustaining U.S. nuclear deterrent and reducing global nuclear threats with unique security and nonproliferation research capabilities NN and GSP Missions Bring Fresh Ideas and Solves Important National Security Problems NN and GSP Missions Keep Our Technology and People Sharp and Ready for New Challenges

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Governance and Resilience: A Holistic Approach to Systems Security in Complex and Chaotic Environments

Here, a systems governance approach emphasizes a holistic perspective that identifies and navigates the interdependencies and conflicts between security and operational needs. Governance is defined as a collection of metasystems that provide the necessary constraints and processes to support, steer, adapt, transform, and sustain a system (Keating et al. 2022). Utilizing the Cynefin framework, which distinguishes between simple, complicated, complex, and chaotic environments (Snowden and Boone 2007), the article highlights the challenges faced by nuclear power plants in predatory contexts and the importance of integrating security objectives into governance frameworks. By incorporating security as a fundamental aspect of governance, the article underscores its significance for persistence, adaptation, and transformation in the face of uncertainty. Additionally, it introduces key heuristics of systems security, such as the importance of context, knowledge‐based decision‐making, and organization‐specific sociological factors (Williams and Caskey 2024). Ultimately, this work provides valuable insights into enhancing resilient operations in complex environments by reinforcing the connection between effective governance and security in systems engineering.

Caskey, Susan A. [Sandia National Laboratories (SN↗

Flexible visualization of a 3rd party Intrusion Prevention (Security) tool: A use case with the ELK stack

A difficult aspect of cyber security is the ability to achieve automated real time intrusion prevention across various sets of systems. To this extent, several companies are offering comprehensive solutions that leverage an "accuracy of scale" and moving much of the intelligence and detection on the Cloud, relying on an ever-growing set of data and analytics to increase decision accuracy. Often, they provide tools to visualize the decision workflows in attack prevention (as well as tune the algorithm) but those solutions are not always practical as companies see the problem as "global" that is, from a unified Cyber-security standpoint. However, a key to a successful Cyber-security program is transparency and trust: from an experimental team viewpoint, this specifically means having the ability to immediately see what and from where, who has been blocked and being able to inform the community in case of a revoked access without the need for filing a "ticket" (that may eventually be answered) – in other words, rapid response to their user-base is essential but solutions targeting "sub-groups" in an organization are not often available. We have come up with a versatile solution leveraging the ELK stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, & Kibana) and an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) based WAF (Web Application Firewall) from Signal Sciences. Signal Science allows the streaming of detailed logs in a Logstash format suitable for custom solutions for visualization. By combining these two tools, we have strengthened our security posture and enabled individual experiments to monitor their own traffic. Specifically, the IPS WAF provides unique data such as country of origin, protocol, response code, source IP, and paths accessed. In this contribution, we will show how we engineered a visualization solution so experiment groups could access a dashboard with predefined graphs but also, where they can create individual customizable dashboards used to display blocked traffic and troubleshoot latency issues. We will discuss the details and procedures for developing and configuring these tools and how it benefits cyber security postures across our scientific based environment.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Semi-device-independent security of one-way quantum key distribution

By testing nonlocality, the security of entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) can be enhanced to being ''device-independent.'' Here we ask whether such a strong form of security could also be established for one-way (prepare and measure) QKD. While fully device-independent security is impossible, we show that security can be guaranteed against individual attacks in a semi-device-independent scenario. In the latter, the devices used by the trusted parties are noncharacterized, but the dimensionality of the quantum systems used in the protocol is assumed to be bounded. Our security proof relies on the analogies between one-way QKD, dimension witnesses, and random-access codes.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Security proof of practical quantum key distribution with detection-efficiency mismatch

Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols with threshold detectors are driving high-performance QKD demonstrations. The corresponding security proofs usually assume that all physical detectors have the same detection efficiency. However, the efficiencies of the detectors used in practice might show a mismatch depending on the manufacturing and setup of these detectors. A mismatch can also be induced as the different spatial-temporal modes of an incoming signal might couple differently to a detector. Here we develop a method that allows to provide security proofs without the usual assumption. Our method can take the detection-efficiency mismatch into account without having to restrict the attack strategy of the adversary. Especially, we do not rely on any photon-number cutoff of incoming signals such that our security proof is directly applicable to practical situations. We illustrate our method for a receiver that is designed for polarization encoding and is sensitive to a number of spatial-temporal modes. In our detector model, the absence of quantum interference between any pair of spatial-temporal modes is assumed. For a QKD protocol with this detector model, we can perform a security proof with characterized efficiency mismatch and without photon-number cutoff assumption. Our method also shows that in the absence of efficiency mismatch in our detector model, the key rate increases if the loss due to detection inefficiency is assumed to be outside of the adversary's control, as compared to the view where for a security proof this loss is attributed to the action of the adversary.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Quantum Security for the Physical Layer

The physical layer describes how communication signals are encoded and transmitted across a channel. Physical security often requires either restricting access to the channel or performing periodic manual inspections. In this tutorial, we describe how the field of quantum communication offers new techniques for securing the physical layer. We describe the use of quantum seals as a unique way to test the integrity and authenticity of a communication channel and to provide security for the physical layer. We present the theoretical and physical underpinnings of quantum seals including the quantum optical encoding used at the transmitter and the test for non-locality used at the receiver. We describe how the envisioned quantum physical sublayer senses tampering and how coordination with higher protocol layers allow quantum seals to influence secure routing or tailor data management methods. We conclude by discussing challenges in the development of quantum seals, the overlap with existing quantum key distribution cryptographic services, and the relevance of a quantum physical sublayer to the future of communication security.

quantum optics↗

MetaPoL: Immersive VR based Indoor Patterns of Life (PoL) and Anomalies Data Generation for Insider Threat Modeling in Nuclear Security

Insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenges that nuclear and radiological security systems face. Insiders pose such a great threat due to their access, authority, and knowledge, granting them opportunities to bypass dedicated nuclear and radiological security elements. For example, in one of the latest major insider threat incidents to nuclear security, the Doel-4 nuclear powerplant in Belgium suffered a shutdown, the threat of nuclear materials diversion, and long-term loss of tens of millions of dollars. Seven years of investigation concluded that it was an inside job and attempted sabotage. In this regard, there is an immediate need for R&D and technology integration in the domain of modeling indoor Patterns-of-Life (PoL) and anomaly detection. This can be achieved by using datasets of facility users’ mobility and activity, which can support the design of algorithms for insider threat modeling and detection. However, due to classification, privacy, sensitivity, and safety protocols, such datasets from real physical nuclear reactor facilities are not only hard to share, but also not always feasible to deploy and collect. Aiming to find an alternate solution, our proposed demonstration work - MetaPoL, is the first-ever (for the application space) immersive VR (virtual reality) environment of a real-world secure facility and allows users to move-and-stay through the designed indoor physical layout and also encounter NPCs (non-player characters) that emulate other facility users. In the MetaPoL an interactive user performs realistic spatio-temporal movement, dwelling and activities using a Meta Quest Pro VR headset, and that generates high-frequency (in time) high-resolution (in space) indoor spatial-temporal datasets that are valuable for PoL modeling and anomaly detection research specifically for insider threat modeling and detection mission. Such generated realistic, rich in context, and mission specific datasets can boost AI/Machine Learning based research for modeling and detecting insider threats in nuclear security and nonproliferation.

Gunaratne, Chathika↗

Reconciling food security and bioenergy: priorities for action

Abstract Understanding the complex interactions among food security, bioenergy sustainability, and resource management requires a focus on specific contextual problems and opportunities. The United Nations’ 2030 Sustainable Development Goals place a high priority on food and energy security; bioenergy plays an important role in achieving both goals. Effective food security programs begin by clearly defining the problem and asking, ‘What can be done to assist people at high risk?’ Simplistic global analyses, headlines, and cartoons that blame biofuels for food insecurity may reflect good intentions but mislead the public and policymakers because they obscure the main drivers of local food insecurity and ignore opportunities for bioenergy to contribute to solutions. Applying sustainability guidelines to bioenergy will help achieve near‐ and long‐term goals to eradicate hunger. Priorities for achieving successful synergies between bioenergy and food security include the following: (1) clarifying communications with clear and consistent terms, (2) recognizing that food and bioenergy need not compete for land and, instead, should be integrated to improve resource management, (3) investing in technology, rural extension, and innovations to build capacity and infrastructure, (4) promoting stable prices that incentivize local production, (5) adopting flex crops that can provide food along with other products and services to society, and (6) engaging stakeholders to identify and assess specific opportunities for biofuels to improve food security. Systematic monitoring and analysis to support adaptive management and continual improvement are essential elements to build synergies and help society equitably meet growing demands for both food and energy.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Consequences of a Weak Nuclear Security Culture [Slides]

(U) The enclosed presentation on nuclear security culture is based on current IAEA guidelines and content of the 2010 Nuclear Summit, both of which underscore the importance of promoting strong security culture at a nuclear facility. The presentation provides definitions of both nuclear security and nuclear security culture, and goes on to examine indications of weak nuclear security culture. The presentation is part of the Department of State's outreach program to foreign countries that intend to establish civilian nuclear programs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Summary Report for the Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School 2014

Executive Summary The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) hosted students from across the United States at the 3rd Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School from 16 – 27 June 2014. The summer school provided students with a unique understanding of nuclear security challenges faced in the field and exposed them to the technical foundations, analyses, and insight that will be required by future leaders in technology development and implementation. The course heavily emphasized laboratory and field demonstrations including direct measurements of special nuclear material. Student evaluations and feedback from student advisors indicates that the summer school achieved its objectives of 1) exposing students to the range of nuclear security applications for which radiation detection is necessary, 2) articulating the relevance of student research into the broader context, and 3) exciting students about the possibility of future careers in nuclear security. In fact, we are beginning to see previous students both enroll in graduate programs (former undergraduates) and complete internships at agencies like the National Nuclear Security Administration.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Selecting RMF Controls for National Security Systems

In 2014, the United States Department of Defense started transitioning the way it performs risk management and accreditation of information systems to a process entitled Risk Management Framework for DoD Information Technology or RMF for DoD IT. There are many more security and privacy controls (and control enhancements) from which to select in RMF, than there were in the previous Information Assurance process. This report is an attempt to clarify the way security controls and enhancements are selected. After a brief overview and comparison of RMF for DoD IT with the previously used process, this report looks at the determination of systems as National Security Systems (NSS). Once deemed to be an NSS, this report addresses the categorization of the information system with respect to impact levels of the various security objectives and the selection of an initial baseline of controls. Next, the report describes tailoring the controls through the use of overlays and scoping considerations. Finally, the report discusses organization-defined values for tuning the security controls to the needs of the information system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cyber Security Research Frameworks For Coevolutionary Network Defense

Several architectures have been created for developing and testing systems used in network security, but most are meant to provide a platform for running cyber security experiments as opposed to automating experiment processes. In the first paper, we propose a framework termed Distributed Cyber Security Automation Framework for Experiments (DCAFE) that enables experiment automation and control in a distributed environment. Predictive analysis of adversaries is another thorny issue in cyber security. Game theory can be used to mathematically analyze adversary models, but its scalability limitations restrict its use. Computational game theory allows us to scale classical game theory to larger, more complex systems. In the second paper, we propose a framework termed Coevolutionary Agent-based Network Defense Lightweight Event System (CANDLES) that can coevolve attacker and defender agent strategies and capabilities and evaluate potential solutions with a custom network defense simulation. The third paper is a continuation of the CANDLES project in which we rewrote key parts of the framework. Attackers and defenders have been redesigned to evolve pure strategy, and a new network security simulation is devised which specifies network architecture and adds a temporal aspect. We also add a hill climber algorithm to evaluate the search space and justify the use of a coevolutionary algorithm.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗