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At least 451 records · Page 25

Outcomes in Women Treated With MammoSite Brachytherapy or Whole Breast Irradiation Stratified by ASTRO Accelerated Partial Breast Irradiation Consensus Statement Groups

Purpose: The American Society for Radiation Oncology published a Consensus Statement for accelerated partial breast irradiation identifying three groups: Suitable, Cautionary, and Unsuitable. The objective of this study was to compare oncologic outcomes in women treated with MammoSite brachytherapy (MB) vs. whole breast irradiation (WBI) after stratification into Statement groups. Methods: Eligible women had invasive carcinoma or ductal carcinoma in situ (DCIS) {<=}3 cm, and {<=}3 lymph nodes positive. Women were stratified by radiation modality and Statement groups. Survival analysis methods including Kaplan-Meier estimation, Cox regression, and competing risks analysis were used to assess overall survival (OS), disease-free survival (DFS), time to local failure (TTLF), and tumor bed failure (TBF). Results: A total of 459 (183 MB and 276 WBI) patients were treated from 2002 to 2009. After a median follow-up of 45 months, we found no statistical differences by stratification group or radiation modality with regard to OS and DFS. At 4 years TTLF or TBF were not statistically different between the cohorts. Univariate analysis in the MB cohort revealed that nodal positivity (pN1 vs. pN0) was related to TTLF (hazard ratio 6.39, p = 0.02). There was a suggestion that DCIS histology had an increased risk of failure when compared with invasive ductal carcinoma (hazard ratio 3.57, p = 0.06). Conclusions: MB and WBI patients stratified by Statement groups seem to combine women who will have similar outcomes regardless of radiation modality. Although outcomes were similar, we remain guarded in overinterpretation of these preliminary results until further analysis and long-term follow-up data become available. Caution should be used in treating women with DCIS or pN1 disease with MB.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Evaluating the Accuracy and Precision of Multiple Abundance Estimators Using State-Space Models: A Case Study for a Threatened Population of Chinook Salmon in Johnson Creek, Idaho

Abstract Over the last century, Chinook Salmon Oncorhynchus tshawytscha populations in the Pacific Northwest have experienced dramatic declines, leading to many of them being listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act. The abundance of these threatened populations relative to the thresholds for delisting remains the primary metric for assessing recovery, yet determining the true population abundances from multiple survey types with unknown levels of accuracy and precision remains difficult. The abundance of the spring–summer Chinook Salmon population in Johnson Creek, Idaho, has been measured using a mark–recapture survey and three different redd count surveys (RCSs) that vary temporally and spatially. Using a state-space model, we determined the accuracy and precision of each survey type by decoupling the observation error of the survey from the process error describing the annual variability in the true population abundance. We then extended the results of the model to determine the risk of managers’ incorrectly delisting the population (a type I error) or incorrectly keeping it listed (a type II error). Finally, we show that salmon managers with data-limited populations (primarily those with only single-pass index RCSs) might use the results of our risk analysis to determine whether expanding survey efforts to minimize management risks is appropriate when they are confronted with dwindling financial resources. For example, we determined that although both the multiple-pass extended RCS (CV = 0.06) and mark–recapture surveys (CV = 0.14) provide unbiased estimates of salmon abundance in Johnson Creek, the mark–recapture study can have annual costs that are 30–100 times greater. Managers may determine that directing research funds toward acquiring information unique to weir-based mark–recapture surveys (i.e., migration timing, good genetics samples, etc.) may not be justified for all populations. Received October 7, 2013; accepted March 5, 2014

Chasco, Brandon E.↗

Studies for the requirements of automatic and remotely controlled shutoff valves on hazardous liquids and natural gas pipelines with respect to public and environmental safety

This study assesses the effectiveness of block valve closure swiftness in mitigating the consequences of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline releases on public and environmental safety. It also evaluates the technical, operational, and economic feasibility and potential cost benefits of installing automatic shutoff valves (ASVs) and remote control valves (RCVs) in newly constructed and fully replaced transmission lines. Risk analyses of hypothetical pipeline release scenarios are used as the basis for assessing: (1) fire damage to buildings and property in Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4 high consequence areas (HCAs) caused by natural gas pipeline releases and subsequent ignition of the released natural gas; (2) fire damage to buildings and property in HCAs designated as high population areas and other populated areas caused by hazardous liquid pipeline releases and subsequent ignition of the released propane; and (3) socioeconomic and environmental damage in HCAs caused by hazardous liquid pipeline releases of crude oil. These risk analyses use engineering principles and fire science practices to characterize thermal radiation effects on buildings and humans and to quantify the total damage cost of socioeconomic and environmental impacts. The risk analysis approach used for natural gas pipelines is consistent with risk assessment standards developed by industry and incorporated into Federal pipeline safety regulations. Feasibility evaluations for the hypothetical pipeline release scenarios considered in this study show that installation of ASVs and RCVs in newly constructed and fully replaced natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines is technically, operationally, and economically feasible with a positive cost benefit. However, these results may not apply to all newly constructed and fully replaced pipelines because site-specific parameters that influence risk analyses and feasibility evaluations often vary significantly from one pipeline segment to another and may not be consistent with those considered in this study. Consequently, the technical, operational, and economic feasibility and potential cost benefits of installing ASVs and RCVs in newly constructed or fully replaced pipelines need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In theory, installing ASVs and RCVs in pipelines can be an effective strategy for mitigating potential consequences of unintended releases because decreasing the total volume of the release reduces overall impacts on the public and to the environment. However, block valve closure has no effect on preventing pipeline failure or stopping the product that remains inside the isolated pipeline segments from escaping into the environment. The benefits in terms of cost avoidance attributed to block valve closure swiftness increase as the time required to isolate the damaged transmission pipeline segment decreases. Block valve closure swiftness is most effective in mitigating damage resulting from a pipeline release and subsequent fire when the damaged pipeline segment is isolated and the thermal radiation produced by the fire declines in time so that emergency responders can safely begin fire fighting activities immediately upon arrival at the scene. Similarly, the avoided cost of socioeconomic and environmental damage for hazardous liquid pipeline releases without ignition increase as time required to isolate the damaged pipeline segment decreases.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Implementation of ALARA radiation protection on the ISS through polyethylene shielding augmentation of the Service Module Crew Quarters

With 5-7 month long duration missions at 51.6 degrees inclination in Low Earth Orbit, the ionizing radiation levels to which International Space Station (ISS) crewmembers are exposed will be the highest planned occupational exposures in the world. Even with the expectation that regulatory dose limits will not be exceeded during a single tour of duty aboard the ISS, the "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) precept requires that radiological risks be minimized when possible through a dose optimization process. Judicious placement of efficient shielding materials in locations where crewmembers sleep, rest, or work is an important means for implementing ALARA for spaceflight. Polyethylene (CnHn) is a relatively inexpensive, stable, and, with a low atomic number, an effective shielding material that has been certified for use aboard the ISS. Several designs for placement of slabs or walls of polyethylene have been evaluated for radiation exposure reduction in the Crew Quarters (CQ) of the Zvezda (Star) Service Module. Optimization of shield designs relies on accurate characterization of the expected primary and secondary particle environment and modeling of the predicted radiobiological responses of critical organs and tissues. Results of the studies shown herein indicate that 20% or more reduction in equivalent dose to the CQ occupant is achievable. These results suggest that shielding design and risk analysis are necessary measures for reducing long-term radiological risks to ISS inhabitants and for meeting legal ALARA requirements. Verification of shield concepts requires results from specific designs to be compared with onboard dosimetry. c2004 COSPAR. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

NASA Center JSC↗

Andra's strategy and approach for operational safety of French underground facility Cigeo - 15127

According to the French Act on radioactive waste of 28 June 2006, Andra shall design a reversible repository. In response to this demand, Andra is developing the industrial project namely 'Cigeo', a reversible geological disposal facility for HLW and ILW located in Meuse/Haute-Marne. The previous safety cases of 2005, 2009 and 2012 give a sound basis to assess Cigeo's safety both for the operational and post-closure periods. Regarding operational safety, in this new stage of the project, the challenging issues for the preparation of the safety case are the following: - To adapt the various regulatory frameworks (nuclear and non-nuclear) to the underground facility - To design the underground facility and handling equipment's to reduce at first risks in the underground facility as such radioactive particles release, gas explosion, fire and co-activity and limit their consequence. - To establish waste acceptance criteria to be fulfilled by waste producers in line with operational safety and design options. The objective of the paper is to present the experience of Andra in operation safety of the underground facility of Cigeo. Operational safety for Cigeo is assessed as much as possible according to the existing French regulations and guidance for nuclear facilities. Indeed, compared to existing nuclear facilities, a geological repository is a specific case due to the existence of underground facilities with particularities such as: - ventilation management in a large scale underground facility, - fire risk management. As an input for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation, Andra defined a fire guidance and a specific reference safety guidance, based on the adaptation of the French nuclear regulatory texts for and when feasible to mines and tunnels regulatory texts and on its own experience gained through safety operational reports since 2005 and their reviews by the Safety Authority. - underground co-activity of nuclear operation with construction works. According to the common 'defense-in depth' principle for nuclear facilities, these guidelines for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation consider the successive levels of defense of: - Preventing the risk and its spreading by design and construction; - Detecting incidents and early fighting by design and operation dispositions (detection and control systems, survey procedure); - Controlling incidents and limiting of their consequences by safeguarding systems, specific procedures. At that stage, design options for Cigeo constitute an adequate response to the operational safety functions and requirements: - Two levels of containment are set up: the first one is ensured by the waste package, the second one is ensured from the surface facility to the disposal vaults by the transfer cask during the transfer of waste packages in the disposal vaults by the disposal vault itself and a nuclear ventilation with HEPA filter; - Favorable options for fire risk prevention and mitigation: transport system minimizing heat load (cable car for the transfer from the surface, electric transfer engines), twin access tunnels to ease fire-fighting and evacuation...; - Permanent complete physical separation of nuclear zone and construction zone (including ventilation systems). In practice, operation safety assessment of Cigeo, designed following the aforesaid reference safety guidelines, follows a common risk analysis (internal aggressions such as auxiliary losses, chemical and toxic risks, fall or collision, fire, human factors and external aggressions such as earthquake, air traffic, flooding) with the following steps: - Identification of the major risks and the design basis scenarios that have to be considered for dimensioning of the installations and the safety devices; - On the basis of these different situations, those who will have to be quantified are identified; one or more representative and envelop situations are chosen in order to evaluate robustness of the installation. Quantitative evaluation of these situations permits to: - identify the consequences on man, environment and installation, and in particular to gain confidence in the maintaining of the safety functions; - identify or define the technic and/or organisational dispositions classified as 'important elements for protection' (IEP); - Situations beyond dimensioning permit to verify the robustness of the installation. They permit, on one hand to identify possible complementary material or organisational dispositions; on the other hand, to define the 'hard core' i.e. structures, systems and components that permit to maintain the confinement function of radioactive substance. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Secondary Protection for 70 MPa Fueling - A White Paper from the Hydrogen Safety Panel

In developing a 70 megapascal (MPa) fueling infrastructure, it is critical to ensure that a vehicle equipped with a lower service pressure fuel tank is never filled from a 70 MPa fueling source. Filling of a lower service pressure vehicle at a 70 MPa fueling source is likely to result in a catastrophic event with severe injuries or fatalities. The Hydrogen Safety Panel recommends that DOE undertake a two-step process to address this issue: 1. Perform an independent risk analysis of a 70MPa dispenser filling a lower pressure vehicle tank and develop different approaches for prevention and mitigation to meet an acceptable level of safety. Cost effectiveness, reliability, advantages and disadvantages are among the factors that should be evaluated for each approach considered. 2. Until such time as this analysis is complete and any recommended actions implemented, communicate the potential risk to responsible parties and strongly encourage those parties to add a secondary layer of protection to the existing system of mechanically non-interchangeable nozzles/receptacles. This will reduce the probability of a pressure mismatch during this developmental phase for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and infrastructure. This step can be reassessed after further analysis is completed and the need and effectiveness of secondary protection methods are evaluated. This paper provides background discussion of the problem, current safety systems and strategy and examples of potential future solutions to support the above recommendations.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Overview of Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Analysis Process for Mars Sample Return Earth Entry System

Introduction: Micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk analyses for the Mars Sample Return (MSR) Earth Entry System (EES) have been significantly more rigorous than previously flown missions because of its categorization as a Class V restricted return mission. This means the returned samples present significant concern for biogenic contamination. These analyses seek to determine if a micrometeoroid or orbital debris strike would result in loss of containment assurance and are summarized in the flowchart in Fig. 1. Methodology: The mission is considered in two MMOD phases: a pre-release phase where the EES is protected by a Micrometeoroid Protection System (MMPS) and a post-release phase called “free-flight” where the EES is exposed directly to the MMOD environment. These phases correspond to interplanetary cruise and imminent re-entry, respectively. To inform the MMPS design, a 30-shot high velocity impact testing (HVIT) series on candidate configurations at NASA White Sands Test Facility was completed in the summer of 2022. Sample post-shot images are shown in Fig 2 [1]. These data are used to baseline the MMPS design and to tune the hydrocode simulations. ALE3D, CTH, and SPHC are the hydrocodes that simulate physics of high-speed impacts [2]. Results generated with these populate a penetration depth versus energy space beyond the testable velocity regime of HVIT (~7 km/s). The penetration depth versus energy space data are used to define a critical projectile diameter function called a Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE), where the projectile “criticality” is determined by zone dependent failure criteria defined a-priori [3]. For example, the nose of the heatshield has a failure criterion of 50% TPS penetration, assigned because the landing loads are concentrated on that region and no substructure damage is permitted. The BLEs for each vehicle material zone are input into the BUMPER 3 code, along with the vehicle surface mesh and the corresponding space environment model, to calculate a probability of penetration or number of penetrations. The environment models, MEM3 for MM and ORDEM 3.2 for OD, simulate the meteoroid environment from 0.2 to 2 au based on the Grün flux equation, and the debris environment up to 40,000 km altitude from Earth surface, respectively [4,5]. Presentation Focus: The presentation or poster will present the results to-date focusing on the full risk analysis process flow seen in Fig. 1. Details on the derivation of the failure criteria will be discussed, along with HVIT results and how these influenced the MMPS configuration baseline decision. Further, results of hydrocode simulations will be presented and the tuning to HVIT outputs will be described. Finally, the strategies that direct the BLE formulation will be reviewed, specifically, for the EES elements that are most exposed to the MMOD environment.

mmod↗

Assessment, Planning, and Execution Considerations for Conjunction Risk Assessment and Mitigation Operations

An operational Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) concept is the real-time process of assessing risk posed by close approaches and reacting to those risks if necessary. The most effective way to completely mitigate conjunction risk is to perform an avoidance maneuver. The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center has implemented a routine CARA process since 2005. Over this period, considerable experience has been gained and many lessons have been learned. This paper identifies and presents these experiences as general concepts in the description of the Conjunction Assessment, Flight Dynamics, and Flight Operations methodologies and processes. These general concepts will be tied together and will be exemplified through a case study of an actual high risk conjunction event for the Aura mission.

Frigm, Ryan C.↗

2009 Technical Risk and Uncertainty Analysis of the U.S. Department of Energy's Solar Energy Technologies Program Concentrating Solar Power and Photovoltaics R&D

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Program (SETP) conducted a 2009 Technical Risk and Uncertainty Analysis to better assess its cost goals for concentrating solar power (CSP) and photovoltaic (PV) systems, and to potentially rebalance its R&D portfolio. This report details the methodology, schedule, and results of this technical risk and uncertainty analysis.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Decision Aid for Conjunction Risk Mitigation by Differential Drag

The NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) team has conducted are view of the historical record of high-risk conjunctions involving CARA-protected missions and evaluated whether (and how much) differential drag can provide effective mitigation. From this analysis, CARA has identified a rule of thumb: missions with perigees below 560 km capable of tripling their drag area for 72 hours(or a larger scale factor for a lesser amount of time) can reliably use differential drag to remediate high-risk events.

mission design↗

Intensity-Modulated Radiation Therapy in Oropharyngeal Carcinoma: Effect of Tumor Volume on Clinical Outcomes

Purpose: To analyze the effect of primary gross tumor volume (pGTV) and nodal gross tumor volume (nGTV) on treatment outcomes in patients treated with definitive intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) for oropharyngeal cancer (OPC). Methods and Materials: Between September 1998 and April 2009, a total of 442 patients with squamous cell carcinoma of the oropharynx were treated with IMRT with curative intent at our center. Thirty patients treated postoperatively and 2 additional patients who started treatment more than 6 months after diagnosis were excluded. A total of 340 patients with restorable treatment plans were included in this present study. The majority of the patients underwent concurrent platinum-based chemotherapy. The pGTV and nGTV were calculated using the original clinical treatment plans. Cox proportional hazards models and log-rank tests were used to evaluate the correlation between tumor volumes and overall survival (OS), and competing risks analysis tools were used to evaluate the correlation between local failure (LF), regional failure (RF), distant metastatic failure (DMF) vs. tumor volumes with death as a competing risk. Results: Median follow-up among surviving patients was 34 months (range, 5-67). The 2-year cumulative incidence of LF, RF and DF in this cohort of patients was 6.1%, 5.2%, and 12.2%, respectively. The 2-year OS rate was 88.6%. Univariate analysis determined pGTV and T-stage correlated with LF (p < 0.0001 and p = 0.004, respectively), whereas nGTV was not associated with RF. On multivariate analysis, pGTV and N-stage were independent risk factors for overall survival (p = 0.0003 and p = 0.0073, respectively) and distant control (p = 0.0008 and p = 0.002, respectively). Conclusions: In this cohort of patients with OPC treated with IMRT, pGTV was found to be associated with overall survival, local failure, and distant metastatic failure.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Johnson Space Center's Risk and Reliability Analysis Group 2008 Annual Report

The Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate s Risk and Reliability Analysis Group provides both mathematical and engineering analysis expertise in the areas of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) analysis, and data collection and analysis. The fundamental goal of this group is to provide National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) decisionmakers with the necessary information to make informed decisions when evaluating personnel, flight hardware, and public safety concerns associated with current operating systems as well as with any future systems. The Analysis Group includes a staff of statistical and reliability experts with valuable backgrounds in the statistical, reliability, and engineering fields. This group includes JSC S&MA Analysis Branch personnel as well as S&MA support services contractors, such as Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and SoHaR. The Analysis Group s experience base includes nuclear power (both commercial and navy), manufacturing, Department of Defense, chemical, and shipping industries, as well as significant aerospace experience specifically in the Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and Constellation Programs. The Analysis Group partners with project and program offices, other NASA centers, NASA contractors, and universities to provide additional resources or information to the group when performing various analysis tasks. The JSC S&MA Analysis Group is recognized as a leader in risk and reliability analysis within the NASA community. Therefore, the Analysis Group is in high demand to help the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) continue to fly safely, assist in designing the next generation spacecraft for the Constellation Program (CxP), and promote advanced analytical techniques. The Analysis Section s tasks include teaching classes and instituting personnel qualification processes to enhance the professional abilities of our analysts as well as performing major probabilistic assessments used to support flight rationale and help establish program requirements. During 2008, the Analysis Group performed more than 70 assessments. Although all these assessments were important, some were instrumental in the decisionmaking processes for the Shuttle and Constellation Programs. Two of the more significant tasks were the Space Transportation System (STS)-122 Low Level Cutoff PRA for the SSP and the Orion Pad Abort One (PA-1) PRA for the CxP. These two activities, along with the numerous other tasks the Analysis Group performed in 2008, are summarized in this report. This report also highlights several ongoing and upcoming efforts to provide crucial statistical and probabilistic assessments, such as the Extravehicular Activity (EVA) PRA for the Hubble Space Telescope service mission and the first fully integrated PRAs for the CxP's Lunar Sortie and ISS missions.

Valentine, Mark↗

Factors Influencing the Evaluation of Spent Fuel Rail Routes - 19010

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is considering use of rail transport for future shipments of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from where it currently resides to storage or disposal facilities. Rail carriers transporting in commerce certain quantities of 'rail security sensitive materials,' including SNF, face a regulatory requirement from the U.S. Department of Transportation to perform route risk assessments on an annual basis. In performing these assessments, each affected rail carrier must take into consideration twenty-seven different route factors, and document its rationale for selecting preferred and alternative routes on the basis of the safety and security risk analysis results. The major freight rail carriers operating in the U.S. have invested in the development of a proprietary tool, for rail carrier use only, to assist them in making route selections. This tool utilizes operations data input by each affected rail carrier in conjunction with geographic information systems (GIS) data to represent proximate risk factors, to be integrated and assigned to individual points and segments on the railroad network. Separate safety and security risk values are generated for each rail route under consideration. These values are then placed on an equivalent scoring basis and summed together to allow direct comparison between different route options and to rank order each route in terms of its relative attractiveness. Each affected rail carrier files an annual report for evaluation by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) that documents its route risk assessment approach and analysis results. DOE has developed its own decision-support tool, Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START), which is capable of generating and analyzing routing options for transporting SNF by rail in addition to other freight modes. To better understand how affected rail carriers are likely to route SNF shipments in accordance with regulatory requirements and those route factors likely to be most influential in impacting DoE's evaluation of alternative SNF rail routes, a study was undertaken by DOE with the following objectives: - Review the shipment routes that have been historically used by rail carriers to move high hazard materials, including SNF; - Identify the physical, operational and proximate characteristics (attributes) associated with the rail segments that comprise these routes; - Evaluate the relationships between these attributes; - Make suggestions for how to streamline the factors used in DoE's rail route evaluations; - Contrast these relationships with how the factors are used by the rail carriers in applying their tool This paper describes the study approach, analysis results, and implications for rail route selection methodology. Differences between this evaluation and railroad industry information about rail route assessments are also discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Uncertainty Analysis of Air Radiation for Lunar Return Shock Layers

By leveraging a new uncertainty markup technique, two risk analysis methods are used to compute the uncertainty of lunar-return shock layer radiation predicted by the High temperature Aerothermodynamic Radiation Algorithm (HARA). The effects of epistemic uncertainty, or uncertainty due to a lack of knowledge, is considered for the following modeling parameters: atomic line oscillator strengths, atomic line Stark broadening widths, atomic photoionization cross sections, negative ion photodetachment cross sections, molecular bands oscillator strengths, and electron impact excitation rates. First, a simplified shock layer problem consisting of two constant-property equilibrium layers is considered. The results of this simplified problem show that the atomic nitrogen oscillator strengths and Stark broadening widths in both the vacuum ultraviolet and infrared spectral regions, along with the negative ion continuum, are the dominant uncertainty contributors. Next, three variable property stagnation-line shock layer cases are analyzed: a typical lunar return case and two Fire II cases. For the near-equilibrium lunar return and Fire 1643-second cases, the resulting uncertainties are very similar to the simplified case. Conversely, the relatively nonequilibrium 1636-second case shows significantly larger influence from electron impact excitation rates of both atoms and molecules. For all cases, the total uncertainty in radiative heat flux to the wall due to epistemic uncertainty in modeling parameters is 30% as opposed to the erroneously-small uncertainty levels (plus or minus 6%) found when treating model parameter uncertainties as aleatory (due to chance) instead of epistemic (due to lack of knowledge).

Kleb, Bil↗

Technical Maturity Assessment of Risk-Informed Safety Analysis Tools

Ensuring maximum safety while enhancing economic benefit is one of most important goal of In the of US Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. Optimization of the safety margins will provide best practice to achieve this goal which can also lead to cost reduction. Under the LWRS framework, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway has been focusing on the optimization of safety margin and minimization of uncertainties to ensure both safety and economics at the highest level. One of the important activities of the pathway is to deploy risk-informed analysis tools to related nuclear industry to support precise representation of safety margins and factors that contribute to cost and safety. The tools therefore need highest technical maturity so that industry can use immediately with strong credibility. The tools should have a capability to support risk-informed decision making for both probabilistic and deterministic elements of safety. The RISA Pathway, therefore, have been performing a comprehensive assessment of technical maturity and verification and validation (V&V) status of selected tools to improve adaptability to the industry. The technical maturity assessment includes three work scope: (a) define requirements based on risk-informed concept; (b) investigate and review development and V&V status for technical maturity assessment; and (c) identify technical gap and propose improvement to meet RISA toolkit requirements. The Requirement Traceability Matrix (RTM) concept was used to capture the requirements from user and developer of the project and/or software. The importance of each requirements was evaluated by Phenomena Identification and Ranking Technology (PIRT) which systematically gathers information and ranks the importance of the information. Finally, degree of the maturity was measured by Technology Readiness Level (TRL) for estimating the maturity of the technologies during the development and acquisition phase of certain technology. This paper summarizes development of assessment method and technical maturity evaluation of multi-purpose probabilistic risk analysis tool RAVEN.

, PIRT↗

Outcomes and Toxicity for Hypofractionated and Single-Fraction Image-Guided Stereotactic Radiosurgery for Sarcomas Metastasizing to the Spine

Purpose: Conventional radiation treatment (20-40 Gy in 5-20 fractions, 2-5 Gy per fraction) for sarcoma metastatic to the spine provides subtherapeutic doses, resulting in poor durable local control (LC) (50%-77% at 1 year). Hypofractionated (HF) and/or single-fraction (SF) image-guided stereotactic radiosurgery (IG-SRS) may provide a more effective means of managing these lesions. Methods and Materials: Patients with pathologically proven high-grade sarcoma metastatic to the spine treated with HF and SF IG-SRS were included. LC and overall survival (OS) were analyzed by the use of Kaplan-Meier statistics. Univariate and multivariate analyses were performed by the use of Cox regression with competing-risks analysis; all confidence intervals are 95%. Toxicities were assessed according to Common Terminology Criteria for Adverse Events, version 4.0. Results: From May 2005 to November 11, 2012, 88 patients with 120 discrete metastases received HF (3-6 fractions; median dose, 28.5 Gy; n=52, 43.3%) or SF IG-SRS (median dose, 24 Gy; n=68, 56.7%). The median follow-up time was 12.3 months. At 12 months, LC was 87.9% (confidence interval [CI], 81.3%-94.5%), OS was 60.6% (CI, 49.6%-71.6%), and median survival was 16.9 months. SF IG-SRS demonstrated superior LC to HF IG-SRS (12-month LC of 90.8% [CI, 83%-98.6%] vs 84.1% [CI, 72.9%-95.3%] P=.007) and retained significance on multivariate analysis (P=.030, hazard ratio 0.345; CI, 0.132-0.901]. Treatment was well tolerated, with 1% acute grade 3 toxicity, 4.5% chronic grade 3 toxicity, and no grade >3 toxicities. Conclusions: In the largest series of metastatic sarcoma to the spine to date, IG-SRS provides excellent LC in the setting of an aggressive disease with low radiation sensitivity and poor prognosis. Single-fraction IG-SRS is associated with the highest rates of LC with minimal toxicity.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Risk assessment of turbine rotor failure using probabilistic ultrasonic non-destructive evaluations

The study presents a method and application of risk assessment methodology for turbine rotor fatigue failure using probabilistic ultrasonic nondestructive evaluations. A rigorous probabilistic modeling for ultrasonic flaw sizing is developed by incorporating the model-assisted probability of detection, and the probability density function (PDF) of the actual flaw size is derived. Two general scenarios, namely the ultrasonic inspection with an identified flaw indication and the ultrasonic inspection without flaw indication, are considered in the derivation. To perform estimations for fatigue reliability and remaining useful life, uncertainties from ultrasonic flaw sizing and fatigue model parameters are systematically included and quantified. The model parameter PDF is estimated using Bayesian parameter estimation and actual fatigue testing data. The overall method is demonstrated using a realistic application of steam turbine rotor, and the risk analysis under given safety criteria is provided to support maintenance planning.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Risk Management for Human Support Technology Development

NASA requires continuous risk management for all programs and projects. The risk management process identifies risks, analyzes their impact, prioritizes them, develops and carries out plans to mitigate or accept them, tracks risks and mitigation plans, and communicates and documents risk information. Project risk management is driven by the project goal and is performed by the entire team. Risk management begins early in the formulation phase with initial risk identification and development of a risk management plan and continues throughout the project life cycle. This paper describes the risk management approach that is suggested for use in NASA's Human Support Technology Development. The first step in risk management is to identify the detailed technical and programmatic risks specific to a project. Each individual risk should be described in detail. The identified risks are summarized in a complete risk list. Risk analysis provides estimates of the likelihood and the qualitative impact of a risk. The likelihood and impact of the risk are used to define its priority location in the risk matrix. The approaches for responding to risk are either to mitigate it by eliminating or reducing the effect or likelihood of a risk, to accept it with a documented rationale and contingency plan, or to research or monitor the risk, The Human Support Technology Development program includes many projects with independently achievable goals. Each project must do independent risk management, considering all its risks together and trading them against performance, budget, and schedule. Since the program can succeed even if some projects fail, the program risk has a complex dependence on the individual project risks.

jones, Harry↗