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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Power Hibernation for Low-Cost Solar Powered Lunar Missions

Lunar Surface temperatures can span from equatorial highs near 400K and polar lows of 50K. The extreme cold combined with the 354-hour duration of the lunar night is particularly challenging for small robotic lander missions. NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) missions involve robotic landers intended to provide low-cost access to the lunar surface. Current CLPS Missions are solar powered and are only intended to survive a single lunar day. The ability to survive the night and continue operations over many lunar cycles would provide a dramatic increase in science productivity. The Power Hibernation approach relies on battery cells that can tolerate the extreme cold night and recover once temperatures return to normal. System recovery from hibernation depends on power electronics that can “cold start” at lunar dawn and operate on solar array output alone. Once battery and avionics systems are restored the spacecraft resumes daytime operations. The challenge is to achieve this capability with minimum impact to the spacecraft design and payload capacity. This talk will describe recent and ongoing investigations in battery and electronics technologies that will enable power hibernation and recovery.

Space Power↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Power Hibernation for Low-Cost Solar Powered Lunar Missions

Lunar Surface temperatures can span from equatorial highs near 400K and polar lows of 50K. The extreme cold combined with the 354-hour duration of the lunar night is particularly challenging for small robotic lander missions. NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) missions involve robotic landers intended to provide low-cost access to the lunar surface. Current CLPS Missions are solar powered and are only intended to survive a single lunar day. The ability to survive the night and continue operations over many lunar cycles would provide a dramatic increase in science productivity. The Power Hibernation approach relies on battery cells that can tolerate the extreme cold night and recover once temperatures return to normal. System recovery from hibernation depends on power electronics that can “cold start” at lunar dawn and operate on solar array output alone. Once battery and avionics systems are restored the spacecraft resumes daytime operations. The challenge is to achieve this capability with minimum impact to the spacecraft design and payload capacity. This talk will describe recent and ongoing investigations in battery and electronics technologies that will enable power hibernation and recovery.

Space Power↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

TRIDENT Drill Validation at Mars and Lunar Analog Field Sites

Drilling on Earth is typically a human-intensive activity. Drilling on other planets is further complicated by the lack of prior local field surveys of their target area, hence blindly drilling into uncertain target rocks. Field conditions on the Moon or Mars are also different than for shallow drilling on Earth: lower temperatures and pressures, less power available, low masses (hence less weight-on-bit). Given the cost of transport from Earth, no drilling muds or working fluids are likely to be available to carry away cuttings. And impact-gardened regolith and dust vary mechanically and texturally from most terrestrial soils. The Regolith and Ice Drill for Exploration of New Terrains (TRIDENT) is a rotary-percussive 1m-class drill from Honeybee Robotics. It is low-power (rotary and percussive actuators are 200 W each) and lightweight (<20 kg) with the maximum weight on bit limited to 200 N. TRIDENT has been manifested for the Volatiles Investigating Polar Exploration Rover (VIPER) and PRIME-1 lunar south pole missions in 2024, has previously been field tested at a hot, dry analog site in the Atacama Desert, and in lunar conditions in thermal vacuum chamber tests. TRIDENT was also part of the 2019 Icebreaker Mars Discovery proposal, as well as in the Mars Life Explorer concept. During ARADS tests, drill control and fault recovery automation software enabled hands-off operations of a rover-mounted TRIDENT drill. TRIDENT Drill Analog Site Validation: Past TRIDENT tests in thermal vacuum (TVAC) chambers targeted containers of manufactured lunar simulants with added volatiles. 2022 TRIDENT ambient testing at NASA Ames drilled into cemented lunar simulant materials. Low cuttings-permeability led to cuttings buildup, and drill choking and binding was observed. The Atacama analog site in ARADS had desiccated unconsolidated sediments that did not challenge the TRIDENT design. However, lunar polar regolith is expected to be diverse and heterogeneous with varying clast sizes, with abundant impactites and perhaps subsurface ice deposits. Neither the simulants nor Atacama testing had completely covered the TRIDENT-targeted field characteristics, motivating further analog tests prior to the planned lunar missions. To gain more insight into the behavior of the TRIDENT hardware in diverse impactites and subsurface ice, and to verify the software automation in that environment, in August 2023 TRIDENT was brought to Haughton Crater, a field analog site in the Canadian Arctic. In September 2023 the same drill was brought to the Bishop Tuff in southern California to verify whether drilling binding behaviors previously seen in lunar simulant testing would be observed in naturally occurring fine-grained massive layers. The ~22 Ma Haughton Crater impact structure is located at 75 ̊22’ N, 89 ̊41’ W, on northwestern Devon Island, Nunavut, Canada. Numerous deposits of pale-grey crater-fill polymictic impact-melt breccia are found within the crater with a typical thickness reaching ~125 m or greater and covering ~60 km -2 . An approximately 600m-thick permafrost layer is also present with ice typically found within 0.5-0.6m of the surface. The volcanic tableland north of Bishop, CA exposes densely welded tuff laid down during the eruption that created the Long Valley Caldera at approximately 0.76 Ma. Extensional faults and the Owens River gorge expose cross-sections across the plateau. The area is viewed as an analog site for Mars features believed to be of pyroclastic origin. Results: Haughton Crater.Drilling tests were conducted 8-13 August 2023 at a previously undisturbed area separated 5-10 m from past years’ Drill Hill test sites (75.4208, -089.7613). In six days, TRIDENT drilled 8 holes to nearly 1 m depth each, totaling 7.80 m. The active layer/ice boundary was at ~67 cm depth, with a total of approximately 2.4 m drilled into ice or ice-cemented impact breccia. During drilling, five drill fault states were observed and successfully recovered. Holes 23-1, 4 and 7 were drilled under manual control, using Honeybee’s Thorax user interface. Holes 23-5, 6, and 8 were drilled with the Ames IBexec automated drilling control software. TRIDENT was observed to have little difficulty in the thawed uncemented impact breccia above the active layer boundary, but required percussion to make slower headway in the ice-cemented breccia. In Hole 23-7 (Fig.1), drilling slowed down in a massive unit just above the active-layer boundary (perhaps a large rock extending into the ice-cementation?), with only 7cm progress made in 27 minutes of high auger torque and constant percussion, leading to a choking fault and then a binding fault. A similar pattern had been observed in TRIDENT Rio Tinto test data from 2017 [6] as well as in the 2022laboratory tests.Bishop Tuff.A team from NASA Ames and the US Geological Survey deployed the same TRIDENT drill to Bishop Sites 1B and 1C (37.4203, -118.4289; 37.4265, -118.4215) on 13-16 September 2023, on the Bishop Tuff plateau. A third drill site was used 17-18 September 2023(37.4598, -118.3667) in an abandoned pumice mine. Four holes (totaling 2.5m depth) were drilled into the fine-grained, meters-thick tuff units at Sites 1B and 1C, and a further two boreholes (totaling 1.98m depth) were made at the pumice site. Drill behavior in the tuff below 10 cm depth was similar to that seen at 65-74 cm depth in Haughton Hole 23-7 (Fig. 1) and that seen in the 2022 lab simulant drilling. Drill safety torque limits were exceeded multiple times resulting in drill stops downhole. These freezes then required external added torques (with a pipe wrench) to resume rotation, to unstick the drill for withdrawal. To prevent this choking and binding behavior we found that more-frequent cuttings removal was necessary, e.g., reducing the “drill bite” size from the nominal 10 cm to 2 cm per bite --bringing the auger up to the surface more frequently, as seen in Bishop Site 1C Hole 2 (Fig.2). This permitted slow progress without drill binding and without external interventions. Conversely, TRIDENT drilling in the more porous pumice target material showed no cuttings buildup issue, and single bites as large as 40 cm were demonstrated. Discussion: We observed that TRIDENT easily penetrated unconsolidated heterogeneous soils (both above the active layer boundary at Haughton and previously in the Atacama). Cemented or consolidated targets that were cuttings-permeable (icy impact breccia, pumice) required more energy applied and percussion. However, in non-cuttings-permeable targets (welded microporous tuff, cemented simulants, boulder) TRIDENT was observed to be prone to excessive cuttings accumulation leading to choking/binding faults and stalling. The wedge cutting bit, used by TRIDENT in field tests and in its flight versions, pulverizes the target rock and creates fine cuttings that ideally are transported up the auger spirals for removal. In porous, fractured or vesicular target materials (such as at the Bishop pumice site) a significant portion of the cuttings are pushed aside, but for non-fractured, microporous targets the cuttings remain in the borehole and accumulate. Rock powder is relatively incompressible as a working fluid at only 100-200N downward force (TRIDENT limits) and hence eventual drilling progress slows or stops. Our recommended strategy for improving TRIDENT cuttings removal in massive target units with low cuttings-permeability is to reduce TRIDENT bite sizes when encountering these units, from 10cm to as little as 1-2cm, to effectively bail the accumulating cuttings. This approach was demonstrated to reduce choking and allowed slow progress to continue in cuttings-impermeable microporous target units (viz. the Bishop tuff in our September 2023 tests or cemented simulants in 2022 ambient tests).

robotic drilling↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Exploration Toilet Hardware Status and Crew Feedback from ISS Artemis-2 Demonstration

The Universal Waste Management System (UWMS), ISS operational nomenclature “Toilet”, was initially installed on the International Space Station (ISS) in 2020 with final installation completed in 2021. Technical progress continues to be made with each on-orbit operation and will ultimately culminate with nominal US crew use of the hardware on ISS. During 2023, the Artemis-2 Demonstration was started, and this paper discusses issues encountered, on-orbit troubleshooting, subsequent ground failure investigation and proposed repairs as well as near-term plans to resume the Artemis-2 demo. Also discussed is an update to the commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Conductivity Monitor (CCM) which is planned to be flown for the resumption of the demo along with additional UWMS hardware and Toilet Integration Hardware (TIH). An updated design of the commode seat and fecal bag for Artemis-2 UWMS will be demonstrated on ISS and a summary of the hardware is included in the paper. Use of the hardware during the first days of the aborted demonstration by crewmembers and feedback received is summarized as well as hardware updates resulting from that feedback. The paper will also provide an overview of the demo results to date that inform the Orion-installed UWMS unit and future manifesting of consumables for both Orion and ISS.

Toilet↗
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗
NASA NTRS2024

NASA Orbital Debris Radar Measurements by the Haystack Ultra-wideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR)

For many years, the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) has partnered with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) to collect data on the orbital debris environment using the Haystack radar. These measurements are used to characterize the small debris environment in low Earth orbit (LEO), down to a noise-limited size of approximately 5 mm—depending on altitude. The Haystack radar operated by MIT/LL underwent upgrades starting in May 2010, with operations resuming in 2014 as the Haystack Ultra-wideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR). HUSIR is the primary source of data used by the ODPO to statistically sample orbital debris in the 5-mm to 10-cm size regime in LEO and is a key source of data to build and validate the NASA Orbital Debris Engineering Model. In this presentation, we will present recent HUSIR results and show how NASA uses them to understand the orbital debris environment.

Mark Matney↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Exploration Hardware Status and Crew Feedback from Artemis-2 Demonstration

The Universal Waste Management System (UWMS), ISS operational nomenclature “Toilet”, was initially installed on the International Space Station (ISS) in 2020 with final installation completed in 2021. Technical progress continues to be made with each on-orbit operation and will ultimately culminate with nominal US crew use of the hardware on ISS. During 2023, the Artemis-2 Demonstration was started, and this paper discusses issues encountered, on-orbit troubleshooting, subsequent ground failure investigation and proposed repairs as well as near-term plans to resume the Artemis-2 demo. Also discussed is an update to the commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Conductivity Monitor which is planned to be flown for the resumption of the demo along with additional UWMS hardware and Toilet Integration Hardware (TIH). An updated design of the commode seat and fecal bag for Artemis-2 UWMS will be demonstrated on ISS and a summary of the hardware is included in the paper. Use of the hardware during the first days of the aborted demonstration by crewmembers and feedback received is summarized as well as hardware updates resulting from that feedback. The paper will also provide an overview of the demo results to date that inform the Orion-installed UWMS unit and future manifesting of consumables for both Orion and ISS.

Toilet↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Building Automation System Replacement and Improvements during Concurrent Integration and Testing for the Spacecraft Systems Development and Integration Facility

The Spacecraft Systems Development and Integration Facility (SSDIF), the premier cleanroom for NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), has gone through multiple iterations of changes to its building automation system (BAS). NASA flight projects require more stringent environmental controls for temperature, humidity, air exchange rates, and pressurization. This led to increasingly difficult circumstances with replacing and improving the BAS during Integration and Testing (I&T) operations. The SSDIF was partially transitioned to a new BAS during November and December of 2023. Transition occurred in a live environment, while regular I&T activities resumed for the Roman Space Telescope. This resulted in the development and execution of a comprehensive method of procedure. Strategies such as sequencing equipment transition, and using temporary controls for critical equipment, avoided detriments to cleanroom environment. While the new BAS was being built, data points on the previous system would become obsolete, leading to data gaps and uncertainties. Critical data points were distinguished and trended on the new system, providing key insights on equipment functionality, while the BAS was completed. Control hunting and environmental deviations were persistent cases with the SSDIF. In some instances, proportional-integral-derivative (PID) tuning was implemented on current logic to bring smooth PID loop hunting. In other situations, controls logic was completely altered by changing setpoints or sequences. This provided greater laminar flow, more stable pressurization, and improved temperature and humidity controls. This paper documents the transitionary procedure to a new BAS, the improvements made, and challenges faced when altering a BAS during I&T operations.

Cleanroom↗
NASA NTRS2024

Launch Complex 39B, SWMU 009, 2023 Performance Monitoring and Air Sparge Expansion Construction Completion Report, Kennedy Space Center, Florida

The 2023 Performance Monitoring and Construction Completion Report (PM-CCR) presents the findings, observations, and results for Air Sparging (AS) operations and expansion activities, as well as sitewide groundwater monitoring for Launch Complex 39B (LC39B), Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 009, at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. The reporting period for activities covered under this PM-CCR is from January 1, 2023, to December 31, 2023. At LC39B, AS operations began in 2017 in the area west of the launch pad, in the liquid oxygen (LOX) tank area located northwest of the launch pad, and in an area outside of the perimeter fence to protect nearby Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW). The LC39B AS system was installed with 279 AS wells to depths ranging from 23 to 60 feet below land surface (bls), including the sump, correlating to top of screen depths ranging from 20 to 57 feet bls. In December 2022, a total of 22 AS wells were abandoned to support launch pad crane operations, and in November 2023, the system was expanded with five additional AS wells installed to 13 or 17 feet bls near the LOX tank. The remedial objective of the LC39B AS Interim Measure (IM) is to actively decrease concentrations of contaminants of concern (COCs) in groundwater, specifically trichloroethene (TCE), cis-1,2-Dichloroethene (cDCE), and vinyl chloride (VC), to less than their respective Natural Attenuation Default Concentrations (NADCs), so LC39B can transition into a Long-Term Monitoring (LTM) program. This PM-CCR presents the following information for LC39B: • AS system operations and maintenance (O&M) (Year 7 of operation) from January 2023 to December 2023, to include AS trailer relocation in March 2023 and subsequent replacement and re-start in June 2023. • Construction completion details for AS system expansion, which included installation of five new AS wells and one new monitoring well in November 2023. As part of expansion activities, soil samples were also collected for petroleum analysis; no exceedances were identified, and no further investigation for petroleum is warranted. • Performance monitoring results for groundwater sampling events conducted in May/June 2023 (30 wells) and November 2023 (31 wells) in the AS IM area and in the Low Concentration Plume (LCP) areas located north and east of the launch pad for volatile organic compound (VOC) analysis. • Sampling results for one monitoring well, LOX-IW0012S, which is sampled for aluminum on an annual basis (May/June 2023). This well was resampled in November 2023 for both total and dissolved aluminum. Due to a communication error with the laboratory, the May/June 2023 sample was analyzed for total aluminum only. • Groundwater sampling results for per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) collected from seven monitoring wells during the May/June 2023 event to further investigate the Former Sewage Treatment Plant #6 and Percolation Pond area, west of the launch pad. O&M and performance monitoring results show that the AS system at LC39B is operating as designed and meeting performance criteria. Overall runtime was 45 percent (%) during the reporting period (January to December), but the operational runtime was 78% during the timeframe when the system could run (June to December). The most significant downtime contributor was post-launch crane operations following the Artemis launch on November 16, 2022, which lasted until June 2023. During that timeframe, the AS trailer at LC39B was relocated to another KSC remediation site (Wilson Corners) and was subsequently replaced with the AS trailer from the Paint & Oil Locker (POL) remediation site at KSC to resume AS system operations. Performance monitoring results in the AS IM and LCP areas continue to show reduction in COC concentrations over time when compared to baseline levels. In 2023, only one monitoring well (MW0048) detected a COC exceeding its NADC (VC at 740 micrograms per liter [µg/L]), which marks the baseline result for this new well installed during system expansion. Across the rest of the site, VC concentrations have declined or remained stable during the 2023 sampling events. Excluding MW0048, the highest VC result in 2023 was during the May/June sampling event with a concentration of 63 µg/L at MW0032, which is located near MW0048 and the AS expansion area by the LOX tank. TCE was detected in select monitoring wells in the IM area in 2023, but only two locations exceeded the State of Florida Groundwater Cleanup Target Level (GCTL): MW0032 (21 µg/L in May/June 2023 and 9.1 µg/L in November 2023) and MW0036 (5.0 µg/L in November 2023). MW0036 is also located near the LOX tank, on the north side, where the AS system is still operational (Zone Z4). cDCE and trans-1,2-dichloroethene concentrations were less than laboratory method detection limits or their respective GCTLs in all wells sampled in 2023. Near the OFW located northwest of the launch complex, all COC concentrations were less than laboratory method detection limits from monitoring wells (MW0039, MW0040, and LOXTA0002S) sampled in 2023. Aluminum results from LOX-IW0012S, which has been sampled routinely since 2006, detected a total aluminum concentration of 3,900 µg/L during the May/June 2023 sampling event. Results from the November 2023 event detected 5,700 µg/L for total aluminum and 5,500 µg/L for dissolved aluminum. These concentrations slightly decreased from the previous year but remain relatively consistent with historical detections. Aluminum will continue to be sampled on an annual basis at this well as results still exceed the GCTL of 200 µg/L and the Upper Limit of the KSC Background Concentration of 280 µg/L. PFAS results detected nine different PFAS compounds (out of 32 analyzed) from seven wells sampled. Two PFAS compounds, perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), currently have FDEP Provisional GCTLs of 70 nanograms per liter (ng/L). All seven samples collected resulted in concentrations less than the FDEP Provisional GCTLs for both PFAS compounds; no exceedances were observed. PFOS and PFOA also have assigned United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) of 4 nanograms per liter (ng/L). None of the PFOS results exceeded the USEPA MCLs. PFOA was detected in two samples above the USEPA MCL at concentrations of 5.8 ng/L (ECS-IW0009I) and 5.5 ng/L (ECS-IW0009S). Three other PFAS compounds, perfluorohexanesulfonic acid (PFHxS), perfluoro-n-nonanoic acid (PFNA), and hexafluoropropylene oxide dimer acid (GenX), currently have USEPA MCLs of 10 ng/L. PFHxS, PFNA, and GenX were not detected at concentrations greater than their respective USEPA MCLs in any of the seven wells. PFAS compounds without FDEP Provisional GCTLs or USEPA MCLs were screened against USEPA RSLs. No other detections exceeded their respective USEPA RSLs. Additional PFAS sampling will be conducted as part of a future PFAS Site Assessment. Based on O&M activities and performance monitoring, the following is recommended for LC39B: • Continue with Year 8 AS system operation within Zone Z4, which includes the AS expansion area. Zone Z3, which has been off since 2018, should remain off as no rebound has been observed. Zones Z1 and Z2, which were turned off at the end of 2022, will remain shut down as monitoring well results have consistently been below GCTLs or have low-level detections with stable or decreasing trends (Meeting Minute 2402-M10, Decision 2402-D30). • Continue with performance monitoring in 2024 with the same monitoring well network as 2023, except with the addition of MW0048 in both semi-annual events. Baseline concentrations for this well were collected during the November 2023 performance monitoring event. Semi-annual sampling should be planned for the May 2024 and November 2024 timeframes (Meeting Minute 2402-M10, Decision 2402-D31). • Continue sampling monitoring well, LOX-IW0012S, for aluminum (total and dissolved) on an annual basis in May 2024. It is also recommended to re-develop this well prior to the next sampling event (Meeting Minute 2402-M10, Decision 2402-D32). The above recommendations for LC39B were presented at the February 2024 KSCRT Meeting, with Team consensus reached on the path forward. The contents of this PM-CCR were also presented at this meeting.

Deborah M Wilson↗
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’S Break-in-Prebreathe Flight Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during hypobaric ground testing at Johnson Space Center (JSC) identified a ~3 min break-in-prebreathe (BiP) late in the prebreathe (13 min prior to depressurization) as the leading credible cause for the DCS case. This occurred despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 min in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Breaks lasting longer than 10 min require a complete restart of the prebreathe protocol. The adequacy of NASA’s BiP rules was evaluated prior to resuming any hypobaric ground testing or International Space Station (ISS) extravehicular activity (EVA). Of particular interest to the authors was the timing of the BiP in relation to the overall prebreathe timeline. Although there exists no agreed-upon definition, a ‘late’ BiP means towards the end of the prebreathe period, and in particular, the last hour prior to depressurization. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) the type II DCS case report and findings from the investigation; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA); iv) relevant published literature; v) tissue gas loading model estimates; and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe.

Andrew F J Abercromby↗
DOE OSTI2020

Towards an all-orders calculation of the electroweak bubble wall velocity

We analyze Higgs condensate bubble expansion during a first-order electroweak phase transition in the early Universe. The interaction of particles with the bubble wall can be accompanied by the emission of multiple soft gauge bosons. When computed at fixed order in perturbation theory, this process exhibits large logarithmic enhancements which must be resummed to all orders when the wall velocity is large. We perform this resummation both analytically and numerically at leading logarithmic accuracy. The numerical simulation is achieved by means of a particle shower in the broken phase of the electroweak theory. The two approaches agree to the 10$\%$ level. For fast-moving walls, we find the scaling of the thermal pressure exerted against the wall to be $P\sim \gamma^2T^4$, independent of the particle masses, implying a significantly slower terminal velocity than previously suggested.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2020

AGC-4 Experiment Irradiation Monitoring Data Qualification Final Report

The Graphite Technology Development Program ran a series of six experiments to quantify the effects of irradiation on nuclear grade graphite. This report focuses on the fourth experiment, Advanced Graphite Creep 4 (AGC 4). The Advanced Reactor Development (ARD) Technology Development Office (TDO) Program for research and development activities require documentation of qualified monitoring data to design and license the first high-temperature reactor nuclear plant. Qualified data meets the requirements for use as described in the experiment planning and quality assurance documents. Failed data do not meet the requirements and provide no useable information. Trend data may not meet all requirements but still provide some useable information. Use of Trend data requires assessment of how any deficiencies affect a particular use of the data. AGC-4 began with Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Cycle 157D on May 30, 2015. After irradiating the graphite for two cycles, the capsule was removed from the reactor after ATR Cycle 158A, which ended on January 2, 2016, due to interference with another experiment. Irradiation was resumed with Cycle 162A on October 7, 2017 after the interfering experiment was removed from the reactor. AGC-4 irradiation completed by the end of Cycle 166B on January 10, 2020. Between Cycles 162A and 166B, AGC-4 capsule was removed from the reactor core during two Powered Axial Locator Mechanism (PALM) Cycles 163A and 165A to avoid overheating. All thermocouples (TCs) have functioned throughout the AGC-4 experiment. A total of 9,256,184 out of all 11,167,213 temperature records (or 82.9%) are Qualified for use by the ARD Program and 1,911,029 missing values are Failed. Argon, helium, and total gas flow data were within expected ranges, except only eight out-of-range values occurred during outages. A total of 21,240,627 out of all 22,288,5103 gas flow rates (or 92.8%) are Qualified for use by the ARD Program and 1,644,476 are Failed records mostly due to missing values. Discharge gas line moisture values were consistently low during full ATR power, except for 162B, when moisture content was increasing to more than 200 ppmv by the end of this cycle. During outages, moisture content reached as high as 700 ppmv. 1,089,941 out of a total of 1,107,331 moisture values (or 98.4%) are within the measurement range of the instrument and are Qualified for use by the ARD Program and 17,390 missing moisture values are Failed. Graphite creep specimens were subjected to one of three loads: 393, 491, or 589 lbf. For a brief period during Cycle 157D between 12:19 on June 2, 2015, and 08:23 on June 11, 2015, the load cells were wired incorrectly, resulting in missing stack load data. Missing stack loads were estimated from measured ram pressures using regression equations developed from the existing data from Cycle 157D. Estimated stack loads during this period are considered to be an accurate representation of actual load applied to the stacks. These loads deviate slightly from the planned loads. This deviation does not prevent the data from being Qualified for use but must be taken into account when analyzing the effect of load on creep. 6,095,728 out of a total of 6,403,985 moisture values (or 95.2%) are within the measurement range of the instrument and are Qualified for use by the ARD Program and 308,257 missing load values are Failed. Stack displacement increased consistently throughout the eight cycles, with total displacement reached highest value of 2.4 in by the end of irradiation. During ATR outages, a set of pneumatic rams raised the stacks of graphite creep specimens to ensure the specimens were not stuck within the test train. This stack raising was performed seven times throughout irradiation. All stacks were raised successfully each time. 4,744,974 out of a total of 6,094,513 displacement values (or 77.9%) are within the measurement range of the instrument and are Qualified for use by the ARD Program and 1,349,539 displacement values are Failed mostly due to missing values. Analyses were conducted on correlations between TCs to look for trends and step changes that might indicate instrument degradation or failure. Correlation analysis was used to identify instances when TCs form short circuits, referred to as virtual junctions, which result in TCs reporting temperatures from some location in the capsule other than the location where they were intended to read. No evidence of virtual junctions was found. Analyses were also conducted on control charts of temperature differences of between two TCs, which are expected to behave consistently throughout the entire irradiation period. Upward or downward trend over time indicates at least one TC in the pair was drifted. Examining control charts for all 66 possible pairs out of twelve TCs installed in the AGC-4 capsules reveal no clear drift failures occurred, except unstable behavior of two TCs in Zone 3, TC-7 and TC-8, over irradiation time. In conclus

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Thermal Stimulation and Injectivity Testing at Raft River, ID EGS Site

The Raft River geothermal field is the site of an innovative Department of Energy Enhanced Geothermal System (EGS) project to determine the viability of using combined thermal and hydraulic stimulation techniques to improve energy production. Well RRG-9 is currently undergoing a stimulation program using injectate from the US Geothermal Raft River Power Plant and cold water from a cooling tower make-up water well. The stimulation began on 13 June 2013 with injection from the power plant at a temperature of about 39 °C and a pressure of 275 psig. Next, two positive displacement plunger type pumps were used to increase the injection pressure and flow rate for about one month. The highest rate achieved was 258 gpm at a pressure of 741 psig. During this time, fluid from the cooler water well was injected for about 2 weeks at various pressures. Then, the pumps were removed and plant injection resumed on 25 September. Plant injection will continue until the spring of 2014, when a high pressure hydraulic stimulation will be conducted. A series of seismic monitoring stations deployed around the well are providing data on seismic events occurring at the site. Over the past year, 51 microseismic events have been recorded, all less than Magnitude 1. During injection, several diagnostic tests were conducted to gain a better understanding of the well and reservoir. A step-rate test was performed on 22 August to measure the in-situ stress and aid in modeling in-situ fractures. A tracer was injected into the well on 9 September. No tracer was detected in adjacent production wells after several months. A second borehole televiewer survey was conducted for comparison to pre-stimulation images. Here, a third borehole televiewer survey is planned after the high pressure stimulation. Injection test data is evaluated in real time. A modified Hall plot analysis indicates the effective permeability is increasing. The injectivity index supports the results of the modified Hall plot analysis. As the thermal stimulation has continued, the injectivity index has consistently followed an upward trend from 0.1 gpm/psi to 0.53 gpm/psi.

enhanced geothermal systems↗
DOE OSTI2023

Avances a un ano del PR100: Resultados Preliminares del Modelzacion y Conjuntos de Datos Solares y Eolicos de Alta Resolucion

El estudio de Resiliencia y Transiciones a 100% Energia Renovable de Puerto Rico (PR100) es un estudio de 2 ano de la Oficina de Movilizacion de la Red del Departamento de Energia y seis laboratorios nacionales para analizar exhaustivamente las rutas dirigidas por las personas interesadas hacia un futuro de energia limpia en Puerto Rico. En el Ano 1 del estudio, el equipo PR100, creo y analizo los modelos que alcanzan las metas de energia renovable para Puerto Rico y los objetivos de resiliencia energetica a corto y largo plazo. Esta presentacion, que resume el progreso en el Ano 1, proporciona las consideraciones que pueden informar posibles decisiones de fondos e implementacion potenciales por parte de las agencias federales y locales clave y partes interesadas. Esta presentacion sigue a la publicacion en julio 2022 de un Informe de Seis Meses de Progreso de PR100 (en ingles y espanol), asi como webinarios publicos en febrero 2022 para lanzar el estudio y julio 2022 para presentar la actualizacion a 6 meses. Un informe final por escrito y visuales por la web seran publicados a finales del 2023. Todas las publicaciones y eventos publicos asociados con el estudio estaran disponibles en ingles y espanol. This report is also available in English https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy23osti/85126.pdf.

datos de recursos eolicos↗
DOE OSTI2023

ICRH operations and experiments during the JET-ILW tritium and DTE2 campaigns

2021 has culminated with the completion of the JET-ILW DTE2 experimental campaign. This contribution summarizes Ion Cyclotron Resonance Heating (ICRH) operations from system and physics point of view. Improvements to the (ICRH) system, to operation procedures and to real time RF power control were implemented to address specific constraints from tritium and deuterium-tritium operations and increase the system reliability and power availability during D-T pulses. ICRH was operated without the ITER-Like Antenna (ILA) because water leaked from an in-vessel capacitor into the vessel on day-2 of the D-T campaign. Three weeks were required to identify and isolate the leak and resume plasma operations. Dedicated RF-Plasma Wall Interaction (PWI) experiments were conducted; tritium plasmas exhibit a higher level of Be sputtering on the outer wall and impurity content when compared to deuterium or hydrogen plasmas. The JET-DTE2 campaigns provided the opportunity to characterize ICRH schemes foreseen for the ITER operation, in the ITER like wall environment in ELMy H-mode scenarios aiming at maximizing fusion performance. The second harmonic tritium resonance heating and to a lesser extent minority 3He heating (ITER D-T ICRH reference schemes) lead to improved ion temperature and fusion performance when compared to hydrogen minority ICRH. However, these discharges suffered from a lack of stationarity and gradual impurity accumulation potentially because of a deficit of ICRH power when using JET antennas at lower frequencies. Fundamental deuterium ICRH was used in tritium-rich plasmas and with deuterium Neutral Beam Heating; this ICRH scheme proved to be very efficient boosting ion temperature and fusion performance in these plasmas.

Klepper, C. Christopher↗
DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 20507

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

History of Ultrasonic Inspection of High-Level Waste Tanks at SRS - 20220

The Liquid Waste Disposition Projects (LWDP) Structural Authority and Inspection Engineering Support Group has teamed with the Materials Science and Technology Non-destructive Evaluation Group of Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to implement a comprehensive In-Service Inspection (ISI) program for the High-Level Waste (HLW) tanks in the sites tank farms. The purpose of this program is to demonstrate the structural and leak integrity of the tanks to maintain the function of waste containment throughout the desired service life. Four types of waste tanks were constructed at Savannah River Site (SRS) from 1951 thru 1981 to store radioactive nuclear waste from the separations process. The Type I, II and III are carbon steel cylindrical tanks with varying degrees of access to the side walls and very limited access to the tank bottom. The tanks contain 750,000 to 1.3 million gallons of waste and are buried or backfilled with soil. The tanks are 75'-85' in diameter and 24'-33' from tank bottom to the tank roof. Inspection of the HLW tanks is made difficult by radiation, contamination, and small access openings. Through the years these challenges have been overcome by progressive improvements to programs and equipment resulting in the sophisticated wall crawler Ultrasonic Testing (UT) technology of today. A formal inspection program was developed and put in service in 1972. UT thickness measurements were first made in 1967 and 1969 of selected waste tanks using an analog-type instrument to measure the thickness of the carbon steel walls. Routine inspections for thinning were performed from 1972-1985 and then discontinued because no thinning had been observed and this technique could not detect pitting or cracking. UT inspections resumed in 1994 using a sophisticated robotic wall crawler with UT technology capable of detecting thinning, cracking and pitting. The current program focuses on the newer Type III tanks that are used primarily for storage. The program was upgraded in 2003 to include selected regions of the tank wall, secondary wall and annulus floor on a 7 to 10-year frequency. The facility is currently in its third cycle of tank inspections. Thus far, there have been no reportable indications of service induced degradation. This result provides assurance that the chemistry control program has been effective at mitigating corrosion and that the tanks remain structurally sound even after more than 40 years of service. This paper will present the UT technology first used at SRS and the evolution to the current systems and their capabilities. Additionally, plans for equipment upgrades that will improve the extent of inspection will be discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗