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Alternate definitions of system failure create complex analysis for which analytic solutions are available only for simple, special cases. The GRASP methodology is a computer simulation approach for solving all classes of problems in which both failure and repair events are modeled according to the probability laws of the individual components of the system.
A large scale, systematic procedure for identifying and evaluating measures that meaningfully characterize one or more elements of software development is described. The background of this research, the nature of the data involved, and the steps of the analytic procedure are discussed. An example of the application of this procedure to data from real software development projects is presented. As the term is used here, a measure is a count or numerical rating of the occurrence of some property. Examples of measures include lines of code, number of computer runs, person hours expended, and degree of use of top down design methodology. Measures appeal to the researcher and the manager as a potential means of defining, explaining, and predicting software development qualities, especially productivity and reliability.
The objective of the study was to perform a quantitative analysis of a high workload portion of a full mission flight simulation in order to test the hypothesis that taskload area is a valid, objective measure of workload management. This methodology provides a tool for the researcher attempting to quantify the management of workload in a complex environment. The researcher can then produce a reliable quantitative evaluation of behavior related to workload management.
Real-time sensor validation improves process monitoring and control system dependability by ensuring data integrity through automated detection of sensor data failures. The NASA Lewis Research Center, Expert Microsystems, and Intelligent Software Associates have developed an innovative sensor validation system that can automatically detect automated sensor failures in real-time for all types of mission-critical systems. This system consists of a sensor validation network development system and a real-time kernel. The network development system provides tools that enable systems engineers to automatically generate software that can be embedded within an application. The sensor validation methodology captured by these tools can be scaled to validate any number of sensors, and permits users to specify system sensitivity. The resulting software reliably detects all types of sensor data failures.
Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) is the process of ensuring space system performance in the presence of a space radiation environment. Herein, we present an updated NASA methodology for RHA focusing on content, deliverables and timeframes.
We are investigating the application of classical reliability performance metrics combined with standard single event upset (SEU) analysis data. We expect to relate SEU behavior to system performance requirements. Our proposed methodology will provide better prediction of SEU responses in harsh radiation environments with confidence metrics. single event upset (SEU), single event effect (SEE), field programmable gate array devises (FPGAs)
There are many software reliability models which try to predict future performance of software based on data generated by the debugging process. Unfortunately, the models appear to be unable to account for the random nature of the data. If the same code is debugged multiple times and one of the models is used to make predictions, intolerable variance is observed in the resulting reliability predictions. It is believed that data replication can remove this variance in lab type situations and that it is less than scientific to talk about validating a software reliability model without considering replication. It is also believed that data replication may prove to be cost effective in the real world, thus the research centered on verification of the need for replication and on methodologies for generating replicated data in a cost effective manner. The context of the debugging graph was pursued by simulation and experimentation. Simulation was done for the Basic model and the Log-Poisson model. Reasonable values of the parameters were assigned and used to generate simulated data which is then processed by the models in order to determine limitations on their accuracy. These experiments exploit the existing software and program specimens which are in AIR-LAB to measure the performance of reliability models.
New technique estimates cost of improvement in reliability for complex system. Model format/approach is dependent upon use of subsystem cost-estimating relationships (CER's) in devising cost-effective policy. Proposed methodology should have application in broad range of engineering management decisions.
A software methodology for JPL deep space network (DSN) data systems software implementations through transfer and delivery is presented. The DSN Data Systems Software Methodology is compatible with and depends on DSN software methodology and also incorporates the characteristics of real-time program development in a DSN environment. The DSN Data Systems software implementation consists of a series of six distinct phases. An Independent Group is responsible for verification and validation of the DSN Data Systems software during developing phases. The DSN data systems software methodology is applied to all development software provided for or by the DSN data systems section in Mark IV where there is a desire for reliability, maintainability, and usability within budget and schedule constraints.
A reactive system is characterized by a control program that interacts with an environment (or controlled program). The control program monitors the environment and reacts to significant events by sending commands to the environment. This structure is quite general. Not only are most embedded real time systems reactive systems, but so are monitoring and debugging systems and distributed application management systems. Since reactive systems are usually long running and may control physical equipment, fault tolerance is vital. The research tries to understand the principal issues of fault tolerance in real time reactive systems and to build tools that allow a programmer to design reliable, real time reactive systems. In order to make real time reactive systems reliable, several issues must be addressed: (1) How can a control program be built to tolerate failures of sensors and actuators. To achieve this, a methodology was developed for transforming a control program that references physical value into one that tolerates sensors that can fail and can return inaccurate values; (2) How can the real time reactive system be built to tolerate failures of the control program. Towards this goal, whether the techniques presented can be extended to real time reactive systems is investigated; and (3) How can the environment be specified in a way that is useful for writing a control program. Towards this goal, whether a system with real time constraints can be expressed as an equivalent system without such constraints is also investigated.
The development was initiated of the Probabilistic Design Analysis (PDA) Process for rocket engines. This will enable engineers a quantitative assessment of calculated reliability during the design process. The PDA will help choose better designs, make them more robust, and help decide on critical tests to help demonstrate key reliability issues to aid in improving the confidence of the engine capabilities. Rockedyne's involvement with the Composite Loads Spectra (CLS) and Probabilistic Structural Analysis Methodology (PSAM) contracts started this effort and are key elements in the on-going developments. Internal development efforts and hardware applications complement and extend the CLS and PSAM efforts. The completion of the CLS option work and the follow-on PSAM developments will also be integral parts of this methodology. A brief summary of these efforts is presented.
Engineers within the commercial and aerospace industries are using trade-off and risk analysis to aid in reducing spacecraft system cost while increasing performance and maintaining high reliability. In many cases, Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components, which include Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits (PEMs), are candidate packaging technologies for spacecrafts due to their lower cost, lower weight and enhanced functionality. Establishing and implementing a parts program that effectively and reliably makes use of these potentially less reliable, but state-of-the-art devices, has become a significant portion of the job for the parts engineer. Assembling a reliable high performance electronic system, which includes COTS components, requires that the end user assume a risk. To minimize the risk involved, companies have developed methodologies by which they use accelerated stress testing to assess the product and reduce the risk involved to the total system. Currently, there are no industry standard procedures for accomplishing this risk mitigation. This paper will present the approaches for reducing the risk of using PEMs devices in space flight systems as developed by two independent Laboratories. The JPL procedure involves primarily a tailored screening with accelerated stress philosophy while the APL procedure is primarily, a lot qualification procedure. Both Laboratories successfully have reduced the risk of using the particular devices for their respective systems and mission requirements.
This project aims to improve performance of NASA missions by developing multimodal neuroelectric technologies for augmented human-system interaction. Neuroelectric technologies will add completely new modes of interaction that operate in parallel with keyboards, speech, or other manual controls, thereby increasing the bandwidth of human-system interaction. We recently demonstrated the feasibility of real-time electromyographic (EMG) pattern recognition for a direct neuroelectric human-computer interface. We recorded EMG signals from an elastic sleeve with dry electrodes, while a human subject performed a range of discrete gestures. A machine-teaming algorithm was trained to recognize the EMG patterns associated with the gestures and map them to control signals. Successful applications now include piloting two Class 4 aircraft simulations (F-15 and 757) and entering data with a "virtual" numeric keyboard. Current research focuses on on-line adaptation of EMG sensing and processing and recognition of continuous gestures. We are also extending this on-line pattern recognition methodology to electroencephalographic (EEG) signals. This will allow us to bypass muscle activity and draw control signals directly from the human brain. Our system can reliably detect P-rhythm (a periodic EEG signal from motor cortex in the 10 Hz range) with a lightweight headset containing saline-soaked sponge electrodes. The data show that EEG p-rhythm can be modulated by real and imaginary motions. Current research focuses on using biofeedback to train of human subjects to modulate EEG rhythms on demand, and to examine interactions of EEG-based control with EMG-based and manual control. Viewgraphs on these neuroelectric technologies are also included.
Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.
Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshal Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.
The Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) on board the Suomi National Polar-Orbiting Partnership (SNPP) satellite has been on orbit for more than eight years since its launch on October 28, 2011. The VIIRS has 22 spectral bands, among which 14 are reflective solar bands(RSBs) covering a spectral range from 0.41 to 2.25 m. The VIIRS RSBs are primarily calibrated on-orbit by an onboard solar diffuser (SD) panel and a solar diffuser stability monitor (SDSM). Besides the SD and SDSM calibration, the RSBs are scheduled to view the Moon approximately monthly through the instrument’s space view (SV). The lunar observations have also been used to calibrate the RSBs on-orbit since early mission. Due to the non uniformity of the SD’s degradation, the calibration coefficients that are derived from the SD/SDSM calibration have long-term biases, especially at short wavelengths. In addition, the SDSM has no capability to monitor the SD degradation beyond 0.935 m, resulting in long-term bias in the shortwave infrared bands, about 0.72% for band M8 (1.238 m). These biases induce significant errors and long-term drifts in the VIIRS sensor data records (SDR) and consequently in the environmental data records (EDR). Unlike the SD, the Moon is a known stable target and any temporal drifts observed while viewing the Moon can be attributed to the sensor’s degradation. Thus, the VIIRS lunar calibration is used to track the RSB on-orbit changes, especially to provide an accurate long-term baseline. Due to the non-uniformity of the lunar surface, the lunar irradiance, instead of the lunar radiance, is used to calibrate the RSBs. The lunar irradiance strongly depends on lunar view geometry and it is still a challenge to accurately characterize the geometric effects associated with the lunar measurements and any residual errors can induce seasonal oscillations in the derived calibration coefficients. The errors of the geometric dependence correction induce seasonal oscillations in the derived RSB lunar calibration coefficients. In this paper, the algorithms for the view geometric effect correction are significantly improved, resulting in a significant reduction in the seasonal oscillations observed in the calibration coefficient time-series. The lunar and SD/SDSM calibration results are properly incorporated to generate a set of hybrid calibration coefficients and implementation of these coefficients is shown to significantly improve the long-term stability of the VIIRS SDR. This is of fundamental importance in making accurate Earth observations from which reliable and high quality science products are generated. The consequent improvements in SNPP VIIRS RSB SDRs and EDRs are shown and discussed. The lunar calibration methodology can be directly applied to follow-on VIIRS instruments.
Long duration and complex mission scenarios are characteristics of NASA's human exploration of Mars, and will provide unprecedented challenges. Systems reliability and safety will become increasingly demanding and management of uncertainty will be increasingly important. NASA's current pioneering strategy recognizes and relies upon assurance of crew and asset safety. In this regard, flexibility to develop and innovate in the emergence of new design environments and methodologies, encompassing modeling of complex systems, is essential to meet the challenges.
In the 47 years since single-event effects were first observed in spacecraft electronics, radiation experts have developed an effective methodology supported by a nationwide infrastructure. A highly skilled workforce of radiation engineers has developed test facilities and methods, modeling and simulation techniques, and mitigation and design strategies to ensure space missions meet their performance and reliability requirements even in the harsh radiation environments of space. Now, increasing performance demands of space missions, the continued disruptive evolution of microcircuit technologies and growth and changes of the space industry have combined with an aging infrastructure are placing increasing strain on the radiation effects community, and the community is responding.