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At least 451 records · Page 25

Low Activity Waste Tuning Feed Material Testing VSL-18R4350-1 (Final Report)

High level waste (HLW) from the Hanford tank farms will be retrieved and transferred to the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). The waste will be pretreated to separate the soluble chemical salts (mostly sodium nitrate/nitrite and sodium hydroxide) from the bulk of the radioactive materials. This decontaminated salt solution is the low activity waste (LAW) stream which constitutes most of the total waste volume. The remaining HLW contains most of the radioactive materials but a fraction of the volume. Each of these waste streams is directed to an independent processing facility where the waste is mixed with glass forming chemicals (mostly silica and borax or boric acid) and fed into the melters for stabilization by conversion into glass. The molten glass is poured into stainless steel containers to produce packages for disposal: local shallow burial for the LAW containers and a future geologic repository for the HLW containers. The LAW facility melters produce significant quantities of NOx-laden off-gas that require abatement in accordance with 10 CFR 830 and air emission requirements. The NOx emissions also pose a safety risk. The LAW facility commissioning sequence requires that the melters be operated and process control loops tuned prior to introducing waste or waste feed materials that produce NOx. Therefore, a temporary or permanent system architecture is needed that provides a feed supply to the melters for the purpose of melter testing and off-gas tuning that does not result in the production of significantly hazardous off-gas products.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Distribution Development for STORM Ingestion Input Parameters

The Sandia-developed Transport of Radioactive Materials (STORM) code suite is used as part of the Radioisotope Power System Launch Safety (RPSLS) program to perform statistical modeling of the consequences due to release of radioactive material given a launch accident. As part of this modeling, STORM samples input parameters from probability distributions with some parameters treated as constants. This report described the work done to convert four of these constant inputs (Consumption Rate, Average Crop Yield, Cropland to Landuse Database Ratio, and Crop Uptake Factor) to sampled values. Consumption rate changed from a constant value of 557.68 kg / yr to a normal distribution with a mean of 102.96 kg / yr and a standard deviation of 2.65 kg / yr. Meanwhile, Average Crop Yield changed from a constant value of 3.783 kg edible / m 2 to a normal distribution with a mean of 3.23 kg edible / m 2 and a standard deviation of 0.442 kg edible / m 2 . The Cropland to Landuse Database ratio changed from a constant value of 0.0996 (9.96%) to a normal distribution with a mean value of 0.0312 (3.12%) and a standard deviation of 0.00292 (0.29%). Finally the crop uptake factor changed from a constant value of 6.37e -4 (Bq crop /kg)/(Bq soil /kg) to a lognormal distribution with a geometric mean value of 3.38e -4 (Bq crop /kg)/(Bq soil /kg) and a standard deviation value of 3.33 (Bq crop /kg)/(Bq soil /kg)

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Joint IAEA/NNSA International Workshop Nuclear Forensics Methodologies for Practitioners 2013 Scenario Based Exercise – Version 4.0 Instructor’s Manual

[Participants will serve as border guards for Reimerland. They will be given brief instruction on the operation of hand-held RadioIsotope DetectorS (RIDS) and be provided an intelligence briefing that tells them to be on the lookout for suspicious activity at their post. Their instruction will include directing suspicious vehicles to a location for secondary screening. If, after secondary screening, suspicions of a criminal act involving nuclear and or radioactive materials remain, participants have been instructed to request assistance from the NLEA, who will then setup and manage a radiological crime scene. Participants will watch a demonstration of two vehicles containing radioactive materials driving through and setting off a portal monitor. The first vehicle, a semi-tractor trailer, sets off only a gamma alarm. After the driver provides a shipping manifest of fertilizer, participants, posing as border guards, are expected to waive this vehicle through inspection. The second vehicle, an SUV, set off both gamma and 2 neutron alarms. The alarming of the neutron monitor should prompt participants to set up a secondary inspection of the vehicle immediately. The driver of the vehicle indicates he is in legal possession of an industrial instrument containing an old 133Ba source that has decayed to a level no longer requiring official paperwork according to the IAEA and internationally accepted transportation regulations. Authorities have verified that the industrial source does fit the description of one that is sold commercially. However, upon setting up a secondary screening, participants will use hand-held detectors to locate several other radioactive sources emanating from a black duffle bag in the rear of the vehicle (Figure 1). Hand held detectors detect the presence of 133Ba, and Pu. Upon questioning, the driver only commits to having the 133Ba industrial source and cannot account for the detection of neutrons within his vehicle. Since neutron alarms also sounded, participants should indicate that a neutron alarm would be inconsistent with a 133Ba source alone and should therefore conclude further investigation is warranted. This will prompt participants to call in a response team from the NLEA to set up a radiological crime scene around the vehicle in question. The response team is able to shoot a 3-D X-ray radiograph of the duffle bag without moving it to ensure it is rendered safe and moveable without disturbing the contents in the field (Figure 2). At this point, the duffle bag is entered into inventory as evidence and a chain of custody form is initiated. Swipes are taken from the outer bag to confirm there is no dispersible contamination. The bag and its contents are considered valuable for the investigation by the lead investigator. He determines the duffle bag is safe to transport to RRL for evidence inventory and analysis. The duffle bag and its contents are packaged and sent off to the RRL.]

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Pattern formation during healing of fluid-filled cracks: an analog experiment

The formation and subsequent healing of cracks and crack networks may control such diverse phenomena as the strengthening of fault zones between earthquakes, fluid migrations in the Earth's crust, or the transport of radioactive materials in nuclear waste disposal. An intriguing pattern-forming process can develop during healing of fluid-filled cracks, where pockets of fluid remain permanently trapped in the solid as the crack tip is displaced driven by surface energy. Here, we present the results of analog experiments in which a liquid was injected into a colloidal inorganic gel to obtain penny-shaped cracks that were subsequently allowed to close and heal under the driving effect of interfacial tension. Depending on the properties of the gel and the injected liquid, two modes of healing were obtained. In the first mode, the crack healed completely through a continuous process. The second mode of healing was discontinuous and was characterized by a 'zipper-like' closure of a front that moved along the crack perimeter, trapping fluid that may eventually form inclusions trapped in the solid. This instability occurred only when the velocity of the crack tip decreased to zero. Our experiments provide a cheap and simple analog to reveal how aligned arrays of fluid inclusions may be captured along preexisting fracture planes and how small amounts of fluids can be permanently trapped in solids, modifying irreversibly their material properties.

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Development of local-power-free, remote α -particle detection using optical fibers

We demonstrate the application of fluorescence optical fiber coupled to a telecom grade fiber as a sensor for alpha particles using alpha-specific ZnS(Ag) scintillation materials whose wavelength is down-shifted into a low-loss region of the telecom grade fiber transmission band. Telecom-grade fiber optics offer a solution for sensing alpha radiation in deep repositories and cask storage for radioactive materials due to the stability of SiO 2 under normal environmental conditions and its relative radiation hardness at low radiation doses. Long-term nuclear waste storage facilities require sensors for the detection of leakage of radioactive materials that are maintenance-free, do not require power and can survive with no ‘wear out’ mechanisms for decades. By accomplishing the wavelength transformation, we maximize efficiencies in the detection of α-particles and signal transport and can detect alpha scintillation at distances on the order of >1 km with a sensor that is ~3% efficient and can be easily scaled as a sensor array. This paper describes the construction and testing of the sensor including manufacture of the controlled thickness films, verification of the wavelength shift from 450 to 620 nm and optimization of the sensitivity as a function of thickness. We also model the relative sensitivity of the film as a function of film thickness, and we demonstrate a signal-to-noise ratio of 10 at a range of greater than 1 km.

alpha particles↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL Radiological Response Training Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radiological Response Training Range (RRTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for a period of 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The DISTINCTIVE University Consortium: Transforming High Activity Materials Research in the UK - 18212

The DISTINCTIVE consortium (Decommissioning, Immobilisation and Storage Solutions for Nuclear Waste Inventories) is a partnership of 11 research universities, working to decommission and clean up the legacy of civil nuclear energy generation, sponsored by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). An important component of the research programme is to develop the skills and facilities to address key research questions, requiring the use of highly radioactive materials. Here we highlight the outcomes of four research projects in which access to state of the art research facilities for working with radioactive materials, supported by international partnerships, has advanced research in plutonium storage and immobilisation, and the disposal of spent nuclear fuels. First, we have developed a viable formulation and process for immobilisation of the UK plutonium stockpile, including commissioning of a radiological hot isostatic press and validation studies using plutonium-239. Second, we have further underpinned the interim storage of PuO{sub 2}, through understanding of water and chlorine sorption / desorption, pertinent to the historic practice of containment within, and degradation of PVC bags. Third, we have developed a novel methodology to investigate the in situ radiolysis induced dissolution of actinide oxide thin films, using synchrotron radiation, to underpin the geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Fourth we monitored in situ the oxidation and self-ignition mechanism of uranium carbide, a legacy fuel from the Dounreay Prototype Fast Reactor that is waiting for oxidation treatment prior to permanent storage and/or disposal. Through this programme of research, the DISTINCTIVE consortium is rebuilding the UK capability for research with transuranic materials, which, hitherto, was eroded over decades of disinvestment. (authors)

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Is Entombment an Acceptable Option for Decommissioning? An International Perspective - 13488

Selection of a decommissioning strategy is one of the key steps in the preparation for decommissioning of nuclear facilities and other facilities using radioactive material. Approaches being implemented or considered by Member States include immediate dismantling, deferred dismantling and entombment. Other options or slight modifications of these strategies are also possible. Entombment has been identified in the current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Standards as one of the three basic decommissioning strategies and has been defined as a decommissioning strategy by which radioactive contaminants are encased in a structurally long lived material until radioactivity decays to a level permitting the unrestricted release of the facility, or release with restrictions imposed by the regulatory body. Although all three strategies have been considered, in principle, applicable to all facilities, their application to some facilities may not be appropriate owing to political concerns, safety or environmental requirements, technical considerations, local conditions or financial considerations. The IAEA is currently revising the decommissioning Safety Standards and one of the issues widely discussed has been the applicability of entombment in the context of decommissioning and its general objective to enable removal of regulatory control from the decommissioned facility. The IAEA recently established a consultancy to collect and discuss experience and lessons learned from entombment projects, to identify regulatory requirements and expectations for applying entombment as a decommissioning option strategy, in compliance with the internationally agreed standards. (authors)

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Modeling Aeolian Transport of Contaminated Sediments at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Technical Area 54, Area G: Sensitivities to Succession, Disturbance, and Future Climate

The Technical Area 54 (TA-54) Area G disposal facility is used for the disposal of radioactive waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 (DOE, 2001) requires that radioactive waste be managed in a manner that protects public health and safety and the environment. In compliance with that requirement, DOE field sites must prepare and maintain site-specific radiological performance assessments for facilities that receive waste after September 26, 1988. Sites are also required to conduct composite analyses for facilities that receive waste after this date; these analyses account for the cumulative impacts of all waste that has been (and will be) disposed of at the facilities and other sources of radioactive material that may interact with these facilities.

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CASTOR THTR/AVR Containment Review

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)Radioactive Material Packaging and Transportation Review Team (herein referred to as ‘LLNL Staff’) was tasked with the technical review and confirmatory analysis of the containment analysis and corresponding leakage test implementation procedure for the CASTOR®THTR/AVR radioactive material transportation package with the AVR contents.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Potential Indoor Worker Exposure From Handling Area Leakage: Example Event Sequence Frequency Analysis

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is currently considering design options for the facilities that will handle spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at the potential nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The license application must demonstrate compliance with the performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 63, which include occupational dose limits from 10 CFR Part 20. If DOE submits a license application under 10 CFR Part 63, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will conduct a risk-informed, performance-based review of the DOE license application and its preclosure safety analysis, in which in-depth technical evaluations are focused on technical areas that are significant to preclosure safety and risk. As part of pre-licensing activities, the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses (CNWRA) developed the Preclosure Safety Analysis Tool software to aid in the regulatory review of a DOE license application and support any independent confirmatory assessments that may be needed. Recent DOE information indicates a primarily canister-based handling approach that includes the wet transfer of individual assemblies where Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems may be relied on to provide confinement and limit the spread of any airborne radioactive material from handling operations. Workers may be involved in manual and remote operations in handling transportation casks, canisters, waste packages, or bare spent nuclear fuel assemblies inside facility buildings. As part of routine operations within these facilities, radioactive material may potentially become airborne if canisters are opened or bare fuel assemblies are handled. Leakage of contaminated air from the handling area into adjacent occupied areas, therefore, represents a potential radiological exposure pathway for indoor workers. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate modeling capabilities that can be used by the regulator to estimate frequencies of potential event sequences. A hypothetical case is presented for failure of the HVAC exhaust system to provide confinement for contaminated air from otherwise normal operations. This paper presents an example calculation of frequencies for a potential event sequence involving HVAC system failure during otherwise routine wet transfer operations of spent nuclear fuel assemblies from an open container. For the simplified HVAC exhaust system model, the calculation indicated that the potential event sequence may or may not be a Category 1 event sequence, in light of current uncertainties (e.g., final HVAC system design and duration of facility operations). Categorization of potential event sequences is important because different regulatory requirements and performance objectives are specified based on the categorization of event sequences. A companion paper presents a dose calculation methodology and example calculations of indoor worker consequences for the posed example event sequence. Together, the two companion papers demonstrate capabilities for performing confirmatory calculations of frequency and consequence, which may assist the assessment of worker safety during a risk-informed regulatory review of a potential DOE license application.

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P Reactor Grouting

Filling the P Reactor with grout. This seals the radioactive material and reduces the environmental footprint left from the Cold War. Project sponsored by the Recovery Act at the Savannah River Site.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Shipment of Non-traditional Contents in the 9977 Type B Package

The 9977 is a certified Type B Packaging authorized to ship uranium and plutonium in metal and oxide forms. These materials are typically confined within metallic containers designed for ease of handling and to prevent the spread of contamination. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) uses Pu and U sources for the training of domestic and international customs agents in the identification and detection of radioactive materials (RAM). These materials are packed in polycarbonate containers which permit the trainees to view the RAM. The safety basis was made to authorize the use of these unusual containers. The inclusion of the PNNL Training Source Contents into the 9977 Packaging imposed unique conditions previously unanalyzed. The use of polycarbonate as a content container material, while different from any configuration previously considered, does not raise any safety issues with the package which continues to operate with a large safety margin for temperatures, pressures, containment, dose rates, and subcriticality.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The effect of metals on zeolite crystallization kinetics with relevance to nuclear waste glass corrosion

Abstract Geologic disposal of vitrified radioactive material is planned in several countries, but there are remaining uncertainties related to the long-term stability of glass exposed to groundwater. Specifically, the crystallization of aluminosilicate zeolite minerals can accelerate the rate at which glass corrodes and radioactive material is released into the biosphere. In this study, we identify elemental species that may accelerate or suppress zeolite formation using a protocol to examine their effects on zeolite synthesis over a three-day duration. Our results are consistent with previous works demonstrating glass corrosion acceleration in the presence of calcium. Furthermore, we identify two elements—tin and lithium—as inhibitors of zeolite P2 (gismondine, or GIS type) nucleation and, thus, promising components for promoting the long-term durability of glass waste forms.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Summary of the Graduate Mentoring Assistance Program for PNNL PNNL.12.006 (April 2012 – May 31, 2013)

Summary of Students and Projects: Sarah Bender: The possible improvement of the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor by the addition of Compton suppression is investigated for this study. The Compton continuum from the dominant 661.7 keV Cs-137 fission product peak obscures lower energy lines which could be used for spectral and multivariate analysis. A novel Compton suppression system which uses fast, room-temperature materials will be developed using simulation. As opposed to the standard high purity germanium (HPGe) detector suppressed using a thallium-doped sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)) guard detector array, cerium-doped lanthanum bromide (LaBr3) will be used as the primary spectroscopic detector. For Sarah’s Master’s degree, she constructed and validated the unsuppressed detector response of the Pennsylvania State University (PSU)-Compton suppression system. For Sarah’s PhD, she is completing that simulation by including the suppressed operation which will be validated with spent fuel samples. She is also going to use the validation of suppressed operation to predict the detector response of a LaBr3 based Compton suppression system. Richard Clark: Richard Clark completed his study this FY of a new technique known as Intrinsic Dosimetry. Intrinsic Dosimetry is the method of measuring total absorbed dose received by the walls of a container holding radioactive material. By considering the total absorbed dose received by a container in tandem with the physical characteristics of the radioactive material housed within that container, this method has the potential to provide enhanced pathway information regarding the history of the container and its radioactive contents. The latest in a series of experiments designed to validate and demonstrate this newly developed tool are reported. Kenneth Dayman: The MIP Monitor is an online, non-destructive approach to process monitoring in a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility using gamma spectra taken of process streams and multivariate data analysis to detect anomalies in operation. Last year, Mr. Dayman investigated methods to classify spent nuclear fuel according to both reactor type and burn up based on the constituent nuclide activities, which may be used to more accurately calibrate other models in an analysis scheme in order to improve the accuracy and precision of predictions. He is currently writing up his results for publication and has transitioned to another project with Dr. Derrick Haas at PNNL.

Schwantes, Jon M.↗

2021 ROMANIA TRANSPORT SECURITY TABLE-TOP EXERCISE (TTX) – LESSONS LEARNED AND GOOD PRACTICES

During the period of 15-18 March 2021, the IAEA conducted a national workshop addressing the security of radioactive material in transport. The workshop was jointly hosted by the Romanian regulatory authority and the General Inspectorate of Romanian Gendarmerie. The workshop assisted Romania in improving its capability to evaluate the ability of response forces to counter a malicious act against radioactive material in transport. The event consisted of briefings, exercises, a demonstration of transport security equipment, and a transport security table-top exercise (TTX). The workshop was conducted in a virtual-hybrid format in such a way as to meet the COVID-19 related requirements in compliance with Romania’s guidelines. This paper provides an overview of the workshop’s activities, lessons-learned, and good practices related to the transport security TTX exercises.

Maican, Catalin↗

Expanded Use of ISOCS Characterization Techniques for WIPP Certification at the Idaho Clean-up Project - 19623

The Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) has been retrieving, treating, characterizing, and shipping legacy Transuranic (TRU) waste for disposal since 2003 as part of the overall Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) in support of the US Department of Energy. As the ICP has progressed, over 700 containers have been identified that cannot be successfully assayed using the current suite of non-destructive assay (NDA) instruments. To meet this challenge, Fluor Idaho, LLC, and Mirion Technologies (formerly Canberra Industries) have teamed to deploy the In-Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) to supplement the current NDA capabilities. ISOCS has long been used in various radioactive waste management applications, but never has the ISOCS ability to perform intrinsic efficiency modeling of discrete waste containers been employed to characterize and certify TRU waste for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Since the primary disposal facility for this waste is the WIPP, the characterization processes for determining the quantity of radioactive material entrained in the waste are subject to WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) quality requirements and associated performance criteria. Until now, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) WIPP-certified NDA equipment has utilized pre-defined efficiency calibrations for fixed geometries. However, due to the radioactive material content, activity levels, waste stream matrix, and/or the geometries of various size drums, boxes and other-odd-shaped containers or container integrity issues, it may not be suitable to characterize these containers with any of the existing WIPP-certified NDA equipment located at the AMWTP. Therefore, advanced technologies are needed to complete characterization of these problematic waste containers. The July 5, 2016 release of the WIPP WAC, DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Revision 8.0, Appendix A, 'Radioassay Requirements for Transuranic Waste,' was expanded to include several newer concepts such as American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) approved methods for efficiency-based calibrations and the use of mathematical computer modeling techniques for calibration. This change prompted AMWTP to pursue obtaining WIPP certification authority for expanded ISOCS techniques to deal with the remaining challenging waste containers and the development and implementation of Mirion's Figures of Merit (FOM) evaluations. These vital FOM evaluations enhance the ISOCS's modeling capabilities by optimizing the dynamic efficiency calibration for each object and reducing the assay's Total Measurement Uncertainty (TMU) budget. (authors)

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