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At least 451 records · Page 25
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

Discovering the Most Severe K-Point Failure Based on Reinforcement Learning: Preprint

Smart devices are essential to ensure the stability of the power grid and resilience to intermittent energy production. However, smart devices can also be the target of cyber adversaries that may exploit false data injection attacks (FDIAs) to induce unstable grid conditions. A practical consideration of FDIA mitigation approaches is addressed here: given a finite available budget, for which smart device should cyber-threat mitigation be deployed first? In this work, this question is answered by identifying the so-called most-sensitive devices, i.e., the devices that, if compromised, can let an adversary induce the most serious grid instabilities. The method proposed utilizes an adversarial reinforcement learning (RL) framework to identify the k-mostsensitive smart devices (here, smart inverters). The adversarial agent can tamper with the compromised inverters' active and reactive operating power setup points, with the goal of maximizing voltage deviations. Numerical results show that the proposed RL method finds the optimal attack scenarios for 1-point failure and the near-optimal solution for the 2-point case. Additionally, the proposed RL method achieves an 8.8 speed-up ratio in running time compared to the brute force method for the 2-point case.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

IBR Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis and Recommendations

The adoption of clean energy technologies, including solar photovoltaics, continues to introduce non-traditional stakeholders to the operations and planning of the electric system. Stakeholders such as manufacturers, vendors, owners, aggregators, and others are enabling the adoption, integration, and optimum operations of solar technologies at accelerated rates. Inverters form the foundation of many digitally controlled energy sources for clean energy technologies, including Solar, Battery Energy Storage Systems, Hybrid Systems, and Hydrogen Fuel Cells. Their supply chain is complex, a series of microchips, electronic switches and other components making up its primary functions. The complexity of this space and the growing digitization associated with these components can create supply chain cyber risks. One measure to mitigate cybersecurity attacks is proper digital supply chain security. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO), in partnership with the Cybersecurity, Energy, Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) office, is hosting a workshop to bring together solar vendors and services providers to discuss digital supply chain security for solar systems and challenges and opportunities in the transitioning to a fully domestic supply chain for solar energy in the U.S. This workshop will support the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) and Energy Cyber Sense program activities. During the workshop, industry experts and researchers from DOE National Laboratories will discuss the current solar supply chain landscape and the transition to domestic manufacturing of solar components in the U.S. Tools and techniques to better manage and secure the digital supply chain of solar devices and systems will be discussed.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy (Final Project Report)

This project establishes a Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy with the objective of designing and operating a cyber-physical testbed for wind energy farms (WEFs) that enables comprehensive cybersecurity research. The testbed incorporates a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system connected to turbine models via industrial-grade programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and remote terminal units (RTUs). It supports side-channel data acquisition, implementation and analysis of various cyberattack scenarios, and development of attack detection, mitigation, and best-practice guidance tailored to wind energy systems. During the project, the team expanded the number and fidelity of mathematical turbine models (MTMs), integrated these models with SCADA infrastructure, and deployed a scaled physical turbine and associated sensors. High-resolution operational and side-channel data streams were collected and used to refine machine-learning (ML)-based attack detection systems and to extend the WindCRAFT framework to multi-turbine threat scenarios. The project demonstrated a realistic, scalable environment for evaluating cyber threats, validated attack detection approaches using enriched datasets, and identified new multi-turbine and inter-turbine communication attack vectors. The resulting testbed, models, and security mechanisms provide a foundation for ongoing R&D and deployment of cyber-resilient offshore wind energy systems.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

On the Feasibility of Market Manipulation and Energy Storage Arbitrage via Load-Altering Attacks

Around the globe, electric power networks are transforming into complex cyber–physical energy systems (CPES) due to the accelerating integration of both information and communication technologies (ICT) and distributed energy resources. While this integration improves power grid operations, the growing number of Internet-of-Things (IoT) controllers and high-wattage appliances being connected to the electric grid is creating new attack vectors, largely inherited from the IoT ecosystem, that could lead to disruptions and potentially energy market manipulation via coordinated load-altering attacks (LAAs). In this article, we explore the feasibility and effects of a realistic LAA targeted at IoT high-wattage loads connected at the distribution system level, designed to manipulate local energy markets and perform energy storage (ES) arbitrage. Realistic integrated transmission and distribution (T&D) systems are used to demonstrate the effects that LAAs have on locational marginal prices at the transmission level and in distribution systems adjacent to the targeted network.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Deep Learning Approach for In-Network Synchrophasor Missing Data Recovery Using Programmable Network Switches

Phasor measurement unit (PMU) networks deliver accurate and timely measurements, which is essential for managing today’s electric power systems. To ensure data quality and enhance the cyber-resilience of PMU networks against malicious attacks and data errors, this study presents an online PMU missing data recovery scheme by leveraging P4 programmable switches. The data plane incorporates a customized PMU protocol parser that abstracts the necessary payload data for recovery. Recovery processes are executed in the control plane using a pre-trained machine learning model. Both traditional and advanced ML models, such as transformer and TimeGPT, are explicitly employed for data prediction. This approach ensures rapid and precise data recovery. Performance evaluations focus on recovery speed and accuracy, using a real dataset from a campus microgrid. With 20% missing PMU data, the mean absolute percentage error for voltage magnitude is 0.0384%, and the phase angle error discrepancy is approximately 0.4064%.

Phasor Measurement Unit, Machine Learning, Program↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber100 Compass: Quantification of Cybersecurity Risks for Systems Transitioning to High Levels of Renewables (Final Report)

The shift to high levels of renewable deployment will entail a significant re-engineering of the grid. As investors, utilities, customers, and others prepare for clean energy transitions, there is need to understand how restructuring the grid to accommodate renewables will change the attack surface of the grid and accompanying cyber risk. However, today the cyber-physical risks associated with electric grids incorporating high levels of renewable deployment remain largely unknown. The Cyber100 Compass proof-of-concept application attempts to quantify future cyber-physical security risks by combining risk data gathered from subject matter experts (SMEs) with input from system planners about conditions they expect to be true about their electric systems in the future. Users provide data about their organization’s tolerance for risk; the value they place on avoiding the consequences of different cyber events; and conditions that they expect to be true on their systems at some point in the future. The SMEs provide baseline probabilities for different cyber events; the probability that an event will be low-, moderate-, or high-impact; and the amount by which user-identified conditions on their systems will change the likelihood of the cyber events. The application takes both the user and SME input and performs a series of Monte Carlo simulations to arrive at a quantification of risk.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Emerging Threats in Transportation Security Related to Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)

Transport of high-consequence shipments requires a resilient and robust systems of systems to guarantee cargo arrival. Furthermore, rising adoption of technologies such as connected and automated vehicles (CAVs), intelligent infrastructure, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication presents unique challenges for securing transportation systems. Within these Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), several additional vulnerabilities exist that create pathways for adversarial attacks and cargo interception. For example, connectivity provides cyber pathways directly into vehicle systems and infrastructure for malicious actors. Furthermore, advanced vehicle automation exposes additional vehicle control necessary for shipment interception otherwise unavailable to adversaries. Within this paper, we will discuss the specific threats introduced by ITS-enabled technologies currently deployed and in development. These include those mentioned related to connectivity and automation, but will be expanded into grid, infrastructure, and vehicle specific threats. In addition, we will discuss how to potentially mitigate these emerging challenges as well as how to safeguard transportation systems from next generation attacks.

Cook, Adian [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000160825395)↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Threat Landscape for Distribution Systems

INL cyber analysts will present an overview of the current threat landscape for distribution systems. We will begin with examples of known attacks that have occurred recently to motivate the threat analysis and mitigation discussed in the remainder of the presentation. Examples may include the attacks affecting wind plants in Europe in Spring 2022, ransomware attacks on city utilities and commercial distribution systems, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) including the attacks on Ukrainian electric system in 2015 and 2016, as well as more recent evidence of other APT activity. We will present the end-to-end attack paths and discuss the various attacker skills, financing, motivations, and access that contributed to these attacks. In the second part of this presentation, we will discuss mitigating the cyber threats for distribution systems. We will discuss recent publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and explain their relevant context for distribution system security. Likely attacks to affect distribution systems, such as denial-of-service (DoS), ransomware, edge-device compromise, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) will be described. In addition to an overview of these kinds of attacks, we will provide examples of the various ways in which these attacks can start and what systems they can affect. Simple, cost-effective counter-measures to these attacks will be discussed and we will emphasize how these mitigations can reduce threats when properly applied and maintained.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Performing Numerical Analysis of Cybersecurity Options Using Dynamic Risk Analysis Tool EMRALD

Cyberattacks can have many different attack paths, durations, and goals. There are also many different mitigation options involving hardware, software, and/or humans. Considering a cyber threat should involve defense-in-depth methods and a quantitative or numerical evaluation of overall effectiveness against dynamic, time-dependent attacks to make cost and risk-informed decisions. Typical cyberattack modeling methods only provide a qualitative evaluation. The main areas of cybersecurity are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For companies with cyber-physical systems such as advanced nuclear reactors, cyber-related safety is a requirement set by North American Electric Reliability and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. They are also concerned about availability or reliability as a business case. As cyber threats are evolving to a business-for-hire structure, more attacks may focus on disrupting business success and reliability, causing financial and economic stability risk. Companies want to know business reliability and recovery from those threats, and that requires modeling physical behavior of the targets. Dynamic-state-based and Markov-based modeling provides a method for better cyber scenario modeling with different tools having issues such as state-base explosion. Dynamic modeling enables time and conditional features not found in other numerical evaluation methods. EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Lined Diagrams) is a dynamic risk analysis modeling and simulation tool and has features that reduce modeling issues. It has been used to model different time-dependent events including plant behavior and operator procedures. As a general modeling tool, EMRALD can also be used to model cyberattack scenarios with varying mitigation options and quantify effectiveness, producing numerical data for risk-informed decisions. This paper uses EMRALD to demonstrate that dynamic numerical risk analysis can be used for cyber threat modeling to provide insights for design decision-making and optimize defense strategies. Keywords: cyber modeling; cyber-physical systems; numerical cyber modeling

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Enhancing grid reliability and resilience through novel DER control, total situational awareness and integrated distribution-transmission representation

High penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) can lead to overvoltage and thermal violations, miscoordination of protection devices and potential adverse control interactions. The challenges are exacerbated by a lack of operator situational awareness of behind-the-meter DERs, and T&D interactions. Furthermore, the large attack surface of a DER environment creates significant cyber security challenges. The motivation is to address these barriers. The main goal is to enable extreme levels of DERs in distribution systems while simultaneously enhancing their reliability and resiliency. This is achieved by a data-driven approach for operation, planning and control of distribution systems with total situational awareness and real-time DER control enabled by a network of edge intelligent devices, a cloud-based analytical platform, and secure communications.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

The NREL Sensor Laboratory Detection of Hydrogen Emissions

The development of a functional hydrogen detection system is a multifaceted process that integrates hardware, deployments strategies, and analytics which can be supported by the NREL Sensor Laboratory: 1. Support of the design, validation and optimization of sensing prototypes; 2. Guide optimized sensing element development, including control electronics; 3. Laboratory testing to validate/optimize metrological performance (measurement range, detection limit, etc.); 4. Provide test sites for field deployments representative of real-world scenarios with controlled hydrogen releases; 5. Develop sensor placement and operation guidance; 6. Provide guidance on electronics to accommodate facility integration; 7. Electrical safety designs to allow for operation within restricted zones; 8. Integration into facility monitoring and control systems; 9. Guide incorporation of cyber security elements to protect facilities from malicious attacks; 10. Modeling and application of advanced analytics to detect and quantify emissions; 11. Higher Order dispersion models to guide sensor placement for reliable detection; 12. Advanced analytics for improved metrological performances, and to inform inverse modeling; 13. Market support and commercialization (national and international markets); 14. Commercial deployments in H2@SCALE markets (e.g., HUBs and other large-scale hydrogen markets); and 15. Leverage off international collaborations/partnerships (e.g., NREL is on the advisory board for the European initiative "pre-Normative Research on Hydrogen Releases Assessment"-NHyRA).

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2020

Detection and Diagnosis of Data Integrity Attacks in Solar Farms Based on Multilayer Long Short-Term Memory Network

Photovoltaic (PV) systems are becoming more vulnerable to cyber threats. In response to this emerging concern, developing cyber-secure power electronics converters has received increased attention from the IEEE Power Electronics Society that recently launched a cyber-physical-security initiative. Here this letter proposes a deep sequence learning based diagnosis solution for data integrity attacks on PV systems in smart grids, including dc–dc and dc–ac converters. The multilayer long short-term memory networks are used to leverage time-series electric waveform data from current and voltage sensors in PV systems. The proposed method has been evaluated in a PV smart grid benchmark model with extensive quantitative analysis. As a comparison, we have evaluated classic data-driven methods, including K-nearest neighbor, decision tree, support vector machine, artificial neural network, and convolutional neural network. Comparison results verify performances of the proposed method for detection and diagnosis of various data integrity attacks on PV systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Generative Vulnerability Assessment for Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are highly susceptible to malicious attacks due to their complex dynamics and interconnectivity. A comprehensive understanding of their vulnerabilities is essential for designing effective resilience measures. This paper presents a data-driven attack generative system for evaluating the vulnerability of CPS. The proposed approach formulates the vulnerability assessment problem as determining the feasibility of a specific attack set based on two boundary functions that represent the effectiveness and stealthiness of attacks. The attack generative model is trained using a custom loss function, with two universal approximators designed to learn the effectiveness and stealthiness functions simultaneously. Theoretical results for successful generation and asymptotic convergence of the resulting training algorithm are given. As a result, the proposed approach is evaluated via numerical simulation of an IEEE 14-bus system and gas pipeline systems, demonstrating its viability in learning how to attack nonlinear CPS and identify potential vulnerabilities.

Computer systems organization↗
DOE OSTI2024

Retrieval Augmented Generation for Robust Cyber Defense

In cybersecurity, the ability to efficiently analyze and respond to vulnerabilities, weaknesses, attack patterns, and threat tactics is critical for effective defense strategies. With the increasing complexity and volume of cybersecurity data, traditional methods of querying and retrieving information are often inadequate. To address this challenge, we implemented Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems—CyRAG and GraphCyRAG—that integrate large language models (LLMs) with both structured data from relational databases and knowledge graphs such as Neo4j. CyRAG is designed to handle structured data, focusing on CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) and CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) entities to generate accurate and context-rich responses. In contrast, GraphCyRAG leverages Neo4j knowledge graphs to retrieve interconnected information from CVE, CWE, CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification), and ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) datasets. By utilizing Neo4j’s graph-based framework, GraphCyRAG enables deeper traversal of relationships between vulnerabilities and attack patterns, providing cybersecurity analysts with more comprehensive insights into potential attack vectors and mitigation strategies. Our preliminary results demonstrate that integrating knowledge graphs with RAG significantly enhances both the accuracy and depth of threat analysis, allowing for the retrieval of dynamic, real-time data and the generation of contextually aware responses. This approach helps analysts uncover hidden relationships between cyber entities, predict exploit paths, and prioritize mitigation efforts effectively. The integration of RAG with cybersecurity knowledge graphs represents a significant advancement in cybersecurity threat intelligence, enabling more informed decision-making and stronger defense strategies.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION IN A CYBER-PHYSICAL MIDSTREAM TESTBED

This thesis presents the development of a laboratory-scale cyber–physical midstream pipeline testbed designed to address this gap and support research in industrial control systems security. The platform integrates pumps, valves, sensors, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and a human–machine interface (HMI) to emulate the monitoring and control architecture of real pipeline operations. The physical process is implemented as a closed-loop liquid circulation system designed to replicate flow behavior characteristic of midstream pipeline infrastructure. The testbed enables real-time data acquisition of key process variables, including flow rate and pressure facilitating the generation of datasets representative of normal pipeline operation. A threat model encompassing common ICS attack vectors was developed, including sensor spoofing, command injection, false data injection, denial-of-service attacks, and relay manipulation. Multiple attack scenarios were implemented and evaluated to demonstrate how cyber intrusions targeting sensors, actuators, networks, and software propagate into measurable physical consequences in pipeline flow and pressure. The developed platform serves as a practical, cost-effective environment for experimentation, education, and future cybersecurity research in midstream pipeline systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Risk Assessment Framework for Cyber-Physical Security in Distribution Grids with Grid-Edge DERs

Integration of inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs) is reshaping the landscape of distribution grids to fulfill the socioeconomic, environmental, and sustainability goals. Addressing the technological challenges of DER grid integration requires an adaptive communication layer for efficient DER management and control. This transition has given rise to a cyberphysical system (CPS) architecture within the distribution system, causing new vulnerabilities for cyberphysical attacks. To better address potential threats, this paper presents a comprehensive risk assessment framework for cyberphysical security in distribution grids with grid-edge DERs. The framework incorporates a detailed CPS model accounting for dynamic DER characteristics within the distribution grid. It identifies vulnerabilities in DER communication systems, models attack scenarios, and addresses communication latency crucial for inverter control timescales. Subsequently, the quantification of attack impacts employs an attack probability model including both the vulnerability and criticality of cyber components. The proposed risk assessment framework was validated through testing on the modified IEEE 13-node and 123-node test feeders.

cyberattack↗
DOE OSTI2022

Resilient Observer Design for Cyber-Physical Systems with Data-Driven Measurement Pruning

Resilient observer design for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in the presence of adversarial false data injection attacks (FDIA) is an active area of research. The existing state-of-the-art algorithms tend to break down as more and more knowledge of the system is built into the attack model; also as the percentage of attacked nodes increases. From the view of optimization theory, the problem is often cast as a classical error correction problem for which a theoretical limit of has been established as the maximum percentage attacked nodes for which state recovery is guaranteed. Beyond this limit, the performance of -minimization based schemes, for instance, deteriorates rapidly. Similar performance degradation occurs for other types of resilient observers beyond certain percentages of attacked nodes. In order to increase the corresponding percentage of attacked nodes for which state recoveries can be guaranteed, researchers have begun to incorporate prior information into the underlying resilient observer design framework. For the most pragmatic cases, this prior information is often obtained through a data-driven machine learning process. Existing results have shown a strong positive correlation between the maximum attacked percentages that can be tolerated and the accuracy of the data-driven model. Motivated by these results, this chapter examines the case for pruning algorithms designed to improve the Positive Prediction Value (PPV) of the resulting prior information, given stochastic uncertainty characteristics of the underlying machine learning model. Theoretical quantification of the achievable improvement is given. Simulation results show that the pruning algorithm significantly increases the maximum correctable percentage of attacked nodes, even for machine learning model whose prediction power is comparable to the random flip of a coin.

Resilient Observer, Cyber-physical Systems, Data-D↗