Improbability of Nuclear Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Based on the rationale presented, nuclear criticality is improbable after salt creep causes compaction of criticality control overpacks (CCOs) disposed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality potential has been updated here because of the introduction of CCOs, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCOs during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual salt compaction (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure). Geomechanical models of rock fall demonstrate three tiers of CCOs are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Criticality models of spheres and cylinders of 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular spacing demonstrate that an array of CCOs is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the amount of hydrogenous material shipped in the CCO (usually water and plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.