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Proceedings of the 5th US/German Workshop on Salt Repository Research Design and Operation

The 5th US/German Workshop on Salt Repository Research, Design, and Operation was held in Santa Fe New Mexico September 8-10, 2014. The forty seven registered participants were equally divided between the United States (US) and Germany, with one participant from The Netherlands. The agenda for the 2014 workshop was under development immediately upon finishing the 4th Workshop. Ongoing, fundamental topics such as thermomechanical behavior of salt, plugging and sealing, the safety case, and performance assessment continue to advance the basis for disposal of heat-generating nuclear waste in salt formations. The utility of a salt underground research laboratory (URL) remains an intriguing concept engendering discussion of testing protocol. By far the most interest in this years’ workshop pertained to operational safety. Given events at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), this discussion took on a new sense of relevance and urgency.

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Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an over-pack container, similar to the pipe component, called the criticality control over-pack, which will significantly enhance the efficiency of disposal. Hundreds of shipments of transuranic SNM, suitably packaged to meet WIPP waste acceptance criteria and with safeguards terminated have been successfully emplaced at WIPP (primarily from the Rocky Flats site clean-up) since WIPP opened. DOE expects that thousands more may eventually result from SNM consolidation efforts throughout the weapons complex. (authors)

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RH-TRU Waste Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) (Rev. 19)

This document, DOE/WIPP 90-045, RH-TRU Waste Content Codes (RH-TRUCON), is a catalog of RH-TRU 72-B authorized contents and a description of methods used to demonstrate compliance with the RH-TRU Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RH-TRAMPAC). All containers must have a content code approved by the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant RH-TRU Payload Engineer to be eligible for shipment. The content codes contained herein are developed under the requirements outlined in the RH-TRAMPAC.

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RH-TRU Waste Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) (Rev. 21)

This document, DOE/WIPP 90-045, RH-TRU Waste Content Codes (RH-TRUCON), is a catalog of RH-TRU 72-B authorized contents and a description of methods used to demonstrate compliance with the RH-TRU Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RH-TRAMPAC). All containers must have a content code approved by the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant RH-TRU Payload Engineer to be eligible for shipment. The content codes contained herein are developed under the requirements outlined in the RH-TRAMPAC.

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Radiological Characterization Technical Report on Californium-252 Sealed Source Transuranic Debris Waste for the Off-Site Source Recovery Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory

This document describes the development and approach for the radiological characterization of Cf-252 sealed sources for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The report combines information on the nuclear material content of each individual source (mass or activity and date of manufacture) with information and data on the radionuclide distributions within the originating nuclear material. This approach allows for complete and accurate characterization of the waste container without the need to take additional measurements. The radionuclide uncertainties, developed from acceptable knowledge (AK) information regarding the source material, are applied to the summed activities in the drum. The AK information used in the characterization of Cf-252 sealed sources has been qualified by the peer review process, which has been reviewed and accepted by the Environmental Protection Agency.

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Used fuel disposition research and development roadmap - FY10 status.

Since 1987 the U.S. has focused research and development activities relevant to the disposal of commercial used nuclear fuel and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned spent nuclear fuel and high level waste on the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. At the same time, the U.S. successfully deployed a deep geologic disposal facility for defense-related transuranic waste in bedded salt at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. In 2009 the DOE established the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) within the Office of Nuclear Energy. The Mission of the UFDC is to identify alternatives and conduct scientific research and technology development to enable storage, transportation and disposal of used nuclear fuel and wastes generated by existing and future nuclear fuel cycles. The U.S. national laboratories have participated on these programs and has conducted research and development related to these issues to a limited extent. However, a comprehensive research and development (R&D) program investigating a variety of geologic media has not been a part of the U.S. waste management program since the mid 1980s. Such a comprehensive R&D program is being developed in the UFDC with a goal of meeting the UFDC Grand Challenge to provide a sound technical basis for absolute confidence in the safety and security of long-term storage, transportation, and disposal of used nuclear fuel and wastes from the nuclear energy enterprise. The DOE has decided to no longer pursue the development of a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Since a repository site will ultimately have to be selected, sited, characterized, designed, and licensed, other disposal options must now be considered. In addition to the unsaturated volcanic tuff evaluated at Yucca Mountain, several different geologic media are under investigation internationally and preliminary assessments indicate that disposal of used nuclear fuel and high level waste in these media is feasible. Considerable progress has been made in the U.S. and other nations in understanding disposal concepts in different geologic media, but gaps in knowledge still exist. A principal aspect of concern to the UFDC as it considers the broad issues of siting a repository in different geologic media are the marked differences in the regulatory bases for assessing suitability and safety of a repository between the U.S. and other nations. Because the probability based - risked informed nature of the current U.S. regulations for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel is sufficiently different from other regulations, information gained in previous studies, while useful, likely need to be supplemented to enable more convincing communication with the public, better defense of the numerical models, and stronger safety cases. Thus, it was recognized when the UFDC was established that there were readily identified disposal-related R&D opportunities to address knowledge gaps. An effort to document these research opportunities was a key component of Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 engineered system, natural system, and system-level modeling activities for a range of disposal environments. A principal contribution to identifying these gaps was a workshop held to gather perspectives from experts both within and external to the UFDC regarding R&D opportunities. In the planning for FY2010 it was expected that these activities would culminate with a UFDC research and development roadmap that would identify the knowledge gaps, discuss the R&D needed to fill these gaps, and prioritize the proposed R&D over both the near- and long-term. A number of knowledge gaps and needed R&D were identified and are discussed in this report. However, these preliminary R&D topics have not been evaluated in detail nor have they been prioritized to support future planning efforts. This will be completed in FY11 and the final UFDC Research and Development Roadmap will be completed. This report discusses proposed R&D topics in three areas related to repository siting, design, and performance: natural systems, engineered systems, and overall disposal system. The intent of this report is to consolidate the proposed R&D topics to support subsequent discussions among UFDC and external expertise to identify additional R&D needs and to prioritize these needs, leading to the development for the UFDC Research and Development Roadmap.

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Adjunct laboratory tests in support of US/German salt characterization program

In summary, the goal of this activity is to complete a subset of a test matrix on salt from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) undertaken by German research groups. The work will be performed at RESPEC in Rapid City, South Dakota, and is divided into three tasks.

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The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944 - 2009

This report updates the report -Plutonium: The first 50 years- which was released by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 1996. The topic of both reports is plutonium, sometimes referred to as Pu-239, which is capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction and is used in nuclear weapons and for nuclear power production. This report updates 1994 data through 2009. The four most significant changes since 1994 include: (a) the completion of cleanup activities at the Rocky Flats Plant in 2005; (b) material consolidation and disposition activities, especially shipments from Hanford to the Savannah River Site; (c) the 2007 declaration of an additional 9.0 MT of weapons grade plutonium to be surplus to defense needs in the coming decades; and (d) the opening of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico in 1999.

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TRU Waste Transportation Plan (Rev. 2)

This plan defines the requirements for managing the transportation of transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed waste from a generator/storage site to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) or to another generator/storage site (inter-site). This plan was developed in accordance with Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.2A, Departmental Materials Transportation and Packaging Management.

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Deep Geologic Nuclear Waste Disposal - No New Taxes - 12469

To some, the perceived inability of the United States to dispose of high-level nuclear waste justifies a moratorium on expansion of nuclear power in this country. Instead, it is more an example of how science yields to social pressure, even on a subject as technical as nuclear waste. Most of the problems, however, stem from confusion on the part of the public and their elected officials, not from a lack of scientific knowledge. We know where to put nuclear waste, how to put it there, how much it will cost, and how well it will work. And it's all about the geology. The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future has drafted a number of recommendations addressing nuclear energy and waste issues (BRC 2011) and three recommendations, in particular, have set the stage for a new strategy to dispose of high-level nuclear waste and to manage spent nuclear fuel in the United States: 1) interim storage for spent nuclear fuel, 2) resumption of the site selection process for a second repository, and 3) a quasi-government entity to execute the program and take control of the Nuclear Waste Fund in order to do so. The first two recommendations allow removal and storage of spent fuel from reactor sites to be used in the future, and allows permanent disposal of actual waste, while the third controls cost and administration. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NPWA 1982) provides the second repository different waste criteria, retrievability, and schedule, so massive salt returns as the candidate formation of choice. The cost (in 2007 dollars) of disposing of 83,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) high-level waste (HLW) is about $ 83 billion (b) in volcanic tuff, $ 29 b in massive salt, and $ 77 b in crystalline rock. Only in salt is the annual revenue stream from the Nuclear Waste Fund more than sufficient to accomplish this program without additional taxes or rate hikes. The cost is determined primarily by the suitability of the geologic formation, i.e., how well it performs on its own for millions of years with little engineering assistance from humans. It is critical that the states most affected by this issue (WA, SC, ID, TN, NM and perhaps others) develop an independent multi-state agreement in order for a successful program to move forward. Federal approval would follow. Unknown to most, the United States has a successful operating deep permanent geologic nuclear repository for high and low activity waste, called the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Its success results from several factors, including an optimal geologic and physio-graphic setting, a strong scientific basis, early regional community support, frequent interactions among stakeholders at all stages of the process, long-term commitment from the upper management of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) over several administrations, strong New Mexico State involvement and oversight, and constant environmental monitoring from before nuclear waste was first emplaced in the WIPP underground (in 1999) to the present. WIPP is located in the massive bedded salts of the Salado Formation, whose geological, physical, chemical, redox, thermal, and creep-closure properties make it an ideal formation for long-term disposal, long-term in this case being greater than 200 million years. These properties also mean minimal engineering requirements as the rock does most of the work of isolating the waste. WIPP has been operating for twelve years, and as of this writing, has disposed of over 80,000 m{sup 3} of nuclear weapons waste, called transuranic or TRU waste (>100 nCurie/g but <23 Curie/1000 cm{sup 3}) including some high activity waste from reprocessing of spent fuel from old weapons reactors. All nuclear waste of any type from any source can be disposed in this formation better, safer and cheaper than in any other geologic formation. At the same time, it is critical that we complete the Yucca Mountain license application review so as not to undermine the credibility of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the scientific community. (authors)

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WIPP - February 2014 operational events and the compliance re-certification application (CRA) 2014 - 15293

On Wednesday, February 5, 2014, an underground mine fire involving a salt haul truck occurred at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). There were 86 workers in the mine when the fire occurred. All workers were evacuated. Nine days later, on Friday, February 14, 2014, there was an incident in the underground repository at WIPP which resulted in the release of americium and plutonium from one or more transuranic (TRU) waste containers into the environment. The release was detected by an underground continuous air monitor and then directed through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter banks located in the surface exhaust building. However, a measurable portion bypassed the HEPA filters via leakage through two ventilation system dampers and was discharged directly to the environment from an exhaust duct. No personnel were determined to have received external contamination; however, some individuals that were on site were identified through bioassay to have initially tested positive for low level amounts of internal contamination. Trace amounts of americium and plutonium were detected off-site.While significant to day-to-day operations, these events have no impact to the long-term performance of the repository. Because WIPP's re-certification is based solely on the post-closure performance of the repository (40 CFR 191, Subparts B and C), these recent events do not affect the long-term performance predictions or its technical and scientific basis. In this paper we will further explore the requirements for WIPP's re-certification, and the basis for our contention that the recent WIPP operational events do not impact long-term repository performance or have any implications on salt as a geologic disposal media, and that re-certification efforts should continue uninterrupted. (authors)

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ORNL/TM-2021/2046 Appendix data repository

Repository of data files used to generate plots for Post-Closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (ORNL/TM-2021/2046). See the readme for information contained in the individual files. See the report for description of the models used to generate the data.

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Prediction of the Extent of the Disturbed Rock Zone around a WIPP Disposal Room, USA

This paper is one of a series of papers outlining the recent performance assessment for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant repository conducted by Sandia National Laboratories. The disturbed rock zone (DRZ) is an important feature that is included in the performance assessment process models to predict future repository conditions and brine flow to the accessible environment. Furthermore, the properties of the DRZ control a significant portion of the brine that can flow into the waste rooms. Extensive laboratory salt creep data demonstrate that damage can be assessed in terms of volumetric strain and principal stresses. Stress states that cause dilation are defined in terms of stress invariants, which allow reasonable models of DRZ evolution and devolution. In this paper, the change of DRZ extent with time is calculated based on a dilatant damage potential criterion. The constant C in the dilatancy criterion is determined by comparing the numerical analysis results of the Room Q access drift with the field data obtained at the same location for the analysis. The most extensive DRZ exists during early times, within the first ten years after an opening is mined. As the back stresses from the waste stack resist deformation, the damage to the salt decreases. The maximum extents of the DRZ calculated below and above the room reach approximately 2.24 m and 4.74 m, respectively. The maximum lateral DRZ extent in the side of the room is calculated to be roughly 2 m. (authors)

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Disposal Systems Evaluations and Tool Development - Engineered Barrier System Evaluation (Work Package LL1015080425)

The Disposal Systems Evaluation Framework (DSEF) will use a logical process for developing one or more disposal system concepts (also referred to as repository system in this report) for any given waste form and geologic setting combination. In the Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs) group of work packages, there are seven categories of waste forms and eight categories of geologic setting being studied. The DSEF will also establish a Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) knowledge management system to organize high-level information, data, and assumptions, thereby facilitating consistency in high-level system simulation and economic analyses. This system likely will be housed with the INL-based documentation system. Attention is given to lessons oearned from the systems used at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP). Where reference material from other programs (e.g., international) is used or cited, the knowledge-management system imports the reference material directly or refer to it in bibliography form. Alternative data sets (e.g., from other programs) will also be utilized to evaluate their influence on DSEF analyses for given waste form and disposal-system combinations. The knowledge-management system can also be used to maintain the results of DSEF realizations, enabling the comparison and ranking of various waste-form/disposal-system-environment/disposal-system-design options. Finally, the UFDC knowledge-management system will be able to provide a compendium of 'templates' that can be utilized, in a labor-efficient fashion, to build parallel DSEF analyses (e.g., 'one offs'). The DSEF will not be a stand-alone, push-the-button and wait for the results, item of software. it will use osftware (probably EXCEL, initially), to guide the team members through a logical process of evaluating combinations of waste-form, disposal-syste-environment, and disposal-system design. In later stages, it will utilize software developed in the field of knowledge engineering and knowledge-management systems (Umeki et al. 2009). At certain points in the logical process, the DSEF software will point the evaluate to other software tools to do analyses needed to move the process forward. In the development of the DSEF, they will be mindful to make it no more complex than necessary to evaluate the system being considered. The DSEF will organize and document the work such that multiple realizations for different combinations can be compared and contrasted.

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The role of acceptable knowledge in transuranic waste disposal operations - 11117

The Acceptable Knowledge (AK) process plays a key role in the delineation of waste streams destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). General Electric's Vallecitos Nuclear Center (GEVNC) provides for an ideal case study of the application of AK in a multiple steward environment. In this review we will elucidate the pivotal role Acceptable Knowledge played in segregating Department of Energy (DOE) responsibilities from a commercial facility. The Acceptable Knowledge process is a necessary component of waste characterization that determines whether or not a waste stream may be considered for disposal at the WIPP site. This process may be thought of as an effort to gain a thorough understanding of the waste origin, chemical content, and physical form gleaned by the collection of documentation that concerns generator/storage site history, mission, and operations; in addition to waste stream specific information which includes the waste generation process, the waste matrix, the quantity of waste concerned, and the radiological and chemical make up of the waste. The collection and dissemination of relevant documentation is the fundamental requirement for the AK process to work. Acceptable Knowledge is the predominant process of characterization and, therefore, a crucial part of WIPP's transuranic waste characterization program. This characterization process, when conducted to the standards set forth in WIPP's operating permit, requires confirmation/verification by physical techniques such as Non-Destructive Examination (NDE), Visual Examination (VE), and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA). These physical characterization techniques may vary in their appropriateness for a given waste stream; however, nothing will allow the substitution or exclusion of AK. Beyond the normal scope of operations, AK may be considered, when appropriate, a surrogate for the physical characterization techniques in a procedure that appeals to concepts such As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and budgetary savings. This substitution is referred to as an Acceptable Knowledge Sufficiency Determination. With a Sufficiency Determination Request, AK may supplant the need for one or all of the physical analysis methods. This powerful procedure may be used on a scale as small as a single container to that of a vast waste stream. Only under the most stringent requirements will an AK Sufficiency Determination be approved by the regulators and, to date, only six such Sufficiency Determinations have been approved. Although Acceptable Knowledge is legislated into the operational procedures of the WIPP facility there is more to it than compliance. AK is not merely one of a long list of requirements in the characterization and verification of transuranic (TRU) waste destined for the WIPP. Acceptable Knowledge goes beyond the regulatory threshold by offering a way to reduce risk, cost, time, and uncertainty on its own laurels. Therefore, AK alone can be argued superior to any other waste characterization technique.

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Savannah River Site Public and Regulatory Involvement in the Inadvertent Disposal of TRU Waste in the E-Area Low-Level Waste (LLW) Trenches

The key to successful public involvement at the Savannah River Site (SRS) has been and continues to be vigorous, up-front involvement of the public, federal and state regulators with technical experts. The SRS Waste Management Program includes all forms of radioactive waste. All of the decisions associated with the management of these wastes are of interest to the public and successful program implementation would be impossible without including the public up-front in the program formulation. Serious problems can result if program decisions are made without public involvement, and if the public is informed after key decisions are made. This paper will describe the regulatory and public involvement program and their effects on the decisions concerning the inadvertent disposal at the Savannah River Site (SRS) of TRU waste in the E-area LLW Facility Trenches. SRS engineers discovered that a small amount of TRU waste was disposed in the E-area LLW trenches in 2003. This discovery was obviously of considerable interest to the State and Federal Regulators, and to the public. In addition to notifications to all interested parties, the first order of business was to ensure that operations continued to be protective of the public and the environment. This paper will describe the interactions with the Department of Energy (DOE), the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the public. In addition the technical details of the inadvertent disposal will be discussed along with the analysis of long term performance of the waste form in the E-Area LLW Trenches and how this information was communicated with all parties. As can be imagined, a decision to dispose of TRU waste onsite versus shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico for disposal is of considerable interest to the stakeholders in South Carolina. The events that lead to the inadvertent disposal will be reviewed as well as the new systems put into place to ensure that this event will not happen again in the future. In order to determine alternatives to properly deposition this TRU waste, an evaluation of retrieval of the waste from the trench disposal was performed as well as an options risk analysis to determine the regulatory path forward should the decision be made to dispose of the TRU waste in place. An evaluation of the risks to the workers associated with retrieval was then compared to the risks of continued disposal in the E-Area Trenches. Cost and schedule for each alternative was also compared. This paper will describe the successful results of this technical, regulatory, and public involvement program, explore the challenges, how the accomplishments occurred, and describe the future challenges along with the road map for the future. A comparison with other similar events at other DOE sites will be discussed as well. In doing this, the SRS TRU and LLW programs must be described to give the readers an understanding of the technical complexities that must be communicated successfully to achieve constructive stakeholder participation and regulatory approval. (authors)

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Management Of Hanford KW Basin Knockout Pot Sludge As Spent Nuclear Fuel

CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) and AREVA Federal Services, LLC (AFS) have been working collaboratively to develop and deploy technologies to remove, transport, and interim store remote-handled sludge from the 10S-K West Reactor Fuel Storage Basin on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site near Richland, WA, USA. Two disposal paths exist for the different types of sludge found in the K West (KW) Basin. One path is to be managed as Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) with eventual disposal at an SNF at a yet to be licensed repository. The second path will be disposed as remote-handled transuranic (RH-TRU) waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, NM. This paper describes the systems developed and executed by the Knockout Pot (KOP) Disposition Subproject for processing and interim storage of the sludge managed as SNF, (i.e., KOP material).

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Processing Plan for Potentially Reactive/Ignitable Remote Handled Transuranic Waste at the Idaho Cleanup Project - 12090

Remote Handle Transuranic (RH-TRU) Waste generated at Argonne National Laboratory - East, from the examination of irradiated and un-irradiated fuel pins and other reactor materials requires a detailed processing plan to ensure reactive/ignitable material is absent to meet WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria prior to shipping and disposal. The Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) approach to repackaging Lot 2 waste and how we ensure prohibited materials are not present in waste intended for disposal at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 'WIPP' uses an Argon Repackaging Station (ARS), which provides an inert gas blanket. Opening of the Lot 2 containers under an argon gas blanket is proposed to be completed in the ARS. The ARS is an interim transition repackaging station that provides a mitigation technique to reduce the chances of a reoccurrence of a thermal event prior to rendering the waste 'Safe'. The consequences, should another thermal event be encountered, (which is likely) is to package the waste, apply the reactive and or ignitable codes to the container, and store until the future treatment permit and process are available. This is the same disposition that the two earlier containers in the 'Thermal Events' were assigned. By performing the initial handling under an inert gas blanket, the waste can sorted and segregate the fines and add the Met-L-X to minimize risk before it is exposed to air. The 1-gal cans that are inside the ANL-E canister will be removed and each can is moved to the ARS for repackaging. In the ARS, the 1-gal can is opened in the inerted environment. The contained waste is sorted, weighed, and visually examined for non compliant items such as unvented aerosol cans and liquids. The contents of the paint cans are transferred into a sieve and manipulated to allow the fines, if any, to be separated into the tray below. The fines are weighed and then blended with a minimum 5:1 mix of Met-L-X. Other debris materials found are segregated from the cans into containers for later packaging. Recoverable fissile waste material (Fuel and fuel-like pieces) suspected of containing sodium bonded pieces) are segregated and will remain in the sieve or transferred to a similar immersion basket in the ARS. The fuel like pieces will be placed into a container with sufficient water to cover the recoverable fissile waste. If a 'reactive characteristic' is present the operator will be able to observe the formation of 'violent' hydrogen gas bubbles. When sodium bonded fuel-like pieces are placed in water the expected reaction is a non-violent reaction that does not meet the definition of reactivity. It is expected that there will be a visible small stream of bubbles present if there is any sodium-bonded fuel-like piece placed in the water. The test will be completed when there is no reaction or the expected reaction is observed..At that point, the fuel like pieces complete the processing cycle in preparation for characterization and shipment to WIPP. If a violent reaction occurs, the fuel-like pieces will be removed from the water, split into the required fissile material content, placed into a screened basket in a 1 gallon drum and drummed out of the hot cell with appropriate RCRA codes applied and placed into storage until sodium treatment is available. These 'violent' reactions will be evidenced by gas bubbles being evolved at the specimen surface where sodium metal is present. The operators will be trained to determine if the reaction is 'violent' or 'mild'. If a 'violent' reaction occurs, the sieve will be immediately removed from the water, placed in a 1 gallon paint can, canned in the argon cover gas and removed from the hot cell to await a future treatment. If the reaction is 'mild', the sieve will then be removed from the water; the material weighed for final packaging and allowed to dry by air exposure. Lot 2 waste cans can be opened, sorted, processed, and weighed while mitigating the potential of thermal events that could occur prior to exposing to air. Exposure to air is a WIPP compliance step demonstrating the absence of reactive or ignitable characteristics. (authors)

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