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At least 451 records · Page 25

Rapid fill compressed gas storage tank

A method for rapidly filling a compressed gas storage tank with a moderated temperature rise using a Coanda nozzle to inject the feed gas into the tank and using the Coanda nozzle to direct the feed gas along the inner surface of the storage tank; entraining the stored gas with the feed gas that is flowing under the influence of the Coanda effect to flow along the inner surface of the gas storage tank; and transferring heat from the flowing gas to the external walls of the tank. Also, a compressed gas storage tank for rapid filling with a moderated temperature rise comprising: a gas storage tank and a Coanda nozzle capable of directing feed gas that is injected into the gas storage tank along the inner surface of the gas storage tank.

Jayaraman, Ambalavanan↗

Thermal Stress Modeling and Analysis of Packed-bed Thermocline Energy Storage Tank for INL Thermal Energy Distribution System (TEDS)

The Thermal Energy Distribution System (TEDS) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is a thermal-hydraulic flow loop to support the integration of co-located multiple experimental systems, where a packed-bed thermal energy storage (TES) is installed as a thermal buffer and storage unit for TEDS. The packed-bed TES is adopted in TEDS because of its benefit as a low-cost single-tank storage option compared to the traditional two-tank storage. However, thermal ratcheting is one potential design concern which is caused by the rearrangement of granular filler inside a packed-bed tank during continuous thermal cycling operation of the packed-bed TES tank. If the thermally induced stress exceeds yield strength of the tank wall, it may cause catastrophic consequences like rupture of the thermal storage tank. Thus, it is crucial to understand the phenomenon to ensure the robust operation. Based on the temperature boundary conditions given by transient thermal analyses with computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations, the thermal ratcheting analysis is then conducted to evaluate the hoop stress and resultant thermal ratcheting potential of the TES tanks with two different modeling approaches: (1) infinite rigidity model and (2) Drucker-Prager (DP) model. The validity of each modeling method was examined by comparing the numerical simulation with the experimental data obtained from the packed-bed TES tank for Solar One Plant and evaluate the thermal ratcheting potential of the TEDS TES tank.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Inspection and Mapping of Savannah River Site (SRS) Waste Tanks via Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) – 25351

The CSTF at SRS contain 51 waste tanks with 8 closed waste tanks between FTF and HTF. SRMC is the LW contractor. The LW mission includes removing legacy nuclear waste from these tanks and treating it for final disposition. Once the bulk of the waste has been removed from a tank, it will undergo inspection and sampling to characterize the remaining waste in the tank prior to it being operationally closed. There are multiple points in the tank closure process where an inspection is performed, and there are multiple parts of a tank that get inspected. Waste tanks have a primary containment vessel (referred to as the “Primary”) and a secondary containment vessel (referred to as the “Annulus”) that surrounds the primary. Both of these sections of a tank receive multiple inspections throughout the closure process.

Murphy, Lucas D. [Savannah River Mission Completio↗

Control Selection for the Neutralization Tank in the Aqueous Recovery System at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

The Aqueous Recovery System (ARS) at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) recovers and purifies plutonium (Pu) using aqueous chemistry techniques. The neutralization tanks in the ARS collect waste streams with various impurities and greatly reduced concentrations of Pu than are produced during aqueous processing. Criticality safety is primarily achieved in the ARS by using geometrically favorable process vessels. However, due to the geometry of neutralization tanks, each tank is administratively limited to no more than 450 g Pu, thus representing the transition from geometry to mass control. To ensure that this mass limit is not exceeded, an administrative control requires taking two samples of any solution to be sent to a neutralization tank. Normal operations are expected to result in less than 50 g Pu in a neutralization tank filled to its capacity of 250 L. Process upsets may cause an inadvertent transfer of up to 1000 g Pu to a neutralization tank, producing a system that is potentially not subcritical for all possible configurations of the tank. To ensure that a neutralization tank remains safety subcritical, passive engineered controls (e.g. changing tank geometry or adding fixed poisons), active engineered controls (e.g. interlocks), and administrative controls (e.g. soluble poisons and valve isolation) were considered and their viability evaluated. Ultimately, the team chose an administrative, dual-valve isolation strategy. This paper will thoroughly discuss the various control strategy options and why many of the options were not feasible for maintaining criticality safety.

Dressman, Phillip M. [Savannah River Nuclear Solut↗

Control Selection for the Neutralization Tank in the Aqueous Recovery System at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

The Aqueous Recovery System (ARS) at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) recovers and purifies plutonium (Pu) using aqueous chemistry techniques. The neutralization tanks in the ARS collect the waste streams, containing various impurities and greatly reduced concentrations of Pu, that are produced during aqueous processing. Criticality safety is primarily achieved in the ARS by using geometrically favorable process vessels. However, due to the geometry of neutralization tanks, each tank is administratively limited to no more than 450 g Pu, thus representing the transition from geometry to mass control. To ensure that this mass limit is not exceeded, an administrative control requires taking two samples of any solution to be sent to a neutralization tank. Normal operations are expected to result in less than 50 g Pu in a neutralization tank filled to its capacity of 250 L. Process upsets may cause an inadvertent transfer of up to 1000 g Pu to a neutralization tank, producing a system that is potentially not subcritical for all possible configurations of the tank. To ensure that a neutralization tank remains safety subcritical, passive engineered controls (e.g.changing tank geometry or adding fixed poisons), active engineered controls (e.g. interlocks), and administrative controls (e.g. soluble poisons and valve isolation) were considered and their viability evaluated. Ultimately, the team chose an administrative, dual-valve isolation strategy. This paper will thoroughly discuss the various control strategy options and why many of the options were not feasible for maintaining criticality safety.

Dressman, Phillip M. [Savannah River Nuclear Solut↗

ENHANCED CHEMICAL CLEANING: A NEW PROCESS FOR CHEMICALLY CLEANING SAVANNAH RIVER WASTE TANKS

The Savannah River Site (SRS) has 49 high level waste (HLW) tanks that must be emptied, cleaned, and closed as required by the Federal Facilities Agreement. The current method of chemical cleaning uses several hundred thousand gallons per tank of 8 weight percent (wt%) oxalic acid to partially dissolve and suspend residual waste and corrosion products such that the waste can be pumped out of the tank. This adds a significant quantity of sodium oxalate to the tanks and, if multiple tanks are cleaned, renders the waste incompatible with the downstream processing. Tank space is also insufficient to store this stream given the large number of tanks to be cleaned. Therefore, a search for a new cleaning process was initiated utilizing the TRIZ literature search approach, and Chemical Oxidation Reduction Decontamination--Ultraviolet (CORD-UV), a mature technology currently used for decontamination and cleaning of commercial nuclear reactor primary cooling water loops, was identified. CORD-UV utilizes oxalic acid for sludge dissolution, but then decomposes the oxalic acid to carbon dioxide and water by UV treatment outside the system being treated. This allows reprecipitation and subsequent deposition of the sludge into a selected container without adding significant volume to that container, and without adding any new chemicals that would impact downstream treatment processes. Bench top and demonstration loop measurements on SRS tank sludge stimulant demonstrated the feasibility of applying CORD-UV for enhanced chemical cleaning of SRS HLW tanks.

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DEPOSITION TANK CORROSION TESTING FOR ENHANCED CHEMICAL CLEANING POST OXALIC ACID DESTRUCTION

An Enhanced Chemical Cleaning (ECC) process is being developed to aid in the high level waste tank closure at the Savannah River Site. The ECC process uses an advanced oxidation process (AOP) to destroy the oxalic acid that is used to remove residual sludge from a waste tank prior to closure. The AOP process treats the dissolved sludge with ozone to decompose the oxalic acid through reactions with hydroxyl radicals. The effluent from this oxalic acid decomposition is to be sent to a Type III waste tank and may be corrosive to these tanks. As part of the hazardous simulant testing that was conducted at the ECC vendor location, corrosion testing was conducted to determine the general corrosion rate for the deposition tank and to assess the susceptibility to localized corrosion, especially pitting. Both of these factors impact the calculation of hydrogen gas generation and the structural integrity of the tanks, which are considered safety class functions. The testing consisted of immersion and electrochemical testing of A537 carbon steel, the material of construction of Type III tanks, and 304L stainless steel, the material of construction for transfer piping. Tests were conducted in solutions removed from the destruction loop of the prototype ECC set up. Hazardous simulants, which were manufactured at SRNL, were used as representative sludges for F-area and H-area waste tanks. Oxalic acid concentrations of 1 and 2.5% were used to dissolve the sludge as a feed to the ECC process. Test solutions included the uninhibited effluent, as well as the effluent treated for corrosion control. The corrosion control options included mixing with an inhibited supernate and the addition of hydroxide. Evaporation of the uninhibited effluent was also tested since it may have a positive impact on reducing corrosion. All corrosion testing was conducted at 50 C. The uninhibited effluent was found to increase the corrosion rate by an order of magnitude from less than 1 mil per year (mpy) for an inhibited waste to a range of 5 to 23.4 mpy, depending on sludge chemistry. F-area-based effluents were, in general, more corrosive. Effective corrosion control measures included evaporation, hydroxide additions and mixing with supernates containing a representative supernate chemistry (5 M hydroxide and 1.5 M nitrite). Corrosion rates with these measures were generally 0.2 mpy. The A537 carbon steel was found to be susceptible to pitting when the corrosion control measure involved mixing the ECC effluent with a supernate chemistry having minimal inhibitor concentrations (0.5 M hydroxide and 0.3 M nitrite). Corrosion rates in this case were near 1 mpy.

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Analysis of the Salt Feed Tank Core Sample

The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) immobilizes and disposes of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Low-level waste (LLW) streams from processes at SRS are stored in Tank 50 until the LLW can be transferred to the SPF for treatment and disposal. The Salt Feed Tank (SFT) at the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) holds approximately 6500 gallons of low level waste from Tank 50 as well as drain water returned from the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) vaults. Over the past several years, Saltstone Engineering has noted the accumulation of solids in the SFT. The solids are causing issues with pump performance, agitator performance, density/level monitoring, as well as taking up volume in the tank. The tank has been sounded at the same location multiple times to determine the level of the solids. The readings have been 12, 25 and 15 inches. The SFT is 8.5 feet high and 12 feet in diameter, therefore the solids account for approximately 10 % of the tank volume. Saltstone Engineering has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain scrape samples of the solids for analysis. As a result, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was tasked with developing a soft core sampler to obtain a sample of the solids and to analyze the core sample to aid in determining a path forward for removing the solids from the SFT. The source of the material in the SFT is the drain water return system where excess liquid from the Saltstone disposal vaults is pumped back to the SFT for reprocessing. It has been shown that fresh grout from the vault enter the drain water system piping. Once these grout solids return to the SFT, they settle in the tank, set up, and can't be reprocessed, causing buildup in the tank over time. The composition of the material indicates that it is potentially toxic for chromium and mercury and the primary radionuclide is cesium-137. Qualitative measurements show that the material is not cohesive and will break apart with some force.

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Analysis Results for Sub-Samples of SRS Tanks 30, 32, and 39 to Support Evaluations of the I-129 Inventory

In order to appropriately model and predict the chemical integrity and performance of cementitious materials used for waste immobilization at the Savannah River Site (SRS), it is critical to understand the I-129 solubility and distribution within the tank farm. Iodine in radioactive waste and in environmental media is typically highly mobile and long lived. Iodine is ubiquitous in SRS tank waste and waste forms. The iodine is assumed to be soluble and present at low levels in Performance Assessments (PAs) for SRS Tank Farms, and is one of the dose drivers in the PAs for both the SRS Salt Disposal Facility (SDF) and the H-Area Tank Farm (HTF). Analysis of tank waste samples is critical to understanding the Tank Farm iodine inventory and reducing disposal uncertainty. Higher than expected iodine levels have recently been observed in residual solids isolated from some SRS tanks prior to closure, indicating uncertainty regarding the chemical species involved. If the iodine inventory uncertainty is larger than anticipated, future work may be necessary to reduce the uncertainty. This memorandum satisfies a portion of the work scope identified in Task Plan SRNL-RP-2016-00651. A separate memorandum issued previously, reported historical unpublished I-129 data, a significant portion of which was below detectable analytical limits. This memorandum includes iodine and general chemical analysis results for six archived SRNL samples which were previously reported to have I-129 concentrations below detectable limits. Lower sample dilution factors were used for the current analyses in order to obtain concentrations above detection. The samples analyzed included surface and depth samples from SRS tanks 30, 32, and 39.

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Summary of Analytical Results from Samples Supporting Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) Batch 3 and Modeling Results for Cs Loading on CST

Savannah River Remediation (SRR) is currently operating the Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) process to remove 137 Cs from tank waste supernate using an ion exchange process. As part of that process, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) receives and analyzes samples in support of the qualification of each batch to be processed. SRNL recently received supernate samples retrieved from Tank 10H as well as in-tank batch contact samples for characterization in support of qualifying Batch 3 for processing through the TCCR unit. Some results from analysis of those samples have been previously reported. This report documents the remaining analyses of the in-tank batch contact samples as well as the results of ZAM (Zheng, Anthony, Miller) isotherm modeling performed for comparison to the measured results. Results of the additional analyses include analysis of the loading of other radionuclides besides 137 Cs on the crystalline silicotitanate (CST) contained within the in-tank batch contact test samples. Results from those analyses revealed the next highest contributor to the activity on the CST was 90 Sr with an average loading of 2.76E+08 dpm/g CST compared to 3.56E+10 dpm/g CST for the 137Cs. Isotopes of plutonium were also detected on the samples. ZAM modeling was performed using the measured composition of the Tank 10H Batch 3 qualification samples. The modeling predicted a maximum Cs loading approximately 2.2x higher than the measured result. This is a slightly lower ratio (expected/measured) compared to what was observed for the prior TCCR in-tank batch contact testing performed for Batches 1A and 2 where the ZAM results were 2.7-2.8x higher than the measured values.

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Characterization of Tank 9H Annulus Sample in Support of Residual Material Inventory Determinations

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested by Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) to provide sample preparation and characterization of the Tank 9H annulus sample in support of Residual Material Inventory Determinations. One Tank 9H sample in three vials [HTF-9-25-13, HTF-9-25-14 and HTF-9-25-15], with each vial containing approximately 200 mL of the Tank 9H annulus salt solution, were delivered to the SRNL Shielded Cells for sample preparation and characterizations in February 2025. The density of the “as-received” solution contained in each of the three Tank 9H annulus sample vials were determined followed by a solid-liquid separation on each one using 0.45-micron Nalgene® nylon filter membranes. The resulting filtrates were combined to form the Tank 9H annulus sample with a total volume of about 600 mL. The combined wet solid fractions, about a total of 4.8 grams of salt material, remaining on the filter membranes were air-dried in the Shielded Cells for 72 hours. The total weight of the air-dried solids was 2.1 grams. These air-dried solids were washed with deionized water (DI water) at a phase ratio of 60 mL DI water/gram of solids to recover insoluble solids, if any. No visible or measurable quantity of insoluble solids were recovered after DI water washing of the air-dried solids because the air-dried solids completely dissolved in the DI water. The solid fraction-wash water was not combined with the 600 mL of the filtrate solution, and the resulting solution was not screened or analyzed for radionuclides. Aliquot sample volumes of the undiluted Tank 9H annulus sample were sent to the SRNL analytical services groups for radionuclides, elementals, anions and total mercury analysis by various methods including radiochemical separations/counting methods, inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission spectroscopy (ICP-AES), and Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectroscopy (ICP-MS) and special preparations. All sample analyses were performed in triplicate. This report presents the analytical characterization results for the Tank 9H annulus sample. The results are also reported where analytical methods yielded additional analytes, other than those requested by SRMC. In the characterization of the Tank 9H annulus sample, the detection limits for all the analytes, as specified in the Technical Task Request (TTR) and Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP), were met.

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ANNUAL RADIOACTIVE WASTE TANK INSPECTION PROGRAM- 2007

Aqueous radioactive wastes from Savannah River Site (SRS) separations and vitrification processes are contained in large underground carbon steel tanks. The 2007 inspection program revealed that the structural integrity and waste confinement capability of the Savannah River Site waste tanks were maintained. A very small amount of material had seeped from Tank 12 from a previously identified leaksite. The material observed had dried on the tank wall and did not reach the annulus floor. A total of 5945 photographs were made and 1221 visual and video inspections were performed during 2007. Additionally, ultrasonic testing was performed on four Waste Tanks (15, 36, 37 and 38) in accordance with approved inspection plans that met the requirements of WSRC-TR-2002- 00061, Revision 2 'In-Service Inspection Program for High Level Waste Tanks'. The Ultrasonic Testing (UT) In-Service Inspections (ISI) are documented in a separate report that is prepared by the ISI programmatic Level III UT Analyst. Tanks 15, 36, 37 and 38 are documented in 'Tank Inspection NDE Results for Fiscal Year 2007'; WSRC-TR-2007-00064.

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EM-31 RETRIEVAL KNOWLEDGE CENTER MEETING REPORT: MOBILIZE AND DISLODGE TANK WASTE HEELS

The Retrieval Knowledge Center sponsored a meeting in June 2009 to review challenges and gaps to retrieval of tank waste heels. The facilitated meeting was held at the Savannah River Research Campus with personnel broadly representing tank waste retrieval knowledge at Hanford, Savannah River, Idaho, and Oak Ridge. This document captures the results of this meeting. In summary, it was agreed that the challenges to retrieval of tank waste heels fell into two broad categories: (1) mechanical heel waste retrieval methodologies and equipment and (2) understanding and manipulating the heel waste (physical, radiological, and chemical characteristics) to support retrieval options and subsequent processing. Recent successes and lessons from deployments of the Sand and Salt Mantis vehicles as well as retrieval of C-Area tanks at Hanford were reviewed. Suggestions to address existing retrieval approaches that utilize a limited set of tools and techniques are included in this report. The meeting found that there had been very little effort to improve or integrate the multiple proven or new techniques and tools available into a menu of available methods for rapid insertion into baselines. It is recommended that focused developmental efforts continue in the two areas underway (low-level mixing evaluation and pumping slurries with large solid materials) and that projects to demonstrate new/improved tools be launched to outfit tank farm operators with the needed tools to complete tank heel retrievals effectively and efficiently. This document describes the results of a meeting held on June 3, 2009 at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina to identify technology gaps and potential technology solutions to retrieving high-level waste (HLW) heels from waste tanks within the complex of sites run by the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE). The meeting brought together personnel with extensive tank waste retrieval knowledge from DOE's four major waste sites - Hanford, Savannah River, Idaho, and Oak Ridge. The meeting was arranged by the Retrieval Knowledge Center (RKC), which is a technology development project sponsored by the Office of Technology Innovation & Development - formerly the Office of Engineering and Technology - within the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM).

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Modeling of Stress Distribution in Molten Salt Thermal Energy Storage Tanks for In-Service Central Receiver Power Plants

Failures in molten nitrate salts thermal energy storage tanks (TES) have been occurring in several concentrating solar power (CSP) plants around the world after a few months or years of operation. These failures are mainly related to a combination of high stress, corrosion, large deformation, and thermal cycling. Most of these failures are a consequence of the infancy of this technology; technical standards for design, fabrication, implementation, and operation of molten salt tanks operating at temperatures up to 565 degrees Celsius do not exist and most of current in-service tanks have been designed using the recommendations from the American Petroleum Institute (API) 650 and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASME section II standards, which are applicable for TES tanks operating at lower temperatures. We have developed a 3-dimensional model of a representative molten salt hot tank design that uses typical CSP plant operation conditions and allows determining the temperature and stress distribution in the tank. The model also considers the initial floor residual stresses and distortion after its welding fabrication. We have identified critical thermal gradients in the tank floor and shell and locations in the tank where the stresses are high and could become susceptible points for failure.

concentrating solar power↗

Evaluation of Fourier Transform Profilometry for Quantitative Waste Volume Determination under Simulated Hanford Tank Conditions

The Hanford Site is currently in the process of an extensive effort to empty and close its radioactive single-shell and double-shell waste storage tanks. Before this can be accomplished, it is necessary to know how much residual material is left in a given waste tank and the chemical makeup of the residue. The objective of Mississippi State University's Institute for Clean Energy Technology's (ICET) efforts is to develop, fabricate, and deploy inspection tools for the Hanford waste tanks that will (1) be remotely operable; (2) provide quantitative information on the amount of wastes remaining; and (3) provide information on the spatial distribution of chemical and radioactive species of interest. A collaborative arrangement has been established with the Hanford Site to develop probe-based inspection systems for deployment in the waste tanks. ICET is currently developing an in-tank inspection system based on Fourier Transform Profilometry, FTP. FTP is a non-contact, 3-D shape measurement technique. By projecting a fringe pattern onto a target surface and observing its deformation due to surface irregularities from a different view angle, FTP is capable of determining the height (depth) distribution (and hence volume distribution) of the target surface, thus reproducing the profile of the target accurately under a wide variety of conditions. Hence FTP has the potential to be utilized for quantitative determination of residual wastes within Hanford waste tanks. We are conducting a multi-stage performance evaluation of FTP in order to document the accuracy, precision, and operator dependence (minimal) of FTP under conditions similar to those that can be expected to pertain within Hanford waste tanks. The successive stages impose aspects that present increasing difficulty and increasingly more accurate approximations of in-tank environments. In this paper, we report our investigations of the dependence of the analyst upon FTP volume determination results and of the effect of gamma radiation on FTP camera and optical components. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Solubility predictions for sodium nitrate from water activity for Hanford tank concentrates - 15551

Space in Hanford waste tanks is very limited and therefore active evaporation of tank liquids continues to provide a means to conserve tank space. Prior to each evaporator campaign, a boil-down of a sample of tank liquid provides a basis for planning by measuring density, solids precipitation, and water activity as a function of concentration and temperature. We have found these datasets also provide opportunities to validate and calibrate various solubility models on actual waste. Previous work has shown the solubilities of minor electrolytes in these five boil-downs follow rather simple power law solubility products. Each of five boil-downs concentrated liquids from five waste tanks and tank blends and have been reported from Hanford's 222-S laboratory. All concentrates eventually showed the precipitation of the dominant electrolyte, NaNO{sub 3}, and solution activity largely drives this solubility. Although there are many well established techniques for calculating solution activity, the complexity of Hanford electrolyte mixtures has proven challenging for such solution activities. Accurate predictions of water activity for these concentrates provides an alternative method for calculating solution activity and previous work has validated a relatively simply model for predicting the water activity of even complex electrolyte mixtures. Given such a water activity, a Gibbs-Duhem integration of that water activity accurately predicts the solution activity and therefore the solubility of NaNO{sub 3} at 18 deg. C with a correlation coefficient of 0.94 over a wide range of liquid waste compositions for these boil-down studies. To our knowledge, no other solubility prediction has correlated as highly with measured solubility points of NaNO{sub 3} in any complex electrolyte mixture. Better predictions of NaNO{sub 3} solubility in complex waste mixtures improve planning for recovery of waste tank space and reduce the need for new tank space. (authors)

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Testing of a 3-D Sonar for Future Deployment to Image Solids on the Floor of Hanford, HLW Conditioning Tanks - 15646

Florida International University (FIU) has tested the capability of 2-D and 3-D sonar systems to image solids settled on the floor of tanks, on the bottom of streams and small rivers, and in 55 gallon drums. FIU developed and successfully tested the Solid-Liquid Interface Monitor (SLIM) for mapping the interface between supernatant and settled solids in several test tanks. SLIM is comprised of: a sonar, a mechanical system for deploying the system into large high-level radioactive waste (HLW) tanks, and imaging programs and algorithms developed at and by FIU faculty and staff. Early testing had the objective to demonstrate the ability of SLIM to image and quantify the height and volume of settled solids on the floor of 1-million-gallon, HLW tanks at Hanford. Testing showed that SLIM: (1) functions accurately in liquid radioactive HLW tank conditions [i.e., caustic (pH>14), warm (up to 45 degrees Centigrade), and highly radioactive]; (2) provides accurate imaging of solids surfaces (1-2% relative error in the height of interfaces); and (3) provides an excellent volume estimation of the solids, thereby allowing engineers to fill tanks closer to the maximum allowed level and optimize solids retrieval; and (4) enables better placement of pumps inside tanks during retrieval to minimize the potential for plugging. The New Hanford technology need is for rapid imaging (even during vigorous mixing) of solids on the floor of conditioning (mixing) tanks. Results of recent successful testing show imaging times under 1 minute, solids volume estimates with <5% error and effective filtering and visualization. (authors)

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Detection and Mitigation of Hanford Site Radioactive Waste Tank Surface Water Intrusion - 16396

The last single-shell underground radioactive waste storage tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site, near Richland, WA, were removed from service in November, 1980. At that time the single-shell tanks contained 153,300 m{sup 3} (40.5 million gallons) of waste, including 34,400 m{sup 3} (9.1 million gallons) of liquids. Subsequently the Interim Stabilization Program and Waste Retrieval/Closure Project have removed 24,600 m{sup 3} (6.5 million gallons) of liquid from the tanks to reduce the potential for leakage to the environment. After interim stabilization, each tank was isolated by cutting and capping waste transfer lines, filling drains with grout, and covering likely surface water entry points. The minimum expected lifetime for the isolation features was 20 years, consistent with planned retrieval of all single-shell tank wastes by 2018. Since then the retrieval completion date has been extended. In 2011 the Tank Operating Contractor began a systematic review of the aging isolation barriers to determine if surface water was entering the single-shell tanks. This paper summarizes the results of the 2011 - 2015 activities including single-shell tank inspection results, methodologies used to identify intrusions and waste leaks masked by intrusion, and eventual deployment of a prototype forced ventilation exhauster in 2015 to evaporate water intrusion pools on the waste surface. Further efforts to limit water intrusion, including deployment of surface barriers, are discussed. (authors)

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