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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Concept of Operations (ConOps) of an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)

The growth of new emerging operations involving Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) necessitates developing a perspective for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). This perspective advances from the National Academies report on IASMS and its recommendation for developing a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for IASMS. A ConOps has been developed for In-time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) from which the IASMS ConOps pivots to provide a robust scope commensurate with the broad vision defined by the National Academies. The IASMS ConOps focuses on emerging operations and spans innovations in Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) and an increasingly complex ecosystem comprised of a widening mix of vehicles and technologies, Urban Air Mobility (UAM) with industry-federated services, traditional operations, as well as new supersonic aircraft and space launch systems.The challenge for the IASMS ConOps is to be broad to encompass innovations in the coming years and decades while agile to ensure levels of safety compatible with operational and certification requirements of the National Airspace System (NAS). The IASMS ConOps interweaves increasing complexity of operational safety capabilities and unlocking UAS Maturity Levels (UMLs). The relationships between increased complexity of automation and automated systems, fewer operators who are not as traditionally higher skilled, more complex operational environments, and aviation operations management with mixed aircraft and equipage pose a multi-dimensional space for IASMS capabilities essential for safety assurance and risk management. Instantiating IASMS capabilities and how they would be integral to AAM operations and increasing maturity of UAM could be accomplished through a series of Safety Demonstrators. These Safety Demonstrators could provide increased understanding and insight into use of controls for risk mitigation, means of compliance for certification, and operational experience with safety services such as in relation to contingency management. The IASMS capabilities can be viewed as initially residing with the vehicle, airspace, and Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP). For example, vehicle capabilities include communications including the command and control link, Remote Identification (ID), conflict advisory/alerting, and UAS system monitoring. These capabilities monitor and assess data such as battery health, aircraft state, and human performance. Complexity of ISAMS capabilities depends on a number of factors. These factors are intendedonly as a notional categorization with the purpose being to reflect the complexity of the AAM ecosystem that would drive up the complexity of ISSA capabilities including systems, sensors, models, standards, and controls. Factors could include the Vehicle Flight Management, Environment, Airspace, and Contingency Management. Each of these factors can be comprised of multiple sub-factors that contribute to increasing complexity. For example, Airspace at a lower level of complexity could be dedicated to UTM operations that are unmonitored, and at a higher level of complexity could involve mixed UTM and ATM operations. The IASMS concept includes safety services that provide data and information to different participants in AAM. The roles and responsibilities of participants can be defined using the Responsible-Accountable-Consulted-Informed (RACI) analysis. For example, for the safety service involving the Remote ID, the Operator would be accountable for providing the data, the Vehicle would be responsible for transmitting it, and the USS, SDSP, Vertiports, FIMS (FAA), and Public Entities such as safety services would be informed by receiving the data. The IASMS ConOps identifies the capabilities needed for risk mitigation and safety assurance in the increasingly complex national airspace. The ConOps serves as a pathway for engaging with industry to gain operational experience including through the Safety Demonstrator series, the RACI analysis, and operational complexity factors. The ConOps serves to integrate these different perspectives to build a cohesive and cogent approach to an AAM safety management system.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
DOE OSTI2022

Development and Demonstration of a Fuel-Efficient, Class 8 Tractor & Trailer Engine System (SuperTruck II)

Navistar presents the SuperTruck II (ST II) Final Report to the Unites States Department of Energy (US DOE), which covers the five Budget Periods (BPs) from 10-1-2016 through 6-30-2022. For ST II, Navistar built on the achievements of the SuperTruck I (ST I) Program as a catalyst to continue critical research, design and development, testing, and operations to reach the ambitious goals of the ST II project. This approach allowed Navistar to continue contributing to the essential needs of our nation for safe, efficient, and cost-effective delivery of goods and services, as we reduced negative environmental effects and improved operational productivity. This document contains information specified in DOE F 4600.2, Final Scientific/Technical Report DOE F 241.3, B. SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL REPORTS, explaining how we met and exceeded program requirements. Throughout this Final Report, Navistar extracted information from documents prepared during the project that represent our management, design and development, building, and testing efforts to meet and exceed SuperTruck II project goals. Navistar followed Plan requirements to achieve / exceed Project Objectives: a) >100% improvement in vehicle freight efficiency (FE) (on ton-MPG basis) relative to 2009 baseline with stretch goal of 140% improvement [actual: 170%); b) >55% engine brake thermal efficiency (BTE) demonstrated in operational engine at a 65-mph cruise point on a dynamometer – ≥31% increase from 2009 baseline [actual: 55.20% of combined BTE) ; and c) development and implementation of commercially cost effective technologies (in terms of a simple payback). Technology selection / development path focused on developing technologies applicable for production within 3-year approach, while ensuring technology readiness and cost of ownership for end users. The Program was organized into five budget periods: Requirements / Technology Assessment and Initial Hardware Testing; Technology Development and Concept Readiness Demonstration; Technology Finalization and Validation Tractor / Trailer Fabrication, Integration and Commissioning Demonstration; and Fuel Economy (FE) and Brake Thermal Efficiency (BTE) and Program Completion. Leadership was provided by DOE, with tasks performed by laboratories (Argonne National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory); partners at Bosch, TPI, Dana, and J.B. Hunt; , and support from University of Michigan and Clemson University. Navistar lead this team with Principal Investigator / Contracting Officer; Project Manager (PM); Vehicle, Engine, and Aftertreatment Engineers; Finance Manager, Technical Program Leads, and Legal/IP; and other key personnel. Work also included personnel in risk management; funding / budget / finance. Work involved analysis, development, testing, and down selection of individual/system engine, aftertreatment, and vehicle technologies, with integration of selected technologies into a prototype vehicle for demonstration of fuel-efficiency gain. Work also included component/integrated system level development of truck and trailer aerodynamics, base engine efficiency, advanced aftertreatment, combustion efficiency, waste heat recovery, hybrid powertrain, reduced rolling resistance, weight reduction, idle reduction, and driver feedback. As ST II progressed, Navistar performed computer-based modeling / simulations of technologies focused on the primary operational areas: Engine, Aftertreatment, and Vehicle. During the ST II Program, the COVID Virus outbreak unexpectedly challenged by the effects of, which affected staffing, scheduling, design, supplies, availability of materials, production procedures, and testing. The DOE responded by extending the program by three quarters to ensure that project tasks were completed for this vital project. Focus continued on analyzing, developing, testing, and down selecting individual-/system-level engine and vehicle technologies for integration of the final selected technologies into a prototype vehicle that would demonstrate fuel-efficiency gains made possible through these technologies. This included component/integrated system-level development of truck and trailer aerodynamics, base engine efficiency, advanced aftertreatment, combustion efficiency, waste heat recovery, solar power, distributed and intelligent vehicle power, hybrid powertrain, reduced rolling resistance, weight reduction, idle reduction, and driver feedback. Throughout the program, function, reliability, and performance at all levels were ensured through testing. Proof of this approach was demonstrated in multiple, on-road demonstrations: Scenario A (Flatland) Fuel Economy, Scenario B (Hilly) Fuel Economy, and City Cycle Tests. Other benefits derived from ST II included new/improved products, publications, patents, and next-step capabilities related to electric/hydrogen vehicles and autonomous driving.

Zukouski, Russ↗
NASA NTRS1970

NASA Safety Manual. Volume 3: System Safety

This Volume 3 of the NASA Safety Manual sets forth the basic elements and techniques for managing a system safety program and the technical methods recommended for use in developing a risk evaluation program that is oriented to the identification of hazards in aerospace hardware systems and the development of residual risk management information for the program manager that is based on the hazards identified. The methods and techniques described in this volume are in consonance with the requirements set forth in NHB 1700.1 (VI), Chapter 3. This volume and future volumes of the NASA Safety Manual shall not be rewritten, reprinted, or reproduced in any manner. Installation implementing procedures, if necessary, shall be inserted as page supplements in accordance with the provisions of Appendix A. No portion of this volume or future volumes of the NASA Safety Manual shall be invoked in contracts.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

Intertwining Risk Insights and Design Decisions

The state of systems engineering is such that a form of early and continued use of risk assessments is conducted (as evidenced by NASA's adoption and use of the 'Continuous Risk Management' paradigm developed by SEI). ... However, these practices fall short of theideal: (1) Integration between risk assessment techniques and other systems engineering tools is weak. (2) Risk assessment techniques and the insights they yield are only informally coupled to design decisions. (3) Individual riskassessment techniques lack the mix of breadth, fidelity and agility required to span the gamut of the design space. In this paper we present an approach that addresses these shortcomings. The hallmark of our approach is a simple representation comprising objectives (what the system is to do), risks (whose occurrence would detract from attainment of objectives) and activities (a.k.a. 'mitigations') that, if performed, will decrease those risks. These are linked to indicate by how much a risk would detract from attainment of an objective, and by how much an activity would reduce a risk. The simplicity of our representational framework gives it the breadth to encompass the gamut of the design space concerns, the agility to be utilized in even the earliest phases of designs, and the capability to connect to system engineering models and higher-fidelity risk tools. It is through this integration that we address the shortcomings listed above, and so achieve the intertwining between risk insights and design decisions needed to guide systems engineering towards superior final designs while avoiding costly rework to achieve them. The paper will use an example, constructed to be representative of space mission design, to illustrate our approach.

systems engineering↗
NASA NTRS2017

Consideration of Collision "Consequence" in Satellite Conjunction Assessment and Risk Analysis

Classic risk management theory requires the assessment of both likelihood and consequence of deleterious events. Satellite conjunction risk assessment has produced a highly-developed theory for assessing collision likelihood but holds a completely static solution for collision consequence, treating all potential collisions as essentially equally worrisome. This may be true for the survival of the protected asset, but the amount of debris produced by the potential collision, and therefore the degree to which the orbital corridor may be compromised, can vary greatly among satellite conjunctions. This study leverages present work on satellite collision modeling to develop a method by which it can be estimated, to a particular confidence level, whether a particular collision is likely to produce a relatively large or relatively small amount of resultant debris and how this datum might alter conjunction remediation decisions. The more general question of orbital corridor protection is also addressed, and a preliminary framework presented by which both collision likelihood and consequence can be jointly considered in the risk assessment process.

Hejduk, M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Writing Good Risk Statements and Critical Thinking in Risk

The term risk is used ubiquitously in the space community, but more often than not it is used in a counterproductive way. Furthermore, risks are often written to convey some type of concern, but the risk statements are often more emotional in nature than technically substantive. In this talk, we will provide a rigorous view and definition of risk, along with some structured guidelines for writing risk statements centered on critical thinking, which will combine to provide effective risk management tools when dealing with complex space systems.

risk↗
DOE OSTI2025

Tactical Analysis for Calculating Contextual Risk at Boundaries: Summary of Laboratory Directed Research & Development Effort

The Tactical Analysis for Calculating Contextual Risk at Boundaries (TACCRAB) tool is an innovative digital twin (DT) platform and automated risk algorithm designed to transform operational decision-making in structured screening environments, with an initial focus on Southern Border Land Ports of Entry (POEs). The invention provides integration points for advanced artificial intelligence, predictive modeling, and real-time data analysis to produce a comprehensive risk management tool that enables proactive, data-informed security strategies. The core inventive features of TACCRAB center on its unique risk algorithm, which dynamically calculates contextual risk by synthesizing historical data, near real-time streaming data from the checkpoints themselves, and AI-generated predictions. Unlike traditional risk assessment methods, TACCRAB utilizes a DT to provide comprehensive operational insights, allowing stakeholders to visualize, simulate, and optimize checkpoint configurations with unprecedented speed and contextual awareness. TACCRAB's key innovation lies in its ability to combine multiple complex inputs - including technology detection probabilities, resource availability, screening pathway characteristics, and threat actor behavioral patterns - into a unified risk calculation and update these inputs based on changing operational and environmental conditions. By leveraging a DT that continuously updates and learns from linked data, TACCRAB can suggest adaptive mitigation strategies that minimize risk while maintaining operational efficiency. Particularly novel is the platform's approach to decision support, which goes beyond static risk assessment. The DT provides dynamic metrics such as wait times, resource allocation effectiveness, and potential emerging threat scenarios, enabling users to view sophisticated, relevant what-if simulations and optimize checkpoint operations in near real-time. The system's architecture allows for generalized application across different screening environments, such as secure facilities, ports of entry, and soft targets, making it a versatile tool for security and operational management. The invention distinguishes itself through its comprehensive integration of predictive modeling, AI-driven pattern discovery, and user-friendly interface design. By combining these elements, TACCRAB transforms complex risk data into actionable insights, supporting decision-makers at various organizational levels - from booth agents making split-second screening decisions to checkpoint managers optimizing the day's resource allocation to strategic planners managing long-term investments.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS2008

We Don't Need Any Stinking AFSRB!

Flight Test supports four needs: a) Management approval to proceed; b) Establish a record of accountability; c) Inject expert insight into the risk management process; and d) Mitigate the human factors vulnerabilities associated with small group teaming and project ownership.

Henwood, Barton↗
NASA NTRS2015

Aerospace Medicine Talk

The presentation is next Sunday, May 10th. It will be to the Civil Aviation Medical Association, for 2 hours at Disney World in Orlando. It is a high level talk on space medicine, including history, the role of my office, human health risks of space flight, general aspects of space medicine practice, human health risk management (including integrated activities of medical operations and the Human Research Program, and thoughts concerning health risks for long duration exploration class space missions. No proprietary data or material will be used, all is readily available in the public sector. There is also a short (30 min) talk on Monday at the CAMA lunch. There we will describe the Visual Impairment and Intracranial Pressure syndrome, with possible etiologies and plans for research (already selected studies). Again, nothing proprietary will be discussed.

Aerospace Medicine Overview↗
NASA NTRS2016

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, and process controls. These sources often dominate component level reliability or risk of failure probability. While consequences of failure is often understood in assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence will likely underestimate the risk. Managers and decision makers often use the probability of occurrence in determining whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. Due to the absence of system level test and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be appropriately characterized for decision making purposes. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Screening Tool for Industrial Resilience: Risk-Informed Decision Making to Support Resilience Planning

The Screening Tool for Industrial Resilience (STIR) helps small and medium-sized manufacturing plants manage risk to their production. Developed by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory under direction and funding from the Department of Energy’s Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains, the STIR helps manufacturers enhance their resilience to a variety of disruptive events, both natural and human-caused, that could interrupt normal operations. This report provides an overview of the STIR’s risk-informed, high-level approach to resilience planning, which identifies potential solutions that could enhance site resilience based on calculated major risk drivers.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2002

Program and Project Management Framework

The primary objective of this project was to develop a framework and system architecture for integrating program and project management tools that may be applied consistently throughout Kennedy Space Center (KSC) to optimize planning, cost estimating, risk management, and project control. Project management methodology used in building interactive systems to accommodate the needs of the project managers is applied as a key component in assessing the usefulness and applicability of the framework and tools developed. Research for the project included investigation and analysis of industrial practices, KSC standards, policies, and techniques, Systems Management Office (SMO) personnel, and other documented experiences of project management experts. In addition, this project documents best practices derived from the literature as well as new or developing project management models, practices, and techniques.

Butler, Cassandra D.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Managing Complex Space Missions Like the James Webb Space Telescope

Program Management Summary; Organizational structure is established. Roles and responsibilities are well defined: a) All major contracts are in place. b) All foreign partners are in place, operating under signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). c) Partners include GSFC, NGST, Ball, ITT, ATK, STScI, ESA, CSA, UAz, LM, JPL, MSFC, ARC, JSC, etc. All enabling technologies are at Technical Readiness Level-6. Earned Value Management is being applied to all major contracts consistent with Agency guidance. Schedules are baselined and the project critical path is understood/managed. Budget with reserves established. Liens and threats system in use. Formal Configuration Management (CM) processes are in place. Project-level schedules are maintained within the CM system. Formal Risk Management processes are in place. Requirements are stable and flowed down. Project metrics are established and tracked monthly: a) Includes technical as well as cost and schedule metrics. b) Changes as well as trends are reported each month.

Sabelhaus, Phil↗
NASA NTRS2011

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Zelkin, Natalie↗
NASA NTRS2011

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗
NASA NTRS2016

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account system integration risks such as those attributable to manufacturing and assembly. These sources often dominate component level risk. While consequence of failure is often understood, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence may underestimate the actual risk. Managers and decision makers use the probability of occurrence to influence the determination whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. The actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be fully understood due to the absence of system level test data or operational data. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗
NASA NTRS1976

Safer Liquid Natural Gas

After the disaster of Staten Island in 1973 where 40 people were killed repairing a liquid natural gas storage tank, the New York Fire Commissioner requested NASA's help in drawing up a comprehensive plan to cover the design, construction, and operation of liquid natural gas facilities. Two programs are underway. The first transfers comprehensive risk management techniques and procedures which take the form of an instruction document that includes determining liquid-gas risks through engineering analysis and tests, controlling these risks by setting up redundant fail safe techniques, and establishing criteria calling for decisions that eliminate or accept certain risks. The second program prepares a liquid gas safety manual (the first of its kind).

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2004

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

The International Space Station (ISS) operates in the F2 region of Earth's ionosphere, orbiting at altitudes ranging from 350 to 450 km at an inclination of 51.6 degrees. The relatively dense, cool F2 ionospheric plasma suppresses surface charging processes much of the time, and the flux of relativistic electrons is low enough to preclude deep dielectric charging processes. The most important spacecraft charging processes in the ISS orbital environment are: 1) ISS electrical power system interactions with the F2 plasma, 2) magnetic induction processes resulting from flight through the geomagnetic field and, 3) charging processes that result from interaction with auroral electrons at high latitude. Recently, the continuing review and evaluation of putative ISS charging hazards required by the ISS Program Office revealed that ISS charging could produce an electrical shock hazard to the ISS crew during extravehicular activity (EVA). ISS charging risks are being evaluated in an ongoing measurement and analysis campaign. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed model of ISS charging (the Plasma Interaction Model) and an exhaustive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data (ISS Ionospheric Specification) to evaluate ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA combines estimates of the frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards with estimates of the reliability of various hazard controls systems, as required by NASA s safety and risk management programs, to enable design and selection of a hazard control approach that minimizes overall programmatic and personnel risk. The PRA provides a quantitative methodology for incorporating the results of the ISS charging measurement and analysis campaigns into the necessary hazard reports, EVA procedures, and ISS flight rules required for operating ISS in a safe and productive manner.

Koontz, Steve↗