Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Reactor”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 451 records · Page 25
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Reactor fuel pellets with thermally-conductive inserts, and related reactor fuel pellet arrangements

Fuel pellets and fuel pellet arrangements include thermally-conductive inserts within a fuel. The inserts have at least one portion of a thermally-conductive material, such as radially-extending fins. The inserts are configured to dissipate heat during use of the fuel pellets, while minimizing the amount of the total volume of the fuel pellet that is occupied by non-fissile material. The inclusion of heat-dissipating inserts enables the fuel pellets to exhibit improved thermal performance over the lifetime of the fuel, including a relatively low peak temperature and relatively low integrated average temperatures, while the minimal volume of the inserts avoids significantly decreasing the percent of enrichment achievable.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Concept of Operations for Advanced Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

This presentation presents a preliminary description of a concept of operations to incorporate advanced-reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) into an integrated waste-management system (IWMS). The evaluation includes SNF from four advanced-reactor concepts with the following fuel types: (1) small modular reactors using oxide fuels, (2) tristructural-isotropic (TRISO) fuels, (3) metallic fuels, and (4) fuel salts. To provide context for the proposed concept of operations for advanced reactors, a comparison is made with traditional light-water reactors (LWRs) to identify potential gaps in the IWMS. The technical differences between advanced reactors and LWRs are assessed to determine the feasibility of managing advanced-reactor waste streams using existing operations and technology. This presentation emphasizes fuel types from Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program reactors: Xe 100, which uses TRISO fuel and Natrium, with its metallic fuels while also analyzing management options for molten-salt reactors and advanced light-water reactors (ALWRs). Understanding the storage, transportation, and disposal requirements of SNF is dependent on both the quantity and characteristics of the SNF generated by nuclear reactors. This presentation provides a high level overview, comparing the anticipated concept of operations for different SNFs from advanced reactors. The IWMS includes at-reactor storage, transportation, potential off-site storage, potential treatment, and disposition. To assess the potential effect of advanced-reactor concept of operations on the IWMS, estimates were made for fuel characteristics that contribute to storage, transportation, disposal, and possible treatment of advanced-reactor SNF. These include canister heat load, dose rates, and criticality-control limits, which are important for determining the condition and configuration of the advanced reactor SNF. At-reactor storage of LWR SNF traditionally involves a spent-fuel pool (SFP) before transfer to an independent spent-fuel storage installation. However, some advanced-reactor concepts, particularly those using TRISO and salt fuels, do not anticipate the use of an SFP. This difference in at-reactor storage could impact the IWMS. Additionally, transportation of advanced-reactor SNF may include additional processes tied to potential off gassing, and transportation of microreactor SNF may occur within the reactor vessel. Some advanced-reactor SNF could also undergo treatment to meet requirements of an acceptable waste form for disposition, and the treatment location will be a major contributor to efficiently performing IWMS responsibilities. Moreover, the quantity of SNF generated is an important consideration for IWMS because it could affect the size of the transportation fleet and potential off-site storage requirements. Additionally, volume and heat load are the primary drivers for SNF disposition. This presentation compares potential packaging options for advanced reactor SNF with traditional LWR packaging to provide a high-level comparison for the needs of the IWMS for advanced-reactor SNF.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Q-value (MeV/fission) Determination for the Advanced Test Reactor

This report documents a step-by-step procedure that can be used to calculate a Q-value for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The Q-value calculation here is an estimate of the total energy released per fission event in the ATR driver fuel in units of MeV/fission and is recognized as a reactor-specific Q-value for the ATR. Such a Q-value is needed INL ATR reactor physicists to normalize calculated fluxes and reaction rates to measured ATR total core and lobe powers. The calculated ATR Q-value and the procedure used to calculate this value are presented in a detailed manner so as to establish a credible basis, such that this single Q-value can be used consistently among all ATR reactor physicists. A Q-value is essentially the summation of all the kinetic energy from all radiation components released from a single fission event that ends up as heat in the reactor coolant. Estimation of a Q-value for a given reactor can theoretically be very complex because it is dependent on several variables, which include (1) the materials in the reactor core, (2) the neutron energy spectrum, and (3) the mix of actinide isotopes that are being simultaneously fissioned. Since these three variables can potentially change over time or with reactor burnup, this potentially makes the Q-value a time-dependent quantity. However, for ATR, we will invoke some simplifying assumptions, based on the unique features of the ATR core and supported by neutronic calculations, which will reduce the complexity of the problem and lead to a single time-independent Q-value. Of the three variables, the materials in the core have the greatest impact on the ATR Q-value. Since the materials in the core are most important, an array of components (materials) have been carefully selected to compose a typical ATR core configuration. It should be noted that the step-by-step procedure here for calculating a reactor-specific Q-value can be applied to any nuclear reactor. In a more general procedure, if one needed to include time-dependent spectral and actinide composition changes as a function of burnup for a specific reactor, this procedure can still be used, but at discrete time steps throughout the burnup. The result will be a set of discrete Q-values as a function of burnup. However, here we will apply the procedure to the ATR, as an example, and obtain a single Q-value that is valid for the ATR reactor as a function of burnup. In the evaluated nuclear data file (ENDF), Q-values for specific actinides are known for a reasonably high degree of accuracy, especially the major uranium and plutonium isotopes. The isotopic Q-values are composed of the kinetic energy of the fission fragments and the energies of the various radiation components emitted from the fission event. One complication is the fact that some of these energy components are dependent on the incident neutron energy (EINC) that induces the fission event (neutron energy spectrum dependence). For ATR, we will estimate an average neutron energy based on the neutron energy flux weighted by the fission cross sections and use this average neutron energy value in the ENDF formulas. This neutron energy dependence is one of two dependencies that make the final ATR Q-value a reactor-specific value. The second dependency, and the most important variable for ATR, involves the materials in the core and the de-excitation radiations produced from neutron radiative capture radiation; radiation energy that becomes heat in the reactor coolant. This important dependency is discussed in detail below. The third dependency, or the mix of fissioning actinides as a function of ATR burnup, is ignored because the bulk of the fissions over a cycle are always due to U-235 in the high-enriched ATR core. In a fission event, the fission energy is partitioned between the fission fragments and the radiation components that include neutrons, gamma rays, and beta particles. The main variable that makes the calculated Q-value reactor-specific is the amount of radiative capture energy produced in the core due to prompt and delayed neutron capture in the reactor core materials and the subsequent release of nuclear binding energy in the form of de-excitation gamma radiation energy in the reactor core. This energy component, neutron radiative capture energy, is not in the ENDF, because it depends on the reactor and its core materials. The radiative capture gamma energy release can be significant, or approximately 3–12 MeV/fission depending on the materials in the reactor core (fuel materials, cladding, structural components, coolant, targets, reflector, etc.). For the ATR, the energy released from radiative capture gamma radiation is calculated to be near the middle of the 3–12 MeV range. This makes the radiative capture radiation component an important and significant contribution to the total ATR Q-value. The ATR has unique reactor features that will allow us to simplify the complex procedure for determining an ATR reactor-specific Q-value. For example, the ATR is a thermal reactor and contains high-enriched fuel (93.15 wt% U-235). Consequently, the bulk of the fissions in the ATR core from beginning-of-cycle (BOC) to end-of-cycle are from U-235. Even though U-238 makes up approximately 7% of the uranium atoms in the fuel, the number of fissions relative to U-235 is insignificant, since U-238 is fertile and ATR is a thermal reactor. The same is true for U-234 and U-236 (both fertile). The ATR’s high-enriched uranium fuel also inhibits the buildup of large quantities of plutonium isotopes. So, even though there is some buildup of U-236, Np-237, and Pu-239 in the ATR driver fuel, the impact or contribution of these isotopes fissions on the ATR Q-value is minor compared to U-235. Nonetheless, we will include fission contributions from all the major uranium isotopes (U-234, U-235, U-236, and U-238) in the determination of an average isotopic Q-value that is used in the ATR Q-value determination. Although the ATR Q-value calculated here is based on BOC conditions (fresh fuel with no higher order actinide buildup), it is believed that the ATR Q-value is relatively constant with burnup or during any given ATR power cycle (14–60 days). The reason is that the vast majority of the core driver fuel fissions are always from U-235 during the cycle. Also, since we effectively assume instantaneous energy release for the fission product gammas and beta particles and delayed neutrons from a fission event, this corresponds to equilibrium conditions for all fission product concentrations in the ATR driver fuel too. The goal of this effort was to determine a specific numerical and core-average Q-value for the recoverable energy released by a single fission event (MeV/fission) for the ATR. This calculated value has the potential to help standardize and add credibility to not only the Monte Carlo tally normalization process used by many ATR core physics analysts, but also to the normalization process for all reactor physics calculation methods involving ATR analyses. Currently, the ATR core physics analysts use slightly different Q-values. Some values are known to be conservative for specific applications. However, sometimes a more accurate Q-value is needed for the calculation in which ATR test specimens require non-conservative and as-accurate-as-possible Q-values to estimate burnups, heat rates, neutron fluxes, nuclear reaction rates, etc., where corresponding measured post-irradiation examination data provides the ultimate validation for the calculated results. A detailed Q-value procedure was developed and is outlined in this document along with numerical values calculated specifically for the determination of the ATR Q-value. This report attempts to document in some detail the calculation methodology, nuclear data, computer code, computer model, code calculated results, hand calculations, assumptions, and logic that went into the determination of the ATR Q-value.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Training courses on neutron detection systems on the ISIS research reactor: on-site and through internet training

Today, ISIS research reactor is an essential tool for Education and Training programs organized by the National Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology (INSTN) from CEA. In the field of nuclear instrumentation, the INSTN offers both, theoretical courses and training courses on the use of neutron detection systems taking advantage of the ISIS research reactor for the supply of a wide range of neutron fluxes. This paper describes the content of the training carried out on the use of neutron detectors and detection systems, on-site or remote. The ISIS reactor is a 700 kW open core pool type reactor. The facility is very flexible since neutron detectors can be inserted into the core or its vicinity, and be used at different levels of power according to the needs of the course. Neutron fluxes, typically ranging from 1 to 10{sup 12} n/cm{sup 2}.s, can be obtained for the characterisation of the neutron detectors and detection systems. For the monitoring of the neutron density at low level of power, the Instrumentation and Control (I and C) system of the reactor is equipped with two detection systems, named BN1 and BN2. Each way contains a fission chamber, type CFUL01, connected to an electronic system type SIREX.The system works in pulse mode and exhibits two outputs: the counting rate and the doubling time. For the high level of power, the I and C is equipped with two detection systems HN1 and HN2.Each way contain a boron ionization chamber (type CC52) connected to an electronics system type SIREX. The system works in current mode and has two outputs: the current and the doubling time. For each mode, the trainees can observe and measure the signal at the different stages of the electronic system, with an oscilloscope. They can understand the role of each component of the detection system: detector, cable and each electronic block. The limitation of the detection modes and their operating range can be established from the measured signal. The trainees can also modify the settings of the electronic system, such as the high voltage and the discrimination level in order to obtain all the characteristic curves of the detectors. These curves are used to define the right setting of the electronic system and to discuss the expected degradation of the detector signal resulting from the detector damage under the integrated neutron and gamma fluxes. Moreover, in addition to the study of the neutron detection systems itself, the integration of the measurements made by these detection systems in the logic of the safety system of the nuclear reactor is also addressed. Providing the trainees with an extensive overview of each part of the neutron monitoring instrumentation apply to a nuclear reactor, hands-on measurements on the ISIS reactor play a major role in ensuring a practical and comprehensive understanding of the neutron detection system and their integration in the safety system of nuclear reactors. It also gives a solid background for the follow up and the development of the neutron detection systems. In addition to on-reactor training, Internet Reactor Laboratory capability has been implemented on the ISIS reactor in 2014. For the Internet Reactor Laboratory an extensive video conference system has been implemented on ISIS reactor. The system includes 4 cameras and the transmission of the video signal given by the supervision system of the reactor which records and processes the data of the reactor. According to the pedagogic needs during the training courses, the lecturer on the ISIS reactor chooses to broadcast the relevant information at each stage of the course. For example, graph showing the histogram of the counting and current as a function of the time, or the electrical signal observed on the oscilloscope, can be broadcasted trough internet. By interacting through the video conference, the remote classroom is able to ask for changes in the reactor power or settings of the detection systems. They can also ask for the broadcast of some particular information. At the guest institution, the information is displayed in two parts or screens, as shown in the Figure 3. Concerning the interaction with - and the feedback from - the remote classroom, the camera of the video system in the remote classroom is used to ensure the contact between the trainees and the lecturer and reactor operators. Thus, the Internet Reactor Laboratory is complementary to the on reactor training courses. It allows distant learning, reducing the overall cost of the course when this is necessary. It can efficiently be used for the development of the human resources needed by the nuclear industry and the nuclear programs in countries without research reactors.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Reactor Design and Decommissioning - An Overview of International Activities in Post Fukushima Era1 - 12396

Accidents at the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors as a result of the devastating earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 have not only dampened the nuclear renaissance but have also initiated a re-examination of the design and safety features for the existing and planned nuclear reactors. Even though failures of some of the key site features at Fukushima can be attributed to events that in the past would have been considered as beyond the design basis, the industry as well as the regulatory authorities are analyzing what features, especially passive features, should be designed into the new reactor designs to minimize the potential for catastrophic failures. It is also recognized that since the design of the Fukushima BWR reactors which were commissioned in 1971, many advanced safety features are now a part of the newer reactor designs. As the recovery efforts at the Fukushima site are still underway, decisions with respect to the dismantlement and decommissioning of the damaged reactors and structures have not yet been finalized. As it was with Three Mile Island, it could take several decades for dismantlement, decommissioning and clean up, and the project poses especially tough challenges. Near-term assessments have been issued by several organizations, including the IAEA, the USNRC and others. Results of such investigations will lead to additional improvements in system and site design measures including strengthening of the anti-tsunami defenses, more defense-in-depth features in reactor design, and better response planning and preparation involving reactor sites. The question also arises what would the effect be on the decommissioning scene worldwide, and what would the effect be on the new reactors when they are eventually retired and dismantled. This paper provides an overview of the US and international activities related to recovery and decommissioning including the decommissioning features in the reactor design process and examines these from a new perspective in the post Fukushima -accident era. Accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 have slowed down the nuclear renaissance world-wide and may have accelerated decommissioning either because some countries have decided to halt or reduce nuclear, or because the new safety requirements may reduce life-time extensions. Even in countries such as the UK and France that favor nuclear energy production existing nuclear sites are more likely to be chosen as sites for future NPPs. Even as the site recovery efforts continue at Fukushima and any decommissioning decisions are farther into the future, the accidents have focused attention on the reactor designs in general and specifically on the Fukushima type BWRs. The regulatory authorities in many countries have initiated a re-examination of the design of the systems, structures and components and considerations of the capability of the station to cope with beyond-design basis events. Enhancements to SSCs and site features for the existing reactors and the reactors that will be built will also impact the decommissioning phase activities. The newer reactor designs of today not only have enhanced safety features but also take into consideration the features that will facilitate future decommissioning. Lessons learned from past management and operation of reactors as well as the lessons from decommissioning are incorporated into the new designs. However, in the post-Fukushima era, the emphasis on beyond-design-basis capability may lead to significant changes in SSCs, which eventually will also have impact on the decommissioning phase. Additionally, where some countries decide to phase out the nuclear power, many reactors may enter the decommissioning phase in the coming decade. While the formal updating and expanding of existing guidance documents for accident cleanup and decommissioning would benefit by waiting until the Fukushima project has progressed sufficiently for that experience to be reliably interpreted, the development of structured on-line sharing of information and especially the creation of an on-line compendium of methods, tools, and techniques by which damaged fuel and other unique situations have been addressed can be addressed sooner and maintained as new problems and solutions arise and are resolved. The IAEA's new 'WEB 2.0 tool' CONNECT is expected to play a significant role in this and related information-sharing activities. The trend in some countries such as the United States has been to re-license the existing reactors for additional twenty years, beyond the original design life. Given the advances in technology over the past four decades, and considering that the newer designs incorporate significant improvements in safety systems, it may not be economical or technically feasible to retrofit enhancements into some of the older reactors. In such cases, the reactors may be retired from service and decommissioned. Overall, the energy demand in the world continues to rise, with sharp increases in the Asian countries, and nuclear power's role in the world's energy supply is expected to continue. Events at Fukushima have led to a re-examination on many fronts, including reactor design and regulatory requirements. Further changes may occur in these areas in the post-Fukushima era. These changes in turn will also impact the world-wide decommissioning scene and the decommissioning phase of the future reactors. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Molten Salt Reactor Signatures and Modeling Study

Molten salt reactor (MSR) technologies, either liquid fueled and cooled or only liquid cooled, pose specific, unique challenges for safeguards of the special nuclear material during the operation, fueling, and maintenance of the reactor. MSRs are one type of Generation IV technologies being invested in and considered for U.S. domestic fabrication primarily for electricity and process heat production. These designs have generated growing commercial interest for several reasons, including high (≈40%) thermal efficiency, ease of fueling, improved use of uranium fuel, potential utilization of thorium fuel, and proposed inherent safety features. U.S. companies have several planned designs that differ in fuel, cooling, and neutron energy spectrum. Driven by commercial interest and the intent of licensing MSRs, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has developed a vision and strategy to accommodate non-light water reactors (LWR), which include MSRs (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2019). In addition, the Department of Energy (DOE) through the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Office of Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART), …sponsors research, development and deployment (RD&D) activities through its Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP), Advanced Reactor Concepts (ARC), and Advanced Small Modular Reactor (aSMR) programs to promote safety, technical, economical, and environmental advancements of innovative Generation IV nuclear energy technologies. Reactor types considering the use of salts, liquid metals, or gases for coolant fall under both ARC and aSMR. Therefore, Research Design & Development is being pursued by DOE-NE through national laboratories, universities, and international and industrial collaborations. Additionally, the U.S. is a member of the Gen IV International Forum (GIF). The GIF is a cooperative, multinational organization to guide and carry out research and development needed for the GEN IV reactor systems (Forum 2018). GIF evaluated numerous reactor concepts and down-selected to the six most feasible advanced reactor technologies: gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), lead-cooled fast reactor (LFR), MSR, supercritical watercooled reactor (SCWR), sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR), and very high temperature reactor (VHTR). In support of the growing interest domestically and internationally, the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign, under the DOE-NE Fuel Cycle Technologies (FCT) program, engages in R&D activities by developing advanced instrumentation and analysis for safeguards and security of modern, advanced nuclear fuel cycle (non-LWR) facilities. Because of the historic experience in the operation of the Aircraft Reactor Experiment (ARE) and the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) (Robertson, MSRE Design and Operations Report Part I 1965), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is heavily engaged in the various R&D activities through the DOE complex related to MSRs including national technical leadership of the DOE-NE MSR campaign. This report discusses and presents the outcomes of the FY19 MPACT MSR Safeguards task. The challenges presented by MSRs for nuclear material accountancy and control (NMAC) and associated safeguards will be investigated. The objective of this research is to explore and compile the safeguards requirements and identify measurement signatures through an initial high-level MSR design and develop complementary advanced simulation and modeling capabilities. A high-level ORNL-developed MSR design called the Molten Salt Demonstration Reactor (MSDR) (Bettis, Alexander and Watts 1972) was used as the target reactor design for this research. The MSDR model incorporates technology from the MSRE and the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (Robertson, Conceptual Design of a Single-Fluid Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor 1971). But the MSDR is a 750 MWth graphite moderated liquid fueled (low-enriched uranium) MSR compared to the MSRE’s of 7.5 MWth. The focus of this report is to discuss the evaluation of novel signatures, correlations, and indicators to understand the applicability of current safeguards instrumentation to MSRs using the modeling results from the MSDR.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Effect of Delayed Energy Release on Power Normalization in Reactor Depletion Calculations

Reactor depletion calculations typically assume that the thermal power of the reactor is directly proportional to the instantaneous fission rate within the core. However, approximately 7% of the sensible energy released per fission comes from the radioactive decay of fission products, which occurs alter the fission event. Thus, the assumed direct relationship between reactor power and fission rate implies that all fission products have reached secular equilibrium within the core. In situations where fission product concentrations have not reached equilibrium (e.g., shortly after reactor startup or a change in reactor power during operation), the delayed energy release due to fission product decay creates a nonlinear relationship between reactor power and fission rate. This non-linear relationship, in turn, affects the neutron flux levels and fuel consumption rate required to maintain the desired thermal power output for the reactor. For example, during initial startup of a commercial light water reactor the apparent energy release per fission is ∼7{sup %} lower than the typical value of ∼200 MeV/fission due to the potential energy stored in radioactive fission products. As a consequence, the flux level (and, therefore, uranium consumption rate) in the reactor must be correspondingly higher to preserve the desired reactor power. As the reactor operates and fission product inventories increase, the decay heat produced by the reactor will rise, producing a corresponding increase in the apparent energy release per fission. The characteristic time-dependent behavior of energy release due to the decay of fission products (i.e., decay heat) following reactor startup, shutdown, or changes in reactor power is well-known and widely-used in reactor safety analyses. However, to our knowledge, the effects of time-dependent decay heating rates on reactor depletion calculations have not been thoroughly investigated. In this paper, we present a simple methodology for explicitly accounting for delayed energy release due to the decay of fission products in reactor depletion calculations. In the proposed method, the balance equations for fission product decay energy are incorporated into the depletion coefficient matrix, using a strategy similar to that described by Isotalo in 2016. The modified system of differential equations can be solved via a matrix exponential approximation (or other suitable numerical method) to yield solutions for both nuclide densities and decay energy emission densities as a function of time. Numerical results from the method are presented for simplified (one-group point (0-D) and 1-D) representations of a commercial pressurized water reactor (PWR), in order to estimate the effect of delayed energy release on fuel consumption and flux level immediately following reactor startup.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

"Source Term Modeling for Advanced Gas Micro-Reactors"

Maintaining the safety of the public, environment, and operating personnel is the most important factor in designing, operating, maintaining, and decommissioning nuclear reactors. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the development of micro-reactors employing TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO)-coated particle fuel. In gas reactors, TRISO fuel plays an important role in the safety case for high temperature reactors because of the fission product retention properties of the fuel. This ability enables the use of a functional containment strategy for the reactor where multiple barriers are used to prevent fission product release to the environment. Part of the safety analysis of these advanced reactors is the assessment of radionuclide releases under normal and accident conditions through the multiple credited safety barriers. Using conservative assumptions, a mechanistic analysis can be performed to quantify these releases that combines the probabilistic assessment of failure with analytic solutions to radionuclide transport equations. Source term modeling for TRISO fuel has been performed for previous reactor designs; however, these models are outdated, in many cases proprietary, and need updates to be applied to the current state of TRISO fuel technology and alternative gas reactor core configurations [1]. Currently, the only publicly available source term assessment for gas reactors is an expert-based Monte Carlo simulation based on the effectiveness of the fuel kernel, coating layers, and graphite block in a modular high temperature gas reactor [2]. Thus, there is a need to develop a simple, versatile, and mechanistic model of fission product release and transport in gas reactor cores that could be applied to a variety of reactors through user inputs and reactor-specific radionuclide inventories. The release is calculated by the diffusion of the key safety important fission products through the kernel, silicon carbide (SiC), graphite for both intact and defective TRISO particles based on fuel and graphite temperatures in the reactor under normal operation. These releases from the fuel enter the coolant where they can plate-out on cooler surfaces. A clean-up model is included for designs with a coolant purification system to remove fission gases. This initial distribution of fission products in the reactor serves as an initial condition for potential releases under postulated accident conditions. The model then can calculate the fission product release for any transient temperature profile and fission product releases can then be used to assess radiological dose to the workers and the public using conventional dose tools. Data on the diffusion of fission products is based on historic German TRISO experiments and the more current Department of Energy (DOE) Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) TRISO fuel development program. The model is coded in python with inputs and outputs in excel spreadsheets, as well as python plotting utilities to aid in the interpretation of the results. References: [1] INL, NGNP Mechanistic Source Term White Paper, INL-10-17997, July 2010. [2] David A. Petti, Richard R. Hobbins, Peter Lowry, Hans Gougar, “Representative Source Terms and The Influence of Reactor Attributes on Functional Containment in Modular High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors,” Nuclear Technology, Vol. 184, p. 181-197, Nov. 2013.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

The Windscale Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (WAGR) Decommissioning Project A Close Out Report for WAGR Decommissioning Campaigns 1 to 10 - 12474

The reactor core of the Windscale Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (WAGR) has been dismantled as part of an ongoing decommissioning project. The WAGR operated until 1981 as a development reactor for the British Commercial Advanced Gas cooled Reactor (CAGR) power programme. Decommissioning began in 1982 with the removal of fuel from the reactor core which was completed in 1983. Subsequently, a significant amount of engineering work was carried out, including removal of equipment external to the reactor and initial manual dismantling operations at the top of the reactor, in preparation for the removal of the reactor core itself. Modification of the facility structure and construction of the waste packaging plant served to provide a waste route for the reactor components. The reactor core was dismantled on a 'top-down' basis in a series of 'campaigns' related to discrete reactor components. This report describes the facility, the modifications undertaken to facilitate its decommissioning and the strategies employed to recognise the successful decommissioning of the reactor. Early decommissioning tasks at the top of the reactor were undertaken manually but the main of the decommissioning tasks were carried remotely, with deployment systems comprising of little more than crane like devices, intelligently interfaced into the existing structure. The tooling deployed from the 3 tonne capacity (3te) hoist consisted either purely mechanical devices or those being electrically controlled from a 'push-button' panel positioned at the operator control stations, there was no degree of autonomy in the 3te hoist or any of the tools deployed from it. Whilst the ATC was able to provide some tele-robotic capabilities these were very limited and required a good degree of driver input which due to the operating philosophy at WAGR was not utilised. The WAGR box proved a successful waste package, adaptable through the use of waste box furniture specific to the waste-forms generated throughout the various decommissioning campaigns. The use of low force compaction for insulation and soft wastes provided a simple, robust and cost effective solution as did the direct encapsulation of LLW steel components in the later stages of reactor decommissioning. Progress through early campaigns was good, often bettering the baseline schedule, especially when undertaking the repetitive tasks seen during Neutron Shield and Graphite Core decommissioning, once the operators had become experienced with the equipment, though delays became more pronounced, mainly as a result of increased failures due to the age and maintainability of the RDM and associated equipment. Extensive delays came about as a result of the unsupported insulation falling away from the pressure vessel during removal and the inability of the ventilation system to manage the sub micron particulate generated during IPOPI cutting operations, though the in house development of revised and new methodologies ultimately led to the successful completion of PV and I removal. In a programme spanning over 12 years, the decommissioning of the reactor pressure vessel and core led to the production 110 ILW and 75 LLW WAGR boxes, with 20 LLW ISO freight containers of primary reactor wastes, resulting in an overall packaged volume of approximately 2500 cubic metres containing the estimated 460 cubic metres of the reactor structure. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Key Nuclear Data Impacting Reactivity in Advanced Reactors

Advanced reactor concepts currently being developed throughout the industry are significantly different from light water reactor (LWR) designs with respect to geometry, materials, and operating conditions, and consequently, with respect to their reactor physics behavior. Given the limited operating experience with non-LWRs, the accurate simulation of reactor physics and the quantification of associated uncertainties are critical for ensuring that advanced reactor concepts operate within the appropriate safety margins. Nuclear data are a major source of input uncertainties in reactor physics analysis. As part of an ongoing project at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the effects of nuclear data uncertainties on key figures of merit associated with advanced reactor safety are being assessed for selected advanced reactor technologies. Key nuclear data relevant for reactor safety analysis for each selected advanced reactor technology were identified, and their impact on important key figures of merit was assessed. Available advanced reactor specifications were reviewed, results from studies performed at ORNL and other research institutions were consulted, and available evaluated nuclear data libraries were analyzed. This report summarizes the key nuclear data for nuclides in the fuel, as well as other significant data, including scattering and neutron capture in various materials for the moderator, coolant, and structure of the considered advanced reactors. For the considered advanced reactors that use low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, results from LWR studies provided insight into relevant nuclear data given the lack of available studies specifically addressing these new systems. The major nominal missing data that were identified consist of thermal scattering data and 135m Xe cross section data for molten salt reactor (MSR) analysis. The identified major gaps with respect to nuclear data uncertainties are missing uncertainties of thermal scattering data for high temperature gas-cooled reactors and moderated MSR systems, and incomplete uncertainties on angular distributions in particular for fast spectrum systems, such as sodiumcooled fast reactors, fast molten salt reactors, and heat pipe reactors. Furthermore, it was found that special attention should be paid to cross section and uncertainty differences between different evaluated nuclear data library releases, because significant differences in nuclear data that can lead to major differences in reactivity calculations were found, even for well-known nuclides.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗