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At least 451 records · Page 25
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003

The SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about Davis-Besse’s 2003 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 25 January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts and crashed the internet in 10 to 15 minutes, making it one of the fastest spreading worms in history. SQL Slammer is a fileless, memory-resident worm that remotely exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability on local hosts to intensively scan and rapidly self-propagate across the internet. The worm infected approximately 300,000 unpatched hosts running Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server 2000 or Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 with SQL Server Resolution Service. The SQL Slammer worm indirectly infected FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant by first infecting a consultant’s company network server and then propagating through an external misconfigured connection into Davis-Besse’s site network. The infection caused major network congestion, slow performance, data overloads, and the inability of local hosts to communicate with each other, which eventually caused a loss of availability and a loss of view when the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) crashed. At the time of the infection, the plant was already offline, the digital monitoring systems had redundant analog backups, and the plant control and safety functions were not affected, so there were no concerns of a safety breach. However, this incident resulted in many lessons learned and spawned important discussions about cybersecurity’s role in nuclear safety and electric power reliability regulation, policy, and guidance. Researchers and analysts identified 10 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 640 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Eight of the identified techniques used during Davis-Besse cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 596 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 428 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 331 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Precursor Analysis Report: Blackmatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021

The BlackMatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the New Cooperative cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The BlackMatter ransomware was first identified in July 2021 and is reported to have infected more than 50 corporations around the world. , The Iowa-based grain cooperative, New Cooperative, was impacted by the BlackMatter ransomware on or before 18 September 2021. The adversary likely resided on New Cooperative’s networks for 15 days prior to encrypting its network and demanding New Cooperative pay $5.9 million in ransom by 25 September to unlock systems and prevent 1 terabyte (TB) of sensitive data from being publicly released. It is not clear if New Cooperative paid the ransom. The full impact of the ransomware attack is not known; however, according to New Cooperative’s general manager, the attack caused the company’s automated processes to revert back to processes used in the 1970s. , As of 6 October, only 50 percent of New Cooperative’s operations were utilizing automated processes. The company took eight weeks to rebuild the entire network and information technology (IT) systems from the ground up, which puts the date of fully recovery around 13 November. Researchers and analysts identified 20 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 404 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Seventeen of the identified techniques used during the New Cooperative cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 360 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 284 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 15 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022

The Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Industroyer2 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. An adversary attempted to cause a blackout in Ukraine in April 2022 by using the Industroyer2 malware against a regional Ukrainian energy provider. The adversary targeted eight high-voltage electrical substations and utilized the malware in tandem with disk wipers for Windows, Linux, and Solaris operating systems in an attempt to make response and recovery efforts more difficult. The adversary reused a piece of the original Industroyer malware designed to open circuit breakers and de-energize target substations. The adversary gained initial access to the victim’s enterprise network through unknown means in February 2022 and was able to perform reconnaissance, pivot to the operations network, and reside in the system for at least 51 days. This gave the adversary a detailed understanding of the environment and allowed them to customize the Industroyer2 malware to the victim’s operations network. However, defenders detected and stopped the attack before the adversary could achieve their intended impact. Had the Industroyer2 attack been successful, it could have caused a blackout for more than two million people during the early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 31 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 297 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-three of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer2 cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 224 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 122 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 51 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Doppelpaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019

The DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the PEMEX cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The 2019 DoppelPaymer ransomware attack on PEMEX, Mexico’s nationalized petroleum corporation, highlights a unique threat that ransomware and cybercriminal extortion poses to Operational Technology (OT) environments in critical infrastructure. The incident began with an employee downloading commodity malware that allowed adversaries to gain initial access to PEMEX’s enterprise environment. After conducting privilege escalation, tool ingress, and data exfiltration, the adversaries deployed DoppelPaymer ransomware throughout the PEMEX enterprise environment, resulting in the company having to take dozens of systems offline for at least several days. Although PEMEX stated that their operations were not affected, the data exfiltrated from PEMEX was made available for download on DoppelPaymer’s leak site, as well as on other illicit criminal forums. This stolen data included not only company information, but also sensitive OT-specific configuration data. This incident showcases how cybercriminal exfiltration and posting of sensitive OT architecture documentation can pose security concerns for the targeted organization for years due to the long lifespan of OT assets and architectures. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 190 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the DoppelPaymer ransomware attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 163 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 34 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 60 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021

The Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Oldsmar cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 5 February 2021, an adversary gained unauthorized remote access to Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Florida, which provides treated water to 15,000 customers. The adversary accessed the facility’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and human machine interface (HMI) to change the chemical concentration of sodium hydroxide, commonly referred to as lye and used to regulate acidity levels, from 100 parts per million (PPM) to 11,100 PPM. The chemical was raised to lethal levels that if ingested could lead to serious soft tissue damage, burns, or even death. The facility, however, had redundancies and alarms in place to alert personnel of dangerous chemical levels, and facility officials stated it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the chemical changes to affect the water supply. Researchers and analysts identified six unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 23 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Four of the identified techniques used during the Oldsmar cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 21 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 20 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the minutes preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Recent Metallic Fuel Data Recovery in FIPD

The Metallic Fuels Irradiation and Physics Database (FIPD) [1] is an organized collection of metallic fuel test pin data (U-xPu-yZr, = 0 ~ 28; y = 2 ~ 10) and documentation available to industry. FIPD mainly contains three types of data: (1) Fuel pin fabrication data, including fuel slug diameter, fuel slug length, cladding diameter, smear density, etc. (2) Fuel pin operation conditions, including axial distributions for power, temperatures, fluences, burnup, and isotopic densities, etc. and (3) Fuel pin post-irradiation examination (PIE) data, including fission gas release and gas chemistry, profilometry, and neutron radiography, etc. The operating conditions for pins with PIE data available in FIPD span significant ranges across key parameters. The fuel peak burnup extends from less than 5% up to 20 at%. The cladding peak temperature varies from about 490°C to 660°C. Finally, the cladding peak DPA shows a wide range from less than 5 to 120. These broad ranges reflect the diverse testing conditions and operational parameters captured in the available PIE data. More detail about FIPD can be found in ref. [2]. The database development is an ongoing effort covering metallic fuel experiments from the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) and the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF). As reported in the ref. [3, 4], most of the PIE data generated during the IFR program [5] has been collected, reviewed, processed, and integrated into FIPD. The most recently added PIE data can be found in ref. [4], which shows the collection of over 95% of the PIE data by the time of this paper. The recent improvements to the database are summarized in this paper.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

A Look Towards the Execution of the Low-Temperature TEX Experimental Campaign

To address the mounting need for below roomtemperature nuclear data validation, the Low-Temperature Thermal Epithermal eXperiments (LT-TEX) have been designed. Validation of low-temperature neutron cross sections is necessary to verify any operation at temperatures below room temperature which is typically observed in environments far from the equator. For example, a fissile material transportation truck may routinely observe ambient temperatures down to -40°C, which is the lower temperature bound of the normal conditions of transportation defined in the United States Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations §71.71c2. Additionally, sub-room temperature benchmarks can validate newly produced cross sections, that include novel thermal scattering laws, from North Carolina State University.

LT-TEX↗
DOE OSTI2025

Immersive Scientific Visualization of Molten-Salt Reactor Waste Characteristics Using Virtual Reality

Immersive visualization is changing how we explore, communicate, and understand complex scientific systems. In nuclear energy, an area in which data are often multidimensional, time-dependent, and difficult to interpret, virtual reality (VR) represents a powerful and intuitive informational medium. This work introduces a VR-based platform that visualizes the post-shutdown behavior and waste management lifecycle of molten-salt reactors (MSRs), a next-generation reactor type with unique operational and safety characteristics. The platform, built in Unity, is streamed on the Meta Quest 3 headset. It transforms high-fidelity simulation data into an interactive, immersive experience. Users can explore time-dependent reactor characteristics such as nuclide decay, which is a key factor for evaluating reactor waste strategies. The datasets were generated using the MOOSE (Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment) framework and then processed through ParaView scripting for smooth integration into Unity. From a visualization standpoint, the platform emphasizes spatial storytelling, temporal exploration, and user-centered interaction. Users can navigate 3D reactor geometries, slice through volumetric data, and manipulate time to observe how physical phenomena evolve. Real-scale rendering and embodied interaction make the experience feel tangible. The interface is designed to be accessible, even to those without nuclear or simulation expertise. This lowers the barrier for stakeholders, policymakers, and the general public, while still supporting expert analysis and collaborative decision-making. This work shows how immersive visualization can function as both a scientific tool and a communication interface. By integrating simulation, processing, and visualization into a cohesive workflow, we offer a scalable framework for immersive scientific storytelling. The modular design supports future extensions to other reactor types and lifecycle stages, from shutdown to long-term storage, making the platform adaptable for both research and outreach.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2026

AI-driven Neutrino Beam Diagnostics for Next-Generation Neutrino Experiments

The accelerator-driven beam uncertainty limits oscillation measurements in long-baseline neutrino experiments. Spill-resolved beam diagnostics and real-time inference are necessary to address these neutrino flux systematics. As such, we present a machine-learning-based beam monitoring framework developed and validated using data from the T2K experiment. Our approach uses downstream, spill-by-spill muon monitor observables to predict upstream parameters such as proton beam position and width. We achieve high predictive accuracy on nominal runs, demonstrating robust baseline performance whether the model is trained on stable runs or systematically varied conditions. The framework is designed to be robust against domain shifts, allowing the neural network architectures and inference strategies developed with T2K data to be retrained and validated using LBNF simulations, with the goal of eventual deployment under real LBNF/DUNE operating conditions. This scalable approach to real-time beam inference offers a pathway toward reducing flux systematics for next-generation neutrino experiments such as DUNE.

Aney, Noah [Fermilab; U. Chicago (main)]↗
DOE OSTI2020

Quantitative Long-Term Monitoring of the Circulating Gases in the KATRIN Experiment Using Raman Spectroscopy

The Karlsruhe Tritium Neutrino (KATRIN) experiment aims at measuring the effective electron neutrino mass with a sensitivity of 0.2 eV/c2, i.e., improving on previous measurements by an order of magnitude. Neutrino mass data taking with KATRIN commenced in early 2019, and after only a few weeks of data recording, analysis of these data showed the success of KATRIN, improving on the known neutrino mass limit by a factor of about two. This success very much could be ascribed to the fact that most of the system components met, or even surpassed, the required specifications during long-term operation. Here, we report on the performance of the laser Raman (LARA) monitoring system which provides continuous high-precision information on the gas composition injected into the experiment’s windowless gaseous tritium source (WGTS), specifically on its isotopic purity of tritium—one of the key parameters required in the derivation of the electron neutrino mass. The concentrations cx for all six hydrogen isotopologues were monitored simultaneously, with a measurement precision for individual components of the order 10−3 or better throughout the complete KATRIN data taking campaigns to date. From these, the tritium purity, εT, is derived with precision of <10−3 and trueness of <3 × 10−3, being within and surpassing the actual requirements for KATRIN, respectively.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Controls on Barite (BaSO 4 ) Precipitation in Unconventional Reservoirs

Barite (BaSO 4 ) precipitation is one of the most ubiquitous examples of secondary sulfate mineral scaling in shale oil and gas reservoirs. Often, a suite of chemical additives is used during fracturing operations to inhibit the accumulation of mineral scales, though their efficacy is widely varied and poorly understood. This study combines experimental data and multi-component numerical reactive transport modeling to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the geochemical behavior of barite accumulation in shale matrices under conditions typical of fracturing operations. A variety of additives and conditions are individually tested in batch reactor experiments to identify the factors controlling barite precipitation. Our experimental results demonstrate a pH dependence in the rate of barite precipitation, which we use to develop a predictive model including a pH-dependent term that satisfactorily reproduces our observations. Further, this model is then extended to consider the behavior of three major shale samples of highly variable mineralogy (Eagle Ford, Marcellus, and Barnett). This data-validated model offers a reliable tool to predict and ultimately mitigate against secondary mineral accumulation in unconventional shale reservoirs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Effect of Membrane Casting Irregularities on Initial Fuel Cell Performance

Membrane electrode assemblies (MEA) for polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cells (PEMFC) may possess as-manufactured non-uniformities in any of its constituent components. This article studies casting irregularities located within the PEM to understand their potential impact on MEA initial performance. Membrane material was cast on a lab-scale polymer casting line operating either within or at the boundaries of the process window. The resulting membrane material was either pristine in the former case, or, in the latter case, contained air bubbles, cracks, and other irregularities, ranging in size from about 0.6 to 3 mm. Spatial polarization experiments were conducted using a 121-channel segmented fuel cell system, and thermal imaging was performed subsequently to map hydrogen crossover to spatial performance. While total-cell polarization data was minimally impacted by the irregularities, the spatial diagnostics showed local performance impacts that, in operation over time, could cause degradation in performance or earlier failure of the MEA. Such impacts could lead to these irregularities being classified as defects, i.e., manufacturing variations that should be identified and not included in a fuel cell stack. Classification of irregularities as defects will ultimately assist the industry by contributing to the development of threshold detection limits for in-line quality control diagnostics.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗
DOE OSTI2021

A review of machine learning in building load prediction

The surge of machine learning in recent years has been empowering engineer modeling in various fields. The decreasing hardware cost, increasing data accessibility, and advances of building automation system (BAS) allow the collection and storage of a significant amount of building operation data. The two facts provide great opportunities of applying machine learning to building energy systems modeling and analysis. There are a great number of research papers on this topic but there lacks a comprehensive and general review to summarize the current development, limitations, gaps and future trend. In this review paper series, machine learning techniques in building energy system modeling and analysis are reviewed under the organization and logic of the machine learning definition by Tom M. Mitchell: a computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure P if its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, improves with experience E. This paper is the first part of the review paper series, which focuses on building load prediction. First, the applications of building load prediction model (task T) are reviewed. Then, the modeling algorithms improving machine learning performance and accuracy (performance P) are reviewed. At the same time, the literature on the data perspective for modeling (experience E), including data engineering from sensors level to data level, pre-processing, feature extraction and selection, is reviewed. Finally, what is well-studied and what is lacking but with great potential are concluded; the gaps between present and future utilization of machine learning techniques are identified; the future trend and development are also predicted. The target readers of this paper are not only researchers from the building side who can get exposed to cutting edge machine learning tools, but also those from machine learning side who can understand the potential and challenge to apply machine learning in buildings.

Liang, Zhang↗
DOE OSTI2026

Chemically Enabled CO 2 -Enhanced Oil Recovery in Multi-Porosity, Hydrothermally Altered Carbonates in the Southern Michigan Basin (Final Technical Report)

This is the Final Technical Report for the project "Chemically Enabled CO 2 -Enhanced Oil Recovery in Multi-Porosity, Hydrothermally Altered Carbonates in the Southern Michigan Basin." Over the course of six years of collaboration between Battelle and project partners, all stated objectives of the program have been completed, including full geological characterization of the TBR trend (See companion report for Task2), laboratory and modeling experiments to determine the optimum composition and design of CO 2 -EOR operations in the TBR trend, execution of a field test of chemically-enhanced CO 2 in a TBR well, and integration of the data and learnings gathered during these efforts into a full-trend development plan. Detailed reporting on these activities, their outcomes, and implications for trend-wide development is provided in the report. This report and encompassed data will provide TBR field operators with detailed information on what worked, what did not work, and how to proceed with production optimization of their TBR assets using chemically-enhanced CO 2 -EOR. CO 2 -EOR is a relatively well understood and broadly implemented strategy for increasing incremental production across the oil and gas industry, but its application has been primarily focused on reservoirs with limited heterogeneity. The intention of this project was show first that the same physical mechanisms that improve recovery factors in homogeneous reservoirs (namely wettability alteration, viscosity alteration, oil swelling, and mobility control) are at play in heterogeneous reservoirs. This was proven by the project’s laboratory studies and dynamic simulations, with the potential exception of mobility control, which needs further study. The second intention was to demonstrate via direct field testing that CO 2 -EOR can work in a strongly heterogeneous reservoir. While the field test strategy implemented during this project did not succeed in producing oil, data gathered during the test sheds light on what may work for field operators who try chemically-enhanced CO 2 -EOR within their own reservoirs, significantly reducing the level of uncertainty carried by first-of-a-kind commercial efforts that could (and should) follow this test. Simultaneously, the project has identified several large-volume ethanol plants and other sources of CO 2 emissions in the region and provided a handrail that CO 2 emitters and field operators can leverage to capture, transport, and inject that CO 2 into their fields. This project has also shown that, in many cases, the economics of CO 2 -EOR in the TBR are attractive. And finally, by completing a project of this scope in the southern Michigan Basin, the project has contributed to the knowledge base and operational experience of field operators, state regulatory agencies, local service companies, and state universities, with CO 2 -EOR projects which should allow follow-on projects to proceed safely and efficiently.

02 PETROLEUM↗