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At least 451 records · Page 25

Dragonstone Strategy Kickoff Report [Slides]

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system like any other heavy industrial process, relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. Cyber-preparedness varies across the ONG industry from organization to organization. Common challenges include remote locations, long-lived field assets, and insufficient capabilities to find and track malware. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cybersecurity within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cybersecurity of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: regulatory overlap and inefficiencies, and lack of industry awareness of potentially useful technologies for solving known issues. In the months following this report, LLNL will develop a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, coupling threat intelligence, industry knowledge base, and ongoing outreach

02 PETROLEUM↗

Improving AHU Performance by Minimizing Approach Temperature, Reducing Air Maldistribution, and Efficiently Handling Sensible and Latent Loads (Phase 1 Interim Final Technical Report)

Residential air handling units (AHUs) have stayed the same in form and efficiency for the past 30+ years, with incremental improvements made to address safety, functionality, and energy-efficiency. The purpose of this research in Phase I, Topic 9a: Next Generation Residential Air Handlers, was to improve AHU performance by minimizing heat exchanger (HX) approach temperature, reducing air maldistribution, and developing alternative system configurations which more efficiently handle sensible and latent loads. In this research Optimized Thermal Systems (OTS) developed, modeled, and evaluated multiple alternative system concepts. A dual vapor compression system separate sensible and latent cooling (SSLC) concept was studied to inform work on alternative concepts and to show best-case performance benefit. System concepts included ejector enhanced vapor compression cycles, desiccant assisted dehumidification, dual evaporator SSLC, and alternative AHU HX configurations. A dual vapor compression system showed COP improvement of 20%, however, required additional components, increased unit size, and increased cost. Two types of ejector enhanced vapor compression cycles with dual evaporators improved system COP by 9 to 11%, and reduced AHU losses by as much as 18%, with design changes limited to the AHU, no unit physical size increase, and a moderate increase to system first cost. Desiccant assisted air-conditioning required increased air flow rate resulting in higher fan power and the desiccant wheel increased sensible heat load leading to increased compressor power and reduced system COP. Dual evaporator cycles were found to degrade performance due to increased expansion losses. Optimized single slab HX designs used in place of the traditional A-coil HX led to 44–49% reduction in aluminum, 47–60% less refrigerant charge, and improved HX velocity distribution.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

First-principles Studies of Tritium Reactivity and Diffusivity on Defective and Carbon Doped Surfaces of $\gamma$-LiAlO 2 Pellets (Tritium Science Program Report FY 2019 )

In tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs), tritium ($^{3}_{1}$H,T) is produced in 6 Li isotope enriched γ-LiAlO 2 ceramic pellet. However, a better understanding of $^{3}_{1}$H transport through the pellets, getters and the barrier/cladding system is hampered by a lack of fundamental data about the $^{3}_{1}$H solubility and diffusivity. In the process of $^{3}_{1}$H diffusion from bulk γ-LiAlO 2 to its surface, it is possible that $^{3}_{1}$H atoms bind with surface atoms or become trapped at vacancies sites. By increasing the number of $^{3}_{1}$H diffused from bulk to surface, upon recombination and desorption from surface sites, they will escape from the γ-LiAlO 2 surface to form different $^{3}_{1}$H species (possibly being as T, T 2 , T 2 O, OT, or CT x (x=1-4, with C impurity present at a 100-600 ppm level in pellets) that need to be identified and can become captured by the getter. Therefore, exploring the $^{3}_{1}$H diffusion from bulk to surface, corroborated with surface adsorption, diffusion and recombination and followed by desorption from surface as various types of $^{3}_{1}$H species becomes a very important task as an integral part of the study of $^{3}_{1}$H solubility and diffusivity in the pellets.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

AGGREGATE: dAta-driven modelinG preservinG contRollable dEr for outaGe mAnagemenT and rEsiliency (Report for Task 10: Controllability and Observability Analysis (Deliverable D7))

It is common to have less than full observability for distribution systems, as the number of available measurements are not sufficient. Considering increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs), it is imperative to understand and control distribution systems better. Developed for the transmission system, the original numerical observability analysis methods were based on the canonical DC Power Flow (DC-PF) model. However, the DC-PF model is ill-suited for the distribution system in which line resistance to reactance (R/X) ratios can be near unity. In this report, we apply the non-iterative Observability Test (OT) and Observable Island Identification Procedure (OIIP) in to the gain matrix from the distribution system state estimator. Because sensors are few in distribution systems, pseudo-measurements based on historical load profiles and zero-injection virtual measurements are often employed to ensure observability. However, both the observability and the accuracy of the state estimates are uncertain when historical data is limited/unavailable.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Evolving Architectures and Considerations to address Distributed Energy Resources and Non-Wired Alternatives

The electric grid is in the beginning stage of a transformation, driven by a combination of shutdowns of coal-fired plants, commissioning of new natural-gas plants, and tremendous growth in energy supply from renewables such as wind, and solar. As utilities navigate this transformation, their progress is supported by advances in Operational Technologies (OT), and Informational Technologies (IT), such as automation, smart inverters, cloud computing, mobile computing, machine learning, big data analytics, which have the potential to enable advanced capabilities more efficiently and at a lower cost. This white paper focuses on the architectural considerations that will allow the industry to transition in a planned manner. It introduces and formalizes two architectural constructs –the data bus and the control bus. The data bus is responsible for carrying all non-operational models and information necessary to drive utility decisions. In contrast, the control bus is responsible for carrying all operational data and control actions taken at the local level, centralized level, or other levels in-between. The paper reviews those architectural considerations, their requirements and how they will evolve. This paper intends to provide a context for vendors, utilities, and their service providers to review and understand the changes that are coming and get ready for them.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

INS–Support for Formal Cyber Security Education in Brazil–After Action Report

The adoption of digital technology into Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems in nuclear facilities fundamentally changes the nature of these systems. Greater interconnectivity of reprogrammable, and functionally interdependent control systems has given rise to the need for computer security consideration in digital I&C Systems. The cyber security of I&C systems presents a growing risk to nuclear facilities and requires the development of educational and research tools to ensure the safety of these facilities. Currently there is a major gap in formal educational offerings on cyber security for these Operational Technology (OT) systems. To provide formal cyber security education resources, DOE’s office of International Nuclear Security (INS) partnered with the University of São Paulo (USP) to develop a training course on the cyber security of nuclear facility I&C systems using the hypothetical Nuclear Power Plant, Asherah.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Using the CYBER-Champ Model to Determine Cyber Competencies and Role Alignment

Cybersecurity roles, tasks, and skills are seen by many organizations as nonessential, abstract, or complicated. Although standards are in place, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-181 document titled “Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity (NICE Framework)” available since September 2012, companies are still showing security vulnerabilities in their cyber networks (Hatzes, 2020). Barriers towards creating a cyber-ready workforce are not always due to a lack of resources, but often caused by organizational structure. The need for cyber-cognizant job postings, improved communication between Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) employees, increases in staffing and funding for cyber teams, and better communication of standards and training can all contribute to increasing an organization’s cyber resilience. Cybersecurity Competency Health and Maturity Progression model (CYBER-CHAMP) is a model aimed at evaluating an organization’s structure and individual employee’s cyber knowledge and helps develop a plan to reach competency. This model was used to engage with organizations to promote proper cyber protocols and policies. The aim of this paper is to answer if it is possible for an organization to build a cyber-ready workforce by providing education and training options for current employees and prepare the future workforce to be ready on day one of employment. Both open source and firsthand interviews with organizations were used to conduct the research contained in this document. Further research may include additional development to the CYBER-CHAMP model and its delivery platform.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Fundamental Studies of Tritium Diffusivity and Formation on the Surfaces of Defective LiAlO 2 Pellets

One of the important components of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBAR) is the γLiAlO 2 layer used in the form of an annular ceramic pellet enriched with the 6 Li isotope. Within TPBAR architecture, this oxide is located between the zircaloy-4 liner and nickel-plated zircaloy-4 tritium getter. When irradiated in a pressurized water reactor (PWR), the 6 Li pellets absorb neutrons, simulating the nuclear characteristics of a burnable absorber rod, and produce tritium ( 3 H, T). The 3 H specie chemically reacts with the metal getter, leading to the formation of a metal hydride. Accurate analysis of the 3 H transport through the ceramic pellets and the barrier/cladding system is hampered by the lack of fundamental data about the hydrogen isotope solubility and diffusivity. In TPBAR architecture, between the γ-LiAlO 2 pellet and the Ni-plated Zircaloy-4 getter (or liner), there is a gas gap. After 3 H diffuses from bulk γ-LiAlO 2 to its surface, it is possible that different 3 H species (such as T, T 2 , T 2 O, and OT, etc.) are formed on this surface which can then get into the gas gap region. Furthermore, upon recombination and desorption molecular tritium can be formed on the γ-LiAlO 2 surface. Therefore, exploring the formation of 3 H-related species on γ-LiAlO 2 surface becomes very important as an integral part of the study of 3H solubility and diffusivity in the pellets.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

First-principles Studies of Tritium Species Formation on and Desorption from Surfaces of $γ- LiAlO_2$ Pellets with Related Secondary Phase

The $γ- LiAlO_2$ ceramics enriched with the $^6Li$ isotope are used in the form of annular pellets in tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs). When irradiated in a pressurized water reactor (PWR), the $^6Li$ absorbs neutrons, simulating the nuclear characteristics of a burnable absorber rod, and produces tritium $(_{1}^{3}H, T)$. Once the $_{1}^{3}H$ is produced in the bulk of $γ- LiAlO_2$, it diffuses to its surface, forming different $_{1}^{3}H$ species (possibly $T, OT, T_2, or T_2O$). The $T_2O$ is expected to be generated from experiment, to avoid $_{1}^{3}H$ leakage. However, up to now, it is still not clear which $_{1}^{3}H$ species are formed on the $γ- LiAlO_2$ surface and travel to the getter. Besides, with the dramatic Li loss under irradiation, the secondary phase (possibly $LiAl_5O_8$) precipitates and participates into the $_{1}^{3}H$ diffusivity and $_{1}^{3}H$ species formation. Therefore, exploring $_{1}^{3}H$ species formation on and desorption from surfaces of $γ- LiAlO_2$ with related secondary phases becomes a very important task to provide a better understanding of $_{1}^{3}H$H species escaping from pellets.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Intel® DOE Grid Security Enhancement Security in Power System Edge. Final Technical Report

Intel® and its partners, Schneider Electric and LiveData Utilities, were tasked by Department of Energy to explore solutions in two areas of grid security. One, secure the existing communication network and the legacy devices with minimal disruption to the infrastructure, and second, to develop capabilities in semiconductor chips such that they come with built-in security to order to provide secure communication and protection from cyberattacks with minimal effort from operation technology (OT) application developers.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Hydropower Cyber-Physical Configurations

The U.S. Department of Energy’s Water Power Technologies Office funded Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory to develop a typology to characterize the variety and pervasiveness of cyber-physical configurations across the nation’s hydropower fleet. Outreach to owners and operators returned configurations for 275 hydropower plants or approximately 12% of the fleet. Components (OT and IT), systems, and connections among systems differed among plants according to function, age, position in the river cascade, and many other factors. Seven cyber-physical configuration types labeled A through I, included from 2 to dozens of plants. They were differentiated by how pervasive data and control connections were among cyber-physical components and how frequently control signals paired with data signals in a feedback loop. The flow of data and control within each type implies what cybersecurity vulnerabilities may exist, and what mitigation actions may be most effective. A self-assessment approach allows plant operators to identify the configuration type similar to their plant and link to the lessons learned and best practices information. The cyber-physical typology reinforces the idea that hydropower facilities vary widely, but it also identifies groups that highlight similarities in how their cyber-physical components interact. This helps address fleetwide cybersecurity needs by identifying a reasonable number of configuration types that share risks, vulnerabilities, and potential mitigations.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Networked Microgrid Cybersecurity Architecture Design Guide: A New Jersey TRANSITGRID Use Case

Microgrids require reliable communication systems for equipment control, power delivery optimization, and operational visibility. To maintain secure communications, Microgrid Operational Technology (OT) networks must be defensible and cyber-resilient. The communication network must be carefully architected with appropriate cyber-hardening technologies to provide security defenders the data, analytics, and response capabilities to quickly mitigate malicious and accidental cyberattacks. In this work, we outline several best practices and technologies that can support microgrid operations (e.g., intrusion detection and monitoring systems, response tools, etc.). Then we apply these recommendations to the New Jersey TRANSITGRID use case to demonstrate how they would be deployed in practice.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Model Driven Deception for Defense of Operational Technology Environments

Due to the strong integration of real-world physics, OT deception platforms must operate differently than traditional IT deceptions. For instance, turning off a valve will be detected downstream by other sensors because the flow will reduce and stop. Additionally, controllers and applications leverage data from sensors to send control commands to each other. A believable deception must be integrated with the system to project the effects of events. An attack will likely attempt to control the physical process in a negative manner. To make the attacker believe they are achieving their objective, it must predict the effects of these actions, to a reasonable degree. Our approach to simulating a model to generate realistic decoy behavior is explored including description of two approaches: a physics model-based approach and a data driven approach. The performance of two machine learning techniques are investigated in their ability to learn a good enough model of the physics of the system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Pros and Cons Analysis of HALEU Utilization in Example Fuel Cycles

The Systems Analysis and Integration campaign assessed the pros and cons of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) utilization in advanced reactors and associated fuel cycles. The assessment was done for three example fuel cycles at equilibrium states: once-through, limited recycle, and continuous recycle (CR) starting with HALEU. Front- and back-end fuel cycle parameters and the Levelized Cost of Fuel (LCF), which is the Levelized Cost of Electricity excluding reactor cost, of the three example fuel cycles were calculated using a single Analysis Example Reactor. The pros and cons of HALEU utilization were assessed by normalizing the fuel cycle parameters and LCF to a unit of electricity generation (GWe-year) and comparing them with a Basis of Comparison. In this study, a sodium-cooled reactor with sodium-bonded metallic fuel having a burnup of ~100 GWd/t was used as the Analysis Example Reactor because its technology readiness level is high, and the burnup and fuel enrichment are in the middle of those ranges of advanced reactor concepts that are under development. The current once-through Light Water Reactors (OT-LWRs) with <5% low-enriched uranium and 50 GWd/t burnup were used as the Basis of Comparison. In addition, a series of sensitivity analyses was conducted by varying burnup, enrichment, fuel forms, and reactor types to capture the design variations in two once-through Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) reactors, Natrium with sodium-free metallic fuel having a burnup of ~150 GW/t and Xe-100 with Tristructural-Isotropic (TRISO) pebble fuel having a burnup of ~168 GWd/t.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense (Final)

In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Virtual Environment Platform for OT/IT Training Enhancement

TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES OT/IT Concepts Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) concepts can often be difficult to visualize Teaching Methods Traditional teaching methods lack the intuitive & immersive aspects of hands-on activities Caveat: Unless taught by Team B! Physical Limitations Digital Twins require existing systems/hardware to mirror UPDATED TECHNIQUES Virtual Environment By making use of a virtual environment, we can represent abstract concepts in a more approachable and digestible way Increased Engagement Students are more engaged with the activities and are more likely to retain the information they are given. New/Emerging Technologies As the system is currently growing and developing, the technologies in use, as well as those represented by the system, stay up-to-date.

Deroller, Nicholas F.↗

Cybersecurity Considerations for the Liquified Natural Gas Sector

Due to the highly volatile nature of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) and the systems required for generation and safe containment, it is likely a targeted cyber-attack on LNG control and safety systems will have a significant economic impact on energy supplies and prices. Moreover, if the interconnected operational technology (OT) devices within LNG systems are exploited to malfunction, the repair and recertification process will almost certainly be longer than for natural gas (NG) systems.

03 NATURAL GAS↗