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At least 451 records · Page 25
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

2024 SNL/KTF Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER)

Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the Sandia National Laboratories Kaua‘i Test Facility in Hawai‘i. Activities at the site are conducted in support of U.S. Department of Energy weapons programs, and the site has operated as a rocket preparation launching and tracking facility since 1962.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Rossi-α Measurements on a System Consisting of Weapons Grade Plutonium Moderated by Polyethylene [Poster]

A series of experiments nicknamed "TEX," standing for Thermal-Epithermal eXperiments, were performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) on the Planet critical assembly. The TEX experiment campaigns are a collaboration between Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and funded by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). The TEX experiment consists of several campaigns; this work specifically discusses measurements made on one series of TEX experiments designed to examine the thermal scattering law (TSL) for polyethylene. This series consisted of two different critical configurations which contain plutonium fuel. The plutonium plates are 2 in. by 3 in. by 0.125 in. Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) plates and are placed in a tray in an array of 6 plates by 4 plates wide creating a 12 in. by 12 in. square. These trays of plutonium are interleaved between polyethylene plates. These measurements differ from previous TEX experiments in that they examine a more thermal neutron spectrum than previously examined by interleaving much thicker interstitial moderating plates than the previous measurements. The two configurations differ in the thickness of polyethylene between the fissile material. While the experiment was designed to examine the TSL, this work only examines the results of Rossi-α measurements on the two different configurations. For both configurations, Rossi-α measurements were performed to experimentally validate the neutron spectrum.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Warhead verification concepts and technologies [Slides]

Weapons verification concepts and technologies are discussed related to Arms Control instrumentation, which is a three-part problem: measurement; certification, and authentication.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Trinity 78th Anniversary: re-discovered and newly edited unclassified footage shows use of tanks to collect radioactive samples immediately after Trinity test (Rev. 1)

On July 16, 1945, at 5:29 a.m., a team of Los Alamos scientists successfully detonated the world’s first atomic bomb at a remote section of south-central New Mexico desert, then known as the Alamogordo Bombing Range. This full-scale test, dubbed “Trinity” by the Lab’s first Director J. Robert Oppenheimer, proved the viability of the implosion-type bomb known as The Gadget and ushered in the Atomic Age. Three weeks after Trinity, two Los-Alamos created atomic weapons – Little Boy and Fat Man – were released above Japan, helping to end World War II and changing the course of history forever.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

NSRC makes vital vintage films accessible to today's weapons researchers

A few years ago, archivists at the Lab’s National Security Research Center (NSRC) rediscovered 65 special reels of nitrate motion picture film among the 20,000 film reels in the NSRC’s collections. Because nitrate film stock was discontinued in 1951, they realized that the films contained footage from the Lab’s earliest days of nuclear testing. However, nitrate film is highly toxic and flammable. Confirming this hunch would have to wait until the NSRC team devised a strategy for safely preserving and digitizing the reels. Now, after many months of planning and collaboration with LANL fire safety and industrial hygiene teams, the reels – which include footage from Operation Sandstone, Operation Ivy, and the Trinity test – have been digitized by the NSRC archivist team and are accessible to today’s researchers.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Moly 99 Reactor Case Study

Molybdenum-99 (Moly 99) is a critical raw material for Technetium (Tc) 99m, a radioactive isotope most widely used in nuclear medicine procedures. Moly 99 has a short half-life of about six hours, which means it cannot be stockpiled. When Moly 99 decays, it turns into Tc 99m, which has a half-life of 214,000 years. The photon energy emitted from the decay of Moly 99 is used in a variety of nuclear imaging technologies such as gamma cameras. Furthermore, radiopharmaceutical manufacturers use the photon energy emitted from the decay of Moly 99 to produce generators for hospitals, clinics, and radiopharmacies. Once Moly 99 decays to Tc 99m, it is used to make individual patient doses for a variety of diagnostic imaging procedures. The Moly 99 Reactor Design is a conceptual blueprint for Moly 99 production that does not use weapon-grade uranium; instead, the reactor has a target core of low-enriched uranium. The reactor design is small, reaching a foot-and-a-half in height and diameter and consumes less than two megawatts of power. The reactor's only purpose is for medical isotope production and with every fission, Moly 99 is produced.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Buster-Jangle

Buster-Jangle changed the working relationship between the AEC and the DoD. Beginning with Trinity and continuing through Greenhouse, the military was the logistical hub of nuclear testing, supplying men and material to carry out the myriad of mostly non-technical tasks. With the inclusion of the two Jangle tests and the Desert Rock exercises, that relationship became more symbiotic driven by the growing requirements for tactical weapons and their possible battlefield use. At Buster-Jangle, as well, the first use of a jet bomber was evidence that the military technology was evolving, requiring closer cooperation between the two agencies to match weapons and delivery systems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

High Explosive Testing Capabilities at Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) [Slides]

LANL is a non-profit Federally Funded Research & Development Center (FFRDC). LANL’s Integrated Weapons Experiments (J) Division addresses national security challenges by executing largescale, integrated, focused experiments, and tests of engineered devices and systems. J-NV plans, fields, and executes dynamic high explosive experiments at NNSS. This includes sub-critical experiments involving special nuclear material, as well as small- and largescale non-nuclear experiments. J-NV generates, analyzes, and disseminates unique, high-quality data.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 34: US DOE Featured Site: Savannah River Operations Office: 70 Years of Service

The Savannah River Site celebrates its 70. anniversary on November 28, 2020. On this date in 1950, President Harry S. Truman requested the Dupont Company to design, build and operate what was then known as the Savannah River Plant in response to the Soviet Union's detonation of its first atomic weapon, which set the Cold War into motion. During the 1950's, six South Carolina towns were relocated for the construction of SRS and by 1953, the 310 square mile site was complete. Nearly 40,000 workers were employed t build five nuclear reactors and support facilities, two chemical separations plants, heavy water extraction plant, nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility tritium extraction facility and waste management facilities. SRS played a key role in winning the Cold War and for seven decades, SRS has been a leader within the DOE complex. Today, the site supports environmental stewardship and maintains the nation's nuclear deterrent while ensuring the safekeeping and disposal of domestic and international nuclear materials. The site continues to support the nation's nuclear defense as it explores new potential NNSA missions. SRS has a proud 70- year history and looks forward to a future of service as a national asset and strong community partner. The session was kicked off with a video message from Secretary of Energy, Dan Brouillette, who thanked employees past and current for their efforts. The video also provided an overview of the history and future of the Site. This panel provided an overview of the Savannah River Site's 70 years of service (history, challenges, opportunities, and future) presented by the SRS's Senior leadership and the local Aiken, South Carolina Mayor. Panelists with presentations: US DOE Secretary Dan Brouillette's Overview of DOE and SRS - A Legacy of 70 Years of Service (Amy Boyette); 70 Years of Service (Michael Budney); 70 Years of Service (Stuart MacVean); SRS Liquid Waste (Thomas Foster); National Nuclear Security Administration (Nicole Nelson-Jean)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

NA-22 Write for Consortium Efforts

We are asked to look into the improvements for the measurement of Pu of a variety of material types (MT): MT41 (Pu-242, 20 – 60% enriched), MT42 (Pu-242 > 60% enrichment), and MT-82 (Np-237). Many of these are legacy items that were packaged years ago (Fig 1&2), and when the items are re-packaged for long-term storage, they must be re-measured using either NDA (nondestructive analysis methods or radiochemical methods. It is of interest to improve the NDA and radiochemistry to reduce the un-certainty in the measurements, as in the case of larger items (250 g to 2 kg items) the uncertainty in measurements makes it difficult to certify the mass of the material down to the 0.5 g accountability requirement per DOE orders by only doing NDA measurement. It would be of interest to look into methods to improve the detection of these materials, which would not only benefit the weapon manufacturing community, but also has the ability to significantly improve the non-proliferation community.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Operation Upshot-Knothole

A thundering boom and sheet of fire announced a dramatic, once in a lifetime event – the firing of a nuclear projectile from a 280 mm cannon. Travelling seven miles downrange, the projectile detonated 500 feet over the Nevada Test Site’s Frenchman Flat with a force of fifteen kilotons. Although the test was successful, the massive cannon, designed for tactical battlefield use, had a critical flaw. It was too large and cumbersome for mobile combat. The cannon test, codenamed Grable, was part of Operation Upshot-Knothole, the fourth test series conducted in Nevada. Beginning with the Annie test on March 17, 1953, and concluding with the Climax test on June 4th, the Operation consisted of three airdrops, seven tower detonations, and the one artillery shot. As with previous Nevada tests, the demarcation between the weapon development series, Upshot, and the DOD effects tests, Knothole, was blurred. All eleven tests generated data in support of weapon development as well as tactical battlefield applications. During Upshot-Knothole, the University of California Radiation Laboratory (UCRL), conducted its first ever tests, Ruth and Ray. Although neither test was successful, these failures, along with another a year later at Operation Castle, provided the new laboratory with design data leading to future successful tests. The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) participated in a test series with the general goal of preparing for societal recovery from a nuclear attack. Known as Operation Doorstep, the FCDA’s experiments evaluated the effects of a nuclear attack on food supplies, housing and urban structures, and even a copse of trees transplanted from nearby Mt. Charleston. A contingent of the press witnessed test Annie from an outcropping of rocks, subsequently named News Nob. The presence of the news media, along with the FCDA’s participation, marked a fundamental change in the Nevada test program - a change that that now included the general populace, whose survival was, of course, the rationale for testing. The Department of Defense continued and expanded its Desert Rock exercises of troop exercises, helicopter operations, and evaluation of blast damage to military aircraft, tanks, and guns. Annie, Nancy, Badger, Simon, Encore, and Grable involved larger numbers of personnel than the other five shots. Below is an edited and condensed account of Desert Rock activities compiled by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

2020 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, and Kaua'i Test Facility, Hawai'i

Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at Sandia National Laboratories, Tonopah Test Range (SNL/TTR) in Nevada and Sandia National Laboratories, Kaua‘i Test Facility (SNL/KTF) in Hawai‘i. Activities at SNL/TTR are conducted in support of U.S. Department of Energy weapons programs and have operated at the site since 1957. SNL/KTF has operated as a rocket preparation launching and tracking facility since 1962. The U.S. Department of Energy and its management and operating contractor are committed to safeguarding the environment, assessing sustainability practices, and ensuring the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data presented in this Annual Site Environmental Report. This report summarizes the environmental protection, restoration, and monitoring programs in place at SNL/TTR and SNL/KTF during calendar year 2020. Environmental topics include air quality, ecology, environmental restoration, oil storage, site sustainability, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, water quality, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This report is prepared in accordance with and as required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting , and has been approved for public distribution.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Estimating β eff from static, late-time Feynman neutron noise measurements

The effective delayed neutron fraction, β eff , is a kinematic parameter describing the contribution of delayed neutrons to the effective multiplication factor, $\kappa$ eff , and is of great interest to the nuclear criticality safety community and beyond. In fact, $\kappa$ eff presently must be inferred (as opposed to directly measured) since variables like β eff must be obtained from simulation, reference tables, or a dynamic or pulsed measurement where the assembly of fissile material is perturbed and not in steady state. Several recent works have proposed neutron noise techniques to estimate β eff from static measurements (such as benchmark experiments). This work experimentally investigates an approach based on looking at late-time (up to thousands of seconds) correlated neutrons in Feynman histograms. This work utilizes measurements of weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium to construct late-time Feynman histograms and investigate a proposed methodology of estimating β eff from a fit of the distribution. Data is shown from both He-3 detectors and an organic scintillator array. This work is preliminary in nature, demonstrating some experimental feasibility and proposing improvements for future investigations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Measurement of the prompt fission neutron spectrum from 800 keV to 10 MeV for 240 Pu(sf) and for the 240 Pu($n,f$) reaction induced by neutrons of energy from 1–20 MeV

Here, the presence of 240 Pu in nuclear fuels for reactors has resulted in high uncertainties in the results of reactor and nuclear transmutation calculations because of deficiencies in 240 Pu-related nuclear data. Specifically for the prompt fission neutron spectrum (PFNS) of 240 Pu, there is only one neutron-induced, (n,f), measurement at 0.85 MeV incident neutron energy and only one complete spontaneous fission, (sf), measurement. This limited availability of data does not sufficiently guide nuclear data evaluations of these quantities. Here we report on a measurement of both the 240 Pu(sf) and the 240 Pu(n,f) PFNS, both over the emitted neutron energy range of 0.79–10.0 MeV, and from incident neutron energies of 1.0–20.0 MeV for the (n,f) reaction. Measurements were made with a hemispherical array of liquid scintillators at the high-energy Los Alamos Neutron Science Center white neutron source at the Weapons Neutron Research facility as part of the joint LANL-LLNL Chi-Nu experimental campaign to measure actinide fission neutron spectra. These measurements are the first of their kind, and provide clear experimental evidence for second-chance fission, third chance fission, and pre-equilibrium neutron emission processes in neutron-induced fission of 240 Pu, and are the first ever measurements above 1 MeV incident neutron energy.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Measurement of the Prompt Fission Neutron Spectrum from 800 keV to 10 MeV for 240 Pu($sf$) and for the 240 Pu($n,f$) Reaction Induced by Neutrons of Energy from 1-20 MeV

The presence of 240 Pu in nuclear fuels for reactors has resulted in high uncertainties in the results of reactor and nuclear transmutation calculations because of deficiencies in 240 Pu-related nuclear data. Specifically for the prompt fission neutron spectrum (PFNS) of 240 Pu, there is only one neutron-induced, ($n,f$), measurement at 0.85 MeV incident neutron energy and only one complete spontaneous fission, ($sf$), measurement. This limited availability of data does not sufficiently guide nuclear data evaluations of these quantities. Here we report on a measurement of both the 240 Pu($sf$) and the 240 Pu($n,f$) PFNS, both over the emitted neutron energy range of 0.79–10.0 MeV, and from incident neutron energies of 1.0–20.0 MeV for the ($n,f$) reaction. Measurements were made with a hemispherical array of liquid scintillators at the high-energy Los Alamos Neutron Science Center white neutron source at the Weapons Neutron Research facility as part of the joint LANL-LLNL Chi-Nu experimental campaign to measure actinide fission neutron spectra. These measurements are the first of their kind, and provide clear experimental evidence for second-chance fission, third-chance fission, and pre-equilibrium neutron emission processes in neutron-induced fission of 240 Pu, and are the first ever measurements above 1 MeV incident neutron energy.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

MeVXRay-23A: We aim to increase the laser-driven MeV x-ray yield to ~ 4-6 Rads/shot (~2-3X increase) using novel target designs suitable for weapons radiography [Slides]

The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate enhanced laser-plasma coupling using near-critical foam padded tungsten cube targets and it’s effect on the laser-driven MeV x-ray dose. Compact MeV x-ray sources with <200µm source size in the several Rads/shot are needed for weapons radiography. The goal is to increase laser-driven MeV x-ray dose by ~2-3X.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗