Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “NONPROLIFERATION”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 451 records · Page 25

On the Origins and Significance of the Limit Demarcating Low-Enriched Uranium from Highly Enriched Uranium

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines uranium with a 235 U isotope concentration of 20 percent as the threshold between low-enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU), and as a significant waypoint on the path towards weapon-grade uranium (typically above 90 percent 235 U enrich-ment). Furthermore, the distinction between LEU and HEU is widely used in shaping nonproliferation policy, and it has featured prominently in commentary over Iran’s nuclear program and the series of Nuclear Security Summits that since 2010 have sought to minimize civilian stockpiles and use of HEU. Yet the origin of this threshold is obscure, dating back 6 decades. Our research note traces the political origin and the technical basis for this limit.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Islands: International Leasing of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Sites to Provide Enduring Assurance of Peaceful Use

Current International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards do not provide adequate protection against the diversion to military use of materials or technology from certain types of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In view of highly enriched uranium’s relatively greater ease of use as a nuclear explosive material than plutonium and the significant diseconomies of commercial spent fuel reprocessing, this article focuses on the need for improved international controls over uranium enrichment facilities as the proximate justification for creation of an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Association (INFCA). In principle, the proposal is equally applicable to alleviating the proliferation concerns provoked by nuclear fuel reprocessing plants and other sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The INFCA would provide significantly increased nonproliferation assurance to its member states and the wider international community by holding long-term leasehold contracts to operate secure restricted zones containing such sensitive nuclear facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Importance of Safeguards Culture

This is a paper we plan to submit to the Nonproliferation Review for publication. The paper provides an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture and gauges its value to the safeguards community. Accompanying the paper are three additional documents that contain the figures and tables cited in the paper. NPR guidelines state these figures and tables are to be submitted in separate documents.

Mladineo, Stephen V.↗

A Framework for Assessing Alternate Proliferation Pathways In The Age Of Non-State Actors

While the nonproliferation community has long acknowledged the possibility of nuclear terrorism, its prevention has become a central focus area in recent years. For decades it has been assumed that, with access to special nuclear material (SNM), the steps to indigenously develop an improvised nuclear device are within the reach of non-state actors. At the same time, indigenous development of the SNM itself has generally been dismissed as it is perceived as an infeasible option. Recognizing how recent trends of technology democratization, the open exchange of information, and globalization have eroded certain barriers to proliferation by non-state actors, this research explores whether indigenous development of SNM is feasible given the current capabilities of non-state actors. In addition, methods were developed to screen which approaches should be further investigated to devise and enact general and non-state actor specific countermeasures.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

“Defense by other means”: future evolution(s) of cooperative threat reduction

This article discusses likely future contexts of, and options for, global threat-reduction activities to support nonproliferation goals over the next five to ten years. Threat-reduction activities span a continuum from unilateral actions that the United States might take with little cooperation and transparency at one end to cooperative actions associated with negotiated treaties and agreements at the other. This study focuses on cooperative approaches embodied in the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which has been the most visible program reducing the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction for over two decades. Here, we argue that CTR’s evolution can be described in terms of the relationship between the desired US influence on outcomes, the ability to generate a common threat definition, and appetite for collaboration on threat reduction. To that end, this article provides an introduction and overview of CTR initiatives over its twenty-seven-year history and a review of relevant legislation and trends. After introducing and describing the CTR Possible Futures Framework, this article offers five possible options for—and discusses the implications of—CTR’s future evolution.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Consumer Choice and Dempster-Shafer Models of Threat Prioritization for Emerging Dual-Use Technologies: Their Application to Synthetic Biology

Identification and prioritization of risks to international security associated with emerging dual-use technologies presents numerous challenges. First, it demands prediction of the evolving states-of-the-art in various technological fields and, second, it requires a comprehension of the motivations and prospective selection criteria that illicit users might adopt in choosing among new technologies and their means of deployment. Nevertheless, the identification and prioritization of such threats is critical in establishing the appropriate focal points for proactive, nonproliferation policy-making. This paper addresses the question of how the threats associated with alternative means of deploying an emerging technology might be prioritized. The method revolves around systematic identification of the technological barriers to an illicit user in deploying a new technology. Evaluation of the resources necessary to overcome the barriers - such acquisition of the necessary intellectual capital and laboratory assets - then provides the basis for assessing the relative likelihoods or plausibilities of various deployment scenarios. Two optional bases are outlined for quantification of the model. One is a choice model that has found application in the analysis of consumer behavior, where the illicit user is modeled essentially as a consumer of new technology. The other employs a Dempster-Shafer framework for priority characterization. The paper describes application of the methodology to emerging life science technologies; in particular, to synthetic biology - the means of engineering biological systems. The prospect of a terrorist being able to synthesize natural pathogens or, perhaps worse still, to engineer pathogens not present in nature, creates an unprecedented threat to international security. Use of the proposed methodology to identify and prioritize threats associated with the engineering of pathogens is described.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Mitigating the Threat of Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation via Nuclear-Submarine Programs

Brazil is building a nuclear-powered attack submarine, South Korea has in the past asserted its need for nuclear-powered attack submarines to deal with the threat of North Korean nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and Iran has asserted more vaguely its need for naval nuclear propulsion. All three countries are non-weapon-state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Their interest in naval reactors brings with it two challenges to the NPT: 1) The safeguards “loophole” under which a country can withdraw nuclear materials from IAEA safeguards indefinitely for allowed “non-peaceful activities;” and 2) A justification for the acquisition of national uranium-enrichment facilities because the international suppliers of enrichment services have peaceful-use requirements. In fact, Brazil’s acquisition of enrichment was driven by its navy. It is argued, however, that nuclear-powered attack submarines have advantages over modern conventional attack submarines primarily in their ability to transit great distances at high speed whereas only a few countries have foreign military commitments requiring such capabilities. For defense of nearby waters against foreign navies, attack submarines are merely one component of a complex system of anti-submarine aircraft and surface vessels and underwater sensor networks. Conventional attack submarines are no less effective and much less costly than nuclear-powered attack submarines in this role.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A graphite oxide (GO)-based remote readable tamper evident seal

Here, this paper presents a prototype of a remotely readable graphite oxide (GO) paper-based tamper evident seal. The proposed device combines the tunable electrical properties offered by reduced graphite oxide (RGO) with a compressive sampling scheme. The benefit of using RGO as a tamper evident seal material is the sensitivity of its electrical properties to the common mechanisms adopted to defeat tamper-evident seals. RGO’s electrical properties vary upon local stress or cracks induced by mechanical action (e.g., produced by shimming or lifting attacks). Further, modification of the seal’s electrical properties can result from the incidence of other defeat mechanisms, such as temperature changes, solvent treatment and steam application. The electrical tunability of RGO enables the engraving of a circuit on the area of the tamper evident seal intended to be exposed to malicious attacks. The operation of the tamper evident seal, as well as its remote communication functionality, is supervised by a microcontroller unit (MCU). The MCU uses the RGO-engraved circuitry to physically implement a compressive sampling acquisition procedure. The compressive sampling scheme provides the seal with self-authentication and self-state-of-health awareness capabilities. Finally, the prototype shows potential for use in low-power, embedded, remote-operation nonproliferation security related applications.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Eos: conceptual design for a demonstrator of hybrid optical detector technology

Eos is a technology demonstrator, designed to explore the capabilities of hybrid event detection technology, leveraging both Cherenkov and scintillation light simultaneously. With a fiducial mass of four tons, Eos is designed to operate in a high-precision regime, with sufficient size to utilize time-of-flight information for full event reconstruction, flexibility to demonstrate a range of cutting edge technologies, and simplicity of design to facilitate potential future deployment at alternative sites. Results from Eos can inform the design of future neutrino detectors for both fundamental physics and nonproliferation applications. This paper describes the conceptual design and potential applications of the Eos

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Defining the Synthetic Biology Supply Chain

In this article, a team of experts in synthetic biology, data analytics, and national security describe the overall supply chain surrounding synthetic biology. The team analyzes selected interactions within that network to better understand the risks raised by synthetic biology and identifies opportunities for risk mitigation. To introduce the concept, the article will briefly describe how an understanding of supply chains has been important in promoting nuclear nonproliferation objectives. The article concludes by assessing the structure and networks identified in the supply chains to reveal potential opportunities for future biodefense research and development; options for additional information exchange; and means to interdict, detect, or deter suspicious activity.

nuclear supply chain↗

Discriminating Uranium Isotopes Using the Time-Emission Profiles of Long-Lived Delayed Neutrons

In nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards, detecting and accurately characterizing special nuclear material remains one of the greatest challenges. Uranium enrichment determination is typically achieved by measuring the ratio of characteristic γ -ray emissions from 235 U and 238 U. Fission also produces β -delayed neutrons, which have been used in the past to determine uranium enrichment from the time dependence of the long-lived delayed-neutron emission rate. Such measurements typically use moderated 3 He-tube detectors. We demonstrate an alternative measurement technique that employs a fast neutron active-interrogation probe and a scintillation detector to measure the enrichment of uranium using both the buildup and decay of β -delayed-neutron emission. Instead of 3 He tubes, a capture-based heterogeneous composite detector consisting of scintillating Li glass and polyvinyl toluene is constructed and used, offering a prospect to scale delayed-neutron measurements to larger detector sizes. Since the technique relies on the existing tabulated nuclear data, no calibration standards are required. It is shown that the buildup of delayed-neutron emission can be used to distinguish between uranium samples and infer the uranium enrichment level, with accuracy that rivals the method that employs the time-dependent decay of delayed-neutron emission.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Passive Low-Energy Nuclear-Recoil Detection with Color Centers

Crystal-damage events such as tracks and point defects have been used to record and detect radiation for a long time and recently they have been proposed as a means for dark-matter detection. Color centers can be read out optically and we propose a scheme based on selective plane illumination microscopy for micrometer-scale imaging of large volumes corresponding to kilogram mass detectors. This class of detectors would be passive and would operate at room temperature and we call this the passive low-energy optical color-center nuclear-recoil (PALEOCCENE) detection method. We apply these concepts to the detection of reactor neutrinos using coherent elastic neutrino nucleus scattering (CE ν NS). Crystal-damage formation energies are intrinsically on the order of 25 eV, resulting in similarly low nuclear-recoil thresholds. Furthermore, this would enable the observation of reactor-neutrino CE ν NS with detectors as small as 10 g. Additionally, a competitive search for spin-dependent dark-matter scattering down to a dark-matter mass of 0.3 GeV could be possible. Passive crystal detectors might also be attractive for nuclear-nonproliferation safeguards if used to monitor reactor power and to put limits on plutonium production. The passive nature and small footprint of the proposed detectors implies that these might fit well within accepted reactor-safeguards operations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Exclusion and Verification of Remote Nuclear Reactors with a 1-kiloton Gd -Doped Water Detector

To date, antineutrino experiments built for the purpose of demonstrating a nonproliferation capability have typically employed organic scintillators situated as close to the core as possible (typically at a distance of a few meters to tens of meters) and have not exceeded a few tons in size. One problem with this approach is that proximity to the reactor core requires accommodation by the host facility. Water Cherenkov detectors located offsite, at distances of a few kilometers or greater, may facilitate nonintrusive monitoring and verification of reactor activities over a large area. As the standoff distance increases, the detector target mass must scale accordingly. This paper quantifies the degree to which a kiloton-scale gadolinium-doped water Cherenkov detector can exclude the existence of undeclared reactors within a specified distance, and remotely detect the presence of a hidden reactor in the presence of declared reactors, by verifying the operational power and standoff distance using a Feldman-Cousins-based likelihood analysis. A 1-kton scale (fiducial) water Cherenkov detector can exclude gigawatt-scale nuclear reactors up to tens of kilometers within a year. In conclusion, when attempting to identify the specific range and power of a reactor, the detector energy resolution is not sufficient to delineate between the two.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Directional response of several geometries for reactor-neutrino detectors

Here we have modeled six abstracted detector designs, with the goal of determining their ability to resolve the direction to an antineutrino source, including two for which we have operational data for validating our computer modeling and analytical processes. We have found that the most promising options, regardless of scale and range, have angular resolutions on the order of a few degrees, which is better than any yet achieved in practice by a factor of at least two. We examine and compare several approaches to detector geometry for their ability not only to detect the inverse beta decay (IBD) reaction, but also to determine the source direction of incident antineutrinos. The information from these detectors provides insight into reactor power and burning profile, which is especially useful in constraining the clandestine production of weapons material. In a live deployment, a nonproliferation detector must be able to isolate the subject reactor, possibly from a field of much-larger power reactors; directional sensitivity can help greatly with this task. We also discuss implications for using such detectors in longer-distance observation of reactors, from a few kilometers to hundreds of kilometers.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Determining the average prompt-fission-neutron multiplicity for Pu 239 ( n , f ) via a Pu 240 ( α , α ' f ) surrogate reaction

The average prompt-fission-neutron multiplicity ν ¯ is of significance in the areas of nuclear theory, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear energy. In this work, the surrogate-reaction method has been used for the first time to indirectly determine ν ¯ for Pu 239 ( n , f ) via Pu 240 ( α , α ' f ) reactions. A Pu 240 target was bombarded with a beam of 53.9-MeV α particles. Scattered α particles, fission products, and neutrons were measured with the NeutronSTARS detector array. Values of ν ¯ were obtained for a continuous range of equivalent incident neutron energies between 0.25 and 26.25 MeV, and the results agree well with direct neutron measurements.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Microscopic calculation of fission product yields with particle-number projection

Fission fragments' charge and mass distribution is an important input to applications ranging from basic science to energy production or nuclear nonproliferation. In simulations of nucleosynthesis or calculations of superheavy elements, these quantities must be computed from models, as they are needed in nuclei where no experimental information is available. Until now, standard techniques to estimate these distributions were not capable of accounting for fine-structure effects, such as the odd-even staggering of the charge distributions. In this work, we combine a fully microscopic collective model of fission dynamics with a recent extension of the particle number projection formalism to provide the highest-fidelity prediction of the primary fission fragment distributions for the neutron-induced fission of 235 U and 239 Pu. Here, we show that particle-number projection is an essential ingredient to reproduce odd-even staggering in the charge yields and benchmark the performance of various empirical probability laws that could simulate its effect. This new approach also enables for the first time the realistic determination of two-dimensional isotopic yields within nuclear density functional theory.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Improved predictions of reactor antineutrino spectra

Precise predictions of the antineutrino spectra emitted by nuclear reactors is a key ingredient in measurements of reactor neutrino oscillations as well as in recent applications to the surveillance of power plants in the context of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We report new calculations including the latest information from nuclear databases and a detailed error budget. The first part of this work is the so-called ab initio approach where the total antineutrino spectrum is built from the sum of all {beta} branches of all fission products predicted by an evolution code. Systematic effects and missing information in nuclear databases lead to final relative uncertainties in the 10-20% range. A prediction of the antineutrino spectrum associated with the fission of {sup 238}U is given based on this ab initio method. For the dominant isotopes we developed a more accurate approach combining information from nuclear databases and reference electron spectra associated with the fission of {sup 235}U, {sup 239}Pu, and {sup 241}Pu, measured at Institut Laue-Langevin (ILL) in the 1980s. We show how the anchor point of the measured total {beta} spectra can be used to suppress the uncertainty in nuclear databases while taking advantage of all the information they contain. We provide new reference antineutrino spectra for {sup 235}U, {sup 239}Pu, and {sup 241}Pu isotopes in the 2-8 MeV range. While the shapes of the spectra and their uncertainties are comparable to those of the previous analysis of the ILL data, the normalization is shifted by about +3% on average. In the perspective of the reanalysis of past experiments and direct use of these results by upcoming oscillation experiments, we discuss the various sources of errors and their correlations as well as the corrections induced by off-equilibrium effects.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Expansion of the surrogate method to measure the prompt fission neutron multiplicity for Pu 241 [Prompt Fission Neutron Multiplicity for Pu-241 using the Surrogate Method]

Fission neutron multiplicity data are imperative for nuclear models that support criticality safety, nuclear nonproliferation, and stockpile stewardship. This work presents the first experimental measurement to determine the average neutron multiplicity ($\bar{ν}$) and the neutron multiplicity distribution using a surrogate reaction. 241 Pu has a short half-life of 14.3 yr. To circumvent experimental difficulties, inelastic scattering of 53.96-MeV α particles on 242 Pu served as a surrogate for 241 Pu (n , f). The present text reports and discusses the average neutron multiplicity, in addition to the neutron multiplicity moments and distribution for equivalent neutron energies up to 20 MeV. Finally, the $\bar{ν}$ measured in this experiment agrees with previous measurements until 12 MeV, where discrepancies arise due to preequilibrium neutron emission.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗