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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Optimizing Fleet Operations in Automated Mobility Districts: Serving On-Demand Mobility with Automated Electric Shuttles

On-demand transportation services have seen a dramatic rise in the past decade, thanks to technology. Connected and automated vehicle (CAV) technology holds potential for a major transformation in the on-demand mobility services landscape.The timeline for fully automated vehicles (AVs) to reach the critical market share is still uncertain. In the short term, many cities in the United States and abroad are testing low-speed automated electric shuttles (AES) as a shared on-demand mobility service in geo-fenced regions. An automated mobility district (AMD) is a campus-sized implementation of connected/automated vehicle technology to realize the full benefits of a fully electric automated mobility service within a confined region or district. Building on this concept, an AMD toolkit is under development at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to inform a campus-or district-sized implementation in which automated electric shuttles (AES). This research extends the functionality of the AMD toolkit by developing a mathematical program to optimize the operations of an AES fleet in an on-demand service configuration.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2019

Automated Mobility Districts Toolkit

On-demand transportation services have seen a dramatic rise in the past decade, thanks to technology. Connected and automated vehicle (CAV) technology holds potential for a major transformation in the on-demand mobility services landscape.The timeline for fully automated vehicles (AVs) to reach the critical market share is still uncertain. In the short term, many cities in the United States and abroad are testing low-speed automated electric shuttles (AES) as a shared on-demand mobility service in geo-fenced regions. This presentation provides information about the development of the Automated Mobility District (AMD) Toolkit, which features an assortment of modeling and simulation capabilities. An AMD is a campus-sized implementation of connected and automated vehicle technologies that realize all the benefits of a fully electric automated mobility service within a confined region or district.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Determining a location and size of a gas source with a spectrometer gas monitor

A process for determining a location and size of a gas source within an area with a spectrometer gas monitor includes: providing the spectrometer gas monitor; performing fence line monitoring of the area with the spectrometer gas monitor; collecting spectroscopic data over multiple open paths around the area with the spectrometer gas monitor; measuring atmospheric conditions along gas inflows and gas outflows of the area; subtracting a background for a selected gas from the spectroscopic data; applying a boundary constraint to the spectroscopic data; determining an atmospheric concentration of air entering the area; applying bootstrapping to the spectroscopic data; applying zero minimum elimination to the spectroscopic data; and producing inversion data from the spectroscopic data to determine the location and size of the gas source within the area.

03 NATURAL GAS↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Decision Support Tool for Planning Neighborhood-Scale Deployment of Low-Speed Shared Automated Shuttles

Increasing interest and investment in connected, automated, and electric vehicles, and mobility-as-a-service concepts are paving the way for the next major shift in transportation through automated and shared mobility. The initial excitement towards rapid deployment and adoption of automated vehicles has subsided, and low-speed automated shuttles are emerging as a more pragmatic pathway for introducing automated mobility in geo-fenced districts. Such shuttles hold the promise to provide a viable alternative for serving short trips in urban districts with high travel densities. As interest in low-speed automated shuttle systems (to improve urban mobility) increases, the need for tools that can inform communities regarding benefits or dis-benefits of automated shuttle deployments is imminent. However, most of the existing transportation planning and simulation tools are not capable of handling emerging shared automated mobility options. This presentation presents a microscopic simulation toolkit that can be used by cities and communities to plan for the deployment of low-speed automated shuttles systems, as well as other shared mobility options. Labeled as the Automated Mobility District (AMD) modeling and simulation toolkit, the proposed decision support tool can help cities evaluate the mobility and sustainability impacts of deploying shared automated vehicles in geofenced regions. This paper presents a description of the toolkit, as well as a sample scenario analysis for the deployment of low-speed automated shuttles in Greenville, South Carolina. Results from the scenario study demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed simulation toolkit in planning for advanced mobility systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2019

ADVANCING THE TRANSPORTATION – SECURITY, TRACKING, AND REPORTING (T-STAR) SYSTEM

The Transportation – Security, Tracking and Reporting (T-STAR) System was developed by NNSA NA-21 Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for use during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material to provide detection and tracking capability for shipments. While many off the shelf systems provide asset tracking of the conveyance, few offer detection of a breach into the cargo compartment or the removal of cargo from the conveyance. Systems that do offer such capability need to be permanently installed on the conveyance, requiring drilling of holes and running of cables throughout the conveyance itself. This means that dedicated shipping containers or vehicles are required, and this is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building capacity for the security of radioactive materials in use, storage, and in transport. T-STAR is leveraging various ORNL technologies for improved communications capability and reduced power requirements; the multimode communications module developed by the Unmanned Aerial Systems group and the low power and extensible Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS) tag developed for the US Department of Energy’s Packaging Certification Program provide a small footprint tracking system which can be installed quickly as needed. T-STAR uses a cellular and an Iridium modem to communicate configuration and alert information to a server used to monitor the shipment and incorporates a Z-wave © wireless security system allowing various intrusion detection sensors to be located in the conveyance. The Z-wave sensors are readily available, inexpensive, and power efficient, making them replaceable and low maintenance. The server software be configured as a standalone system installed on a light duty computer hosted by the competent authority, carrier, or response agency, or hosted as part of an Amazon Cloud Server (AWS) accessible via a secure login. The server has two functions, first is to handle messages to/from the T-STAR field unit, second is to host the user interface which can be accessed using a web browser on desktop or mobile device. The user interface implements roles to determine the level of access to shipment information, define geo-fences, and configure notifications. The user interface also supports multiple languages for display as well as notifications by using a simple lookup file which can be modified by the host country to ensure translations are correct and meaningful to responders receiving notifications and alerts. This paper will detail the overarching T-STAR capabilities, architecture and components, and provide insights on how it is deployed, used, and monitored during transportation of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2020

Modeling and Simulation of Automated Mobility Districts

Increasing interest and investment in connected, automated, and electric vehicles (CAEVs), and mobility-as-a-service (MaaS) concepts are paving the way for the next major shift in transportation through automated and shared mobility. The initial excitement towards rapid deployment and adoption of automated vehicles has subsided, and low-speed automated shuttles are emerging as a more pragmatic pathway for introducing automated mobility in geo-fenced districts. Such shuttles hold the promise to provide a viable alternative for serving short trips in urban districts with high travel densities. As interest in low-speed automated shuttle systems (to improve urban mobility) increases, the need for tools that can inform communities regarding benefits or dis-benefits of automated shuttle deployments is imminent. However, most of the existing transportation planning and simulation tools are not capable of handling emerging shared automated mobility options. This presentation provide the details of a microscopic simulation toolkit that can be used by cities and communities to plan for the deployment of low-speed automated shuttles systems, as well as other shared mobility options. Labeled as Automated Mobility District (AMD) modeling and simulation toolkit, the proposed decision support tool intends to help cities evaluate the mobility and sustainability impacts of deploying shared automated vehicles in geofenced regions.The AMD modeling and simulation task is funded through DOE's SMART Mobility Consortium. This presentation outlines the progress of the AMD modeling and simulation task in FY19, including case studies conducted in Greenville, SC, and Austin, TX.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Systems and Implementation: Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into Physical Protection Systems at Fixed Sites and During Transportation

Physical protection systems, and response forces in particular, are designed to prevent an adversary from successfully completing a malevolent act against a facility or transport operations. Timely detection and assessment of any potential adversary action against a target is an essential element of materials security. The timely detection and assessment must then be followed-up by a capable and timely response that might be enhanced with the additional situational awareness provided by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration Office of International Nuclear Security has been exploring capabilities provided by UAS to support response force operations within the physical protection system. UAS have the potential to provide response force commanders and operators with situational awareness in assessing adversary locations and actions as well as the locations of responders. UAS may be utilized for area searches ahead of responder pathways to identify potential threats and to provide situational awareness of areas not normally covered by cameras (such as areas outside the fence line outside at fixed facilities). In addition, UAS can provide real-time information to transportation convoy teams that pass through constantly changing public access environments. This paper will provide operational recommendations to be addressed when integrating UAS into existing physical protection systems at fixed sites and during transport. Recommendations will include aspects of the following: needs analysis; tactics and techniques to support detection and assessment as well as response force deployment; remote pilot selection, qualifications, training, and currency; UAS selection criteria; UAS laws and regulations; possible cost sharing with other facility operations; and on-scene emergency management.

Stockwell, Brandon↗
DOE OSTI2022

Geothermal Reserve Pits: Considerations for Installation on BLM-Administered Lands

Reserve pits, also known as sumps, are a common aspect of geothermal drilling operations. This paper describes the Bureau of Land Management's regulatory authorities and key environmental considerations associated with geothermal reserve pits. Reserve pit design, the need for environmental compliance measures, and reclamation approaches will vary depending on site-specific conditions. Groundwater and wildlife impacts are the most common environmental considerations related to reserve pits. In some cases, regulations or groundwater or soil conditions necessitate the use of a synthetic liner. However, the chemical composition of most geothermal drilling fluids and muds, completion fluids, and produced fluids that are discharged to reserve pits does not warrant pit liners. The potential for hazardous fluids, high water temperatures, and entrapment are concerns for wildlife. Common wildlife impact avoidance and mitigation measures include fencing, netting, and escape ramps. The need for these measures depends on localized site and environmental conditions. There are requirements to reclaim reserve pits following geothermal drilling operations. Reserve pits often remain in place to accommodate multiple phases of drilling and well testing. They are eventually backfilled and decommissioned.

BLM↗
DOE OSTI2012

Overview of the Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor building layout

The Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor (SMR) is an 800 MWt (>225 MWe) integral pressurized water reactor (iPWR), in which all of the components typically associated with the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) of a nuclear power plant are incorporated within a single reactor pressure vessel. This paper is the third in a series of four papers, which describe the design and functionality of the Westinghouse SMR. It focuses in particular upon the plant building layout and modular design of the Westinghouse SMR. In the development of small modular reactors, the building layout is an area where the safety of the plant can be improved by applying new design approaches. This paper will present an overview of the Westinghouse SMR building layout and indicate how the design features improve the safety and robustness of the plant. The Westinghouse SMR is designed with no shared systems between individual reactor units. The main buildings inside the security fence are the nuclear island, the rad-waste building, the annex building, and the turbine building. All safety related equipment is located in the nuclear island, which is a seismic class 1 building. To further enhance the safety and robustness of the design, the reactor, containment, and most of the safety related equipment are located below grade on the nuclear island. This reduces the possibility of severe damage from external threats or natural disasters. Two safety related ultimate heat sink (UHS) water tanks that are used for decay heat removal are located above grade, but are redundant and physically separated as far as possible for improved safety. The reactor and containment vessel are located below grade in the center of the nuclear island. The rad-waste and other radioactive systems are located on the bottom floors to limit the radiation exposure to personnel. The Westinghouse SMR safety trains are completely separated into four unconnected quadrants of the building, with access between quadrants only allowed above grade. This is an improvement to conventional reactor design since it prevents failures of multiple trains during floods or fires and other external events. The main control room is located below grade, with a remote shutdown room in a different quadrant. All defense in depth systems are placed on the nuclear island, primarily above grade, while the safety systems are located on lower floors. The economics of the Westinghouse SMR challenges the established approach of large Light Water Reactors (LWR) that utilized the economies of scale to reach economic competitiveness. To serve the market expectation of smaller capital investment and cost competitive energy, a modular design approach is implemented within the Westinghouse SMR. The Westinghouse SMR building layout integrates the three basic design constraints of modularization; transportation, handling and module-joining technology. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Land Use Manager Application Ensures Protectiveness Following Remediation on the Oak Ridge Reservation - 13355

Long-term stewardship is the set of activities necessary to return contaminated land to safe and beneficial use. The activities include physical and legal controls to prevent inappropriate exposure to contamination left in place at a site. It is the longest phase of the Department of Energy's Environmental Management Program and ensures the protection of human health and the environment for varied end uses. At the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Reservation an automated program has been developed and implemented that tracks the multitude of long-term stewardship activities. The Oak Ridge Reservation is a large site that currently has over 50 actions requiring long-term stewardship activities. The Oak Ridge Reservation consists primarily of three plant sites, and long-term stewardship will enable these sites to be leased to private entities (East Tennessee Technology Park), modernized for an evolving national security mission (Y-12 National Security Complex), and revitalized to continue multi-disciplinary research (Oak Ridge National Laboratory). The varied site end uses of the individual plant sites coupled with the multitude of controls required by leaving waste in place presents challenges. A single remedial action may include surveillance and maintenance activities, media monitoring, property record notices as well as physical controls such as fences and signs. Thus, the array of long-term stewardship activities is complex and intermingled (over 200 inspections each year at various frequencies are required currently) and requires an effective tracking program, termed the Land Use Manager. The Land Use Manager is a web-based data management application for use by personnel responsible for implementing, maintaining, and verifying engineering and land use controls on the Oak Ridge Reservation. The program is a data entry and tracking tool, as well as a notification tool. The status and performance of engineering and land use controls are checked annually for evaluation in the required Remediation Effectiveness Report, and the automated Land Use Manager collects, maintains, tracks, notifies, monitors, and manages the information necessary to perform this evaluation. Land Use Manager tracks site information including type of contamination, regulatory requirements, locates land use controls; provides information on inspections, certification, and reporting; and provides reports. Most data access features, e.g., view, print, query, and download, are available to all users; however, data input, updating, and editing are restricted to the personnel directly responsible for monitoring and inspection. The Land Use Manager application was developed for the Department of Energy Oak Ridge Office by URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC, Restoration Services Incorporated, and MIJARA Corporation to meet the specific needs of long-term stewardship tracking on the Oak Ridge Reservation. The successful implementation of long-term stewardship enables the future government and private activities being planned on the Oak Ridge Reservation to proceed. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2013

Achieving Accelerated Cleanup of Cesium Contaminated Stream at the Savannah River Site; Collaboration between Stakeholders, Regulators, and the Federal Government - 13182

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina that contains six primary stream/river systems. The Lower Three Runs Stream (LTR) is one of the primary streams within the site that is located in the southeast portion of the Savannah River Site and is a large black water stream system that originates in the northeast portion of SRS and follows a southerly direction before it enters the Savannah River. During reactor operations, secondary reactor cooling water, storm sewer discharges, and miscellaneous wastewater was discharged and contaminated a 36 kilometer stretch of Lower Three Runs Stream that narrows providing a limited buffer of US DOE property along the stream and flood plain. Based on data collected during 2009 and 2010 under Recover Act Funding, the stream was determined to be contaminated with cesium-137 at levels that exceeded acceptable risk based limits. As efficiencies were realized within the SRS Recovery Act Program, funding was made available to design, permit and execute remediation of the LTR. This accelerated Project allowed for the remediation of 36 kilometers of LTR in only nine months from inception to completion, contributing significantly to the Foot Print Reduction of SRS. The scope consisted of excavation and disposal of more than 2064 cubic meters of contaminated soil, and installing 11 kilometers of fence and 2,000 signs at 1000 locations. Confirmatory sampling and analysis, and radiological surveying were performed demonstrating that soil concentrations met the cleanup goals. The project completed with a very good safety record considering the harsh conditions including, excessive rain in the early stages of the project, high summer temperatures, swampy terrain, snakes, wild boar, insects and dense vegetation. The regulatory approval process was compressed by over 75% and required significant efforts from SRS's stakeholders including the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), and the public including local property owners and the SRS Citizens Advisory Board. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the up-front planning in order to achieve this challenging cleanup. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Lower Three Runs Remediation Safety Preparation Strategy - 13318

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina that contains six primary stream/river systems. The Lower Three Runs Stream (LTR) is one of the primary streams within the site that is located in the southeast portion of the Savannah River Site. It is a large blackwater stream system that originates in the northeast portion of SRS and follows a southerly direction before it enters the Savannah River. During reactor operations, secondary reactor cooling water, storm sewer discharges, and miscellaneous wastewater was discharged and contaminated a 20 mile stretch of Lower Three Runs Stream that narrows and provides a limited buffer of US DOE property along the stream and flood-plain. Based on data collected during the years 2009 and 2010 under American Recovery and Re-investment Act funding, the stream was determined to be contaminated with cesium-137 at levels that exceeded acceptable risk based limits. In agreement with the Environmental Protection Agency and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, three areas were identified for remediation [1] (SRNS April 2012). A comprehensive safety preparation strategy was developed for safe execution of the LTR remediation project. Contract incentives for safety encouraged the contractor to perform a complete evaluation of the work and develop an implementation plan to perform the work. The safety coverage was controlled to ensure all work was observed and assessed by one person per work area within the project. This was necessary due to the distances between the fence work and three transects being worked, approximately 20 miles. Contractor Management field observations were performed along with DOE assessments to ensure contractor focus on safe performance of the work. Dedicated ambulance coverage for remote worker work activities was provided. This effort was augmented with access to medical evacuation services. The areas where the work was performed were remote and difficult to get emergency vehicles to in a timely manner in case of an accident. Satellite phones were utilized due to intermittent phone coverage. High visibility vests were utilized to enable any hunters in the area to see the workers; due to the limited buffer areas along the stream route. An innovative approach to providing the necessary protection for workers during periods of extreme heat and humidity was also employed, which included the use of 'heat islands' with fans and crew trailers and ice vests for workers. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

The Revised WIPP Passive Institutional Controls Program - A Conceptual Plan - 13145

The Department of Energy/Carlsbad Field Office (DOE/CBFO) is responsible for managing all activities related to the disposal of TRU and TRU-mixed waste in the geologic repository, 650 m below the land surface, at WIPP, near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The main function of the Passive Institutional Controls (PIC's) program is to inform future generations of the long-lived radioactive wastes buried beneath their feet in the desert. For the first 100 years after cessation of disposal operations, the rooms are closed and the shafts leading underground sealed, WIPP is mandated by law to institute Active Institutional Controls (AIC's) with fences, gates, and armed guards on patrol. At this same time a plan must be in place of how to warn/inform the future, after the AIC's are gone, of the consequences of intrusion into the geologic repository disposal area. A plan was put into place during the 1990's with records management and storage, awareness triggers, permanent marker design concepts and testing schedules. This work included the thoughts of expert panels and individuals. The plan held up under peer review and met the requirements of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Today the NEA is coordinating a study called the 'Preservation of Records, Knowledge and Memory (RK and M) Across Generations' to provide the international nuclear waste repository community with a guide on how a nuclear record archive programs should be approached and developed. CBFO is cooperating and participating in this project and will take what knowledge is gained and apply that to the WIPP program. At the same time CBFO is well aware that the EPA and others are expecting DOE to move forward with planning for the future WIPP PIC's program; so a plan will be in place in time for WIPP's closure slated for the early 2030's. The DOE/CBFO WIPP PIC's program in place today meets the regulatory criteria, but complete feasibility of implementation is questionable, and may not be in conformance with the international guidance being developed. International guidance currently under development may suggest that the inter-generational equity principle strives to warn the future, however, in doing so not to unduly burden present generations. Building markers and monuments that are out of proportion to the risk being presented to the future is not in keeping with generational equity. With this in mind the DOE/CBFO is developing conceptual plans for re-evaluating and revising the current WIPP PIC's program. These conceptual plans will suggest scientific and technical work that must be completed to develop a 'new' PICs program that takes the best ideas of the present plan, blended with new ideas from the RK and M project, and proposed alternative permanent markers designs and materials in consideration. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Non-Operational Property Evaluation for the Hanford Site River Corridor - 12409

The Hanford Site River Corridor consists of the former reactor areas of the 100 Areas and the former industrial (fuel processing) area in the 300 Area. Most of the waste sites are located close to the decommissioned reactors or former industrial facilities along the Columbia River. Most of the surface area of the River Corridor consists of land with little or no subsurface infrastructure or indication of past or present releases of hazardous constituents, and is referred to as non-operational property or non-operational area. Multiple lines of evidence have been developed to assess identified fate and transport mechanisms and to evaluate the potential magnitude and significance of waste site-related contaminants in the non-operational area. Predictive modeling was used for determining the likelihood of locating waste sites and evaluating the distribution of radionuclides in soil based on available soil concentration data and aerial radiological surveys. The results of this evaluation indicated: 1) With the exception of stack emissions, transport pathways associated with waste site contaminants are unlikely to result in dispersion of contaminants in soil away from operational areas, 2) Stack emissions that may have been associated with Hanford Site operations generally emitted short-lived and/or gaseous radionuclides, and (3) the likelihood of detecting elevated radionuclide concentrations or other waste sites in non-operational area soils is very small. The overall conclusions from the NPE evaluation of the River Corridor are: - With the exception of stack emissions to the air, transport pathways associated with waste site contaminants are unlikely to result in dispersion of contaminants in soil away from operational areas. While pathways such as windblown dust, overland transport and biointrusion have the potential for dispersing waste site contaminants, the resulting transport is unlikely to result in substantial contamination in non-operational areas. - Stack emissions that may have been associated with Hanford Site operations generally emitted short-lived and/or gaseous radionuclides; these radionuclides either would have decayed and would be undetectable in soil, or likely would not have deposited onto Hanford Site soils. A small fraction of the total historical emissions consisted of long-lived particulate radionuclides, which could have deposited onto the soil. Soil monitoring studies conducted as part of surveillance and monitoring programs do not indicate a build-up of radionuclide concentrations in soil, which might indicate potential deposition impacts from stack emissions. Aerial radiological surveys of the Hanford Site, while effective in detecting gamma-emitting nuclides, also do not indicate deposition patterns in soil from stack emissions. - The surveillance and monitoring programs also have verified that the limited occurrence of biointrusion observed in the River Corridor has not resulted in a spread of contamination into the non-operational areas. - Monitoring of radionuclides in ambient air conducted as part of the surveillance and monitoring programs generally show a low and declining trend of detected concentrations in air. Monitoring of radionuclides in soil and vegetation correspondingly show declining trends in concentrations, particularly for nuclides with short half lives (Cs-137, Co-60 and Sr-90). - Statistical analysis of the geographical distribution of waste sites based on man -made features and topography describes the likely locations of waste sites in the River Corridor. The results from this analysis reinforce the findings from the Orphan Site Evaluation program, which has systematically identified any remaining waste sites within the River Corridor. - Statistical analysis of the distribution of radionuclide concentrations observable from aerial surveys has confirmed that the likelihood of detecting elevated radionuclide concentrations in non-operational area soils is very small; the occurrences and locations where potentially elevated concentrations may be found are discussed below. In addition, statistical analysis showed that there is a relatively high probability (>50%) that concentrations of Cs-137 higher than background (3.9 Bq/kg or 1.05 pCi/g) are located outside of the operational portion of the 100-BC, 100-K, and 100-N Areas. This observation is based on modeled concentrations in soil derived from aerial radiography data. However, the extent is limited to a few meters from the respective facilities fence lines or known operational activities. Evaluation of the extent of contamination is being conducted as part of the RI process for each decision area. No unanticipated waste sites were identified either from the OSE program or statistical analysis of waste site proximity to known features. Based on the evaluation of these multiple lines of evidence, the likelihood of identifying waste sites or contaminant dispersal from Hanford site operations into non-operational areas can be considered very small. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Post-closure program streamlining at the Nevada national security site - 15290

More than 200 sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), and Tonopah Test Range (TTR) have been closed in place. At these sites, contamination has been left in place, and protection of human health, safety, and the environment is ensured through the establishment of use restrictions (URs). Post-closure requirements were initially established in the Closure Report (CR) for each site and include a variety of inspection, monitoring, maintenance, and reporting commitments. Post-closure requirements and site controls (fences, monuments, soil covers, and postings) may vary depending on site location, accessibility, land use scenario, and the nature of contaminants left in place. Corrective Action Sites (CASs) on the NNSS, NTTR, and TTR have been identified for closure under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), which was signed in 1996. Over 1,900 CASs have been closed under the framework of the FFACO, and more than 200 of those have URs. Many post-closure requirements have been modified over time. In addition, because the scope of the program has spanned almost 20 years, the post-closure requirements have varied due to changing strategies and expectations. Because of the number of sites closed over the course of the program, post-closure requirements are found in hundreds of closure documents, addendums, errata sheets, Records of Technical Change, inspection reports, permit modifications, and correspondence. Furthermore, resources such as personnel and funding necessary to conduct the post-closure program have diminished, while computer capabilities and configuration control principles have improved since closure activities under the FFACO began. Because of these factors, to effectively manage the post-closure program, ensure that all commitments are being met, and improve the ease of identifying the most current post-closure requirements for each UR, the current requirements for every use-restricted site under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office will be consolidated into a single Post-Closure Plan. The Consolidated Post-Closure Plan will also outline a strategy and present possible criteria that may be used for future evaluation of post-closure requirements. Continual assessment of the post-closure program will ensure that the post-closure requirements for URs across the NNSS, NTTR, and TTR are consistently justifiable and sufficient to protect site workers, the public, and the environment while increasing efficiency. Future changes to post-closure requirements and justification for those changes will be recorded in revisions to the Consolidated Post-Closure Plan. This process will provide a comprehensive, consistent, and streamlined method for evaluation of post-closure requirements and implementation of changes. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2015

Fate and transport of contaminants at soils sites - 15512

As part of the Soils Activity of the Environmental Management Operations at the NNSA, Nevada Field Office, radionuclide-contaminated Soils sites will undergo regulatory closure in accordance with the 1996 Nevada Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order. One closure alternative that has been evaluated for each Soils site has been -closure-in-place- with fencing and posting, along with administrative controls. However, potential disturbance agents for radionuclide-contaminated soils left in place are possible erosion and transport by wind and water. Previous work with radionuclide-contaminated soils has indicated that the highest activity levels of Pu tend to be found in the fine sands, silts, or clays, which are the most likely particle sizes to be transported by wind re-suspension, and by runoff flow events. Monitoring and sampling stations have been deployed at specific Soils sites to collect meteorological data, airborne particulate filter samples, and both suspended and bed-load sediment transport samples during and after runoff flow events, as needed. The primary objective of the air monitoring and sampling stations is to evaluate whether there is wind transport of radionuclide-contaminated soils from Soils sites. The primary objective of the precipitation and runoff flow data collection, as well as both suspended and bed-load sediment sampling, is to determine during which rainfall events (i.e., precipitation return interval, duration, and intensity) radionuclide-contaminated soils are likely to be transported. The NNSS continues to demonstrate compliance with US DOE Order 458.1 for the Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, as reported in annual environmental reports. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Radioactive contamination from 1920-50's at an urban site of the New York City and interim remedial action - 15630

The former Wolff-Alport Chemical Company operated at the location in densely populated urban area in Queens, New York, between 1920 to about 1954. The company imported, stored on-site and processed monazite sand ores from the Belgium Congo. The extracted refined products enriched in rare-earth metals were sold on the commercial market. The process residues, rich in thorium and its progeny, were originally disposed of directly to the city sewer line and probably on-site also. The site's buildings are currently occupied by the auto shops, corner delicatessen store, light construction company, ice maker/distributor, and two residential apartments. Preliminary site investigations found multiple areas with elevated levels of direct gamma radiation with the maximum reported rates of 22 micro-sievert/hour (2.2 milli-rem/hour) at surface level and 40 micro-sievert/hour (4 milli-rem/hour) inside sewer manhole access. The thoron (Rn-220) gas air concentration in outdoor areas was reported reaching 13.5 kBq/m{sup 3} (366 pCi/L) and the radon (Rn-222) gas air concentrations was reported exceeding 148 Bq/ m{sup 3} (4 pCi/L) in some buildings. The dose assessments indicated that, under realistic scenarios, some members of the public were likely to receive the radiation exposure from this contamination in excess of the New York City and Nuclear Regulatory Commission general public radiation dose limit of 1 milli-sievert /yr (100 milli-rem/yr). The interim remedial action was planned and conducted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) Region 2 in close cooperation with the New York City and New York State in 2012-13. The purpose of the action was to take necessary interim measures to reduce annual public dose below limit of 1 milli-sievert/yr (100 milli-rem/yr) and reduce radon gas concentration levels in impacted indoor spaces below U.S. EPA Action Level for residencies of 148 Bq/ m{sup 3} (4 pCi/L). In order to achieve these goals, the following actions were taken: detailed radiological and occupancy surveys; development of realistic exposure scenarios; dose assessments; installation of the fence and gates around the 'backyard' portion of the site; vegetation removal; development and detailed assessment of the radiation shielding options; application of the multilayer radiation shielding in some buildings, portions of the sidewalk and unpaved areas; mitigation of radon/thoron gas entry point; and installation of the radon mitigation system in one of the buildings. The preliminary post-action analyses indicated that the action goal would likely be achieved. The interim remedial action was conducted in a tight urban setting; it has significantly reduced public health risk from radiation without closure of businesses that continued operating within the site perimeter. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2019

Erosion Control Measures at Oak Ridge Reservation Landfills Oak Ridge, Tennessee - 19190

URS-CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) manages the cleanup of the 2,200-acre East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) for its client, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The ETTP was contaminated with radioactive, hazardous and industrial wastes generated by more than 40 years of national defense and energy missions. In disposing of low-level radioactive and other wastes from demolition activities, the UCOR approach relies on the availability of onsite facilities to streamline disposal, reduce costs and enhance cleanup schedules while confining shipments and related hazards onsite. The sanitary/industrial waste facility, known as the Oak Ridge Reservation Landfill Facility (ORRLF) is a solid waste operation that receives and disposes of sanitary/industrial, construction/demolition and classified, special waste; and spoil materials types of waste generated at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge facilities. ETTP is the primary generator; however, the landfill accepts waste from Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), Oak Ridge National Laboratory and other DOE prime contractors in the Oak Ridge area. ORRLF's mission is to receive nonhazardous, non-radioactive, and non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)-regulated solid wastes. Approved operations include receiving, compacting, and covering wastes; leachate management, site drainage; erosion control and prevention, inspections, maintenance and recording keeping. The Oak Ridge Reservation has three separate State of Tennessee-permitted active landfills (Landfill IV, Landfill V, and Landfill VII) that meet different disposal needs -- classified industrial waste, industrial waste that includes office trash and cafeteria waste, and construction and demolition debris,. As with a typical landfill, strategic waste placement and covering involves moving a lot of soil, usually resulting in large areas of exposed land. After increased sediment was noted in streams following heavy rains, a concerted erosion prevention and sediment control effort began in 2017. While not uncommon for landfills, the ORRLF staff knew they could do better in controlling sediment. In response, the ORRLF staff developed an approach of aggressive revegetation, ditch improvements and other erosion controls. Staff developed a list of all the areas that needed the most attention and requested resources. UCOR management arranged funding for needed improvements. The oldest of the three landfills is Industrial Landfill IV, which opened in 1989 and has an expected remaining 60 years of life. Therefore, how the landfills are maintained/managed today directly affects the compliance posture, the capacity, and the infrastructure in the future. A systematic, aggressive and multi-pronged approach was taken to address the major concerns first, then continue with longer-term, and/or lower priority projects. Buy-in was obtained from both craft and supervision, resulting in approaches like 'Ditch of the Month'. In addition, management support at the highest levels has provided resources and recognition that further fuels progress. After working on the site for the past year, what used to be exposed brown hills looks more like a golf course now. Now that the grass is established and other erosion controls are in place, the amount of sediment leaving the site has been reduced, and the appearance of the landfills is improved. Vegetation dissipates the kinetic energy from rain droplets while the root system helps hold the soil in place, and wire-reinforced silt fences and straw wattles have greatly improved erosion control. Improved ditches reduce the runoff velocities allowing sediments to fall out of suspension in the stormwater before they reach the receiving waters, and structures are in place to let finer sediment settle in ponds rather than going downstream. In addition, the project has added more stone to roadways to minimize tracking dirt down the road as an average of 20 to 40 trucks per day enter and leave the site. Ongoing landfill erosion and sediment control must be funded and maintained continually. The lack of attention to either resource will negatively affect the condition of the landfill fairly quickly. Constant compliance commitment is necessary to ensure protection to the environment, the operator/workers and the public. Operations must include sediment control, pond maintenance and clean out, road maintenance and construction, erosion prevention, seeps repair, leachate management, landfill expansion, mowing and grounds upkeep and much more. Knowledgeable/experience staff is also crucial. Knowing how to build lifts, create leachate drainage windows, respond to high rains events, compact waste will impact operations today and future operations into the closure / post closure periods. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗