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At least 451 records · Page 25

Next Generation Wiring

Wiring is a major operational component on aerospace hardware that accounts for substantial weight and volumetric space. Over time wire insulation can age and fail, often leading to catastrophic events such as system failure or fire. The next generation of wiring must be reliable and sustainable over long periods of time. These features will be achieved by the development of a wire insulation capable of autonomous self-healing that mitigates failure before it reaches a catastrophic level. In order to develop a self-healing insulation material, three steps must occur. First, methods of bonding similar materials must be developed that are capable of being initiated autonomously. This process will lead to the development of a manual repair system for polyimide wire insulation. Second, ways to initiate these bonding methods that lead to materials that are similar to the primary insulation must be developed. Finally, steps one and two must be integrated to produce a material that has no residues from the process that degrades the insulating properties of the final repaired insulation. The self-healing technology, teamed with the ability to identify and locate damage, will greatly improve reliability and safety of electrical wiring of critical systems. This paper will address these topics, discuss the results of preliminary testing, and remaining development issues related to self-healing wire insulation.

Medelius, Petro↗

Can Cell to Cell Thermal Runaway Propagation be Prevented in a Li-ion Battery Module?

Increasing cell spacing decreased adjacent cell damage center dotElectrically connected adjacent cells drained more than physically adjacent cells center dotRadiant barrier prevents propagation when fully installed between BP cells center dotBP cells vent rapidly and expel contents at 100% SOC -Slower vent with flame/smoke at 50% -Thermal runaway event typically occurs at 160 degC center dotLG cells vent but do not expel contents -Thermal runaway event typically occurs at 200 degC center dotSKC LFP modules did not propagate; fuses on negative terminal of cell may provide a benefit in reducing cell to cell damage propagation. New requirement in NASA-Battery Safety Requirements document: JSC 20793 Rev C 5.1.5.1 Requirements - Thermal Runaway Propagation a. For battery designs greater than a 80-Wh energy employing high specific energy cells (greater than 80 watt-hours/kg, for example, lithium-ion chemistries) with catastrophic failure modes, the battery shall be evaluated to ascertain the severity of a worst-case single-cell thermal runaway event and the propensity of the design to demonstrate cell-to-cell propagation in the intended application and environment. NASA has traditionally addressed the threat of thermal runaway incidents in its battery deployments through comprehensive prevention protocols. This prevention-centered approach has included extensive screening for manufacturing defects, as well as robust battery management controls that prevent abuse-induced runaway even in the face of multiple system failures. This focused strategy has made the likelihood of occurrence of such an event highly improbable. b. The evaluation shall include all necessary analysis and test to quantify the severity (consequence) of the event in the intended application and environment as well as to identify design modifications to the battery or the system that could appreciably reduce that severity. In addition to prevention protocols, programs developing battery designs with catastrophic failure modes should take the steps necessary to assess the severity of a possible thermal runaway event. Programs should assess whether there are reasonable design changes that could appreciably affect the severity of the outcome. Evaluation should include environmental effects to surrounding hardware (i.e., temperature, pressure, shock), contamination effects due to any expelled contaminates, and venting propulsive effects when venting overboard.

Jeevarajan, Judith↗

International Space Station (ISS) Plasma Contactor Unit (PCU) Utilization Plan Assessment Update

The International Space Station (ISS) vehicle undergoes spacecraft charging as it interacts with Earth's ionosphere and magnetic field. The interaction can result in a large potential difference developing between the ISS metal chassis and the local ionosphere plasma environment. If an astronaut conducting extravehicular activities (EVA) is exposed to the potential difference, then a possible electrical shock hazard arises. The control of this hazard was addressed by a number of documents within the ISS Program (ISSP) including Catastrophic Safety Hazard for Astronauts on EVA (ISS-EVA-312-4A_revE). The safety hazard identified the risk for an astronaut to experience an electrical shock in the event an arc was generated on an extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) surface. A catastrophic safety hazard, by the ISS requirements, necessitates mitigation by a two-fault tolerant system of hazard controls. Traditionally, the plasma contactor units (PCUs) on the ISS have been used to limit the charging and serve as a "ground strap" between the ISS structure and the surrounding ionospheric plasma. In 2009, a previous NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) team evaluated the PCU utilization plan (NESC Request #07-054-E) with the objective to assess whether leaving PCUs off during non-EVA time periods presented risk to the ISS through assembly completion. For this study, in situ measurements of ISS charging, covering the installation of three of the four photovoltaic arrays, and laboratory testing results provided key data to underpin the assessment. The conclusion stated, "there appears to be no significant risk of damage to critical equipment nor excessive ISS thermal coating damage as a result of eliminating PCU operations during non- EVA times." In 2013, the ISSP was presented with recommendations from Boeing Space Environments for the "Conditional" Marginalization of Plasma Hazard. These recommendations include a plan that would keep the PCUs off during EVAs when the space environment forecast input to the ISS charging model indicates floating potentials (FP) within specified limits. These recommendations were based on the persistence of conditions in the space environment due to the current low solar cycle and belief in the accuracy and completeness of the ISS charging model. Subsequently, a Noncompliance Report (NCR), ISS-NCR-232G, Lack of Two-fault Tolerance to EVA Crew Shock in the Low Earth Orbit Plasma Environment, was signed in September 2013 specifying new guidelines for the use of shock hazard controls based on a forecast of the space environment from ISS plasma measurements taken prior to the EVA [ISS-EVA-312-AC, 2012]. This NESC assessment re-evaluates EVA charging hazards through a process that is based on over 14 years of ISS operations, charging measurements, laboratory tests, EMU studies and modifications, and safety reports. The assessment seeks an objective review of the plasma charging hazards associated with EVA operations to determine if any of the present hazard controls can safely change the PCU utilization plan to allow more flexibility in ISS operations during EVA preparation and execution.

Hernandez-Pellerano, Amri↗

Radiation Failures in Intel 14nm Microprocessors

In this study the 14 nm Intel Broadwell 5th generation core series 5005U-i3 and 5200U-i5 was mounted on Dell Inspiron laptops, MSI Cubi and Gigabyte Brix barebones and tested with Windows 8 and CentOS7 at idle. Heavy-ion-induced hard- and catastrophic failures do not appear to be related to the Intel 14nm Tri-Gate FinFET process. They originate from a small (9 m 140 m) area on the 32nm planar PCH die (not the CPU) as initially speculated. The hard failures seem to be due to a SEE but the exact physical mechanism has yet to be identified. Some possibilities include latch-ups, charge ion trapping or implantation, ion channels, or a combination of those (in biased conditions). The mechanism of the catastrophic failures seems related to the presence of electric power (1.05V core voltage). The 1064 nm laser mimics ionization radiation and induces soft- and hard failures as a direct result of electron-hole pair production, not heat. The 14nm FinFET processes continue to look promising for space radiation environments.

Microprocessors↗

NASA's Ground-Based Observing Campaigns of Rocket Bodies with the UKIRT and NASA ES-MCAT Telescopes

Rocket bodies comprise a class of human-made space debris that are at the same time essential for launching every spacecraft from the Earth, but are also a significant source of debris both as intact objects, as well as fragmented debris. Unspent fuel has been long theorized as a potential cause of catastrophic rocket body break-ups. Given typical orbital speeds range from approximately 2-3 kilometers per second at Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) and up to 15 kilometers per second in low Earth orbit (LEO), collisions with uncatalogued and undetected debris can also cause catastrophic breakups. Understanding break-ups is a necessary step in preventing them, and one key step in that process is to correlate and characterize daughter fragments with their parent bodies. Two very different methods include (1) conducting photometric surveys to correlate an object's motion and orbital elements to the parent body, and (2) characterizing what materials comprise the target to determine whether those materials are consistent with the parent body or like objects. With this in mind, photometric data were taken shortly after the breakup of one rocket body for short-term orbital studies, and a suite of spectral data were taken of rocket bodies that are fully intact to compare with debris, for characterization studies. Targets included Titan Transtage, Briz-M, and Ariane rocket bodies and debris. Spectra of each sub-class of rocket body were very similar within their rocket body type, but differed distinctly from one type to the next, supporting the effectiveness of this approach.

Lederer, Susan M.↗

Fracture Control for Additively Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

This paper describes how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to “fracture critical” additively manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing NASA standards and is required on all human-rated space structures. As legacy spacecraft structures have been built using primarily metallic and composite materials manufactured using well established methods, guidance for application of fracture control to parts composed of these material types has been established and is documented in several NASA requirements. Additive manufactured structures offer advantages in design flexibility and manufacturing efficiency and as a result are expected to continue to be used more and more in the future. Recently, relevant guidance has been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control are not addressed yet in any requirements or guidance document. While use of additive manufactured parts in non-critical scenarios may be of relatively low concern in current structural certification processes, there is a need for new fracture control guidance in order to use and certify additively manufacture hardware that is “fracture critical” where failure of the part may result in loss of life or loss of vehicle. Assurance of damage tolerance, i.e., that as-built flaws in a given part either do not exist or will not grow to become catastrophic, is of particular interest to the fracture control community. This poses a challenge due to the fact that damage tolerance behavior is not well understood in additive manufactured parts compared to legacy material types and manufacturing techniques. The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large. Different hardware types (e.g., pressure vessel, structural member) are described to highlight specific challenges and solutions for each. The discussion concludes with considering specific disciplines within fracture control (non-destructive evaluation, materials & processes, fracture mechanics, and structural certification) in a proposed extension of existing fracture control requirements to additive manufactured parts.

McElroy, Mark↗

Fracture Control for Additive Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

This paper describes how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to “fracture critical” additively manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing NASA standards and is required on all human-rated space structures. As legacy spacecraft structures have been built using primarily metallic and composite materials manufactured using well established methods, guidance for application of fracture control to parts composed of these material types has been established and is documented in several NASA requirements. Additive manufactured structures offer advantages in design flexibility and manufacturing efficiency and as a result are expected to continue to be used more and more in the future. Recently, relevant guidance has been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control are not addressed yet in any requirements or guidance document. While use of additive manufactured parts in non-critical scenarios may be of relatively low concern in current structural certification processes, there is a need for new fracture control guidance in order to use and certify additively manufacture hardware that is “fracture critical” where failure of the part may result in loss of life or loss of vehicle. Assurance of damage tolerance, i.e., that as-built flaws in a given part either do not exist or will not grow to become catastrophic, is of particular interest to the fracture control community. This poses a challenge due to the fact that damage tolerance behavior is not well understood in additive manufactured parts compared to legacy material types and manufacturing techniques. The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large. Different hardware types (e.g., pressure vessel, structural member) are described to highlight specific challenges and solutions for each. The discussion concludes with considering specific disciplines within fracture control (non-destructive evaluation, materials & processes, fracture mechanics, and structural certification) in a proposed extension of existing fracture control requirements to additive manufactured parts.

McElroy, Mark↗

TPSAS-NF1676L-13678-DND

An area that shows promise in enhancing structural integrity of aircraft and aerospace structures is integral stitched composite technology. The most recent generation of this technology is the Pultruded Rod Stitched Efficient Unitized Structure (PRSEUS) concept. The goal of the PRSEUS concept is to provide damage-containment capability for composite structures while reducing overall structural weight. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Boeing Company, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have partnered in an effort to assess the damage-containment features of a full-scale curved PRSEUS panel using the FAA Full-Scale Aircraft Structural Test Evaluation and Research facility. The background, test plan, fixture modifications, pre-test analysis, and planned experimental procedure were presented at the 2011 Aircraft Airworthiness and Sustainment Conference. This follow-on paper and presentation will provide details of the experimental procedure, test results, nondestructive inspection results, and preliminary test analysis comparison. The test program included three phases of loading and inspections: Phase I, as-built; Phase II, with barely visible impact damage (BVID); and Phase III, with a two-bay notch severing the central stiffener. Axial tension, internal pressure, and combined axial tension and internal pressure load conditions were applied during each phase using load levels that demonstrate compliance with the strength, deformation, and damage-tolerance requirements of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25. Pressure loads were based on an operating pressure of 9.2 psi, designated as 1P, and the axial loads were based on a design limit load (DLL) of 227 kip. The Phase I test results provided a baseline. First, 50 percent limit-load levels were applied for each of the three load cases to verify proper load introduction and repeatability by examining strain and displacement results. Next, three limit-load cases were applied: limit pressure of 12.2 psi (1.33 P), axial DLL of 227 kip, and combined 1P pressure and axial DLL. Linear strain and displacement results were observed in all load cases. For Phase-II testing, the panel was impacted to introduce BVID with an energy of 40 ft-lb, with the impact located between the central stringer stitch line and flange edge. The impact created non-penetrating visual damage with fiber breaks and delamination between the skin and stringer flange. Limit-load conditions were applied followed by pressure overload of 18.4 psi (2P) and ultimate load conditions, defined as 1.5 times DLL. Inspections were performed after each load case; no damage growth was observed. For Phase-III testing, a two-bay notch was machined severing the central stiffener. The panel was then subjected to limit-load conditions, followed by combined 1P pressure while increasing axial tension load to catastrophic failure. As limit combined loads were approached, damage initiation was observed in the form of 45? splitting at 1P + 79% DLL. Axial loading was increased to 1P + 150 percent DLL causing damage to propagate to the adjacent stringer flanges. Damage was contained within the two-bay region by the stitching rows up to 1P + 176% DLL. Axial load was further increased until catastrophic failure, when a stringer rod failed at 1P + 192% DLL. These test results further verify the damage containment features of the PRSEUS concept and suggest its appropriateness for future flight vehicles.

Andrew Bergan↗

Sensor-based Prognostics for Safe Batteries for Electric Aircraft

With a new start awarded under CAS for Fiscal Year 2020, the Sensor-based Prognostics to Avoid Runaway Reactions and Catastrophic Ignition project, or SPARRCI, aims to eliminate safety risks of lithium-ion and next-generation lithium-based batteries. SPARRCI is taking a deeper dive into the inner workings of battery cells by introducing miniature multifunctional sensors within the cells to detect early signs of failure. Combined with nondestructive evaluation techniques to gather complementary battery health data, battery data will be monitored in real-time via prognostics which will ultimately be able to identify when the cell is exhibiting abnormal behavior bordering on failure, with the ability to provide early warning such that the battery may be taken offline prior to catastrophic failure events.

Brianne Demattia↗

ISS Columbus Heat Exchanger Close Call Investigation Case Study

During International Space Station (ISS) Expedition 38, just days before Christmas 2013, the External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) on the ISS Columbus Moderate Temperature Loop (MTL) Interface Heat Exchanger (IFHX) shut down due to low temperatures. Engineers on the ground scrambled for several days to troubleshoot a pump module Flow Control Valve (FCV) problem, however; no one recognized that the core temperature of the Columbus MTL IFHX was continuing to drop, to the point that water in the system could freeze. Freezing could rupture the core, resulting in high pressure ammonia entering the cabin of the ISS. With no way to clean up the ammonia, ISS crew would have to evacuate the U.S. segment of the station. Columbus MTL IFHX rupture is considered a catastrophic failure and could potentially result in a loss of crew/loss of vehicle. How did engineers miss this potentially catastrophic issue?

Joyce B Abbey↗

Space Radiation Effects on SiC Power Device Reliability

Heavy-ion radiation can result in silicon carbide power device degradation and/or catastrophic failure. Test procedures and data interpretation must consider the impact that heavy-ion induced off-state leakage current increases will have on subsequent single-event effect susceptibility and testability. On orbit, reliable performance in the presence of increased off-state leakage currents due to cumulative ion-induced non-catastrophic single-event effects must be assured over the mission lifetime. This work presents a large body of heavy-ion test data for different diode, power MOSFET, and JFET devices. Susceptibility to single-event effects is compared between SiC and Si power devices. Initial recommendations on heavy-ion radiation test methods for silicon carbide power devices are made and radiation hardness assurance is discussed with the goal of moving one step closer to reliably getting this technology off the ground into a broad array of spacecraft and instruments that will benefit from its unique capabilities.

diode↗

Impact histories inferred from exogenic boulders on asteroids Ryugu and Bennu

Rubble-pile asteroids, such as (162173) Ryugu and (101955) Bennu, are formed as a result of catastrophic disruption of a parent body and re-accumulation of the fragments by self-gravity. Therefore, reaccumulated rubble piles could include mixtures of materials from both the parent body and its catastrophic impactor, as they did in the case of 2008 TC3 and the Almahata Sitta meteorites (Jenniskens et al. 2009). Indeed, six unusually bright, basaltic, meter-scale boulders were recently identified on Bennu’s dark surface (DellaGiustina et al. 2021), and their close spectral matches to the Howardite-Eucrite-Diogenite (HED) meteorites and Vesta family members indicate that they originated from asteroid (4) Vesta. In parallel, bright exogenic anhydrous-silicate–rich materials were found on Ryugu (Tatsumi et al. 2021). The bright boulders on Ryugu are consistent with ordinary chondrite meteorites, based on their albedo and weak or even absent absorption band at 2 µm. These exogenous materials on the surfaces of rubble-pile asteroids could be a key to constraining their specific impact conditions and collisional evolution. In this study, we report further study of the visible spectrophotometry and morphology of exogenic boulders on Ryugu and Bennu using two multi-band cameras: the telescopic Optical Navigation Camera (ONC-T) onboard the Hayabusa2 spacecraft, and MapCam onboard the Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, and Security–Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) spacecraft, respectively. For Ryugu, we first detected objects with peak reflectance brighter by a factor of >1.5 than the surrounding area. Tatsumi et al. (2021) found two spectral groups among the bright boulders: S-type with an absorption near 1 µm and C/X-type with a flat spectrum. That study found 6 S-types and 15 C/X-types, and in this work we additionally find one S-type and ~70 C/X-types. We found that S-type bright boulders follow two parallel trends consistent with space weathering of ordinary chondrites. Fragments from projectiles suggest that Ryugu may not have formed directly from the original parent body, i.e., it is from a second or higher generation of collisional descendants (Sugimoto et al. in revision). For Bennu, we directly surveyed absorption near 1 µm, which is indicative of anhydrous silicates. We propose 77 objects of exogenic origin including 6 boulders previously reported by DellaGiustina et al. (2021). We find that proposed exogenic objects follow two mixing trends with respect to the average spectrum of Bennu (Tatsumi and Popescu et al. submitted). One trend can be explained by mixing with HED as discussed in DellaGiustina et al. (2021), and the other trend can be explained by mixing with another, olivine-rich composition. Near-infrared spectra also support the possibility of multiple compositions among exogenic objects on Bennu. Thus, similar to Ryugu, Bennu could represent a second or higher generation. Using high-resolution images, we found that more than half of the exogenic objects that we identified on Bennu have breccia-like or inclusion-like morphologies. We do not observe a correlation between morphology and spectral shape. Direct comparison of reflectance spectra of exogenic object spectra between Ryugu and Bennu suggests a compositional difference. Furthermore, the number density of exogenic objects > 0.5 m on Bennu is ~40 times that on Ryugu (Tatsumi and Popescu et al. submitted). Bennu exhibits much more contamination from exogenic materials than Ryugu, which likely reflects differences in impact conditions, such as impact velocity and impactor size.

E. Tatsumi↗

Local Ultrasonic Resonance Spectroscopy of Lithium Metal Batteries for Aerospace Applications

As next-generation aircraft and vehicles continue to develop, so do their associated energy demands. Lithium metal batteries are a leading candidate to fulfill this energy requirement, but these batteries are prone to internal dendrite defects that can lead to catastrophic thermal runaway events. Current battery management systems are capable of mitigating such risks, but are unable to detect such defects until thermal runaway has already begun. Various nondestructive evaluation (NDE) techniques, particularly ultrasonic NDE, can directly monitor internal battery parameters giving them the potential to detect critical defects prior to catastrophic failure. However, most of the current battery NDE research has focused on improved battery state-of-charge (SOC) and stateof- health (SOH) monitoring with little emphasis on critical defect detection. Thus, a measurement technique sensitive to subtle battery defects is needed. In addition, the complex mechanics of ultrasound in porous, thin, multilayered batteries prompt the use of physics-based simulation to guide inspections. In this work, an ultrasonic NDE technique has been developed utilizing frequency domain analysis of local battery resonances to detect the presence of battery defects. This technique is a practical extension of local ultrasonic resonance spectroscopy (LURS) – which previously required non-contact laser ultrasonics – to measurements with piezoelectric contact and immersion scan transducers. To extend the technique to work with piezoelectric transducers, ultrasonic battery measurements were compared to a sans-battery calibration measurement. Then, a linear systems deconvolution was used to eliminate the transfer functions of extraneous factors such as the transducer and electronics, leaving only the frequency-dependent battery reflection coefficient. The LURS technique was first validated on stainless steel and aluminum plates, producing reflection coefficients in line with analytical and numerical finite element modeling (FEM) results. Functioning Li-metal pouch cells were then seeded with lithium chip defects prior to LURS measurements. The presence of these defects is shown to cause a measurable shift in the battery’s through-thickness local resonances. 2D, frequency-domain poroelastic models of ultrasonic propagation in a single-cell lithium metal pouch battery were created and corroborated these findings. Thus, this work has both extended and proven the feasibility of the LURS technique in the detection of local battery defects.

Ultrasound↗

Fault Propagation, EMI Propagation, and Fault Containment in Aerospace Systems

The occurrence of faults in aerospace system hardware and software have consequences ranging from minor effects to catastrophic effects, and such faults can directly affect the safety of hardware and personnel. There are many origins to fault conditions, and the hardware that is capable of still meeting its performance requirements after experiencing itself a fault is said to be fault tolerant. A fault tolerant hardware is capable of detecting, isolating, and recovering from a fault condition; and this is a subfield of control engineering. An aerospace system that has been shown to have electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) in all its subsystems and systems cannot induced faults caused by electromagnetic interference (EMI). It can be proposed that the presence of EMI (or lack of EMC) is analogous to a potential fault initiator and the effects can likewise range from minor to severe. This paper starts by addressing the consequences of hardware failure in aerospace systems from a fault perspective, because the design of fault tolerant system is a major endeavor in aerospace. To arrive to this goal the paper starts with the concepts of fault, fault propagation, and a new concept called fault containment region. The paper then proceeds to provide two very recent examples in the aircraft industry of fault propagation with catastrophic effects. The paper proceeds to introduce the concept of EMI fault containment and a brief introduction to another new concept called the EMI containment region. The paper proceeds with an example of EMI fault containment region. The paper ends with a lesson learned conclusions.

Perez, Reinaldo↗

Predicting Thermal Response in a Li-ion Cell on a UAV Fight Profile

As the energy storage devices continue to "pack" more energy in a small space, any damage, battery component failure, manufacturing defect, or electrically abusing the battery can lead to catastrophic thermal runaway events. A catastrophic thermal event in a cell leads to high temperature, in some instances spewing of battery materials due to gas development from side reactions initiated due to high internal temperatures. Also, a thermal runaway event can propagate from a single "failed" cell to the pack in a battery pack, leading to a more significant event. Mitigating a thermal runaway event is important in the commercial and automotive sectors. However, preventing such events in an electric aircraft (or air taxis) is paramount due to the lack of alternatives in the event of a failure. Battery prognostics algorithms allow the prediction of state-of-charge (SOC) and end-of-life (EOL) of a Li-ion battery in a UAV (unmanned air vehicle) [1]. For this presentation, we will extend this two-level battery predictive algorithm to predict SOC, EOL, and estimated maximum temperature during a simulated flight. The model is extended by integrating a lumped physics-driven thermal model for high current densities [2]. The parameters used to control SOC and EOL are maximum storable charge, time constant for Li-ion diffusivity in the carbon particles, and internal cell resistance. Cycling leads to an increase in the heat generated by an aged Li-ion cell with a LiyCoO2 (LCO) cathode and a LixC6 (MCMB) anode. The aging of a cell leads to increase in SEI layer thickness, the diffusion time for the lithium ions inside the electrodes, and the local reaction rates, in addition to the thermodynamic abuse caused by fixed cycling voltages controlled by a Battery Management System. As the battery ages, the cell resistance increases, while the onset temperature of the thermal runaway decreases (depends on the cell chemistry and cell abuse history). Any large deviation of the cell temperature from the estimated (expected) value can identify a faulty cell. Since SEI decomposition has the lowest onset temperature in the series of reactions leading to thermal runaway, the model considers the self-heating rate of the SEI decomposition as onset temperature (similar to Ref. [3]). The parameters in the Arrhenius equation for the SEI heating rate depend on the number of cycles, the cell's operating temperature, and the cell's abuse history [4,5]. Coupling the electrochemical, thermal, and aging model allow the prognostic algorithm to estimate a typical cell voltage and temperature as a function of age (cycling and calendar), whose departure from measured values from the BMS is used to identify a safety event. In addition, we will present the results from two simulated flight scenarios for a UAV: typical and extreme, since the power requirements vary significantly during take-off, landing, and changing altitudes, while the power requirements remain low during the cruise. For this presentation, the power requirement for a battery pack in a UAV is scaled to a single cell. This cell is cycled through a simulated profile, and the data is collected and used to predict a safety event.

Li-ion↗

Predicting Maximum Thermal Response in a Li-ion Cell as a Thermal Runaway Predictor for a UAV Fight

As the energy storage devices continue to "pack" more energy in a small space, any damage, battery component failure, manufacturing defect, or electrically abusing the battery can lead to catastrophic thermal runaway events. A catastrophic thermal event in a cell leads to high temperature, in some instances to spewing of battery materials due to gas development from side reactions initiated due to high internal temperatures. Moreover, a thermal runaway can propagate from a single "failed" cell to a whole battery pack, resulting in a more serious event. The commercial and automotive sectors need to mitigate thermal runaway events. An electric aircraft (or air taxi) has no alternative in the event of a failure, so preventing such events is paramount. Currently, battery prognostics algorithms only predict the state-of-charge (SOC) and end-of-life (EOL) of a Li-ion battery in a UAV (unmanned air vehicle), but do not predict the maximum temperature during a flight or the likelihood of thermal runaway. Our current work focuses on adding the thermal model (based on Birkl's OCV model, in Ref. [1]) to the existing hybrid electrochemical model (single-particle model with lumped parameters as in Ref. [2]) to determine end-of-discharge, end-of-life, and maximum temperature during discharge.

Thermal runaway↗

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Program Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

Human-Rating↗

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗