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DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Assessment of Electrode Contamination Mitigation at 0.5 MA Scale

The Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories uses current pulses with peaks up to 27 MA to drive target implosions and generate high energy density conditions of interest for stockpile stewardship programs pertinent to the NNSA program portfolio . Physical processes in the region near the Z Machine target create electrode plasmas which seed parasitic current loss that reduce the performance and output of a Z experiment. Electrode surface contaminants (hydrogen, water, hydrocarbons) are thought to be the primary constituent of electrode plasmas which contribute to loss mechanisms. The Sandia team explore d in situ heating and plasma discharge techniques by integrating requisite infrastructure into Sandia's Mykonos LTD accelerator, addressing potential impacts to accelerator operation, and reporting on the impact of these techniques on electrode plasma formation and shot performance. The in situ discharge cleaning utilizes the electrodes of the accelerator to excite an argon-oxygen plasma to sputter and chemically react contaminants from electrode surfaces. Insulating breaks are required to isolate the plasma in electrode regions where loss processes are most likely to occur. The shots on Mykonos validate that these breaks do not perturb experiment performance, reducing the uncertainty on the largest unknown about the in situ cleaning system. Preliminary observations with electrical and optical diagnostics suggest that electrode plasma formation is delayed, and overall inventory has been substantively reduced. In situ heating embeds cartridge heaters into accelerator electrodes and employs a thermal bakeout to rapidly desorb contaminants from electrode surfaces. For the first time, additively manufactured (AM) electrode assemblies were used on a low impedance accelerator to integrate cooling channels and manage thermal gradients. Challenges with poor supplier fabrication to specifications, load alignment, thermal expansion and hardware movement and warpage appears to have introduced large variability in observed loss, though, preventing strong assertions of loss reduction via in situ heating. At this time, an in situ discharge cleaning process offers the lowest risk path to reduce electrode contaminant inventories on Z, though we recommend continuing to develop both approaches. Additional engineering and testing are required to improve the implementation of both systems. .

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Annual Status Report (FY 2020): Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low Level Waste in the 200 East Area Burial Grounds

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the 200 East Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-SD-WM-TI-730). The estimates are compared with requirements of DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 and performance objectives defined in companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 Chg 1and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations that indicate potential impacts well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 is expected. A new PA study was initiated in fiscal year (FY) 2019 for evaluation of active disposal sites within the 200 East and 200 West Areas (Trench 94 in 200 East; Trenches 31 and 34 in 200 West) due to extended time elapsing between the current annual status report and the original PA for the active disposal sites. The new PA for the active disposal sites is expected to be completed in FY 2021. Within the active burial grounds in the 200 East Area, low-level waste and mixed low-level waste will continue to be disposed of in the dedicated U.S. Navy reactor compartment trench at the 218-E-12B Burial Ground (Trench 94). During this reporting period (FY 2020, from October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020), two reactor compartments were disposed in Trench 94. Results from sorption experiments are summarized for this reporting period to quantify the efficacy of concrete waste forms in retaining key radionuclides (e.g., technetium-99 and iodine-129). The test durations ranged from 1 to 3 months. Continued groundwater monitoring of the 200 East Area LLBGs indicates no groundwater contamination due to LLBG waste. Current assumptions about future land use at the Hanford Site are consistent with PA analysis1 assumptions of a post-closure facility that will not be degraded by human activity. The LLBGs are located in an area identified for waste management and containment of residual contamination. This area will remain after final environmental remediation and the proposed shrinkage of Hanford Site boundaries to small sections within the 200 East and 200 West Areas in the Central Plateau (DOE/EIS-0391). The current closure plan for the LLBGs (DOE/RL-2000-707) estimates that the 200 East LLBGs will be closed in the 2050 timeframe. The Disposal Authorization Statement, other technical basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis are of continued adequacy to meet the performance objectives of DOE O 435.1 Chg 1. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions nor the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 and the Disposal Authorization Statement is maintained.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

SECARB-USA: Needs Assessment Framework for Storage Complexes (Task 2.1.b)

A team of SECARB storage experts examined 63 formations at 39 sites that were selected to represent the range of diversity of newly assessed, as well as well-advanced, storage prospects in the SECARB region. We inventoried the data needs triggered by the requirements to obtain a Class VI UIC storage permit, the data needs that results from the requirement to create geocellular fluid flow models to support that permit, and by pragmatic and best practice inputs such as public acceptance, regulatory readiness, and pore space leasing. We anchored both the needs inventory and the processes for and cost of meeting the needs with data from 9 sites in in the SECARB area that have advanced far in characterization. Results show that the total cost of characterization prior to obtaining a permit is convergent, because the permit and modeling requirements drive projects to obtain the same types of data for all cases. The high cost data that control cost are 1) drilling, coring, core-testing, logging, sampling and testing a characterization well and 2) collection of a 3-D seismic survey to map reservoir and confining system properties over the area of the plume or the area of elevated pressure. In 5 of our case study sites we determined that one or both of these costs could be avoided because the needs are met by available data.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

Vitrification of Hanford Tank Wastes for Condensate Recycle and Feed Composition Changeover Testing

During the vitrification of Hanford Site nuclear waste at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP), which is a part of the safe and efficient retrieval, treatment, and disposal mission of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection, the offgas condensate generated from the waste-to-glass conversion is currently planned to be concentrated by evaporation in the Effluent Management Facility (EMF). This concentrated condensate can then be recycled back to the incoming waste and vitrified. To test the recycle process, an apparatus was designed and built to mimic the EMF evaporator and was then used to concentrate a volume of condensate produced during the vitrification of a sample of Hanford tank 241-AP-107 (referred to herein as AP-107) waste in a continuous laboratory-scale melter (CLSM). The concentrated condensate was added to an additional sample of AP-107 waste, to mimic one round of the recycle process, and the combined solution was vitrified, producing a second round of recycle condensate. In the current study, the EMF test apparatus was used to concentrate the second-round recycle condensate under evaporation conditions (at 45 °C and 1.4 psia) designed to emulate EMF operation. The condensate was successfully concentrated by a factor of ~10 while retaining over 95 % of the technetium-99 ( 99 Tc), Cs, and I inventories in the concentrate. Another portion of AP-107 waste was retrieved by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) and transferred to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), where it was pretreated and then combined with the second-round recycle AP-107 condensate concentrate and glass-forming chemicals (GFCs) to form the two-time recycle AP-107 melter feed, approximating a second round to the recycling action to be performed at the WTP. A portion of AP-105 waste was also retrieved by WRPS and provided to PNNL for pretreatment and combining with GFCs to form AP-105 melter feed. The two-time recycle AP-107 and AP-105 melter feeds were processed consecutively in the CLSM. The CLSM run proceeded for 13.63 hours, producing 9.70 kg of glass for an average glass production rate of 1464 kg m 2 d -1 during the two-time recycle AP-107 feed charging and 1568 kg m 2 d -1 during the AP-105 feed charging. The rate during AP-107 charging was essentially equivalent to the rate when processing no-recycle AP-107 feed and lower than that achieved when processing one-time recycle AP-107 feed. However, all rates were within the potential range of variability when processing melter feeds with similar composition in the CLSM. Likewise, the rate during AP-105 charging was higher than the previous rate processing AP-105, but within the potential CLSM range. The cold-cap characteristics changed from the typically thin AP-107 cold cap to a foamy-edged cold cap as previously seen with AP-105 shortly after transitioning to the AP-105 melter feed. The glass produced during the CLSM run was within 10 % of its target composition for the primary glass components. The CaO and Li 2 O targets varied by more than 1 wt% between the two-time recycle AP-107 and AP-105 glass targets and it took about 2 turnovers of the CLSM glass inventory to reach a relative chemical steady state in the glass for CaO and Li 2 O after the melter feed inputs were switched. The 99 Tc and total cesium content in the melter feeds were maintained at concentrations expected to be experienced at the WTP. During the CLSM run, while processing the two-time recycle AP-107 melter feed at a relative chemical steady state, the 99 Tc/Cs ratio was 10, and 34% of 99 Tc and 74% of Cs were retained in the glass. These values were higher than those measured in the CLSM run with one-time recycle AP-107 melter feed. After the transition to processing the AP-105 melter feed, when the production reached a relative chemical steady state, the 99 Tc/Cs ratio was 77 while 44% of 99 Tc was retained in the glass. The C's retention during this time frame reached 200% due to the excess C's in the glass after the target content decreased to 15% of its initial level in the two-time recycle AP-107 melter feed to the lower target in the Ap-105 melter feed. While iodine was below inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry analytical reporting limits in the melter feed and glass samples, it was detected in quantities above the analytical reporting limits in the liquid and filter samples collected from the CLSM offgas treatment system. The behavior of iodine in the CLSM offgas treatment system followed a similar pattern to those of 99 Tc and Cs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

Upgrade of Gamma Spectrometry Systems for ORNL TRISO Fuel PIE

Gamma spectrometry is a key element in much of the post-irradiation examination (PIE) work performed under the Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification (AGR) Program (Demkowicz et al. 2015; Stempien et al. 2021). Gamma spectrometers are integrated into three major capabilities used at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory (IFEL) for PIE of tristructural-isotropic (TRISO) coated particles and fuel compacts: the Core Conduction Cooldown Test Facility (CCCTF), the Vertical Counting System (VCS), and the Irradiated Microsphere Gamma Analyzer (IMGA). The CCCTF includes liquid-nitrogen-cooled traps to extract 85 Kr out of the He sweep gas that passes through the furnace in which the fuel compacts are heated during safety testing. Analysis of the 85 Kr activity in the traps is the primary indicator for TRISO failure during safety testing. The VCS is a system used to accurately measure gamma emission from components placed in a lead-shielded chamber. It is used to count the CCCTF deposition cups after removal from furnace. Each cup resides in the CCCTF furnace for typically 12–24 h and is periodically replaced with a fresh cup throughout the safety test. Metallic fission products collect on the water-cooled cups and several gamma-emitting isotopes ( 110 mAg, 134 Cs, 137 Cs, 154 Eu, and 155 Eu) are often measured and provide indication of the retention performance of the TRISO coatings. The VCS is also used to measure the presence of these isotopes on the CCCTF tantalum liner and sweep gas inlet tube for the determination of cup collection efficiency, as well as support other gamma spectrometry needs related to calibration of the 85 Kr fission gas traps and various other special PIE tasks. The IMGA uses gamma spectrometry to measure the inventory of gamma-emitting isotopes in individual TRISO particles. An automated particle handling system within the IMGA hot cell removes each particle from a source vial and positions it in front of a gamma detector, and output from the gamma spectrometer is used by the IMGA software to determine a destination vial such that particles are sorted according to their inventory and retention characteristics. At the conclusion of the AGR-1 and AGR-2 PIE campaigns, the gamma spectrometer systems used at ORNL to support that PIE had reached the end of its life cycle due to gradual obsolescence of the hardware and software. Upgrade of the Canberra Genie 2000 software used by these systems to a Windows 10 version was not a viable option, because the newest Windows 10 version offered by Mirion (the new owner of the Canberra technology) did not include the dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) needed for integration with the custom PIE software used with the CCCTF and IMGA, and Mirion had no current plans for development and release of Windows 10 versions of these DLLs with the Model S560 Genie 2000 Programming Library. Ultimately a switch was made to ORTEC gamma spectrometry systems, which appeared to be a more sustainable solution due to more proactive vendor support. The ORTEC conversion involved replacing the aging detector preamplifier and multichannel analyzer (MCA) hardware, upgrading the obsolete Windows 7 computers to Windows 10 compatible models, adopting ORTEC GammaVision software, and extensive modification of the ORNL-developed Visual Basic .NET (VB.NET) programs that provide the CCCTF and IMGA user interfaces.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2021

Gamma Spectrometry Examination of the AGR-3/4 Irradiation

The results from gamma spectrometry examination of the different components from the combined third and fourth U.S. Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) TRISO-coated particle fuel irradiation tests (AGR-3/4) have been analyzed. This experiment was designed to provide information about in-pile fission product migration. In each of the 12 capsules, a single stack of four compacts with designed-to-fail (DTF) particles surrounded by inner and outer graphite and/or graphitic matrix rings and a graphite sink ring were irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Gamma spectrometry has been used to evaluate the gamma-emitting fission product inventory of compacts from the irradiation and evaluate the burnup of these compacts based on the activity of the radioactive cesium isotopes (i.e., Cs-134 and Cs-137) in the compacts. Burnup from gamma spectrometry compares well with predicted burnup from simulations. The inner and outer rings were also examined by gamma spectrometry to evaluate the total fission product inventory of the rings, and gamma emission computed tomography (GECT) was used to investigate the spatial distribution of gamma-emitting fission products within the rings. This report focuses on results obtained via the Precision Gamma Scanner (PGS) for the compacts and inner and outer rings. These non-destructive gamma measurements are currently being compared to recent destructive measurements of spatial fission product distributions in the rings and to predictions made via mathematical modeling. A separate report discusses the entire AGR-3/4 fission product mass balance for all irradiation capsule components including the inner and outer rings, graphite sink rings, capsule spacers, capsule foils, through tubes, and felts. This report is similar to the conference proceedings: Harp, J.M., Demkowicz, P.A., and Stempien, J.D., “Initial gamma spectrometry examination of the AGR-3/4 irradiation,” International Topical Meeting High Temperature Reactor Technology (HTR 2016), Las Vegas, NV, USA, November 2016, Paper HTR2016-18593, but it has been updated to reflect all the data that has been collected on AGR-3/4 using PGS. The Appendices contain extensive data from the collected gamma spectra.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

FY2021 Savannah River Site Composite Analysis Annual Summary Review

This document provides the Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 and its manual, Radioactive Waste Management (DOE 2021a, 2021b) required Annual Review for the Savannah River Site (SRS) Composite Analysis (CA). Progress made to-date toward addressing the secondary issue from the LFRG review of the 2010 SRS CA has focused primarily upon inventory estimate improvements. Inventory impacts dose in a linear fashion and reduces the uncertainty with the CA conclusions. Maintenance items are addressed, as funding allows, based on the relative risk associated with meeting the performance objectives. Currently, there is minimal risk in exceeding the DOE 100 mrem/yr CA primary dose limit or the DOE 30 mrem/yr dose constraint (administrative limit).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

FY22 Progress on Computational Modeling of the Water-Based NSTF

This report summarizes the system-level modeling effort by Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) of the Natural convection Shutdown heat removal Test Facility (NSTF) in FY22. As an extension of the effort from FY21, this year’s work focuses primarily on the two-phase modeling of the NSTF using RELAP5-3D, particularly with the inclusion of the cavity model. The results from simulations were used to compare against experimental data for benchmarking purposes of the RELAP5 deck. Additionally, RELAP5 was used as a predictive tool to guide planned test operations and identify expected system behaviors. In the first part of this report, details are provided of the cavity omitted model where heat flux is applied directly as a boundary condition to the risers. The general trend predicted by the RELAP5 model matches that from the experimental data when a single-phase natural circulation flow is first established, followed by an oscillatory two-phase period and finally a stable two-phase flow. However, the onset of oscillations is predicted early by the model due to the smaller thermal mixing region in the tank. However, by expanding the simulated thermal mixing region in the tank, the onset of oscillations predicted by the model is able to match that from the experiment. These oscillations where studied in depth and are deduced to be flashing-induced instability. The model was then modified to simulate an accident scenario case where a representative heat load based on the full-scale Framatome’s 625 MW t SC-HTGR was applied directly to the riser channels. The simulated initial and boundary conditions were identical to those performed experimentally, facilitating direct comparisons between the predicted and experimental results. It was determined that the results showed some discrepancies remain, likely due to the overprediction of vapor generation rate by the computer model. In the second part of this report, the cavity model is re-introduced where it is observed that the RELAP5 prediction is now able to capture the major trends of the observed flow commonly observed during two-phase conditions. However, the onset of oscillations is once again predicted early by the model, possibly caused by the underprediction of heat loss from the heater and cavity. This is likely due to the omission of support structures in the cavity that can act as additional pathways for heat to escape to the environment. To overcome the underprediction of heat loss, part of the insulation surrounding the cavity side panels and the back of the heaters are removed to allow heat to escape directly to the environment, which then improves the RELAP5 prediction. Parametric studies are also performed to investigate the effects of heater power, tank inventory level, and tank gas space pressure on flow behaviors, also in direct comparison to conditions tested experimentally. User option-61 in the RELAP5-3D input deck, which changes the heat transfer coefficient correlations used for calculating the vapor generation, is also investigated where it is found that by enabling the option, the overall duration of oscillations is increased and matches that from the experiment better. The RELAP5 model is further benchmarked with a header inlet- throttling case where it is observed that the prediction from the model fails to capture some major features observed in the experiment. By using a modified loss coefficient curve for the valve, the accuracy of the prediction is improved where most of the major features observed in the experiment are predicted by the model. Lastly, the model is benchmarked with an inventory depletion scenario where it is observed that despite the modeling limitation of RELAP5, the prediction shows good agreement with the experimental data where major trends and features are captured by the model. Future work will see continued development of the current RELAP5-3D input deck of the NSTF to both improve the accuracy of the model’s predictive capability and continuing serving the experimental program. The mutually beneficial relationship between analysis and experimental efforts has become integral to the parent NSTF program, and the greater objective to fully understand and accurately predict the heat removal performance of a full scale RCCS concept.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2022

The Influence of Environment on Post-Detonation Chemistry and Debris Formation (Abbreviated Final Report: 20-SI-006)

Predicting, responding to, or interpreting the chemical record preserved in debris derived from nuclear events can be challenging due to chemical fractionation. Chemical fractionation is where different species of the evolving radionuclide inventory segregate and/or are lost from the system over the timescales of debris formation. Both historic data and recent research suggest that the interaction and character of the local environment may exert controls on chemical fractionation by influencing the cooling and evolution of the associated fireball as well as the composition of the vapor term and resultant speciation. Prior to this work, an integrated platform permitting dynamic and concurrent consideration of physical and chemical evolution of early time post-detonation event environments did not exist. Our work merged historic data and experimental approaches to support development of a computational framework able to simulate fundamental processes (e.g., entrainment of local environment, oxidation chemistry, and cooling time scales) that may perturb the radionuclide inventory captured in post-detonation debris. Work with historic debris confirmed that entrained environmental material affect debris composition, structure, and radionuclide incorporation. Complementary work utilizing a readily controllable and tunable benchtop setup (a plasma flow reactor) simulated the late cooling of a nuclear fireball (e.g., T < 6000 K) and bounded the sensitivity of actinide speciation and particle size distribution to variations in oxygen concentration and cooling rates. Concurrent laser ablation and laser heating experiments were used to investigate the chemistry and physics of processes occurring in vaporized and/or rapidly heated actinides and other elements in the presence of oxygen. A more computationally efficient microphysical model was developed for predicting and evolving size distributions of particles forming from mixed vapor terms and simulating particle formation processes under a variety of extreme conditions. Continued study of historic nuclear event film confirmed that shockwave data and physics codes agree to within the uncertainty of the data. Good agreement was achieved for thermal emission from an airburst, however the paucity of low-temperature molecular opacity data for mixtures of air, bomb debris, entrained dirt, and water vapor complicate agreement for more elaborate scenarios. A multiphysics code (ALE3D) was modified to bring the necessary physics and chemistry, including these new data and insights, onto a single platform. Code development included improved initialization of large physical systems, modernization of chemistry capabilities, and modifications to enable inclusion of particle transport.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Electrolyzers for Hydrogen Production: Solid Oxide, Alkaline, and Proton Exchange Membrane

The effects of climate change have led to a push for cleaner energy sources across multiple sectors. Hydrogen has emerged as a promising energy carrier in this context, as it can be produced using various water electrolysis technologies capable of utilizing clean power (e.g., nuclear and renewable electricity). However, a comprehensive environmental assessment of these technologies requires an understanding of the environmental impacts during their complete life cycle, including the embodied emissions in their material composition and during their manufacturing stages; these emissions are often neglected. This report provides a brief overview of major water electrolysis technologies, viz., proton exchange membrane electrolyzer cell (PEMEC) or polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM), alkaline electrolysis cell (AEC) and solid oxide electrolysis cell (SOEC), along with a detailed bill of materials for these technologies that has been incorporated in the updated G reenhouse gases, R egulated E missions, and E nergy use in T ransportation (GREET ® ) 2022 model. We also provide an inventory for the intermediate materials used to produce these electrolyzers, which has not been covered in prior releases. Using these material and energy flows, the GREET model provides a detailed life cycle inventory (energy use and emissions) from raw material extraction through complete production of electrolyzers for major electrolysis technologies.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2022

Hanford Site Composite Analysis Special Analysis: P2R Model Predictive Contaminant Transport Simulations - Sensitivity Case

This environmental calculation file (ECF) documents the methodologies, assumptions, and results of predictive fate and transport simulations using the Plateau-to-River (P2R) model. This ECF supports the reevaluation of the representativeness of solid-waste radionuclide inventory and release rate from three solid waste sites included in the recently completed Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA) (DOE-RL-2019-52, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Hanford Site Central Plateau (FY 2020)). Specifically, this ECF supports the reevaluation of the representativeness of the base case inventory and radionuclide waste release rates from three solid waste sites (i.e., 218-E-12B, 218-W-3A and 218-W-3AE) and two radionuclides (carbon-14 [C-14] and technetium [Tc-99]). These three waste sites and two radionuclides were identified as being the most significant contributors to groundwater contamination and dose in the CA at time periods after the compliance period. The release rates and footprints of the releases from the vadose zone are implemented in the fate and transport modeling utilizing the HSS package.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Waste Compliance and Tracking System (WCATS) Version 3 Requirements Document

This document describes the end-user requirements for the Waste Compliance and Tracking System (WCATS) project in accordance with the WCATS Software Quality Management Plan, EPC-WMP-WCATSPLAN-001. The WCATS application shall support the generation, characterization, processing, and shipment of LANL radioactive, hazardous, and industrial waste. Regulatory drivers include RCRA hazardous waste, DOT shipping, NNSA nuclear material control and accountability, DOE nuclear safety, TSDF permit, and transuranic waste certification requirements. The system will utilize a task-based architecture that supports the spectrum of treatment, storage, disposal, administrative, and characterization based unit operations necessary to manage waste from cradle to grave. The application design shall readily accommodate new facilities, processes, workflow, signature requirements, and so forth, via end-user established metadata. WCATS will provide support for representing waste storage and disposal facilities, buildings, rooms, and grid layouts (x, y, z) to support waste and radioactive material inventory management. Nuclear material at risk (MAR), DOE hazard rating (e.g., Category II facility) compliance per DOE-STD-1027, and permit inventory requirements will be configurable for any storage or disposal facility, or waste operation, and the system will automatically evaluate and enforce those requirements. In addition, the application will support the characterization and management of the entire range of hazardous and radioactive wastes (TRU, MTRU, LLW, MLLW, hazardous waste, etc.) that might be colocated or processed at a permitted facility. Some capabilities not found in traditional systems include user-defined tank systems for liquid waste, user-defined work paths (i.e., sequence of operations), and an equipment subsystem for tracking the calibration, maintenance, and inspection of tools used to process waste, such as torque wrenches, scales, pH probes, etc. The application incorporates a desktop and mobile user interface as shown in Figure 1. The mobile interface supports field operations, such as waste item characterization, intra-facility transfers, internal and external audits, and shipment preparation and receipt.

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DOE OSTI2023

Performance Assessment for the E-Area Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site: Appendix G

This appendix contains supporting information and key data used during the IHI analysis, including the following: • A list of parent radionuclides requiring IHI inventory limits (Section G.1) • Tables of IHI acute and chronic dose factors, inventory limits, and concentration limits for all DUs (Section G.2) • IHI acute and chronic dose history time profiles for all DUs (Section G.3)

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DOE OSTI2022

Milestone 1.2.10: Steady-state H 2 “roll over” point data for aluminum alloys 1100 and 6061

Extended (> 50 years) dry storage is being evaluated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the disposition of ~ 18 metric tons of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF). Transition of the current ASNF inventory into dry storage—using the standard DOE canister—necessitates a rigorous, predictive understanding of the long-term physical and chemical factors that may influence the integrity of the proposed storage canister, including radiolytic molecular hydrogen (H 2 ) generation. Current model predictions employ initial radiolytic yields of H 2 , the values of which change as the cladding’s H 2 -precursor inventory is depleted and H 2 itself becomes progressively more involved in radiolytic and surface dissociation processes. Consequently, the absorbed radiation dose that this steady-state H 2 yield corresponds to is essential for the evaluation and improvement of model predictions. Here, we report our findings on the long-term generation of H 2 from the gamma irradiation (≤ 36 MGy) of corroded AA1100 and AA6061 coupons in helium environments at ambient temperature and ~ 50% RH. Our findings show that AA1100 systems reached steady-state by ~ 36 MGy, while higher doses were necessary for AA6061 systems. This discrepancy was attributed to the AA6061 coupons developing a thicker corrosion layer that led to the trapping of H 2 and its precursors, and potentially additional chemistries, ultimately delaying the depletion of H 2 precursors and the system’s “roll over” point. Further, current model predictions—based on previous AA1100 data—do not show steady-state attainment until above 120 MGy, which is not the case for the AA1100 data collected here. Consequently, the new alloy dependent data presented here are important for the continued improvement of predictive computer models for evaluating the feasibility of extended storage of ASNF in helium backfilled canisters.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2023

Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste in the 200 East Area Burial Grounds (Annual Status Report FY 2022)

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DOE OSTI2023

Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste in the 200 West Area Burial Grounds (Annual Status Report FY 2022)

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the active 200 West Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-EP-0645). The estimates are compared with the performance objectives defined in U.S. Department of Energy requirements (DOE O 435.1 and its companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations that indicate potential impacts well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 is expected. Within the active burial grounds, low-level and mixed low-level waste currently may be disposed only in two lined trenches in the 218-W-5 Burial Ground (Trenches 31 and 34) until they are either filled or a decision is made to close these trenches. Some mixed low-level waste is also disposed at the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility in the 200 West Area (which is covered under a separate PA). During this (fiscal year 2022) reporting period (October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022), waste was disposed to the 200 West Area LLBGs. Continued groundwater monitoring of the 200 West Area LLBGs indicates no groundwater contamination due to LLBG waste. Current assumptions about future land use at the Hanford Site are consistent with PA analysis assumptions of a postclosure facility that will not be degraded by human activity. The LLBGs are in an area identified for waste management and containment of residual contamination (DOE/EIS-0391). The current closure plan for the LLBGs (DOE/RL-2000-70) estimates that the 200 West LLBGs will be closed in the 2050 timeframe. The Disposal Authorization Statement, other technical basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis are of continued adequacy to meet the performance objectives of DOE O 435.1. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions and no changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the Disposal Authorization Statement is maintained. A new PA to evaluate the long-term impacts of three disposal trenches that are currently active within the 200 East and 200 West Areas (Trench 94 in the 200 East Area and Trenches 31 and 34 in the 200 West Area) was initiated in fiscal year 2019 and completed in fiscal year 2022. Corrective actions addressing 3 key issues and 31 secondary issues identified during the review process were developed and submitted to the Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group Co-Chairs for review and approval. This PA provides additional technical basis for the continued adequacy of the existing Operating Disposal Authorization Statement.

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