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At least 433 records · Page 24
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1995

Software dependability in the Tandem GUARDIAN system

Based on extensive field failure data for Tandem's GUARDIAN operating system this paper discusses evaluation of the dependability of operational software. Software faults considered are major defects that result in processor failures and invoke backup processes to take over. The paper categorizes the underlying causes of software failures and evaluates the effectiveness of the process pair technique in tolerating software faults. A model to describe the impact of software faults on the reliability of an overall system is proposed. The model is used to evaluate the significance of key factors that determine software dependability and to identify areas for improvement. An analysis of the data shows that about 77% of processor failures that are initially considered due to software are confirmed as software problems. The analysis shows that the use of process pairs to provide checkpointing and restart (originally intended for tolerating hardware faults) allows the system to tolerate about 75% of reported software faults that result in processor failures. The loose coupling between processors, which results in the backup execution (the processor state and the sequence of events) being different from the original execution, is a major reason for the measured software fault tolerance. Over two-thirds (72%) of measured software failures are recurrences of previously reported faults. Modeling, based on the data, shows that, in addition to reducing the number of software faults, software dependability can be enhanced by reducing the recurrence rate.

Lee, Inhwan↗
NASA NTRS1975

Computer controlled vent and pressurization system

The Centaur space launch vehicle airborne computer, which was primarily used to perform guidance, navigation, and sequencing tasks, was further used to monitor and control inflight pressurization and venting of the cryogenic propellant tanks. Computer software flexibility also provided a failure detection and correction capability necessary to adopt and operate redundant hardware techniques and enhance the overall vehicle reliability.

Cieslewicz, E. J.↗
NASA NTRS1975

Computer controlled vent and pressurization system

The paper illustrates how the Centaur space launch vehicle airborne computer, which was primarily used to perform guidance, navigation, and sequencing tasks, was further used to monitor and control inflight pressurization and venting of the cryogenic propellant tanks. Computer software flexibility also provided a failure detection and correction capability necessary to adopt and operate redundant hardware techniques and enhance the overall vehicle reliability.

Cieslewicz, E. J.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Modified aerospace R&QA method for wind turbines

This paper describes the Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) approach developed for the first large wind turbine generator project, MOD-OA. The SR&QA approach to be used had to assure that the machine would not be hazardous, would operate unattended on a utility grid, would demonstrate reliable operation, and would help establish the quality assurance and maintainability requirements for wind turbine projects. The final approach consisted of a modified Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) during the design phase, minimal hardware inspections during parts fabrication, and three documents to control activities during machine construction and operation.

Klein, W. E.↗
NASA NTRS1982

Experience with modified aerospace reliability and quality assurance method for wind turbines

The SR&QA approach assures that the machine is not hazardous to the public or operating personnel, can operate unattended on a utility grid, demonstrates reliability operation, and helps establish the quality assurance and maintainability requirements for future wind turbine projects. The approach consisted of modified failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) during the design phase, minimal hardware inspection during parts fabrication, and three simple documents to control activities during machine construction and operation. Five years experience shows that this low cost approach works well enough that it should be considered by others for similar projects.

Klein, W. E.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Five basic steps to problem trending

Five basic steps to problem trending evolved from experience in trending problems on Space Shuttle hardware are discussed: extracting data; constructing a Pareto chart of all failure modes; constructing normalized subsystem, component, and failure-mode trend charts; identifying trend direction; and providing a summary assessment. The five-step method has been useful for identifying failure modes of concern, evaluating the effectiveness of corrective actions, and determining funding allocation.

Bombara, Elwood L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Safety Considerations in the Ground Environment

In the history of humankind, every great space adventure has begun on the ground. While this seems to be stating the obvious, mission and spacecraft designers who have overlooked this fact have paid a high price, either in loss or damage to the spacecraft pre-launch, or in mission failure or reduction. Spacecraft personnel may risk not only their flight hardware, but they may also risk their lives, their co-workers lives and even the general public by not heeding safety on the ground. Their eyes may be on the stars but their feet are on the ground! One additional comment: Although the design requirements are very different for human rated and nonhuman rated flight hardware, while on the ground that flight hardware (and its ground support equipment) doesn't care about what it is flying on. On the ground, additional requirements are often levied to protect the work force and general public. (Authors' Note: The source material for this chapter is primarily taken from the Kennedy Space Center Handbook (KHB) 1700.7/45 SW Handbook S-100 Space Shuttle Payload Ground Safety Handbook and the authors' personal experiences.

Kirkpatrick, Paul D.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Standardizing Microprocessor and GPU Radiation Test Approaches

Microprocessor, Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) and DDRx memory devices have emerged as promising next-generation technologies that enables both high performance processing and acceleration of complex algorithms for the latest challenges in human spaceflight, autonomous vehicles and artificial intelligence (AI). The feature sets of these devices offer exponential increases to throughput, calculation capability and system autonomy when compared to legacy flight systems. NASA's Electronic Part and Packaging (NEPP) Program has conducted an investigation into the radiation susceptibility of leading edge devices and process technologies by establishing standardized test approaches. Unlike most discrete devices, these require state of the art test systems to induce specific hardware activity similar to application software, thus allowing the characterization of failure modes within the system. To best characterize the tested part, NEPP eliminates variables that may impact device performance under radiation. Simplification of remaining system-level variables leads to an improved understanding of complex computational devices and their intended applications. The failure modes and error signatures that are recorded during testing are used to determine radiation sensitivity of the semiconductor process and the microcode architecture of the design. This presentation will discuss the test methodology that NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) is working to establish for its microprocessor, GPU and DDRx memory test programs to provide guidance on these devices and their underlying technology, in regards to their potential usage in future space flight systems.

GPU↗
NASA NTRS2009

A Summary of NASA and USAF Hypergolic Propellant Related Spills and Fires

Several unintentional hypergolic fluid related spills, fires, and explosions from the Apollo Program, the Space Shuttle Program, the Titan Program, and a few others have occurred over the past several decades. Spill sites include the following government facilities: Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), Little Rock AFB, and McConnell AFB. Until now, the only method of capturing the lessons learned from these incidents has been "word of mouth" or by studying each individual incident report. The root causes and consequences of the incidents vary drastically; however, certain "themes" can be deduced and utilized for future hypergolic propellant handling. Some of those common "themes" are summarized below: (1) Improper configuration control and internal or external human performance shaping factors can lead to being falsely comfortable with a system (2) Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur and/or hardware is damaged (3) Improper propulsion system and ground support system designs can destine a system for failure (4) Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger (5) Improper PPE, spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing equipment can result in unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs (6) Improper procedural oversight, development, and adherence to the procedure can be detrimental and quickly lead to an undesirable incident (7) Improper materials cleanliness or compatibility and chemical reactivity can result in fires or explosions (8) Improper established "back-out" and/or emergency safing procedures can escalate an event The items listed above are only a short list of the issues that should be recognized prior to handling hypergolic fluids or processing vehicles containing hypergolic propellants. The summary of incidents in this report is intended to cover many more issues than those listed above.

Nufer, Brian M.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Lessons Learned Entry: Hypergolic Propellant Related Spills and Fires

The attached report is a compilation of all credible, unintentional hypergolic fluid related spills, fires, and explosions from the Apollo Program, the Space Shuttle Program, Titan Program, and a few other programs. Spill sites include the following government facilities: KSC, JSC, WSTF, VAFB, CCAFS, EAFB, Little Rock AFB, and McConnell AFB. The root causes and consequences of the incidents contained in this document vary drastically; however, certain "themes" can be deduced and utilized for future hypergolic propellant handling. Some of those common "themes" are summarized below: (1) Improper configuration control and complacency can lead to being falsely comfortable with a system (2) Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur and/or hardware is damaged (3) Improper propulsion system and ground support system designs can destine a system for failure (4) Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger (5) Improper PPE, spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing equipment can result in unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs (6) Improper procedural oversight, development, and adherence to the procedure can be detrimental and quickly lead to an undesirable incident (7) Improper local cleanliness or compatibility can result in fires or explosions The items listed above are only a short list of the issues that should be recognized prior to handling of hypergolic fluids or processing of vehicles containing hypergolic propellants. The summary of incidents in this report is intended to cover many more issues than those listed above that have been found during nearly the entire spectrum. of hypergolic propellant and/or vehicle processing.

Nufer, Brian↗
NASA NTRS2010

U.S. Spacesuit Knowledge Capture

The ability to learn from both the mistakes and successes of the past is vital to assuring success in the future. Due to the close physical interaction between spacesuit systems and human beings as users, spacesuit technology and usage lends itself rather uniquely to the benefits realized from the skillful organization of historical information; its dissemination; the collection and identification of artifacts; and the education of individuals and groups working in the field. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), other organizations and individuals have been performing United States (U.S.) spacesuit knowledge capture since the beginning of space exploration. Avenues used to capture the knowledge have included publication of reports; conference presentations; specialized seminars; and classes usually given by veterans in the field. Recently, the effort has been more concentrated and formalized whereby a new avenue of spacesuit knowledge capture has been added to the archives through which videotaping occurs, engaging both current and retired specialists in the field presenting technical scope specifically for education and preservation of knowledge. Now with video archiving, all these avenues of learning can be brought to life with the real experts presenting their wealth of knowledge on screen for future learners to enjoy. U.S. spacesuit knowledge capture topics have included lessons learned in spacesuit technology, experience from the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and Shuttle programs, hardware certification, design, development and other program components, spacesuit evolution and experience, failure analysis and resolution, and aspects of program management. Concurrently, U.S. spacesuit knowledge capture activities have progressed to a level where NASA, the National Air and Space Museum (NASM), Hamilton Sundstrand (HS) and the spacesuit community are now working together to provide a rather closed-looped spacesuit knowledge capture system which includes specific attention to spacesuit system artifacts as well. A NASM report has recently been created that allows the cross reference of history to the artifacts and the artifacts to the history including spacesuit manufacturing details with current condition and location. NASA has examined spacesuits in the NASM collection for evidence of wear during their operational life. NASA s formal spacesuit knowledge capture efforts now make use of both the NASM spacesuit preservation collection and report to enhance its efforts to educate NASA personnel and contribute to spacesuit history. Be it archiving of human knowledge or archiving of the actual spacesuit legacy hardware with its rich history, the joining together of spacesuit system artifact history with that of development and use during past programs will provide a wealth of knowledge which will greatly enhance the chances for the success of future and more ambitious spacesuit system programs.

Chullen, Cinda↗
NASA NTRS2019

The Analysis of Adhesive Residue Failure

Adhesives have always been, and will continue to be, a crucial component of assembling flight hardware. Unfortunately, adhesives have a long standing history of being a source of costly contaminations. There are currently no existing documents that can aid a technician in discerning the proper adhesive/substrate combinations, nor the optimal solvent to use when removing adhesive residue. This project seeks to evaluate the performance of adhesive tapes on various flight hardware substrates in order to create an easy-to-use guide for spacecraft ground processing. The analyses performed were the adhesive/solvent solubility, SEM examinations, and peel adhesion tests. The solubility tests showed that amyl acetate, acetone, and MEK were the most successful in dissolving the adhesives. The SEM data gives preliminary insight into the morphology of the residues. Lastly, the peel adhesion testing proved that there is no relationship between the length of time the adhesive was applied and its adhesive strength.

Smiley, Adrienne↗
NASA NTRS2005

How to Extend the Capabilities of Space Systems for Long Duration Space Exploration Systems

For sustainable Exploration Missions the need exists to assemble systems-of-systems in space, on the Moon or on other planetary surfaces. To fulfill this need new and innovative system architecture is needed that can be satisfied with the present lift capability of existing rocket technology without the added cost of developing a new heavy lift vehicle. To enable ultra-long life missions with minimum redundancy and lighter mass the need exists to develop system soft,i,are and hardware reconfigurability, which enables increasing functionality and multiple use of launched assets while at the same time overcoming any components failures. Also the need exists to develop the ability to dynamically demate and reassemble individual system elements during a mission in order to work around failed hardware or changed mission requirements. Therefore to meet the goals of Space Exploration Missions in hiteroperability and Reconfigurability, many challenges must be addressed to transform the traditional static avionics architecture into architecture with dynamic capabilities. The objective of this paper is to introduce concepts associated with reconfigurable computer systems; review the various needs and challenges associated with reconfigurable avionics space systems; provide an operational example that illustrates the needs applicable to either the Crew Exploration Vehicle or a collection of "Habot like" mobile surface elements; summarize the approaches that address key challenges to acceptance of a Flexible, Intelligent, Modular and Affordable reconfigurable avionics space system.

Marzwell, Neville I.↗
NASA NTRS1974

A self-reorganizing digital flight control system for aircraft

This paper presents a design method for digital self-reorganizing control systems which is optimally tolerant of failures in aircraft sensors. The functions of this system are accomplished with software instead of the popular and costly technique of hardware duplication. The theoretical development, based on M-ary hypothesis testing, results in a bank of M Kalman filters operating in parallel in the failure detection logic. A moving window of the innovations of each Kalman filter drives the detection logic to decide the failure state of the system. The detection logic also selects the optimal state estimate (for control logic) from the bank of Kalman filters. The design process is applied to the design of a self-reorganizing control system for a current configuration of the space shuttle orbiter at Mach 5 and 120,000 feet. The failure detection capabilities of the system are demonstrated using a real-time simulation of the system with noisy sensors.

Montgomery, R. C.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Failure Analysis Results and Corrective Actions Implemented for the EMU 3011 Water in the Helmet Mishap

During EVA (Extravehicular Activity) No. 23 aboard the ISS (International Space Station) on 07/16/2013 water entered the EMU (Extravehicular Mobility Unit) helmet resulting in the termination of the EVA (Extravehicular Activity) approximately 1-hour after it began. It was estimated that 1.5-L of water had migrated up the ventilation loop into the helmet, adversely impacting the astronauts hearing, vision and verbal communication. Subsequent on-board testing and ground-based TT and E (Test, Tear-down and Evaluation) of the affected EMU hardware components led to the determination that the proximate cause of the mishap was blockage of all water separator drum holes with a mixture of silica and silicates. The blockages caused a failure of the water separator function which resulted in EMU cooling water spilling into the ventilation loop, around the circulating fan, and ultimately pushing into the helmet. The root cause of the failure was determined to be ground-processing short-comings of the ALCLR (Airlock Cooling Loop Recovery) Ion Filter Beds which led to various levels of contaminants being introduced into the Filters before they left the ground. Those contaminants were thereafter introduced into the EMU hardware on-orbit during ALCLR scrubbing operations. This paper summarizes the failure analysis results along with identified process, hardware and operational corrective actions that were implemented as a result of findings from this investigation.

Steele, John↗
NASA NTRS2010

EVA 2010: Preparing for International Space Station EVA Operations Post-Space Shuttle Retirement

The expected retirement of the NASA Space Transportation System (also known as the Space Shuttle ) by 2011 will pose a significant challenge to Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA) on-board the International Space Station (ISS). The EVA hardware currently used to assemble and maintain the ISS was designed assuming that it would be returned to Earth on the Space Shuttle for refurbishment, or if necessary for failure investigation. With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, a new concept of operations was developed to enable EVA hardware (Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), Airlock Systems, EVA tools, and associated support hardware and consumables) to perform ISS EVAs until 2015, and possibly beyond to 2020. Shortly after the decision to retire the Space Shuttle was announced, the EVA 2010 Project was jointly initiated by NASA and the OneEVA contractor team. The challenges addressed were to extend the operating life and certification of EVA hardware, to secure the capability to launch EVA hardware safely on alternate launch vehicles, to protect for EMU hardware operability on-orbit, and to determine the source of high water purity to support recharge of PLSSs (no longer available via Shuttle). EVA 2010 Project includes the following tasks: the development of a launch fixture that would allow the EMU Portable Life Support System (PLSS) to be launched on-board alternate vehicles; extension of the EMU hardware maintenance interval from 3 years (current certification) to a minimum of 6 years (to extend to 2015); testing of recycled ISS Water Processor Assembly (WPA) water for use in the EMU cooling system in lieu of water resupplied by International Partner (IP) vehicles; development of techniques to remove & replace critical components in the PLSS on-orbit (not routine); extension of on-orbit certification of EVA tools; and development of an EVA hardware logistical plan to support the ISS without the Space Shuttle. Assumptions for the EVA 2010 Project included no more than 8 EVAs per year for ISS EVA operations in the Post-Shuttle environment and limited availability of cargo upmass on IP launch vehicles. From 2010 forward, EVA operations on-board the ISS without the Space Shuttle will be a paradigm shift in safely operating EVA hardware on orbit and the EVA 2010 effort was initiated to accommodate this significant change in EVA evolutionary history.

Chullen, Cinda↗
NASA NTRS2010

Post-Shuttle EVA Operations on ISS

The expected retirement of the NASA Space Transportation System (also known as the Space Shuttle ) by 2011 will pose a significant challenge to Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA) on-board the International Space Station (ISS). The EVA hardware currently used to assemble and maintain the ISS was designed assuming that it would be returned to Earth on the Space Shuttle for refurbishment, or if necessary for failure investigation. With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, a new concept of operations was developed to enable EVA hardware (Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), Airlock Systems, EVA tools, and associated support hardware and consumables) to perform ISS EVAs until 2015, and possibly beyond to 2020. Shortly after the decision to retire the Space Shuttle was announced, the EVA 2010 Project was jointly initiated by NASA and the One EVA contractor team. The challenges addressed were to extend the operating life and certification of EVA hardware, to secure the capability to launch EVA hardware safely on alternate launch vehicles, to protect for EMU hardware operability on-orbit, and to determine the source of high water purity to support recharge of PLSSs (no longer available via Shuttle). EVA 2010 Project includes the following tasks: the development of a launch fixture that would allow the EMU Portable Life Support System (PLSS) to be launched on-board alternate vehicles; extension of the EMU hardware maintenance interval from 3 years (current certification) to a minimum of 6 years (to extend to 2015); testing of recycled ISS Water Processor Assembly (WPA) water for use in the EMU cooling system in lieu of water resupplied by International Partner (IP) vehicles; development of techniques to remove & replace critical components in the PLSS on-orbit (not routine); extension of on-orbit certification of EVA tools; and development of an EVA hardware logistical plan to support the ISS without the Space Shuttle. Assumptions for the EVA 2010 Project included no more than 8 EVAs per year for ISS EVA operations in the Post-Shuttle environment and limited availability of cargo upmass on IP launch vehicles. From 2010 forward, EVA operations on-board the ISS without the Space Shuttle will be a paradigm shift in safely operating EVA hardware on orbit and the EVA 2010 effort was initiated to accommodate this significant change in EVA evolutionary history. 1

West, William↗
NASA NTRS2011

Backup Alignment Devices on Shuttle: Heads-Up Display or Crew Optical Alignment Sight

NASA s Space Shuttle was built to withstand multiple failures while still keeping the crew and vehicle safe. Although the design of the Space Shuttle had a great deal of redundancy built into each system, there were often additional ways to keep systems in the best configuration if a failure were to occur. One such method was to use select pieces of hardware in a way for which they were not primarily intended. The primary function of the Heads-Up Display (HUD) was to provide the crew with a display of flight critical information during the entry phase. The primary function of the Crew Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) was to provide the crew an optical alignment capability for rendezvous and docking phases. An alignment device was required to keep the Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) well aligned for a safe Entry; nominally this alignment device would be the two on-board Star Trackers. However, in the event of a Star Tracker failure, the HUD or COAS could also be used as a backup alignment device, but only if the device had been calibrated beforehand. Once the HUD or COAS was calibrated and verified then it was considered an adequate backup to the Star Trackers for entry IMU alignment. There were procedures in place and the astronauts were trained on how to accurately calibrate the HUD or COAS and how to use them as an alignment device. The calibration procedure for the HUD and COAS had been performed on many Shuttle missions. Many of the first calibrations performed were for data gathering purposes to determine which device was more accurate as a backup alignment device, HUD or COAS. Once this was determined, the following missions would frequently calibrate the HUD in order to be one step closer to having the device ready in case it was needed as a backup alignment device.

Chavez, Melissa A.↗