Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “defense”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 433 records · Page 24
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Getting things done onsite: Heat Source production never ramps down

The COVID-19 pandemic has changed many norms in the world and at LANL. During the rapid transition of sending many to work from home in March, some programs were deemed mission critical, with the expectation to continue driving their missions forward. One of those essential programs is Heat Source Technologies, a group within the Actinide Material Power & Processing (AMPP) Division at TA-55. Within the Associate Laboratory Directorate of Weapons Production (ALDWP), the group responsible for the Pu-238 heat sources continued their work nearly uninterrupted as many others made the mandatory transition to work remotely. This group, known as AMPP-1, Heat Source Technologies, works on the production line producing heat sources from Plutonium (Pu)-238, which is an essential mission for National Security. This group is comprised of nearly 90 employees and operates out of the TA-55 Plutonium Facility (PF-4 and PF-5) producing heat sources. Heat source production includes the operations that purify, process, and weld Pu-238 oxide into encapsulated heat sources that are essential for space and defense missions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Sequim Bay Underwater UXO (SBU2) Prototype Demonstration Site: Field Operations Summary, 2019

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has identified more than 400 underwater sites that are potentially contaminated with munitions. Many of these sites are in shallow water (0–35 m deep) where the munitions pose a threat to human health and the environmental. To address this challenge, the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) held a workshop in 2018 to establish the requirements and framework for developing a series of underwater unexploded ordnance (UXO) Standardized Demonstration sites (“test beds”) to support the evaluation of sensors, equipment, and technologies to detect UXO. Sequim Bay in Washington State was evaluated as a potential test bed and was determined to meet initial qualifying criteria with respect to environmental setting, and operational, logistical, and facilities support provided by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability and Installation Energy Security

The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) fixed installations - or military bases - are a critical element of national security. Military bases support the maintenance and deployment of weapons systems, training and mobilization of combat forces, and provide direct support to combat operations. Fixed installations do not operate without energy and they rely largely on electricity to support critical missions and functions. Installations are dependent on a commercial grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to severe weather, physical attacks, and cyberattacks. This report looks at the impact on the highest priority critical loads.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Grey Zone Test Range Integrated Urban Simulation Environment

Sandia National Laboratories is part of the government test and evaluation team for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Collection and Monitoring via Planning for Active Situational Scenarios program. The program is designed to better understand competition in the area between peace and conventional conflict when adversary actions are subtle and difficult to detect. For the purposes of test and evaluation, Sandia conducted a range of activities for the program: creation of the Grey Zone Test Range; design of the data stream for a user experiment conducted with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; design, implementation, and execution of the formal evaluation; and analysis and summary of the evaluation results. This report details Sandia's activities and provides additional information on the Grey Zone Test Range urban simulation environment developed to evaluate the performer technologies.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Next U.S. Strategic Posture - and the Posture After Next (Workshop Summary)

On July 8-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Next U.S. Strategic Posture – And the Posture After Next.” This session brought together participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities in the United States and among allies. The event was a follow-up discussion to CGSR’s last meeting titled “Fit for Purpose? The U.S. Nuclear Posture in 2030 and Beyond.” The July workshop had a broader scope and looked at the different elements of U.S. strategic posture, including not just nuclear capabilities but missile defense, conventional prompt global strike, and space and cyberspace. Participants assessed the 2030 U.S. posture relative to the predicted Russian and Chinese postures, and they examined what capabilities will be crucial beyond 2030.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Vault National Security Then & Now (2021 Annual)

Looking back, I can say with certainty that we rose to the challenge. Like other entities all around the globe, the National Security Research Center was tested by the COVID-19 pandemic. As a young organization (we celebrated our second anniversary in June 2021) and one that is critical to Los Alamos National Laboratory’s national security charge, we faced the difficult task of continuing our mission-essential work while keeping our staff safe. The NSRC is one of the largest libraries in the United States, and it houses the country’s most-comprehensive collections of nuclear weapons-related national security material. The NSRC contains millions of documents, films, photos, and other materials on the development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons. These are accessed on a daily basis by scientists, engineers, and researchers at Los Alamos and other National Nuclear Security Administration’s labs and sites, as well as partners in the Department of Defense. It was not an option for us to close our doors - our nation’s security depended on us not to. Not only did we continue operating under new safety protocols, we successfully accomplished many pre-pandemic goals. Thanks to the NSRC’s dedicated staff, our accomplishments during our second year are too numerous to list, though two in particular come to mind.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

ADAM Program Execution Plan LANL Inputs (FY2022)

The National Security Research Center (NSRC) is Los Alamos National Laboratory’s classified library. There are two groups associated with the NSRC, both of who work for LANL’s Weapons Research Services (WRS) division (WRS-SIS and WRS-WMT). These groups are funded in part by the NNSA Archives Program. The NSRC’s collections include tens of millions of documents from the Manhattan Project era through today. It is staffed with an expert, highly trained staff of librarians, archivists, digitizers, historians, and communications specialists. The NSRC traces its lineage to the wartime Technical Library created by J. Robert Oppenheimer during in 1943. Today, it supports a broad range of researchers within the LANL Weapons Program and beyond. The NSRC also has customers across other National Nuclear Security Administration labs and sites, and partners in the Department of Defense. This report highlights LANL accomplishments through NSRC.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Operation Tumbler-Snapper

Operation Tumbler-Snapper began on April 1, 1952, when Able, a low-yield nuclear device, detonated 793 feet over the Frenchman Flat area of the Nevada Proving Ground. Able, the first of four airdrops conducted as the Tumbler phase of the Operation, provided the Department of Defense with reliable data on the relationship between height of burst and blast overpressure. Such information was vital to establishing the battlefield use of nuclear weapons. A final set of four tower detonations, the Snapper phase, provided the AEC and Los Alamos with diagnostic data on new weapon designs. Although the test series was nominally divided between the AEC and the DOD, this distinction held little meaning because two of the Tumbler effects tests, Charlie and Dog, employed experimental devices and all four of the Snapper tests involved effects experiments, including military troop maneuvers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Distances to Prompt Effects for a Nuclear Device

In 2010, nuclear weapon effects experts at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) were asked to provide a quick reference document containing estimated prompt nuclear effects. This report is an update to the 2010 document that includes updated model assumptions. This report addresses only the prompt effects associated with a nuclear detonation (e.g., blast, thermal fluence, and prompt ionizing radiation). The potential medium- and longer-term health effects associated with nuclear fallout are not considered in this report because, in part, of the impracticality of making generic estimates given the high dependency of fallout predictions on the local meteorological conditions at the time of the event. The results included in this report also do not consider the urban environment (e.g., shielding by or collapse of structures) which may affect the extent of prompt effects. It is important to note that any operational recommendations made using the estimates in this report are limited by the generic assumptions considered in the analysis and should not replace analyses made for a specific scenario/device. Furthermore, nuclear effects experts (John Hogan, SNL, and Byron Ristvet, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)) have indicated that the accuracy of effects predictions below 0.5 kilotons (kT) or 500 tons nuclear yield have greater uncertainty because of the limited data available for the prompt effects in this regime. The Specialized Hazard Assessment Response Capability (SHARC) effects prediction tool was used for these analyses. Specifically, the NUKE model within SHARC 2021 Version 10.2 was used. NUKE models only the prompt effects following a nuclear detonation. The algorithms for predicting range-to-output data contained within the NUKE model are primarily based on nuclear test effects data. Probits have been derived from nuclear test data and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) protective action guides. Probits relate the probability of a hazard (e.g., fatality or injury) caused by a given insult (e.g., overpressure, thermal fluence, dose level). Several probits have been built into SHARC to determine the fatality and injury associated with a given level of insult. Some of these probits differ with varying yield. Such probits were used to develop the tables and plots in this report.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Artificial Intelligence for Digital Security and Protections

Proper functioning of nuclear power plants relies on a mix of well-regulated human and machine-driven workflows. This regulation supports nuclear safety through a series of processes and many of the tasks that support these processes have a repetitive nature that make artificial intelligence (AI) informed by machine learning (ML) a potential aid in a variety of tasks. AI is being evaluated for activities that include inspections, fuel processing, monitoring, and other activities. The introduction of any new technology presents a potential new attack vector. In the case of AI/ML, there are many attacks that have already been discovered and over time the attacks can be expected to follow the growth pattern observed in cyber security. While future planning is necessary, current efforts need to be established now to predict the threat emergence over the next year 10 years and mitigate potential threats. Based on these observations, AI/ML will need to become trustworthy, which corresponds to techniques and procedures that emphasize AI explainability along with resilience techniques to data, algorithms, models, and systems. This kind of system robustness is the foundation for defenses against AI/ML-specific attacks. Attempting to look forward and take a broad view of capabilities provides input to research roadmaps and the ability to distill vulnerabilities into specific use cases may provide greater assistance in understanding the technology benefits while introducing new risks. The impact of current and future AI in three areas—capabilities, challenges, and recovery strategies—represents an initial attempt at balancing both.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Operational and Mission Highlights: A Monthly Summary of Top Achievements October 2022

On Sept. 26, Director Thom Mason signed the Laboratory’s annual assessment of four of the weapons systems in our nation’s nuclear stockpile: the B61 family of bombs and the W76, the W78 and the W88 warheads. Addressed to the secretary of energy, the secretary of defense and the chair of the Nuclear Weapons Council, this letter informs the president of the United States of our confidence that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective now and into the future as a result of our dedicated sustainment and modernization efforts.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Tommy Morris’ Comments on Nuclear Explosive Safety

Nuclear explosives and weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident. The special consideration translates into specific requirements promulgated by Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1E “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety,” and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02 “DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) W-Division Nuclear Explosive Safety Office mission is to coordinate LANL participation in Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies (NESS) and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies (NWSS); to provide qualified members and advisors to the studies; to liaise with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DoD, other national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and Pantex Plant with regards to nuclear explosive and weapon system safety. These orders and directives define nuclear detonation as an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

W-13 Advanced Engineering Analysis Group Overview [Slides]

W-13 provides the Nuclear Weapons Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory with excellence in engineering analysis, predictive modeling, validated simulations, and the quantification of margins and uncertainty. Our customers include the nuclear weapons program, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense, among others.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Strategic Analyses and Assessments Office Annual Report 2023

The past year has seen a significant increase in focus on strategic issues with the continued aggression by Russia, the rapid expansion of China’s military—particularly their nuclear capabilities, North Korea’s rapid improvements in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology, and the increase in Iranian fuel enrichment. The U.S. continues to modernize Nuclear Command Control and Communication and all three legs of its nuclear Triad—Columbia-class submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, and B-21 bombers—for the Department of Defense (DOD). At the same time, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is updating its stockpile, producing the B61-12, the new B61-13, the W88 Alteration, the W87-1—with new pits, and the W80-4. This rework of the nuclear enterprise represents the most aggressive expansion of our capabilities and infrastructure in the modern era. At the same time, the Strategic Posture Commission completed its report to Congress and reported that the current modernization program, although clearly necessary, is insufficient to meet the threats that are emerging.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Multi-phenomenology Yield Characterization

This report serves as the first delivery of a four-year applied science effort to transform and advance the error bounds for the yield estimate of an explosion. Each year’s delivery will be in this form, culminating in the submission of this work for peer review to a scientific journal. Importantly, the yearly progress reports can then also be viewed as expanding drafts working towards a formal journal article submission. For the first tranche of funding, we collaborated with Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) scientists to identify unclassified real-world data that demonstrate and validate our advanced error propagation methods. Collaboration includes visits to AFTAC and telecons. For this development, we illustrate the fusion of seismic, acoustic, optical, and surface effect signatures from an explosion. The mathematics and code being adapted to this specific application (Williams et al., 2021) involves physics models of multiple sensor signatures. We have also identified related physics models and have integrated them into code. Current methods of underground explosion yield estimation for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) have served the US treaty monitoring mission well for decades. A research objective of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) office of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has always been to provide new technical capabilities for monitoring lower thresholds. The general model and error propagation code to be developed in this project is based on significant advances in error modeling and propagation needed to analyze data at lower detection thresholds. The second tranche of funding for this project began on May 1, 2022, and planned work for the second tranche includes: i) completing the integration of physical model code into the general error model framework; this code accommodates a wide range of linear/nonlinear source models, fixed/ random effects, and frequentist/Bayesian analyses (the purpose of which is not to dictate to users how to analyze data, but instead to allow users the maximum flexibility in their work); ii) illustrative application of code to identified data, and; iii) initial planning with AFTAC researchers on delivery of code to the Common Development Environment at AFTAC, and continued writing of the planned final journal article submission (year two of this progress report), with particular emphasis on descriptions of data identified for this effort.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Sigma Division Capability Strategy

Sigma Division maintains a unique manufacturing science capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory that has made substantial contributions to weapons component process development for more than 70 years. This mission requires the ability to handle a range of radiological and hazardous materials, work with a variety of metallic and non-metallic components, and process materials systems with elements spanning hydrogen to uranium. Today, Sigma serves as a national resource for uranium research and development, provides hardware for experimental campaigns, supports production by demonstrating modern fabrication technologies, and conducts manufacturing science research primarily for customers across the nuclear weapons complex, including the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, and Office of Defense Programs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Delicate Balance Redux: The Role of Nuclear Forces, Damage Limitation and Uncertainty in Future U.S.-China Crises

What is the impact of damage limitation capabilities like counterforce and missile defenses on deterrence, when their efficacy in stopping an adversary nuclear attack is uncertain? This is a key unanswered question to understand “how much is enough” for the United States to deter China and Russia in future nuclear crises. In this paper we extend an established, single move game theory model to capture the dynamics of two players in a nuclear crisis having varying damage limitation capabilities with uncertain effectiveness. Our model formalizes the logic of the “delicate balance” school of deterrence, which states that leverage in a crisis is driven by the risk each player can take with their combined strategic forces, and that those risks carry uncertainty as nuclear forces are hard to deliver against technologically advanced adversaries. Our model shows that damage limitation capabilities—even those with significant uncertainty around them like cyber or electronic warfare—can drive bargaining outcomes in an array of nuclear crises. We then apply these bargaining outcomes to the expected U.S.-China strategic balance as China builds out its nuclear force through 2035. We apply published force exchange models to determine the expected damage each side will be able to deliver, and we use these values to determine the likelihood that the U.S. can prevail in crises of varying stakes. Last, we show that U.S. policymakers have an array of options to improve future bargaining outcomes, evaluating how additional nuclear forces trade against improvements in damage limitation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗