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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 433 records · Page 24
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2005

Wipes, Coatings, and Patches for Detecting Hydrazines

Three color-indicating devices have been conceived as simple, rapid, inexpensive means of detecting hazardous liquid and gaseous substances in settings in which safety is of paramount concern and it would be too time-consuming or otherwise impractical to perform detection by use of such instruments as mass spectrometers. More specifically, these devices are designed for detecting hypergolic fuels (in particular, hydrazines) and hypergolic oxidizers in spacecraft settings, where occasional leakage of these substances in liquid or vapor form occurs and it is imperative to take early corrective action to minimize adverse health effects. With suitable redesign, including reformulation of their color indicator chemicals, these devices could be adapted to detection of other hazardous substances in terrestrial settings (e.g., industrial and military ones). One of the devices is a pad of a commercially available absorbent material doped with a color indicator. The absorbent material is made from 70 percent polyester and 30 percent nylon and can absorb about eight times its own weight of liquid. The color indicator is a mixture of conventional pH color indicator chemicals. Hydrazine and monomethyl hydrazine, which are basic, cause the color indicator to turn green. In the original intended application, the pad is wiped on a space suit that is suspected of having been exposed to leaking monomethyl hydrazine during a space walk, before the wearer returns to the interior of the spacecraft. If the wiped surface is contaminated with hydrazine, the pad turns green. In addition, the pad absorbs hydrazine from the wiped surface, thereby reducing or eliminating the hazard. Used pads, including ones that show contamination by hydrazine, can be stored in a sealed plastic bag for subsequent disposal. The second device, which has been proposed but not yet developed, would comprise a color indicator material in the form of either a coating on a space suit (or other protective garment) or a coating on a sheet that could be easily attached to and detached from the protective garment. The coating material would be a hydrogel doped with a suitable pH indicator. The hydrogel would also serve to maintain a level of moisture needed to support the chemical reaction mentioned in the next sentence. In addition to changing color to indicate the presence of any hypergolic fuel (which is basic) or hypergolic oxidizer (which is acidic) that might splash on the space suit, the pH indicator would also react with the hypergolic fuel or oxidizer and thereby bind it. The third device is a color dosimeter for detecting hydrazine liquid or vapor coming from microscopic leaks. This device is designed to satisfy several requirements specific to its original intended use in the auxiliary power unit of the space shuttle. These requirements include stability under vacuum, stability at moderate temperature, fast and irreversible change in color upon exposure to hydrazine, and visibility of the color change through polyimide tape.

Young, Rebecca↗
NASA NTRS2004

Simple Systems for Detecting Spacecraft Meteoroid Punctures

A report describes proposed systems to be installed in spacecraft to detect punctures by impinging meteoroids or debris. Relative to other systems that have been used for this purpose, the proposed systems would be simpler and more adaptable, and would demand less of astronauts attention and of spacecraft power and computing resources. The proposed systems would include a thin, hollow, hermetically sealed panel containing an inert fluid at a pressure above the spacecraft cabin pressure. A transducer would monitor the pressure in the panel. It is assumed that an impinging object that punctures the cabin at the location of the panel would also puncture the panel. Because the volume of the panel would be much smaller than that of the cabin, the panel would lose its elevated pressure much faster than the cabin would lose its lower pressure. The transducer would convert the rapid pressure drop to an electrical signal that could trigger an alarm. Hence, the system would provide an immediate indication of the approximate location of a small impact leak, possibly in time to take corrective action before a large loss of cabin pressure could occur.

Hall, Stephen B.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Prognostics Methodology for Complex Systems

An automatic method to schedule maintenance and repair of complex systems is produced based on a computational structure called the Informed Maintenance Grid (IMG). This method provides solutions to the two fundamental problems in autonomic logistics: (1) unambiguous detection of deterioration or impending loss of function and (2) determination of the time remaining to perform maintenance or other corrective action based upon information from the system. The IMG provides a health determination over the medium-to-longterm operation of the system, from one or more days to years of study. The IMG is especially applicable to spacecraft and both piloted and autonomous aircraft, or industrial control processes.

Gulati, Sandeep↗
NASA NTRS2003

Oxygen-Partial-Pressure Sensor for Aircraft Oxygen Mask

A device that generates an alarm when the partial pressure of oxygen decreases to less than a preset level has been developed to help prevent hypoxia in a pilot or other crewmember of a military or other high-performance aircraft. Loss of oxygen partial pressure can be caused by poor fit of the mask or failure of a hose or other component of an oxygen distribution system. The deleterious physical and mental effects of hypoxia cause the loss of a military aircraft and crew every few years. The device is installed in the crewmember s oxygen mask and is powered via communication wiring already present in all such oxygen masks. The device (see figure) includes an electrochemical sensor, the output potential of which is proportional to the partial pressure of oxygen. The output of the sensor is amplified and fed to the input of a comparator circuit. A reference potential that corresponds to the amplified sensor output at the alarm oxygen-partial-pressure level is fed to the second input of the comparator. When the sensed partial pressure of oxygen falls below the minimum acceptable level, the output of the comparator goes from the low state (a few millivolts) to the high state (near the supply potential, which is typically 6.8 V for microphone power). The switching of the comparator output to the high state triggers a tactile alarm in the form of a vibration in the mask, generated by a small 1.3-Vdc pager motor spinning an eccentric mass at a rate between 8,000 and 10,000 rpm. The sensation of the mask vibrating against the crewmember s nose is very effective at alerting the crewmember, who may already be groggy from hypoxia and is immersed in an environment that is saturated with visual cues and sounds. Indeed, the sensation is one of rudeness, but such rudeness could be what is needed to stimulate the crewmember to take corrective action in a life-threatening situation.

Kelly, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2003

Software Assists in Extensive Environmental Auditing

The Base Environmental Management System (BEMS) is a Web-based application program for managing and tracking audits by the Environmental Office of Stennis Space Center in conformity with standard 14001 of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO 14001). (This standard specifies requirements for an environmental-management system.) BEMS saves time by partly automating what were previously manual processes for creating audit checklists; recording and tracking audit results; issuing, tracking, and implementing corrective-action requests (CARs); tracking continuous improvements (CIs); and tracking audit results and statistics. BEMS consists of an administration module and an auditor module. As its name suggests, the administration module is used to administer the audit. It helps administrators to edit the list of audit questions; edit the list of audit locations; assign mandatory questions to locations; track, approve, and edit CARs; and edit completed audits. The auditor module is used by auditors to perform audits and record audit results: it helps the auditors to create audit checklists, complete audits, view completed audits, create CARs, record and acknowledge CIs, and generate reports from audit results.

Callac, Christopher↗
NASA NTRS2011

Detecting Abnormal Machine Characteristics in Cloud Infrastructures

In the cloud computing environment resources are accessed as services rather than as a product. Monitoring this system for performance is crucial because of typical pay-peruse packages bought by the users for their jobs. With the huge number of machines currently in the cloud system, it is often extremely difficult for system administrators to keep track of all machines using distributed monitoring programs such as Ganglia1 which lacks system health assessment and summarization capabilities. To overcome this problem, we propose a technique for automated anomaly detection using machine performance data in the cloud. Our algorithm is entirely distributed and runs locally on each computing machine on the cloud in order to rank the machines in order of their anomalous behavior for given jobs. There is no need to centralize any of the performance data for the analysis and at the end of the analysis, our algorithm generates error reports, thereby allowing the system administrators to take corrective actions. Experiments performed on real data sets collected for different jobs validate the fact that our algorithm has a low overhead for tracking anomalous machines in a cloud infrastructure.

Bhaduri, Kanishka↗
NASA NTRS2011

Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) - Evolution and Lessons Learned During the Shuttle Program

The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) element integrates all the subsystems needed for ascent flight, entry, and recovery of the combined Booster and Motor system. These include the structures, avionics, thrust vector control, pyrotechnic, range safety, deceleration, thermal protection, and retrieval systems. This represents the only human-rated, recoverable and refurbishable solid rocket ever developed and flown. Challenges included subsystem integration, thermal environments and severe loads (including water impact), sometimes resulting in hardware attrition. Several of the subsystems evolved during the program through design changes. These included the thermal protection system, range safety system, parachute/recovery system, and others. Obsolescence issues occasionally required component recertification. Because the system was recovered, the SRB was ideal for data and imagery acquisition, which proved essential for understanding loads and system response. The three main parachutes that lower the SRBs to the ocean are the largest parachutes ever designed, and the SRBs are the largest structures ever to be lowered by parachutes. SRB recovery from the ocean was a unique process and represented a significant operational challenge; requiring personnel, facilities, transportation, and ground support equipment. The SRB element achieved reliability via extensive system testing and checkout, redundancy management, and a thorough postflight assessment process. Assembly and integration of the booster subsystems was a unique process and acceptance testing of reused hardware components was required for each build. Extensive testing was done to assure hardware functionality at each level of stage integration. Because the booster element is recoverable, subsystems were available for inspection and testing postflight, unique to the Shuttle launch vehicle. Problems were noted and corrective actions were implemented as needed. The postflight assessment process was quite detailed and a significant portion of flight operations. The SRBs provided fully redundant critical systems including thrust vector control, mission critical pyrotechnics, avionics, and parachute recovery system. The design intent was to lift off with full redundancy. On occasion, the redundancy management scheme was needed during flight operations. This paper describes some of the design challenges, how the design evolved with time, and key areas where hardware reusability contributed to improved system level understanding.

Kanner, Howard S.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Flight System Integration at Its Best

The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) element integrates all the subsystems needed for ascent flight, entry, and recovery of the combined Booster and Motor system. These include the structures, avionics, thrust vector control, pyrotechnic, range safety, deceleration, thermal protection, and retrieval systems. This represents the only human-rated, recoverable and refurbishable solid rocket ever developed and flown. Challenges included subsystem integration, thermal environments and severe loads (including water impact), sometimes resulting in hardware attrition. Several of the subsystems evolved during the program through design changes. These included the thermal protection system, range safety system, parachute/recovery system, and others. Because the system was recovered, the SRB was ideal for data and imagery acquisition, which proved essential for understanding loads, environments and system response. The three main parachutes that lower the SRBs to the ocean are the largest parachutes ever designed, and the SRBs are the largest structures ever to be lowered by parachutes. SRB recovery from the ocean was a unique process and represented a significant operational challenge; requiring personnel, facilities, transportation, and ground support equipment. The SRB element achieved reliability via extensive system testing and checkout, redundancy management, and a thorough postflight assessment process. However, the in-flight data and postflight assessment process revealed the hardware was affected much more strongly than originally anticipated. Assembly and integration of the booster subsystems required acceptance testing of reused hardware components for each build. Extensive testing was done to assure hardware functionality at each level of stage integration. Because the booster element is recoverable, subsystems were available for inspection and testing postflight, unique to the Shuttle launch vehicle. Problems were noted and corrective actions were implemented as needed. The postflight assessment process was quite detailed and a significant portion of flight operations. The SRBs provided fully redundant critical systems including thrust vector control, mission critical pyrotechnics, avionics, and parachute recovery system. The design intent was to lift off with full redundancy. On occasion, the redundancy management scheme was needed during flight operations. This paper describes some of the design challenges and technical issues, how the design evolved with time, and key areas where hardware reusability contributed to improved system level understanding.

Wood, T. David↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Handbook, Version 1.0

Catastrophic accidents are usually preceded by precursory events that, although observable, are not recognized as harbingers of a tragedy until after the fact. In the nuclear industry, the Three Mile Island accident was preceded by at least two events portending the potential for severe consequences from an underappreciated causal mechanism. Anomalies whose failure mechanisms were integral to the losses of Space Transportation Systems (STS) Challenger and Columbia had been occurring within the STS fleet prior to those accidents. Both the Rogers Commission Report and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report found that processes in place at the time did not respond to the prior anomalies in a way that shed light on their true risk implications. This includes the concern that, in the words of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), "no process addresses the need to update a hazard analysis when anomalies occur" At a broader level, the ASAP noted in 2007 that NASA "could better gauge the likelihood of losses by developing leading indicators, rather than continue to depend on lagging indicators". These observations suggest a need to revalidate prior assumptions and conclusions of existing safety (and reliability) analyses, as well as to consider the potential for previously unrecognized accident scenarios, when unexpected or otherwise undesired behaviors of the system are observed. This need is also discussed in NASA's system safety handbook, which advocates a view of safety assurance as driving a program to take steps that are necessary to establish and maintain a valid and credible argument for the safety of its missions. It is the premise of this handbook that making cases for safety more experience-based allows NASA to be better informed about the safety performance of its systems, and will ultimately help it to manage safety in a more effective manner. The APA process described in this handbook provides a systematic means of analyzing candidate accident precursors by evaluating anomaly occurrences for their system safety implications and, through both analytical and deliberative methods used to project to other circumstances, identifying those that portend more serious consequences to come if effective corrective action is not taken. APA builds upon existing safety analysis processes currently in practice within NASA, leveraging their results to provide an improved understanding of overall system risk. As such, APA represents an important dimension of safety evaluation; as operational experience is acquired, precursor information is generated such that it can be fed back into system safety analyses to risk-inform safety improvements. Importantly, APA utilizes anomaly data to predict risk whereas standard reliability and PRA approaches utilize failure data which often is limited and rare.

Groen, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2011

EMU Lessons Learned Database

As manned space exploration takes on the task of traveling beyond low Earth orbit, many problems arise that must be solved in order to make the journey possible. One major task is protecting humans from the harsh space environment. The current method of protecting astronauts during Extravehicular Activity (EVA) is through use of the specially designed Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). As more rigorous EVA conditions need to be endured at new destinations, the suit will need to be tailored and improved in order to accommodate the astronaut. The Objective behind the EMU Lessons Learned Database(LLD) is to be able to create a tool which will assist in the development of next-generation EMUs, along with maintenance and improvement of the current EMU, by compiling data from Failure Investigation and Analysis Reports (FIARs) which have information on past suit failures. FIARs use a system of codes that give more information on the aspects of the failure, but if one is unfamiliar with the EMU they will be unable to decipher the information. A goal of the EMU LLD is to not only compile the information, but to present it in a user-friendly, organized, searchable database accessible to all familiarity levels with the EMU; both newcomers and veterans alike. The EMU LLD originally started as an Excel database, which allowed easy navigation and analysis of the data through pivot charts. Creating an entry requires access to the Problem Reporting And Corrective Action database (PRACA), which contains the original FIAR data for all hardware. FIAR data are then transferred to, defined, and formatted in the LLD. Work is being done to create a web-based version of the LLD in order to increase accessibility to all of Johnson Space Center (JSC), which includes converting entries from Excel to the HTML format. FIARs related to the EMU have been completed in the Excel version, and now focus has shifted to expanding FIAR data in the LLD to include EVA tools and support hardware such as the Pistol Grip Tool (PGT) and the Battery Charger Module (BCM), while adding any recently closed EMU-related FIARs.

Matthews, Kevin M., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2012

STS-133/ET-137 Tanking Test Photogrammetry Assessment

Following the launch scrub of Space Shuttle mission STS-133 on November 5, 2010, an anomalous condition of cracked and raised thermal protection system (TPS) foam was observed on the External Tank (ET). Subsequent dissection of the affected TPS region revealed cracks in the feet of two Intertank (IT) metallic stringers. An extensive investigation into the cause(s) and corrective action(s) for the cracked stringers was initiated, involving a wide array of material and structural tests and nondestructive evaluations, with the intent to culminate into the development of flight rational. One such structural test was the instrumented tanking test performed on December 17, 2010. The tanking test incorporated two three-dimensional optical displacement measurement systems to measure full-field outer surface displacements of the TPS surrounding the affected region that contained the stringer cracks. The results showed that the radial displacement and rotation of the liquid oxygen (LO2) tank flange changed significantly as the fluid level of the LO2 approached and passed the LO2 tank flange.

Oliver, Stanley T.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Onboard Sensor Data Qualification in Human-Rated Launch Vehicles

The avionics system software for human-rated launch vehicles requires an implementation approach that is robust to failures, especially the failure of sensors used to monitor vehicle conditions that might result in an abort determination. Sensor measurements provide the basis for operational decisions on human-rated launch vehicles. This data is often used to assess the health of system or subsystem components, to identify failures, and to take corrective action. An incorrect conclusion and/or response may result if the sensor itself provides faulty data, or if the data provided by the sensor has been corrupted. Operational decisions based on faulty sensor data have the potential to be catastrophic, resulting in loss of mission or loss of crew. To prevent these later situations from occurring, a Modular Architecture and Generalized Methodology for Sensor Data Qualification in Human-rated Launch Vehicles has been developed. Sensor Data Qualification (SDQ) is a set of algorithms that can be implemented in onboard flight software, and can be used to qualify data obtained from flight-critical sensors prior to the data being used by other flight software algorithms. Qualified data has been analyzed by SDQ and is determined to be a true representation of the sensed system state; that is, the sensor data is determined not to be corrupted by sensor faults or signal transmission faults. Sensor data can become corrupted by faults at any point in the signal path between the sensor and the flight computer. Qualifying the sensor data has the benefit of ensuring that erroneous data is identified and flagged before otherwise being used for operational decisions, thus increasing confidence in the response of the other flight software processes using the qualified data, and decreasing the probability of false alarms or missed detections.

Wong, Edmond↗
NASA NTRS2012

Investigation of International Space Station Major Constituent Analyzer Anomalous ORU 02 Performance

The Major Constituent Analyzer (MCA) is a mass spectrometer-based instrument designed to provide critical monitoring of six major atmospheric constituents; nitrogen, oxygen, hydrogen, carbon dioxide, methane, and water vapor on-board the International Space Station. It is an integral part of the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS). The MCA system is comprised of seven orbit-replaceable units (ORUs) that provide flexibility in maintaining the MCA. Of these, ORU 02, the analyzer assembly requires replacement every 1 to 2 years due to the consumption of limited life components including the ion pump and ion source filaments. Typically, ORU 02s that reach end of life are swapped out of the MCA on orbit and replaced with the on-orbit spare. The replaced ORU 02 is then cycled through the OEM for refurbishment and returned to service. Recently, two refurbished ORU 02s, serial numbers F0001 and F0003, failed on orbit shortly after being installed into the MCA. Both ORU 02s were returned to ground for TT&E and a failure investigation. The failure signatures were reproduced on the ground and the investigation determined that both ORU 02 failures involve either the ion source or the ion source control electronics. This paper discusses the results of the failure investigation, the steps required to refurbish the ORU 02s, and the corrective actions that are being incorporated into the build and refurbishment process to preclude the reoccurrence of these failures in the future.

Gardner, Ben D.↗
NASA NTRS2012

A Systems Modeling Approach for Risk Management of Command File Errors

The main cause of commanding errors is often (but not always) due to procedures. Either lack of maturity in the processes, incompleteness of requirements or lack of compliance to these procedures. Other causes of commanding errors include lack of understanding of system states, inadequate communication, and making hasty changes in standard procedures in response to an unexpected event. In general, it's important to look at the big picture prior to making corrective actions. In the case of errors traced back to procedures, considering the reliability of the process as a metric during its' design may help to reduce risk. This metric is obtained by using data from Nuclear Industry regarding human reliability. A structured method for the collection of anomaly data will help the operator think systematically about the anomaly and facilitate risk management. Formal models can be used for risk based design and risk management. A generic set of models can be customized for a broad range of missions.

probabilistic risk↗
NASA NTRS2013

Earned Value Management (EVM) Implementation Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide Earned Value Management (EVM) guidance for the effective application, implementation, and utilization of EVM on NASA programs, projects, major contracts and subcontracts in a consolidated reference document. EVM is a project management process that effectively integrates a project s scope of work with schedule and cost elements for optimum project planning and control. The goal is to achieve timely and accurate quantification of progress that will facilitate management by exception and enable early visibility into the nature and the magnitude of technical problems as well as the intended course and success of corrective actions.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2013

Investigation of International Space Station Major Constituent Analyzer Anomalous ORU 02 Performance

The Major Constituent Analyzer (MCA) is a mass spectrometer based system that measures the major atmospheric constituents on the International Space Station. In 2011, two MCA ORU 02 analyzer assemblies experienced premature on-orbit failures. These failures were determined to be the result of off-nominal ion source filament performance. Recent product improvements to ORU 02 designed to improve the lifetime of the ion pump also constrained the allowable tuning criteria for the ion source filaments. This presentation describes the filament failures as well as the corrective actions implemented to preclude such failures in the future.

Gardner, Ben D.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ) Lubrication Interval Test and Evaluation (LITE). Post-Test Grease Analysis

The Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ) is a mechanism of the International Space Station (ISS) that orients the solar power generating arrays toward the sun as the ISS orbits our planet. The orientation with the sun must be maintained to fully charge the ISS batteries and maintain all the other ISS electrical systems operating properly. In 2007, just a few months after full deployment, the starboard SARJ developed anomalies that warranted a full investigation including ISS Extravehicular Activity (EVA). The EVA uncovered unexpected debris that was due to degradation of a nitride layer on the SARJ bearing race. ISS personnel identified the failure root-cause and applied an aerospace grease to lubricate the area associated with the anomaly. The corrective action allowed the starboard SARJ to continue operating within the specified engineering parameters. The SARJ LITE (Lubrication Interval Test and Evaluation) program was initiated by NASA, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing to simulate the operation of the ISS SARJ for an extended time. The hardware was designed to test and evaluate the exact material components used aboard the ISS SARJ, but in a controlled area where engineers could continuously monitor the performance. After running the SARJ LITE test for an equivalent of 36+ years of continuous use, the test was opened to evaluate the metallography and lubrication. We have sampled the SARJ LITE rollers and plate to fully assess the grease used for lubrication. Chemical and thermal analysis of these samples has generated information that has allowed us to assess the location, migration, and current condition of the grease. The collective information will be key toward understanding and circumventing any performance deviations involving the ISS SARJ in the years to come.

Golden, Johnny L.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Toward Baseline Software Anomalies in NASA Missions

In this fast abstract, we provide preliminary findings an analysis of 14,500 spacecraft anomalies from unmanned NASA missions. We provide some baselines for the distributions of software vs. non-software anomalies in spaceflight systems, the risk ratings of software anomalies, and the corrective actions associated with software anomalies.

anonaly↗