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The Legislative and Regulatory Histories Related to Greater-Than-Class-C Low-Level Radioactive Waste - 18602

The history surrounding the legislative and regulatory developments regarding Greater-Than-Class C Low Level Radioactive Waste (GTCC LLW) is both interesting and complex. On October 25, 1978, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking pertaining to the development of regulations for the land disposal of LLW. This regulation was one of the first undertaken by NRC since its inception pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Given the problematic challenges that many States were facing with releases of radioactivity from waste disposal facilities at the time, the technical bases supporting this rulemaking were both forward-thinking and comprehensive. The rule included a waste classification system that was tiered in four waste classes: Class A, B, C and GTCC LLW. On December 27, 1982, the NRC finalized the requirements for disposing of these classes of radioactive waste in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 61 (10 CFR 61). The NRC established the waste classification system to protect both members of the public and individuals that may someday inadvertently intrude in the waste placed in the disposal facility after expiration of the institutional control period. This waste classification was developed to ensure that radiation doses to members of the public and an inadvertent intruder would not exceed 0.25 mSv y{sup -1} (25 mrem y{sup -1}) or 5.0 mSv y{sup -1} (500 mrem y{sup -1}), respectively. At the time the regulation was promulgated, GTCC LLW was considered generally not suitable for near surface disposal. It was recognized that disposal of GTCC LLW would require disposal technologies having greater confinement capacity or protection than 'normal' near-surface disposal. In 1980 Congress enacted the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980, as amended in 1985 (LLWPAA of 1985) that assigned responsibility of disposing of GTCC LLW generated in the commercial sector or owned or generated by the federal government to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). At the time States were having difficulties in developing disposal facilities within the time constraints mandated in the LLWPA of 1980. Therefore, Congress believed that if DOE was assigned responsibility of developing disposal facilities for GTCC LLW, then the States would be more likely to develop new LLW disposal facilities. Congress also assigned the NRC with the responsibility to license the disposal of GTCC LLW generated or owned by the federal government or by the commercial sector. Lastly, Congress changed the definition of LLW that had been defined in the LLWPA of 1980 removing the 'transuranic' exclusionary language. Four years later, on May 25, 1989, the NRC promulgated its regulation needed to implement the mandates specified in the LLWPAA of 1985. The NRC revised 10 CFR 61.55 specifying that the NRC was responsible for licensing the disposal of GTCC LLW. However, it inadvertently did not revise the definition of LLW needed to remove the 'transuranic' exclusionary language in this rulemaking consistent with the LLWPAA of 1985. This seemingly inconsequential omission was not discovered until a Petition for Rulemaking was filed in Texas in July 2014. Moreover, this omission has effectively orphaned waste with certain transuranic radionuclides with concentrations exceeding 100 nanocuries per gram (100 nCi/g). In December 2015, the NRC Commissioners directed its staff to move forward with a rulemaking to resolve this issue and to perform a regulatory analysis to determine whether or not an Agreement State can license the disposal of GTCC LLW pursuant to Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The paper will discuss past and current legislation, rulemaking, and regulatory developments pertaining to resolving the transuranic waste discrepancy and providing a pathway to disposition GTCC LLW. (authors)

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Covenant Deferral Request for the Proposed Transfer of Land Parcel ED-8 at the East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, Tennessee - Final - May 2009

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is proposing to transfer a land parcel (hereinafter referred to as 'the Property') designated as Land Parcel ED-8 at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, by deed, and is submitting this Covenant Deferral Request (CDR) pursuant to Section 120(h)(3)(C) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), as amended, and applicable U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidance. The Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), which includes ETTP, was placed on the National Priorities List (NPL) in November 1989. Environmental investigation and cleanup activities are continuing at ETTP in accordance with CERCLA, the National Contingency Plan (NCP), and the Federal Facility Agreement (FFA). The FFA was entered into by the DOE-Oak Ridge Office (ORO), EPA Region 4, and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) in 1991. The FFA establishes the schedule and milestones for environmental remediation of the ORR. The proposed property transfer is a key component of the Oak Ridge Performance Management Plan (ORPMP) for accelerated cleanup of the ORR. DOE, using its authority under Section 161(g) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), proposes to transfer the Property to Heritage Center, LLC, a subsidiary of the Community Reuse Organization of East Tennessee (CROET), hereafter referred to as 'Heritage Center.' CROET is a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit corporation established to foster the diversification of the regional economy by re-utilizing DOE property for private-sector investment and job creation. The Property is located in the southern portion of ETTP and consists of approximately 84 acres proposed as the potential site for new facilities to be used for office space, industrial activities, or other commercial uses. The parcel contains both grassy fields located outside the ETTP 'main plant' area and infrastructure located inside the 'main plant' area. No buildings are included in the proposed ED-8 transfer. The buildings in ED-8 have already been transferred (Buildings K-1007, K-1580, K-1330, and K-1000). These buildings are not included in the transfer footprint of Land Parcel ED-8. A number of temporary structures, such as trailers and tents (non-real property), are located within the footprint. These temporary structures are not included in the transfer. DOE would continue to be responsible for any contamination resulting from DOE activities that is present on the property at the time of transfer but found after the date of transfer. The deed transferring the Property contains various restrictions and prohibitions on the use of the Property that are subject to enforcement pursuant to State Law Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.) 68-212-225 and state real property law. These restrictions and prohibitions are designed to ensure protection of human health and the environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NORM in Building Materials: A Case Study in Releasing and Disposing of Building Debris within the DOE System - 18123

In 2013, the Office of Management and Budget issued Memorandum 2013-02, clarifying its 'Freeze the Footprint' policy. Memorandum 2013-02 requires that all federal agencies maintain or reduce their total square footage, within each subsequent year, from a FY2012 baseline. Memorandum 2013-02 also requires that total square footage remain constant with respect to the type/intended use of a building. At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), this means that new construction cannot occur without demolition of equivalent (both in type and square footage) building(s). Since 2013, decommissioning and demolition of aging, unused facilities at LANL has increased. In 2016, the TA16-280 building complex was scheduled for demolition. TA16-280 is a former high explosives (HE) processing facility that consists of six buildings connected to each other via weatherproof walkways. It was constructed in the 1950's and has been subsequently used for HE shipping, receiving, and storage. Interviews with radiation protection staff suggest that some of the buildings within the complex may have been used to store depleted uranium metal parts in a non-dispersible form. It is LANL policy to conduct decommissioning surveys for radioactive materials when building history cannot confirm that a structure is radiologically non-impacted. LANL follows the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) process to develop its surveys and clear structures from radiological control. After clearance, a structure may be dispositioned as non-regulated waste, at a significant cost savings compared to regulated disposition pathways such as low-level waste. MARSAME measurements conducted in the 16-280 complex were elevated compared to reference measurements of surrogate materials, and a majority of the survey units failed to pass indistinguishable from background (IFB), which is LANL's unregulated clearance criteria. Further measurements conducted both in situ and in the laboratory indicated the presence of naturally-occurring thorium in several building materials including: poured concrete, the glaze atop ceramic blast tiles, and the porcelain enamel on the exterior of blast-proof ceiling lamps. Other than naturally-occurring thorium, there were no elevated radionuclide concentrations detected in building materials. It should be noted that there was no history of thorium use in the 16-280 complex, and the material in question was in all cases fixed to and within the building materials in question. Except in certain specific cases, such material is exempt from regulation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [3], as amended, and is therefore exempt from regulation under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, and agreement state regulatory frameworks. Despite this regulatory exemption, disposition of material from the 16-280 complex proved to be challenging, principally because local industrial landfills stipulate 'No radioactive material' in their Waste Acceptance Criteria. This disconnect between what is regulated and what is disposable creates a situation where some DOE sites find it easier to disposition property as Low Level Waste in lieu of pursuing a non-regulated disposition pathway. This presentation will explore the specifics of the 16-280 decommissioning project as well as the implications of the release/disposition disconnect for naturally occurring radioactive material and project planning at LANL. (authors)

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Update on the Benchmark Analysis of the Jupiter Experiments: Plutonium Moderated by Lead

The Jupiter experiment was a series of measurements in the summer of 2017 to analyze the effects of voids in lead moderated plutonium assemblies. This experiment was part of a larger campaign that took place at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) in collaboration with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) that also investigated assemblies with differing uranium enrichments. The purpose for this campaign was to provide data useful for a potential lead-bismuth cooled accelerator driven system. This data is needed due to the low number of benchmarks involving lead. Given the wide use of lead for shielding in addition to new reactor designs, there is a need for further benchmarking that this experiment could help fulfill. In addition, adding more benchmarks to the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) is helpful for further validation of simulation methods used for criticality safety. This summary is an update on the current progress of this analysis, and all results shown are preliminary.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Design Considerations for the Field Use of International Nuclear Safeguards Technology

The process of developing and deploying safeguards technology should be carried out in such a way that it supports the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) international safeguards verification mission, while also being efficient in terms of both cost and time. This process, however, may be hindered by a general lack of nuclear facility operating experience among the scientists or engineers designing safeguards technology, or the inability to interact with the IAEA inspector end user. As a result, equipment designers may have difficulty understanding inspector needs and the limitations of using safeguards technology in the field, often leading to inefficiencies (in the form of increased cost and time spent) in the safeguards technology design process. Here, to mitigate this knowledge gap, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, has developed design considerations that should be incorporated into safeguards technologies, focusing on non-destructive assay equipment. Timelines for integration of these considerations into the design process are also discussed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Perform Tests and Document Results and Analysis of Oxide Layer Effects and Comparisons

During the initial feasibility test using actual used nuclear fuel (UNF) cladding in FY 2012, an incubation period of 30–45 minutes was observed in the initial dry chlorination. The cladding hull used in the test had been previously oxidized in a dry air oxidation pretreatment prior to removal of the fuel. The cause of this incubation period was attributed to the resistance to chlorination of an oxide layer imparted by the dry oxidation pretreatment on the cladding. Subsequently in 2013, researchers at the Korea Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI) reported on their chlorination study [R1] on ~9-gram samples of unirradiated ZirloTM cladding tubes that had been previously oxidized in air at 500oC for various time periods to impart oxide layers of varying thickness. In early 2014, discussions with Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracted technical consultants from Westinghouse described their previous development (and patents) [R2] on methods of chemical washing to remove some or all of the hydrous oxide layer imparted on UNF cladding during irradiation in light water reactors (LWRs) . Thus, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) study, described herein, was planned to extend the KAERI study on the effects of anhydrous oxide layers, but on larger ~100-gram samples of unirradiated zirconium alloy cladding tubes, and to investigate the effects of various methods of chemical pretreatment prior to chlorination with 100% chlorine on the average reaction rates and Cl2 usage efficiencies.

Korea Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI)↗

Risk-based Prioritization of Facility Decommissioning and Environmental Restoration Projects in the National Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program at the Chalk River Laboratory - 13564

Chalk River Laboratory (CRL), located in Ontario Canada, has a large number of remediation projects currently in the Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program (NLLP), including hundreds of facility decommissioning projects and over one hundred environmental remediation projects, all to be executed over the next 70 years. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) utilized WorleyParsons to prioritize the NLLP projects at the CRL through a risk-based prioritization and ranking process, using the WorleyParsons Sequencing Unit Prioritization and Estimating Risk Model (SUPERmodel). The prioritization project made use of the SUPERmodel which has been previously used for other large-scale site prioritization and sequencing of facilities at nuclear laboratories in the United States. The process included development and vetting of risk parameter matrices as well as confirmation/validation of project risks. Detailed sensitivity studies were also conducted to understand the impacts that risk parameter weighting and scoring had on prioritization. The repeatable prioritization process yielded an objective, risk-based and technically defendable process for prioritization that gained concurrence from all stakeholders, including Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) who is responsible for the oversight of the NLLP. (authors)

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Strategies for Decommissioning the Fuel Storage and Reprocessing Complex at Chalk River Laboratories - 16183

For over 60 years, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL), previously Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), has been a world leader in developing peaceful and innovative applications from nuclear technology. Resulting from these years of nuclear research there are legacy liabilities consisting of outdated and unused research facilities and buildings, a wide variety of buried and stored wastes, and affected lands. In 2006, the Government of Canada established the Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program (NLLP) to safely and cost-effectively eliminate, to the extent practicable, the nuclear legacy liabilities. The National Research Experimental (NRX) fuel rod storage and handling facility, as well as two dedicated fuel reprocessing facilities at the Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) known as the Building 200 (B200) Complex, are examples of these legacy liabilities. It is planned to remove these facilities as part of a logical progression of activities to reduce CNL's liabilities under the NLLP and to prepare the property for the physical redevelopment of the CRL site. (authors)

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A review of collaborative studies between the NSTX/-U and MAST/-U spherical tokamaks

The National Spherical Torus Experiment (NSTX) at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory in the United States, and the mega ampere spherical tokamak (MAST) at the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority in the United Kingdom, and their respective upgrades (NSTX-U and MAST-U) are two MAST fusion devices that have operated roughly over the past two decades. Both devices have made significant contributions to understanding spherical tokamak (ST) plasma physics, and fusion plasmas in general, and both have contributed data to multi-machine database studies. Several diagnostics have been physically moved from one machine to the other by diagnostic teams working on both devices. Collaboration has benefited both research teams in the areas of operational expertise, scenario development, and equilibrium reconstruction techniques. More focused comparative studies between the two devices have been pursued over the years in many areas as well, including stability calculations, disruption characterization, pedestal and edge localized mode stability, confinement and transport, energetic particles, and heating and current drive modelling. Together NSTX/-U and MAST/-U set the stage for the future of STs, which is entering the phase of design of demonstration power plant devices.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Konrad Repository Facing its Construction

According to the German Atomic Energy Act the Federation is responsible for the construction and operation of installations for the safekeeping and disposal of radioactive waste. This duty was assigned to the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (Bundesamt fuer Strahlenschutz - BfS). In 1982, the Federal Institute of Physics and Metrology (Physikalisch Technische Bundesanstalt - PTB) as the precursor of BfS applied for a license for the disposal of radioactive waste with negligible heat generation in the Konrad iron ore mine near Salzgitter at the Ministry for Environment of Lower Saxony. After 25 years of plan approval procedure and subsequent lawsuits the license is now valid and Konrad is waiting for construction. Facing this challenge BfS has established a project team to supervise the in-house and external activities to be done. It is intended to construct the Konrad repository within a preparation period of two years and a subsequent erection phase of four years. Thus, Konrad is planned to come into operation in 2013. In this paper the development of the plan approval procedure, the technical design of the planned repository, especially with regard to safety-related aspects, and the planning for the construction will be discussed. (authors)

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Heats of Formation of Krypton Fluorides and Stability Predictions for KrF₄ and KrF₆ from High Level Electronic Structure Calculations.

The research described in this product was performed in part in the Environmental Molecular Sciences Laboratory, a national scientific user facility sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Biological and Environmental Research and located at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Atomization energies at 0 K and heats of formation at 0 and 298 K are predicted for KrF⁺, KrF-, KrF₂, KrF₃⁺, KrF₄, KrF₅⁺, and KrF₆ from coupled-cluster theory (CCSD(T)) calculations with effective core potential correlation-consistent basis sets for krypton. To achieve near chemical accuracy (±1 kcal/mol), three corrections were added to the complete basis set binding energies based on frozen core coupled-cluster theory energies: a correction for corevalence effects, a correction for scalar relativistic effects, and a correction for first-order atomic spin-orbit effects. Vibrational zero point energies were computed at the coupled-cluster level of theory. The calculated value for the heat of formation of KrF₂ is in excellent agreement with the experimental value. Contrary to the analogous xenon fluorides, KrF₂, KrF₄, and KrF₆ are predicted to be thermodynamically unstable with respect to loss of F₂. An analysis of the energetics of KrF₄ and KrF₆ with respect to fluorine atom loss together with calculations of the transition states for the intramolecular loss of F₂ show that fluorine atom loss is the limiting factor determining the kinetic stabilities of these molecules. Whereas KrF₄ possesses a marginal energy barrier of 10 kcal/mol toward fluorine atom loss and might be stable at moderately low temperatures, the corresponding barrier in KrF₆ is only 0.9 kcal/mol, suggesting that it could exist only at very low temperatures. Although the simultaneous reactions of either two or four fluorine atoms with KrF₂ to give KrF₄ or KrF₆, respectively, are exothermic, they do not represent feasible synthetic approaches because the attack of the fluorine ligands of KrF₂ by the fluorine atoms, resulting in F₂ abstraction, is thermodynamically favored over oxidative fluorination of the krypton central atom. Therefore, KrF₆ could exist only at very low temperatures, and even the preparation of KrF₄ will be extremely difficult.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Preliminary Concept of Operations for a Global Cylinder Identification and Monitoring System

This report describes a preliminary concept of operations for a Global Cylinder Identification and Monitoring System that could improve the efficiency of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in conducting its current inspection activities and could provide a capability to substantially increase its ability to detect credible diversion scenarios and undeclared production pathways involving UF6 cylinders. There exist concerns that a proliferant State with access to enrichment technology could obtain a cylinder containing natural or low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and produce a significant quantity (SQ)1 of highly enriched uranium in as little as 30 days. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative sponsored a multi-laboratory team to develop an integrated system that provides for detecting scenarios involving 1) diverting an entire declared cylinder for enrichment at a clandestine facility, 2) misusing a declared cylinder at a safeguarded facility, and 3) using an undeclared cylinder at a safeguarded facility. An important objective in developing this integrated system was to improve the timeliness for detecting the cylinder diversion and undeclared production scenarios. Developing this preliminary concept required in-depth analyses of current operational and safeguards practices at conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication facilities. The analyses evaluated the processing, movement, and storage of cylinders at the facilities; the movement of cylinders between facilities (including cylinder fabrication); and the misuse of safeguarded facilities.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Scheduling the Remediation of Port Hope: Logistical and Regulatory Challenges of a Multiple Site Urban Remediation Project - 13119

The Port Hope Project is part of the larger CAN$1.28 billion Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI), a community-based program for the development and implementation of a safe, local, long-term management solution for historic Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) in the Municipalities of Port Hope and Clarington, Ontario, Canada. Atomic Energy of Canada (AECL) is the Project Proponent, Public Works and Government Services (PWGSC) is managing the procurement of services and the MMM Group Limited - Conestoga Rovers and Associates Joint Venture (MMM-CRA Joint Venture) is providing detailed design and construction oversight and administration services for the Project. The Port Hope Project includes the construction of a long-term waste management facility (LTWMF) in the Municipality of Port Hope and the remediation of 18 (eighteen) large-scale LLRW, numerous small-scale sites still being identified and industrial sites within the Municipality. The total volume to be remediated is over one million cubic metres and will come from sites that include temporary storage sites, ravines, beaches, parks, private commercial and residential properties and vacant industrial sites all within the urban area of Port Hope. Challenges that will need to be overcome during this 10 year project include: - Requirements stipulated by the Environmental Assessment (EA) that affect Project logistics and schedule. - Coordination of site remediation with the construction schedule at the LTWMF. - Physical constraints on transport routes and at sites affecting production rates. - Despite being an urban undertaking, seasonal constrains for birds and fish (i.e., nesting and spawning seasons). - Municipal considerations. - Site-specific constraints. - Site interdependencies exist requiring consideration in the schedule. Several sites require the use of an adjacent site for staging. (authors)

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New Design for an HLW Repository (for Spent Fuel and Waste from Reprocessing) in a Salt Formation in Germany - 12213

In autumn 2010, after a 10-year moratorium, exploration was resumed in Gorleben, the potential site for a German HLW repository. At the same time, the Federal Government launched a two-year preliminary safety analysis to assess whether the salt dome at Gorleben is suitable to host all heat-generating radioactive waste generated by German NPPs based on the waste amounts expected at that time. The revised Atomic Energy Act of June 2011 now stipulates a gradual phase-out of nuclear energy production by 2022, which is 13 years earlier than expected in 2010. A repository design was developed which took into account an updated set of data on the amounts and types of expected heat-generating waste, the documented results of the exploration of the Gorleben salt dome, and the new 'Safety Requirements Governing the Final Disposal of Heat-Generating Radioactive Waste' of 30 September, 2010. The latter has a strong influence on the conceptual designs as it requires that retrievability of all waste containers is possible within the repository lifetime. One design considered that all waste containers will be disposed of in horizontal drifts of a geologic repository, while the other design considered that all waste containers will be disposed of in deep vertical boreholes. For both options (emplacement in drifts/emplacement in vertical boreholes), the respective design includes a selection of waste containers, the layout of drifts, respectively lined boreholes, a description of emplacement fields, and backfilling and sealing measures. The design results were described and displayed and the differences between the two main concepts were elaborated and discussed. For the first time in both repository designs the requirement was implemented to retrieve waste canisters during the operational phase. The measures to fulfill this requirement and eventually the consequences were highlighted. It was pointed out that there arises the need to keep transport- and storage casks in adequate numbers and interim storage facilities available until the repository is closed. (authors)

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Measurement of the 235U Induced Fission Gamma-ray Spectrum as an Active Non-destructive Assay of Fresh Nucleear Fuel

Non-destructive assay is a powerful tool the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) employs to verify adherence to safeguards agreements. Current IAEA veri- cation techniques for fresh nuclear fuel include passive gamma-ray spectroscopy to determine fuel enrichment. This technique suers from self-shielding and lakes the percision to detect diversion of central fuel rods. The aim of this research is to develop a new, more capable non-destructive analysis technique using active neutron interroga- tion of fuel assemblies and determining the yields of short-lived ssion products from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy using high-purity germanium (HPGe). This paper reports results from irradiation of a one meter tall mock fresh fuel assembly with low enriched uranium (LEU) or depleted uranium (DU) rods using a down-scattered deuterium-tritium (D-T) neutron source. Both prompt and delayed gamma-ray spec- tra were collected as time-stamped list-mode data in a coax detector and without list mode data in a planar strip detector. No dierentiating signatures were observed in the prompt spectra in either detector; however, both detectors observed several short-lived ssion product signatures in LEU and not DU fuel, indicating that this technique has potential for determination of enrichment of fresh fuel assemblies. There were eight unique ssion products observed in the LEU spectra with the coax detector spectra, and three ssion products were observed in the LEU spectra with the strip detector.

Fission Gamma-ray Spectrum↗

Model Study and Site Experience of Radiation Physics Analysis for Research Reactor Decommissioning - 18586

The University of Alberta Safe Low Power Kritical Experiment (SLOWPOKE II) nuclear reactor facility (UASF) was commissioned on April 22, 1977. It was designed, built and installed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and was the fourth SLOWPOKE II research reactor installed at a Canadian university at that time. The reactor was used as a source of neutrons for radionuclide production and elemental analysis via neutron activation analysis, to provide a service to industry, government and to support research and teaching at the University of Alberta. It was licensed to operate at 20 kW, less than the heat produced by a small residential furnace, and work with the reactor was typically performed at one-tenth full power. After nearly four decades of service, the reactor reached the end of its useful life in August 2017 when defueling and the project to decommission the reactor began. Decommissioning of the UASF is a process to dismantle the facility by progressively removing the reactor core and other radioactive components as well as managing the balance of contaminated materials around the reactor in a safe manner. The objective of the project is to release the site from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's (CNSC) regulatory control and return the site to a 'greenfield' status. This paper will discuss the radiation physics analysis that was undertaken to support the decommissioning of the University of Alberta SLOWPOKE II Facility Reactor which took place from July - October 2017. It will address the radiation physics model study, development of the radiation protection (RP) plan, site experience and how the lessons learned from this project can be utilized for best practice on other similar projects. (authors)

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The Application of Formal Software Engineering Methods to the Unattended and Remote Monitoring Software Suite at Los Alamos National Laboratory

The Unattended and Remote Monitoring (UNARM) system is a collection of specialized hardware and software used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to institute nuclear safeguards at many nuclear facilities around the world. The hardware consists of detectors, instruments, and networked computers for acquiring various forms of data, including but not limited to radiation data, global position coordinates, camera images, isotopic data, and operator declarations. The software provides two primary functions: the secure and reliable collection of this data from the instruments and the ability to perform an integrated review and analysis of the disparate data sources. Several years ago, the team responsible for maintaining the software portion of the UNARM system began the process of formalizing its operations. These formal operations include a configuration management system, a change control board, an issue tracking system, and extensive formal testing, for both functionality and reliability. Functionality is tested with formal test cases chosen to fully represent the data types and methods of analysis that will be commonly encountered. Reliability is tested with iterative, concurrent testing where up to five analyses are executed simultaneously for thousands of cycles. Iterative concurrent testing helps ensure that there are no resource conflicts or leaks when multiple system components are in use simultaneously. The goal of this work is to provide a high quality, reliable product, commensurate with the criticality of the application. Testing results will be presented that demonstrate that this goal has been achieved and the impact of the introduction of a formal software engineering framework to the UNARM product will be presented.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Remediation of Highland Drive Landfill: Technical Challenges of Segregating Co-Mingled LLRW and Municipal Solid Waste in an Urbanized Area - 13319

Highland Drive Landfill is an inactive Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) Landfill which received waste from the 1940's until its closure in 1991. During a portion of its active life, the Landfill received low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) which currently exists both in a defined layer and co-mingled with MSW. Remediation of this site to remove the LLRW to meet established cleanup criteria, forms part of the Port Hope Project being undertaken by Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL) and Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) as part of the Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI). The total volume of LLRW and co-mingled LLRW/MSW estimated to require removal from the Highland Drive Landfill is approximately 51,900 cubic metres (m{sup 3}). The segregation and removal of LLRW at the Highland Drive Landfill presents a number of unique technical challenges due to the co-mingled waste and location of the Landfill in an urbanized area. Key challenges addressed as part of the design process included: delineation of the extent of LLRW, development of cut lines, and estimation of the quantity of co-mingled LLRW in a heterogeneous matrix; protection of adjacent receptors in a manner which would not impact the use of adjacent facilities which include residences, a recreational facility, and a school; coordination and phasing of the work to allow management of six separate material streams including clean soil, MSW, co-mingled LLRW/MSW, LLRW, un-impacted water, and impacted water/leachate within a confined environment; and development of a multi-tiered and adaptive program of monitoring and control measures for odour, dust, and water including assessment of risk of exceedance of monitoring criteria. In addition to ensuring public safety and protection of the environment during remedy implementation, significant effort in the design process was paid to balancing the advantages of increased certainty, including higher production rates, against the costs of attaining increased certainty. Many of these lessons may be applicable to other projects. (authors)

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