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At least 433 records · Page 24

Service-Based, Segmented, 5G Network-Based Architecture for Securing Distributed Energy Resources: Preprint

As the number of connected devices in the energy grid increase exponentially, so too are the cybersecurity risks. With the development of modern communications standards such as 5G and beyond the extent to which devices will continue to connect will continue to increase exponentially along with the inherent risks. However, 5G also includes features to help address cybersecurity concerns and therefore helping to mitigate many of these risks. This paper proposes a new service-based network architecture implementing network-slicing capabilities for connected systems and devices to improve performance, availability, security, and reliability of the grid devices and services. This paper considers the quality of service requirements and criticality of services needed for securely monitoring, operating, and securing Distributed Energy Resource (DER) devices. From developed use cases, network slicing is implemented based on these requirements and resource allocations. This work then highlights examples of how slicing can help prevent standard existing attack methods such as a denial-of-service or similar attack which limits resource availability and network bandwidth to the service and thus limiting its ability to affect other services by misbehaving. The designed network architecture use case will be further tested on a local virtualized testbed to verify secure operation and availability of services. Using hardware-in-the-loop devices and systems on this local testbed, this fully segmented, secure network may be realized and evaluated. Finally, this paper presents the results of this testing.

5G↗

Y-12 National Security Complex Biological Monitoring and Abatement Program Plan

This document provides the Biological Monitoring and Abatement Program (BMAP) Plan for East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC), as required by the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 Complex) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit which became effective December 1, 2011. The BMAP was first developed in 1985 by staff in the Environmental Science Division at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory at the request of the Y-12 Complex. The multidisciplinary and quantitative biological monitoring approaches used for the BMAP were developed, from the beginning, in close consultation with Y-12 Complex Environmental Compliance staff, as well as the State of Tennessee and the Environmental Protection Agency. A draft BMAP Plan was submitted to the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) in May 2012 and was approved by TDEC with revision in December 2012. The TDEC’s Plan changes are incorporated in this final BMAP Plan issued in January 2013. The general approach to the 2013 BMAP Plan follows previous precedent, and addresses all BMAP-related NPDES permit requirements. The focus of the monitoring effort is on EFPC and comparable reference streams, including Brushy Fork and Hinds Creek. Two other stream systems near the Y-12 Complex, Bear Creek and McCoy Branch, are similarly monitored using BMAP and TDEC protocols as required in the permit; however, these streams are monitored by Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act -funded programs and are only briefly summarized in this Plan. Three major tasks comprise the current program: fish bioaccumulation, benthic macroinvertebrate community, and fish community. A concomitant task, toxicity testing of storm drains, is also implemented at the Y-12 Complex and briefly described in the Plan. Each BMAP task differs slightly in the number of sites and frequency of sampling, depending on need as determined by previous monitoring. Sampling rationale and specific methods for each task are provided herein. A summary of program integration components, including data management, quality assurance, and reporting aspects, are also provided. The BMAP is an internationally recognized biological monitoring program that is a valuable case study for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the nation. First and foremost, the program evaluates Tennessee Water Quality Criteria (as required in the NPDES permit) by conducting studies to annually evaluate bioaccumulation of contaminants of concern, and the receiving streams’ biological integrity. The program has been successful in evaluating ecological effects and their causes, and has provided actionable information in the design and application of pollution abatement actions. Most importantly, the program design focuses on assessing spatial and temporal change, and has documented substantial ecological recovery in response to various facility actions. The program results have therefore become a key measure of how well the DOE facilities are doing relative to protecting the environment, and provide assurance to regulators and the public that stream conditions are improving. The DOE’s mission and environmental management in Oak Ridge will continue to evolve as the facilities modernize and various decontamination and decommissioning activities and pollution abatement actions are implemented. Many changes are expected at the Y-12 Complex in the next few years that have the potential to positively affect, or on a short-term basis negatively affect, the stream environment. The BMAP approach described here will continue to provide an important integrated measure of receiving stream conditions and ecological response to future facility actions.

Peterson, Mark J.↗

Volumetrics of CO{sub 2} Storage in Deep Saline Formations

Concern about the role of greenhouse gases in global climate change has generated interest in sequestering CO{sub 2} from fossil-fuel combustion in deep saline formations. Pore space in these formations is initially filled with brine, and space to accommodate injected CO{sub 2} must be generated by displacing brine, and to a lesser extent by compression of brine and rock. The formation volume required to store a given mass of CO{sub 2} depends on the storage mechanism. We compare the equilibrium volumetric requirements of three end-member processes: CO{sub 2} stored as a supercritical fluid (structural or stratigraphic trapping); CO{sub 2} dissolved in pre-existing brine (solubility trapping); and CO{sub 2} solubility enhanced by dissolution of calcite. For typical storage conditions, storing CO{sub 2} by solubility trapping reduces the volume required to store the same amount of CO{sub 2} by structural or stratigraphic trapping by about 50%. Accessibility of CO{sub 2} to brine determines which storage mechanism (structural/stratigraphic versus solubility) dominates at a given time, which is a critical factor in evaluating CO{sub 2} volumetric requirements and long-term storage security.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Augmented Reality for Enabling Smart Nuclear Infrastructure

This work presents a novel, comprehensive framework that leverages emerging augmented reality headset technology to enable smart nuclear industrial infrastructure that a human can easily interact with to improve their performance in terms of safety, security, and productivity. Nuclear industrial operations require some of the most complicated infrastructure that must be managed today. Nuclear infrastructure and their associated industrial operations typically features stringent requirements associated with seismic, personnel management (e.g., access control, equipment access), safety (e.g., radiation, criticality, mechanical, electrical, spark, and chemical hazards), security (cyber/physical), and sometimes international treaties for nuclear non-proliferation. Furthermore, a wide variety of manufacturing and maintenance operations take place within these facilities further complicating their management. Nuclear facilities require very thorough and stringent documentation of the operations occurring within these facilities as well as maintaining a tight chain-of-custody for the materials being stored within the facility. The emergence of augmented reality and a variety of Internet of Things (IoT) devices offers a possible solution to help mitigate these challenges. This work provides a demonstration of a prototype smart nuclear infrastructure system that leverages augmented reality to illustrate the advantages of this system. It will also present example augmented reality tools that can be leveraged to create the next generation of smart nuclear infrastructure. The discussion will layout future directions of research for this class of work.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Orbiter door closure tools

Safe reentry of the shuttle orbiter requires that the payload bay doors be closed and securely latched. Since a malfunction in the door drive or bulkhead latch systems could make safe reentry impossible, the requirement to provide tools to manually close and secure the doors was implemented. The tools would disconnect a disabled door or latch closure system and close and secure the doors if the normal system failed. The tools required to perform these tasks have evolved into a set that consists of a tubing cutter, a winch, a latching tool, and a bolt extractor. The design, fabrication, and performance tests of each tool are described.

Acres, W. R.↗

The research challenges in security and safeguards for nuclear fission batteries

This paper discusses the nuclear security and safeguards research challenges presented by the development and deployment of nuclear fission batteries. These are defined as easily transportable and deployable nuclear systems which are designed to operate either unattended or autonomously. We start by defining the current landscape of domestic and international safeguards and security and discuss how it can be affected by the introduction these new nuclear systems. We then specifically discuss the technology gaps and technologies to be developed to facilitate their practical deployment. We find that, as expected, we can leverage conclusions from existing security and safeguards studies for small modular rectors and develop bespoke target set analyses to inform security postures based on probabilistic risk assessment. We find also that specific fission battery security economic analysis tools are needed and security by design must be applied early. However, the most important finding is that these new systems will require a new comprehensive set of cyber tools covering transportation, installation, operation, maintenance security of the fission battery systems. Altogether, we find that the development of the necessary security and safeguards requirements at the design phase of such a technology will be of great benefit in the smooth deployment of this modern nuclear energy system.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept DOE non-radioactive classified waste, DOE non-radioactive hazardous classified waste, DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW), DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW), and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste for permanent disposal. Classified waste is the only waste accepted for disposal that may be non-radioactive and will be required to meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project (WMP) at (702) 295-7063, and your call will be directed to the appropriate contact.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept the following: • DOE hazardous and non-hazardous non-radioactive classified waste • DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW) • DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW) • U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste The LLW and MLLW listed above may also be classified waste. Classified waste is the only waste accepted for disposal that may be non-radioactive and shall be required to meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. Classified waste may be sent to the NNSS as classified matter. Section 3.1.18 provides the requirements that must be met for permanent burial of classified matter. The NNSA/NFO and support contractors are available to assist the generator in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management Operations (EMO) at (702) 295-7063, and the call will be directed to the appropriate contact.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Distinguishability of quantum states and shannon complexity in quantum cryptography

The proof of the security of quantum key distribution is a rather complex problem. Security is defined in terms different from the requirements imposed on keys in classical cryptography. In quantum cryptography, the security of keys is expressed in terms of the closeness of the quantum state of an eavesdropper after key distribution to an ideal quantum state that is uncorrelated to the key of legitimate users. A metric of closeness between two quantum states is given by the trace metric. In classical cryptography, the security of keys is understood in terms of, say, the complexity of key search in the presence of side information. In quantum cryptography, side information for the eavesdropper is given by the whole volume of information on keys obtained from both quantum and classical channels. The fact that the mathematical apparatuses used in the proof of key security in classical and quantum cryptography are essentially different leads to misunderstanding and emotional discussions [1]. Therefore, one should be able to answer the question of how different cryptographic robustness criteria are related to each other. In the present study, it is shown that there is a direct relationship between the security criterion in quantum cryptography, which is based on the trace distance determining the distinguishability of quantum states, and the criterion in classical cryptography, which uses guesswork on the determination of a key in the presence of side information.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Violating Bell’s inequality with remotely connected superconducting qubits

Quantum communication relies on the efficient generation of entanglement between remote quantum nodes, as entanglement is required to achieve and verify secure communications. Remote entanglement has been realized using a number of different probabilistic schemes, but deterministic remote entanglement has only been demonstrated recently, using a variety of superconducting circuit approaches. However, the deterministic violation of a Bell inequality, a strong measure of quantum correlation, has not been demonstrated so far in a superconducting quantum communication architecture, in part because achieving sufficiently strong correlation requires fast and accurate control of the emission and capture of the entangling photons. We present a simple and robust architecture for achieving this benchmark result in a superconducting system.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

Underground Test Area Fiscal Year 2013 Annual Quality Assurance Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This report is required by the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) and identifies the UGTA quality assurance (QA) activities for fiscal year (FY) 2013. All UGTA organizations—U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO); Desert Research Institute (DRI); Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I); National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec); and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)—conducted QA activities in FY 2013. The activities included conducting assessments, identifying findings and completing corrective actions, evaluating laboratory performance, and publishing documents. In addition, integrated UGTA required reading and corrective action tracking was instituted.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of the applicability of existing nuclear power plant regulatory requirements in the U.S. to advanced small modular reactors.

The current wave of small modular reactor (SMR) designs all have the goal of reducing the cost of management and operations. By optimizing the system, the goal is to make these power plants safer, cheaper to operate and maintain, and more secure. In particular, the reduction in plant staffing can result in significant cost savings. The introduction of advanced reactor designs and increased use of advanced automation technologies in existing nuclear power plants will likely change the roles, responsibilities, composition, and size of the crews required to control plant operations. Similarly, certain security staffing requirements for traditional operational nuclear power plants may not be appropriate or necessary for SMRs due to the simpler, safer and more automated design characteristics of SMRs. As a first step in a process to identify where regulatory requirements may be met with reduced staffing and therefore lower cost, this report identifies the regulatory requirements and associated guidance utilized in the licensing of existing reactors. The potential applicability of these regulations to advanced SMR designs is identified taking into account the unique features of these types of reactors.

LaChance, Jeffrey L.↗

Expedited Demolition Notification for 2nd Quarter CY 2012 Structures

The National Nuclear Security Administration and Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) (collectively the Permittees) are informing the New Mexico Environment Department Hazardous Waste Bureau (NMED-HWB) of the need to expedite the demolition of structures summarized in the enclosures. These structures have been identified to receive funding and be demolished prior to the 3rd Quarter Demolition Notification (June 30, 2012). This letter is a follow up to the email that was sent to the NMED-HWB on April 17, 2012. The enclosures attached to this letter satisfy the reporting requirements as outlined in Section 1.17 of the LANL Hazardous Facility Waste Permit (Permit). Demolition of buildings that appear on this list will not occur until 30 days after NMED has received this notification.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSS/WAC)

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept the following: DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW); DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW); DOE classified waste/matter; U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste/matter The LLW and MLLW listed above may also be classified waste. Non-radioactive classified waste is accepted for disposal and shall meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. Classified matter may be shipped to the NNSS for permanent burial as classified waste in accordance with the provisions in Section 3.1.18 of this document.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Teaching Laboratory Renovation

Scientists at universities across Iraq are actively working to report actual incidents and accidents occurring in their laboratories, as well as structural improvements made to improve safety and security, to raise awareness and encourage openness, leading to widespread adoption of robust Chemical Safety and Security (CSS) practices. The improvement of students’ understanding of concepts in science and its applications, practical scientific skills and understanding of how science and scientists work in laboratory experiences have been considered key aspects of education in science for over 100 years. Facility requirements for the necessary level of safety and security combined with specific requirements relevant to the course to be conducted dictate the structural design of a particular laboratory, and the design process must address both. This manuscript is the second in a series of five case studies describing laboratory incidents, accidents, and laboratory improvements. We summarize the process used to guide a major renovation of the chemistry instructional laboratory facilities at Al-Nahrain University and discuss lessons learned from the project.

chemistry laboratory↗

National Campaign (NC)-1 Strategic Conflict Management Simulation (X4) Community Based Rules

Projected demand for transportation services in the urban environment has led to the development of several Concepts of Operation for Urban Air Mobility, or UAM. UAM is a concept for the transportation of people and goods in the metropolitan environment using small, efficient aircraft over short distances as part of an expanding multimodal transportation network. UAM will leverage emerging technologies including electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) aircraft, increasing levels of automation and a new operational paradigm in dense airspace where a set of agreed-upon rules govern the procedures and interactions defining a cooperative environment in which operators are entrusted with a range of functions typically conducted by Air Traffic Control (ATC). These rules, proposed in the FAA NextGen Office’s UAM Concept of Operations [1], were originally termed Community Based Rules or Community Business Rules (CBRs), and will in the future termed Cooperative Operating Practices (COPs); this document uses the original term, CBR. CBRs are a set of rules, developed by the UAM community and (where necessary) approved by the FAA that govern the interactions between UAM entities and limit the need for ATC services including, but not limited to, separation control by ATC, addressing a fundamental challenge to scaling UAM operations. UAM community development of CBRs is anticipated to accelerate the adoption of new practices while retaining the regulatory authority of the FAA within required domains (e.g., NAS safety, security and equal access). However, there currently exists no agreed industry forum or defined procedures for CBR development. Investigation of best practices for the development of UAM CBRs was identified by NASA and the FAA NextGen Office as a research need. In collaboration with seven industry partners, NASA participated in a series of simulations that investigated elements of the envisioned UAM operations, with a primary focus on Strategic Conflict Management (SCM). The development and conduct of cooperative UAM simulations with seven industry partners provided a unique opportunity to investigate CBR development practices. Development of CBRs for the UAM SCM simulations was conducted in parallel with simulation capability development and was closely related to requirements definition for the simulations. As such, the CBR development effort presented herein had two objectives: explore CBR development practices in collaboration with the industry partners and develop an initial set of UAM CBRs to support simulation requirements definition and development. Consensus was achieved among NASA and the industry partners on 24 CBRs that were developed to support the cooperative simulation operations across five topic areas: General (related to test requirements), Operational Intent, Conformance Monitoring, Demand Capacity Balancing, and Airspace Constraint Management. Additional topic areas and CBRs were discussed but were deemed outside the scope of the simulation; these are included in the appendices. A collaborative, iterative process was employed for developing the CBRs engaging both NASA and Industry; because CBR development is envisioned to be community-driven, opportunities were sought that provided industry partners leadership roles in developing CBRs. The following key observations and recommendations may aid the UAM industry in future CBR development efforts: - The lack of a defined process proved challenging initially. Stakeholder engagement in the early stages of CBR development was intermittent and may have been due to the lack of a clear definition of roles and responsibilities of those involved in the effort. - Industry leadership of CBR topic areas proved successful. Discussions in these topic areas were engaging, with alternate viewpoints freely discussed and detailed CBRs resulting. This points to the importance of identifying the best-suited leadership in technical areas for CBR development. - Discussions within a CBR topic area were typically dominated by only a few participants. Whereas all industry partners contributed to CBR development, within each topic area, technical leadership was evident even when not formally established. This observation may indicate that smaller, focused groups may be more effective in initial CBR development than an open forum or large standards development effort (although both maybe required prior to FAA review and approval for some CBRs). - Identifying suitable forums for initial UAM CBR development and identifying the most effective industry participants and leadership will be crucial for successful CBR development. Although the operational need for UAM CBRs may not be immediate, establishing the forums and leadership to define the processes for CBR development is a prudent early step to UAM realization.

Community Based Rules↗

Advanced Simulation and Computing FY20 Implementation Plan (Rev. 0)

The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, surety, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP incorporates nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. The suite of data analyzed comes from activities including stockpile surveillance, experimental research, and development and engineering programs. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and the computational capabilities to support the SSP missions. These component parts, in addition to an appropriately scaled production capability, enable the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to support stockpile requirements. The ultimate goal of the Stewardship Program, and thus the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, is to ensure that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗