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NASA NTRS2020

Architecture and Information Requirements to Assess and Predict Flight Safety Risks During Highly Autonomous Urban Flight Operations

As aviation adopts new and increasingly complex operational paradigms, vehicle types, and technologies to broaden airspace capability and efficiency, maintaining a safe system will require recognition and timely mitigation of new safety issues as they emerge and before significant consequences occur. A shift toward a more predictive risk mitigation capability becomes critical to meet this challenge. In-time safety assurance comprises monitoring, assessment, and mitigation functions that proactively reduce risk in complex operational environments where the interplay of hazards may not be known (and therefore not accounted for) during design. These functions can also help to understand and predict emergent effects caused by the increased use of automation or autonomous functions that may exhibit unexpected non-deterministic behaviors. The envisioned monitoring and assessment functions can look for precursors, anomalies, and trends (PATs) by applying model-based and data-driven methods. Outputs would then drive downstream mitigation(s) if needed to reduce risk. These mitigations may be accomplished using traditional design revision processes or via operational (and sometimes automated) mechanisms. The latter refers to the ‘in-time’ aspect of the system concept. This report comprises architecture and information requirements and considerations toward enabling such a capability within the domain of low altitude highly autonomous urban flight operations. This domain may span, for example, public-use surveillance missions flown by small unmanned aircraft (e.g., infrastructure inspection, facility management, emergency response, law enforcement, and/or security) to transportation missions flown by larger aircraft that may carry passengers or deliver products. Caveat: Any stated requirements in this report should be considered initial requirements that are intended to drive research and development (R&D). These initial requirements are likely to evolve based on R&D findings, refinement of operational concepts, industry advances, and new industry or regulatory policies or standards related to safety assurance.

Young, Steven↗

NASA NTRS2005

Nutrition Requirements, Standards, and Operating Bands for Exploration Missions

The challenge was brought forward in early 2005 to define the nutritional requirements for Exploration missions, and to define the relevant standards and associated operating bands related to nutrition. This document is the result of this charge. An extensive review of existing knowledge was conducted with participation of intramural and extramural experts, and the findings are summarized herein. In short, the approach taken was to define the nutrient intake requirements, that is, the amount of each nutrient expected to be available in the food system. The standards are defined as markers of nutritional status, with optimal (green), sub-optimal (yellow), and critical (red) levels for each. For many of the nutrient requirements, it is not known if they are altered during space flight. Furthermore, in many cases the intake of a nutrient may act as a countermeasure to one or more negative effects of space flight, but these potential countermeasures, too, are not well defined. Thus, we have also documented herein the areas where further research is required. Accordingly, while this document is intended as a comprehensive summary of our knowledge to date, it is expected that this is the first edition of these requirements and standards. As we learn more about space-flight nutrition, and as relationships between disease and nutrients are further defined in Earth-based populations, this document, and the approach to nutrition in the space rogram, will need to be updated accordingly.

Neubek, Deborah J.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Formal Requirements Elicitation with FRET

FRET is a tool for writing, understanding, formalizing and analyzing requirements. Users write requirements in an intuitive, restricted natural language, called FRETISH, with precise, unambiguous meaning. For a FRETISH requirement, FRET: 1) produces natural language and diagrammatic explanations of its exact meaning, 2) formalizes the requirement in logics, and 3) supports interactive simulation of produced logic formulas to ensure that they capture user intentions. FRET connects to analysis tools by facilitating the mapping between requirements and models/code, and by generating verification code. FRET is available open source at https://github.com/NASA-SW-VnV/fret; a video can be accessed at : https://tinyurl.com/fretForREFSQ.

Giannakopoulou, Dimitra↗

NASA NTRS2019

Defining Navigation Requirements for Future Precision Lander Missions

Human mission concepts for both the Moon and Mars require landing precision capabilities beyond the current state of art. The Safe and Precise Landing Integrated Capabilities Evolution (SPLICE) project leverages previous work at NASA to develop multimission precision landing and hazard avoidance (PL&HA) technologies to meet the advanced landing requirements. SPLICE aims to develop guidance, navigation and control (GN&C) capabilities for both Moon and Mars lander missions. The approach the project is using to identify a standard suite begins with developing a PL&HA requirements matrix to inform technology investments. The approach to develop a multi-mission navigation requirements matrix includes identifying representative concepts of operations for both robotic and human missions. It also identifies navigation sensor options with estimated performance parameters. This paper summarizes the concepts of operations and sensors considered to develop the SPLICE PL&HA requirements matrix. A description of the analysis used to determine candidate optimal sensor suites and initial results are provided.

Dwyer Cianciolo, Alicia↗

NASA NTRS2018

From Formal Requirements to Highly Assured Software for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Operational requirements of safety-critical systems are often written in restricted specification logics. These restricted logics are amenable to automated analysis techniques such as model-checking, but are not rich enough to express complex requirements of unmanned systems. This short paper advocates for the use of expressive logics, such as higher-order logic, to specify the complex operational requirements and safety properties of unmanned systems. These rich logics are less amenable to automation and, hence, require the use of interactive theorem proving techniques. However, these logics support the formal verification of complex requirements such as those involving the physical environment. Moreover, these logics enable validation techniques that increase con dence in the correctness of numerically intensive software. These features result in highly-assured software that may be easier to certify. The feasibility of this approach is illustrated with examples drawn for NASA's unmanned aircraft systems.

Munoz, Cesar↗

NASA NTRS2019

ISS Safety Requirements Documents: International Space Station Program (Baseline)

The International Space Station (ISS) Program (ISSP) establishes the technical requirements for the safe design, development, test and operation of end items. End items include, but are not limited to: ISS hardware/elements (inclusive of Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)), payload/science hardware, Visiting Vehicles (VV), logistics, crew psychological support items, tools, spare instruments and assemblies, including waste. SSP 41000, System Specification for the International Space Station, provides performance and design requirements for ISS and contains many ISS level safety and design requirements that must be considered when developing end item specification documents for ISS end items. SSP 51721, ISS Safety Requirements, exists to further define the safety requirements to be applied to end items developed for ISS

ISS↗

NASA NTRS2020

Preparing for Mars 2020 and Future Space Missions: Technology Advancements Driving Contamination Control Requirements and Cleanroom Protocols

Future space exploration missions will force contamination control requirements to become more strict to support increasingly sensitive instrumentation and search for life missions. Driving issues for these extremely clean requirements include increased instrument sensitivity, return sample science, and protecting ambitious mission science objectives. Preparing to meet these requirements mandates that contamination control provide new guidelines and more involved support for the cleanrooms during flight hardware assembly, including establishing better methods for setting cleanroom personnel limits to reduce particle fall out in cleanrooms. Limited literature exists for universal methods of determining cleanroom personnel limits, and what does exist includes mostly theory and assumptions on determining the limit. In this work, published method will be assessed against particle fall out data collected from the ISO 5 cleanrooms of the Mars 2020 Perseverance Rover assembly. Additional evaluations will assess contamination control required cleanroom protocols and the overall success of meeting strict cleanliness requirements of the Adaptive Caching Assembly (ACA) and sample tubes to safeguard future scientific endeavors.

Chen, Nicole↗

NASA NTRS2022

Reliability-Aware Requirements Development for Autonomy Software

Autonomy is the ability of a system to make decisions and take actions in the presence of uncertainty. Validating autonomy, therefore, is a matter of validating that the system makes intelligent decisions even when there might be discrepancies between the observed and the expected state of the world as well as when the possible outcome of each of the possible courses of action is uncertain. During the requirements engineering phase, the functions, including those that are required to be autonomous and their expected behavior are specified. However, in the case of autonomous software system, it is challenging to specify all possible scenarios that the software may encounter. Additionally, since autonomous behaviors cannot always be fully predetermined, it is difficult to reason about their completeness and correctness. While these challenges are also faced with non-autonomous system, they are more prevalent for autonomous system due to their complexity and emergent behavior. Our efforts have been three-fold. On one hand, we have developed a goal-based method for requirements decomposition. We have embedded this approach into a higher-level systems engineering framework and then developed methods for decision and reliability analysis within this framework. And finally, we use simulation analysis to validate the more theoretical methods and provide a feedback mechanism. The decision analysis approach (DA) helps in identifying and mitigating the run-time risks, by bringing to the forefront the uncertainties, decisions, interactions, and other factors that may cause autonomous software to make erroneous decisions. The DA framework is used to quantify, for each decision that the software can make, failure risk due to uncertainties. The information about the key decisions and circumstances that can cause autonomous system to make incorrect decisions are used to generate test scenarios to be run in a simulator to ensure that the system can handle error-prone circumstances. The results or outcomes from decisions, based on the simulated scenarios, can then be leveraged to further gain insight of the assured system. We combine a goal-based approach with simulation analysis to facilitate requirements development for autonomous systems and further provide a method for run-time systems level reliability considerations during the autonomous software development process. The DA and the reliability analysis methods provide a formalism for the consideration of uncertainty in the run time decision-making process for autonomous software. This formalism considers the uncertainty involved in the outcome of different courses of action, in terms of performance and cost, as well as a method to consider the system level reliability implications. System level reliability considerations for autonomous software decision making contribute to the satisfaction of the system level goals over the lifecycle of a given mission. We demonstrate our approach using a hypothetical rover path planning example. The requirements for our rover simulator are based on existing literature about Mars rovers and lessons learned from real world observations at JPL. The specifics of the autonomy design for the Mars rovers, that have not been previously cleared for external release, are not used for our demonstrations.

Lindvall, Mikael↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

On The Incorporation of Both Function-Driven Requirements and Topology Optimization in The Development of Lunar Launch & Landing Pads

In the design of additively manufactured structures, there can be a constant battle between focusing on function-driven design and topology optimization in an attempt to improve a products ability to meet all requirements. Function-driven optimization is defined as the process of identifying the best design parameters that satisfy project functionality requirements. Function-driven optimization is typically implemented by a designer(s) who, instead of computational limitations, has human bias for the input or inputs determined. On the other hand, topology optimization is defined as a mathematical method that optimizes material layout within a given design space, for a given set of loads, boundary conditions, and constraints with the goal of maximizing the performance of the system. In topology optimization, the work is defined by the limited mathematical inputs and computationally available goals/restraints. If not evaluated simultaneously, these two approaches can result in fundamentally different design concepts meant to address the same requirements. NASA’s Artemis program includes the development of a base camp near the lunar South Pole. After site selection is made, one of the first infrastructure elements needed will be a launch and landing pad (LLP). The construction of such a pad will prevent damage to nearby structures from plume-surface interaction (PSI) while also providing a stable platform for the lander. These benefits reduce the required distance between the established landing zones and other settlement infrastructure. In this paper, the authors evaluate the requirements associated with lunar LLP development, application of both functional and topological optimization techniques, methodologies to combine the two techniques, and potential impacts on final design of such a pad.

In-situ↗

DOE OSTI2017

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives include: • Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. • Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacturer, etc.), and assessment video feeds. • All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. • Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. • Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). • Automated creation of reports and data visualization. • Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: • For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” • For personnel safety needs: o Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. o Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual (Ref TBD). • For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2018

Technical Requirements for Geothermal Resource Confirmation

In 2017-2018, the Bureau of Land Management's Renewable Energy Coordination Office, through its Geothermal Program, funded the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to analyze technical and environmental considerations related to geothermal resource confirmation drilling. NREL solicited input from a group of technical and environmental experts in the geothermal industry, along with analyzing National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) documentation for previously approved projects. The collected data and analysis will be used by the Bureau of Land Management to examine the possibility of developing a new classification of wells and/or expediting the NEPA compliance process, which could potentially reduce permitting and regulatory compliance timelines when compared to the current process for obtaining a geothermal drilling permit for resource confirmation drilling activities. This paper provides a summary of the technical requirements for confirming a geothermal resource. The analysis showed that confirming a geothermal resource requires confirming reservoir temperature, chemistry, permeability, and flow rate. Obtaining these data requires drilling at least two-preferably three-successful wells into the resource to conduct the necessary tests, including an interference test. Bottom-hole well diameters of at least 6'' to 8'' (0.15 to 0.2 m) are needed to limit the wellbore frictional pressure drop to effectively perform well flow and interference tests. Drilling these wells requires a drill rig with a mud pump and derrick capable of holding three drill pipes. This type of rig requires a minimum well-pad size of 2.5 acres (104 m2) including surface area for a 1 million-gallon (3.8 million-liter) pit. Up to 15 acres (5x104 m2) of total surface disturbance are needed for developing access roads and well pads to drill a total of three to five wells.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2017

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives included: Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacture, etc.), and assessment video feeds. All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). Automated creation of reports and data visualization. Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” For personnel safety needs: Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual. For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

Means of Meeting Chapter 15 Requirements for a Small Modular Reactor Cooled by Lead-Bismuth

The mission of the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) is to advance nuclear power as a resource capable of meeting the nation’s energy, environmental, and national security needs by resolving technical, cost, safety, proliferation resistance, and security barriers through Research, Development, and Demonstration (RD&D). To assist in accomplishing this, DOE-NE has established the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) to provide the nuclear community with access to the technical, regulatory, and financial support necessary to move innovative nuclear energy technologies toward commercialization. As part of this program, a GAIN Voucher was awarded to the Columbia Basin Consulting Group (CBCG) to develop for the Lead-Bismuth Reactor (LBR): (1) a means of meeting Chapter 15 requirements and (2) to perform an assessment against a gap analysis developed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for Chapter 15. These two assessments will determine to what extent the LBR can adapt to or meet the Chapter 15 Accident Analysis requirements, and determine gaps that may still exist and what additional information is needed in order to close them. The CBCG LBR design is being developed with a high level of passive safety. It has the advantages of the classical liquid metal reactor, i.e. small size and passive safety, while having the additional advantage of a chemically inert coolant. The CBCG and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) collaborated to develop an initial licensing pathway for the CBCG Lead-Bismuth conceptual reactor design. It was found that the reactor is well along the licensing pathway and is licensable although some additional design information is needed to establish a complete licensing basis. The missing information is identified in this report and it is noted that much of the missing information can be obtained from the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), a DOE liquid metal test reactor. It was also found that the traditional Chapter 15 requirements for assessing the response of a reactor to possible accident sequences can be adapted to the LBR concept. The Chapter 15 review examined several classes of initiating events and accidents that are normally covered in Chapter 15: reactivity initiated events, reduction in heat removal events, local fuel failure events, and events initiated on the steam supply side. Although some design information is lacking at present, the LBR can be expected to respond as required by Chapter 15 requirements to almost all of the first three events. For events initiated on the steam side, design information is lacking and so conclusions cannot be reached at present. On the other hand, it should be quite possible to develop the design information for the steam supply side and the impact of events initiated on this side can be assessed in a subsequent study.

Wootan, David W.↗

DOE OSTI2013

Comparative Analysis Between US NRC Requirements and US DOE Orders - 13402

Small modular reactor (SMR) is a nuclear reactor design approach that is expected to herald in a new era of clean energy in the U.S. These reactors are less than one-third the size of conventional large nuclear power reactors, and have factory-fabricated components that may be transported by rail or truck to a site selected to house a small nuclear reactor. To facilitate the licensing of these smaller nuclear reactor designs, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is in the process of developing a regulatory infrastructure to support licensing review of these unique reactor designs. As part of these activities, the NRC has been meeting with the Department of Energy (DOE) and with individual SMR designers to discuss potential policy, licensing, and key technical differences in SMR designs. It is anticipated by the NRC that such licensing interaction and guidance early in the design process will contribute towards minimizing complexity while adding stability and predictability in the licensing and subsequent regulation of new reactor designs such as SMRs. In conjunction with the current NRC initiative of developing the SMR licensing process, early communication and collaboration in the identification and resolution of any potential technical and licensing differences between NRC requirements and similar requirements applicable at DOE sites would help to expedite demonstration and implementation of SMR technology in the US. In order to foster such early communication, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) has begun taking the first steps in identifying and evaluating potential licensing gaps that may exist between NRC and DOE requirements in siting SMRs at DOE sites. A comparison between the existing NRC regulations for Early Site Permits and the DOE Orders was undertaken to establish the degree of correlation between NRC requirements and compliance methods in place at DOE sites. The ability to use existing data and information to expedite the development of the Environmental Report is being evaluated at the Savannah River Site as a case study for application across the DOE Complex. This paper will present areas of direct correlation as well as those where the need for site specific data for either DOE operations or NRC compliance warrant additional interaction between the agencies. Areas where further refinement of the SMR technologies may drive collaborative development of revised regulations through such means as industry consensus standards will also be highlighted. Both NRC and DOE have requirements that mandate public involvement in their processes. The importance and value of early engagement with the public as well as collaborating regulatory agencies is of critical importance when deploying new technologies. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2013

Assessment of Quality Assurance Measures for Radioactive Material Transport Packages not Requiring Competent Authority Design Approval - 13282

The majority of transports of radioactive materials are carried out in packages which don't need a package design approval by a competent authority. Low-active radioactive materials are transported in such packages e.g. in the medical and pharmaceutical industry and in the nuclear industry as well. Decommissioning of NPP's leads to a strong demand for packages to transport low and middle active radioactive waste. According to IAEA regulations the 'non-competent authority approved package types' are the Excepted Packages and the Industrial Packages of Type IP-1, IP-2 and IP-3 and packages of Type A. For these types of packages an assessment by the competent authority is required for the quality assurance measures for the design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection (IAEA SSR 6, Chap. 306). In general a compliance audit of the manufacturer of the packaging is required during this assessment procedure. Their regulatory level in the IAEA regulations is not comparable with the 'regulatory density' for packages requiring competent authority package design approval. Practices in different countries lead to different approaches within the assessment of the quality assurance measures in the management system as well as in the quality assurance program of a special package design. To use the package or packaging in a safe manner and in compliance with the regulations a management system for each phase of the life of the package or packaging is necessary. The relevant IAEA-SSR6 chap. 801 requires documentary verification by the consignor concerning package compliance with the requirements. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

Safety Requirement Management System (SRMS) - Improved Documented Safety Analyses Implementation - 18476

Savannah River Remediation (SRR) developed a new software application, Safety Requirement Management System (SRMS), to improve Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) safety requirement implementation in the Savannah River Site's Liquid Waste facilities. Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) Limited Conditions of Operations (LCOs) and related surveillances were previously tracked using four different applications. Due to their differences and their age, the applications introduced a number of operational challenges and vulnerabilities, including outdated platforms, usage demands beyond original design, and different organizational work processes. SRMS was developed to resolve these issues by using a single web-based approach that provides consistency, wider accessibility, simpler maintenance, and a platform for additional functionality. Other SRS facilities are evaluating the application for its applicability as a standard practice across the site. The new SRMS application decreased the administrative overhead for application maintenance, provided the needed TSR change management functionality, and reduced error precursors with the following advantages: - Consistent process/application across all SRR facilities - More efficient way to track and communicate compliance with DSA time-related requirements (i.e., TSR LCOs and surveillances). - Web-based search capability for LCO entries/exits and a record of surveillance performances. - TSR change management and independent reviews through electronic approvals. For example, the application provides the ability to bundle and stage LCO and surveillance changes associated with a TSR revision. The approval process involves multiple roles from the facility to ensure validity. - Formal configuration management program, fully supported by software life cycle documents. SRMS was implemented at Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) in June 2017, with implementation in all Liquid Waste facilities expected by the end of 2017. Next, SRR plans to expand SRMS functionality to include a linking document database (LDD) to support the DSA requirements. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

Nuclear analysis generic requirements for fusion applications of radiation shielding - 25639

Radiation shielding engineering and associated nuclear analysis plays an important role in design, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of nuclear fusion devices. Requirements adopted in current analyses are investigated versus basic principles of requirement management and verification and validation aspects. An assessment is proposed to derive applicable product and process requirements from safety principles and transversal function requirements. V and V aspects are extended to cover input and output data. It is concluded that beyond the progress on computational capabilities and technical quality of fusion neutronics shielding analysis, there is the need to develop the underlying procedures and requirement management to satisfy configuration management, quality assurance and safety demonstration needs. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

NASA NTRS2022

Realizability Checking of Requirements in FRET

Requirements formalization has become increasingly popular in industrial settings as an effort to disambiguate designs and optimize development time and costs for critical system components. Formal requirements elicitation also enables the employment of analysis tools to prove important properties, such as consistency and realizability. In this report, we present the realizability analysis framework that we developed as part of the Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET). Our framework prioritizes usability, and employs state-of-the-art analysis algorithms that support infinite theories. We demonstrate the workflow for realizability checking, showcase the diagnosis process that supports visualization of conflicts between requirements and simulation of counterexamples, and discuss results from industrial-level case studies.

Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool↗