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At least 433 records · Page 24

Resilience History and Focus in the United States

The U.S. operates and maintains a vast array of critical infrastructure (CI), from energy and water systems to transportation systems and communication nodes. Operating and maintaining this CI is a complex challenge, particularly as infrastructure continues to age and overall investments continue to decline. It is within this context that resilience is discussed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

MULTI-MODAL CHALLENGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (THE ONLY INTERESTING PARTS OF A SYSTEM ARE THE INTERFACES.)

Transportation of nuclear and radioactive material exposes these materials to the most risk for malicious acts. Unlike physical facilities, securing radioactive and nuclear materials during transport requires that many different organizations including operators, regulatory agencies, and security agencies work together to ensure the security of the cargo. A major security challenge for international movement of nuclear and radioactive material is the need to use multiple transport modes. Ensuring security of these cargos as they move through intermodal facilities, some of which may take multiple hours, or days, depending on operational constraints at the yards, ports, or other facilities, is a major operational and regulatory challenge. Especially in the international context, ensuring the security of material in transport through in-transit countries and coordinating transport activities across jurisdictions can lead to challenges as to whose security plan controls, whose transport regulations are to be followed, and how might plans need to be adjusted to adapt to in-transit conditions and ultimately how to ensure cargo security. This paper introduces and highlights selected challenges in the multi-modal movement of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. While the paper will address selected challenges in coordination of stakeholders and resources, activities at intermodal facilities, and other selected issues, this does not address all the challenges, rather it brings issues forward and suggests solutions and strategies for enhancing the security of nuclear and radioactive material transported internationally.

Singley, Paul↗

Status Update on the NCRP Scientific Committee SC 5-1 Report: Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents - 13450

In August 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued its final Protective Action Guide (PAG) for radiological dispersal device (RDD) and improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents. This document specifies protective actions for public health during the early and intermediate phases and cleanup guidance for the late phase of RDD or IND incidents, and it discusses approaches to implementing the necessary actions. However, while the PAG provides specific guidance for the early and intermediate phases, it prescribes no equivalent guidance for the late-phase cleanup actions. Instead, the PAG offers a general description of a complex process using a site-specific optimization approach. This approach does not predetermine cleanup levels but approaches the problem from the factors that would bear on the final agreed-on cleanup levels. Based on this approach, the decision-making process involves multifaceted considerations including public health, the environment, and the economy, as well as socio-political factors. In an effort to fully define the process and approach to be used in optimizing late-phase recovery and site restoration following an RDD or IND incident, DHS has tasked the NCRP with preparing a comprehensive report addressing all aspects of the optimization process. Preparation of the NCRP report is a three-year (2010-2013) project assigned to a scientific committee, the Scientific Committee (SC) 5-1; the report was initially titled, Approach to Optimizing Decision Making for Late- Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Terrorism Incidents. Members of SC 5-1 represent a broad range of expertise, including homeland security, health physics, risk and decision analysis, economics, environmental remediation and radioactive waste management, and communication. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011, and guided by a recent process led by the White House through a Principal Level Exercise (PLE), the optimization approach has since been expanded to include off-site contamination from major nuclear power plant accidents as well as other nuclear or radiological incidents. The expanded application under the current guidance has thus led to a broadened scope of the report, which is reflected in its new title, Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents. The NCRP report, which is due for publication in 2013, will substantiate the current DHS guidance by clarifying and elaborating on the processes required for the development and implementation of procedures for optimizing decision making for late-phase recovery, enabling the establishment of cleanup goals on a site-specific basis. The report will contain a series of topics addressing important issues related to the long-term recovery from nuclear or radiological incidents. Special topics relevant to supporting the optimization of the decision-making process will include cost-benefit analysis, radioactive waste management, risk communication, stakeholder interaction, risk assessment, and decontamination approaches and techniques. The committee also evaluated past nuclear and radiological incidents for their relevance to the report, including the emerging issues associated with the Fukushima nuclear accident. Thus, due to the commonality of the late-phase issues (such as the potential widespread contamination following an event), the majority of the information pertaining to the response in the late-phase decision-making period, including site-specific optimization framework and approach, could be used or adapted for use in case of similar situations that are not due to terrorism, such as those that would be caused by major nuclear facility accidents or radiological incidents. To ensure that the report and the NCRP recommendations are current and relevant to the effective implementation of federal guidance, SC 5-1 has actively coordinated with the agencies of interest and other relevant stakeholders throughout the duration of the project. The resulting report will be an important resource to guide those involved in late-phase recovery efforts following a nuclear or radiological incident. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Overview of the Source Physics Experiment at the Nevada National Security Site (SPE-N)

Understanding the changes in seismic energy as it travels from the near field to the far field is the ultimate goal in monitoring for explosive events of interest. This requires a clear understanding of explosion phenomenology as it relates to seismic, infrasound, and acoustic signals. Although there has been much progress in modeling these phenomena, this has been primarily based in the empirical realm. As a result, the logical next step in advancing the seismic monitoring capability of the United States is to conduct field tests that can expand the predictive capability of the physics-based modeling currently under development. The Source Physics Experiment at the Nevada National Security Site (SPE-N) is the first step in this endeavor to link the empirically based with the physics-based modeling. This is a collaborative project between National Security Technologies (NSTec), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC). The test series require both the simple and complex cases to fully characterize the problem, which is to understand the transition of seismic energy from the near field to the far field; to understand the development of S-waves in explosives sources; and how anisotropy controls seismic energy transmission and partitioning. The current series is being conducted in a granite body called the Climax Stock. This location was chosen for several reasons, including the fairly homogenous granite; the location of previous nuclear tests in the same rock body; and generally the geology has been well characterized. The simple geology series is planned for 7 shots using conventional explosives in the same shot hole surrounded by Continuous Reflectometry for Radius vs. Time Experiment (CORRTEX), Time of Arrival (TOA), Velocity of Detonation (VOD), down-hole accelerometers, surface accelerometers, infrasound, and a suite of seismic sensors of various frequency bands from the near field to the far field. This allows for the use of a single test bed in the simple geology case instead of multiple tests beds to obtain the same results. The shots are planned at various depths to obtain a Green’s function, scaled-depth of burial data, nominal depth of burial data and damage zone data. SPE1-N was conducted in May 2011 as a 220 lb (100 kg) TNT equivalent calibration shot at a depth of 180 ft (55 m). SPE2-N was conducted in October 2011 as a 2200 lb (1000 kg) TNT equivalent calibration shot at a depth of 150 ft (46 m). SPE3-N was conducted in July 2012 as a 2200 lb (1000 kg) TNT equivalent calibration shot at a depth of 150 ft (46 m) in the damaged zone. Over 400 data channels were recorded for each of these shots and data recovery was about 95% with high signal to noise ratio. Once the simple geology site data has been utilized, a new test bed will be developed in a complex geology site to test these physics based models. Ultimately, the results from this project will provide the next advances in the science of monitoring to enable a physics-based predicative capability.

Source record↗

Multi-level optimization with the koopman operator for data-driven, domain-aware, and dynamic system security

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) like the power grid are critically important but also increasingly vulnerable; ensuring reliable system operation in the face of disruptions is becoming more and more challenging. Multi-Level Optimization (MLO) is a powerful way to model adversarial interactions, which naturally makes it applicable to studying CPS security. However, MLO typically does not address underlying system dynamics, and incorporating nonlinear dynamics is generally infeasible. In this paper, we show how to combine MLO with the Koopman Operator (KO) to remedy this. The KO maps nonlinear dynamics to a lifted space in which those dynamics are linear, thus making it ideal for use with MLO. Moreover, the structure of the KO also provides convenient ways to incorporate domain knowledge into the data-driven process of learning the KO representation of a given system. Here we then demonstrate the use of MLO-KO on a small example problem taken from the power grid domain, discuss the scalability and computational cost of MLO-KO, and identify future research directions for this work.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Data Release Report for Source Physics Experiments 2 and 3 (SPE-2 and SPE-3) Nevada National Security Site

The second Source Physics Experiment shot (SPE-2) was conducted in Nevada on October 25, 2011, at 1900:00.011623 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). The explosive source was 997 kilograms (kg) trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent of sensitized heavy ammonium fuel oil (SHANFO) detonated at a depth of 45.7 meters (m). The third Source Physics Experiment shot (SPE-3) was conducted in Nevada on July 24, 2012, at 1800:00.44835 GMT. The explosive source was 905 kg TNT equivalent of SHANFO detonated at a depth of 45.8 m. Both shots were recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that includes sensors both at near-field (less than 100 m) and far-field (100 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component accelerometers deployed in boreholes at 15, 46, and 55 m depths around the shot and a set of single-component vertical accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network was composed of a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, three-component accelerometers, and rotational seismometers at distances of 100 m to 25 kilometers. This report coincides with the release of these data for analysts and organizations that are not participants in this program. This report describes the second and third Source Physics Experiment shots and the various types of near-field and far-field data that are available.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Data Release Report for Source Physics Experiments 2 and 3 (SPE-2 and SPE-3) Nevada National Security Site

The second Source Physics Experiment shot (SPE-2) was conducted in Nevada on October 25, 2011, at 1900:00.011623 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). The explosive source was 997 kilograms (kg) trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent of sensitized heavy ammonium fuel oil (SHANFO) detonated at a depth of 45.7 meters (m). The third Source Physics Experiment shot (SPE-3) was conducted in Nevada on July 24, 2012, at 1800:00.44835 GMT. The explosive source was 905 kg TNT equivalent of SHANFO detonated at a depth of 45.8 m. Both shots were recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that includes sensors both at near-field (less than 100 m) and far-field (100 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component accelerometers deployed in boreholes at 15, 46, and 55 m depths around the shot and a set of single-component vertical accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network was composed of a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, three-component accelerometers, and rotational seismometers at distances of 100 m to 25 kilometers. This report coincides with the release of these data for analysts and organizations that are not participants in this program. This report describes the second and third Source Physics Experiment shots and the various types of near-field and farfield data that are available.This revised document includes reports on baseline shift corrections for the SPE-2 and SPE-3 shots that were missing from the original January 2015 version.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Data Release Report Source Physics Experiments 5 and 6 (SPE-5 and SPE-6), Nevada National Security Site

The fifth Source Physics Experiment test (SPE-5) was conducted in Nevada on April 26, 2016, at 20:49:00 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The explosive source was 4,288.7 kilograms (kg) of polymer-bonded explosive (PBXN) –110, equivalent to 5,035 kg of trinitrotoluene (TNT) detonated at a depth of 76.5 meters (m). The sixth Source Physics Experiment test (SPE-6) was conducted in Nevada on October 12, 2016 at 18:36:00 UTC. The explosive source was 1,982.2 kg of PBXC-141, equivalent to 2,240.2 kg of TNT detonated at the depth of 31.4 m. Both tests were recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that includes sensors both at near-field (less than 100 m) and far-field (100 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component accelerometers installed at various depths ranging from 4 to 99 m below ground surface in boreholes positioned around the shot, and a set of single-component vertical accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network was composed of a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, and three-component accelerometers at distances of 100 m to 400 kilometers. In addition, both explosions were recorded in a temporary array of 996 geophones arranged in a densely spaced grid pattern (“large N”). This report coincides with the release of these data for analysts and organizations that are not participants in this program. This report describes the fifth and sixth Source Physics Experiment tests and the various types of near-field and far-field data that are available.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Data Release Report for Source Physics Experiment 4Prime (SPE-4Prime) Nevada National Security Site

The fourth test in the Source Physics Experiment series (SPE-4Prime) was conducted at a granite site in Nevada on May 21, 2015, at 18:35:44.000,003,989 ± 20 nanoseconds Coordinated Universal Time. The explosive source was 69.1 kilograms (kg) (including detonator assembly) of Composition C4 plastic explosive (89.14 kg TNT equivalent) detonated at a depth of 87.2 meters (m). The explosion was recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that includes sensors both at near-field (less than 100 m) and far-field (100 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component accelerometers installed at various depths from 7 to 99 m in boreholes positioned around the source hole, and a set of single-component vertical accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network was composed of a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, and three-component accelerometers at distances of 100 m to 25 kilometers. Infrasound data were collected from ground-based sensor arrays at distances out to 5 kilometers.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Assessing Vulnerabilities, Risks, and Consequences of Damage to Critical Infrastructure

Since the publication of 'Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructure,' there has been a keen understanding of the complexity, interdependencies, and shared responsibility required to protect the nation's most critical assets that are essential to our way of life. The original 5 sectors defined in 1997 have grown to 18 Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources (CIKR), which are discussed in the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and its supporting sector-specific plans. The NIPP provides the structure for a national program dedicated to enhanced protection and resiliency of the nation's infrastructure. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provides in-depth, multi-disciplinary assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence across all 18 sectors at scales ranging from specific facilities to infrastructures spanning multi-state regions, such as the Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) sector. Like many of the CIKR sectors, the ONG sector is comprised of production, processing, distribution, and storage of highly valuable and potentially dangerous commodities. Furthermore, there are significant interdependencies with other sectors, including transportation, communication, finance, and government. Understanding the potentially devastating consequences and collateral damage resulting from a terrorist attack or natural event is an important element of LLNL's infrastructure security programs. Our work began in the energy sector in the late 1990s and quickly expanded other critical infrastructure sectors. We have performed over 600 physical assessments with a particular emphasis on those sectors that utilize, store, or ship potentially hazardous materials and for whom cyber security is important. The success of our approach is based on building awareness of vulnerabilities and risks and working directly with industry partners to collectively advance infrastructure protection. This approach consists of three phases: The Pre-Assessment Phase brings together infrastructure owners and operators to identify critical assets and help the team create a structured information request. During this phase, we gain information about the critical assets from those who are most familiar with operations and interdependencies, making the time we spend on the ground conducting the assessment much more productive and enabling the team to make actionable recommendations. The Assessment Phase analyzes 10 areas: Threat environment, cyber architecture, cyber penetration, physical security, physical penetration, operations security, policies and procedures, interdependencies, consequence analysis, and risk characterization. Each of these individual tasks uses direct and indirect data collection, site inspections, and structured and facilitated workshops to gather data. Because of the importance of understanding the cyber threat, LLNL has built both fixed and mobile cyber penetration, wireless penetration and supporting tools that can be tailored to fit customer needs. The Post-Assessment Phase brings vulnerability and risk assessments to the customer in a format that facilitates implementation of mitigation options. Often the assessment findings and recommendations are briefed and discussed with several levels of management and, if appropriate, across jurisdictional boundaries. The end result is enhanced awareness and informed protective measures. Over the last 15 years, we have continued to refine our methodology and capture lessons learned and best practices. The resulting risk and decision framework thus takes into consideration real-world constraints, including regulatory, operational, and economic realities. In addition to 'on the ground' assessments focused on mitigating vulnerabilities, we have integrated our computational and atmospheric dispersion capability with easy-to-use geo-referenced visualization tools to support emergency planning and response operations. LLNL is home to the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) and the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC). NARAC/IMAAC has capabilities to respond to toxic industrial chemical spills, nuclear-power plant accidents, fires, chemical/biological agents, radiological/nuclear devices (RDDs, INDs), and other airborne hazards. Our web-based systems provide hazards assessments of critical infrastructure for defensive planning and can provide infrastructure operators and emergency responders with a baseline for planning and exercises. LLNL's infrastructure security web mapping services facilitate dissemination of technical information for all phases of disaster management. Examples of some of these products are shown in the Figure 1.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Geology of the Source Physics Experiment Site, Climax Stock, Nevada National Security Site

A test bed for a series of chemical explosives tests known as Source Physics Experiments (SPE) was constructed in granitic rock of the Climax stock, in northern Yucca Flat at the Nevada National Security Site in 2010-2011. These tests are sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration's National Center for Nuclear Security. The test series is designed to study the generation and propagation of seismic waves, and will provide data that will improve the predictive capability of calculational models for detecting and characterizing underground explosions. Abundant geologic data are available for the area, primarily as a result of studies performed in conjunction with the three underground nuclear tests conducted in the Climax granite in the 1960s and a few later studies of various types.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

The Need for Precise and Well-documented Experimental Data on Prompt Fission Neutron Spectra from Neutron-induced Fission of {sup 239}Pu

The spectrum of neutrons emitted promptly after {sup 239}Pu(n,f)—a so-called prompt fission neutron spectrum (PFNS)—is a quantity of high interest, for instance, for reactor physics and global security. However, there are only few experimental data sets available that are suitable for evaluations. In addition, some of those data sets differ by more than their 1-σ uncertainty boundaries. We present the results of MCNP studies indicating that these differences are partly caused by underestimated multiple scattering contributions, over-corrected background, and inconsistent deconvolution methods. A detailed uncertainty quantification for suitable experimental data was undertaken including these effects, and test-evaluations were performed with the improved uncertainty information. The test-evaluations illustrate that the inadequately estimated effects and detailed uncertainty quantification have an impact on the evaluated PFNS and associated uncertainties as well as the neutron multiplicity of selected critical assemblies. A summary of data and documentation needs to improve the quality of the experimental database is provided based on the results of simulations and test-evaluations. Given the possibly substantial distortion of the PFNS by multiple scattering and background effects, special care should be taken to reduce these effects in future measurements, e.g., by measuring the {sup 239}Pu PFNS as a ratio to either the {sup 235}U or {sup 252}Cf PFNS.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Rapid Monitoring and Defense Approach for Resilience Improvement of Grid Cyber Security

Cyber-physical systems and electric utilities significantly depend on the reliability and efficiency of information and operational technology. However, false data injection attacks based on synchrophasor measurement data pose a serious threat to the safe and reliable operation of modern power systems. Here, to mitigate this problem, a rapid monitoring and defense approach is proposed to defend against cyber attacks. Initially, the Time and Frequency based Convolutional neural Network (TFCN) is proposed to detect different types of attacks. Within the TFCN, the advances are that both time and frequency domain information can be fused without extra spectrum analysis methods, and can save detection time to speed the calculation efficiency using the developed time-frequency block. Next, a comprehensive defense strategy is developed for multiple cyber attacks to ensure the stability and resilience of the power system according to the feedback detection results. The advances of this strategy are that different control strategies can be automatically selected to recover the stability to the greatest extent according to the detected attacks. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed approach, the high-speed frequency measurements collected from the wide-area monitoring system are used. The results demonstrate that the cyber attack detection performance can reach 95.57% accuracy, outperforming both traditional and some advanced neural networks. Importantly, the defense strategy is conducted and verified in a modified IEEE 39 bus system as well, which illustrates profound performance in faster stability restoration.

Comprehensive defense strategy↗

A Targeted Attack For Enhancing Resiliency of Intelligent Intrusion Detection Modules in Energy Cyber Physical Systems

Abstract— Secure high-speed communication is required to ensure proper operation of complex power grid systems and prevent malicious tampering activities. In this paper, artificial neural networks with temporal dependency are introduced for false data identification and mitigation for broadcasted IEC 61850 SMV messages. The fast responses of such intelligent modules in intrusion detection make them suitable for time- critical applications, such as protection. However, care must be taken in selecting the appropriate intelligence model and decision criteria. As such, this paper presents a customizable malware script to sniff and manipulate SMV messages and demonstrates the ability of the malware to trigger false positives in the neural network’s response. The malware developed is intended to be as a vaccine to harden the intrusion detection system against data manipulation attacks by enhancing the neural network’s ability to learn and adapt to these attacks.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗