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Evaluate compact replacement cells for the Fast Neutron Collar (FNCL). The current cells are 4x4x4 in 3 of EJ-309 instrumented with 8” tall PMTs, and the replacements are 4x4x3 in 3 cells instrumented with 1” tall SiPM arrays. The replacement cell materials are stilbene (organic crystal), EJ-309 (liquid scintillator), and EJ-299-33M (PSD-capable plastic).
Abstract not provided.
ANL exercises full technology lifecycle for the development and deployment of nuclear safeguards (nonproliferation) systems and methods.
IAEA Priority Objective T2, R&D Need T.2.R6 to “Develop and implement methods to detect signatures of nuclear activities in environmental samples including: Age determination of U and Pu relevant to the origin of nuclear materials”- specific focus on plutonium (Pu) age dating
Abstract not provided.
The US Department of Energy is exploring the methods associated with probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and how they could be used to enhance physical security evaluations for nuclear facilities. A brief review of both international and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission physical security assessment methods is presented. From this review, and with an understanding of the technical elements associated with a traditional nuclear safety PRA, several observations are made pertaining to where physical security analysis methods could be enhanced. These observations principally support and enhance the answers within a physical security context to the risk triplet: (1) What can go wrong? (2) What is the likelihood? and (3) What are the consequences? Finally, benefits and technical challenges toward the development of a full security PRA are presented.
The PM designed and demonstrated under the PMAC project is a significant improvement from other existing PMs in terms of the joint host / inspector confidence provided and usability in a future hypothetical arms control regime. Based on these results, the PMAC system would be the best option currently available for a boundary control use case in a hypothetical arms control regime.
It is crucial for safeguards that the amount of plutonium going to the reprocessing plant or repository is what we believe it to be.
What can we do? Encourage/ensure peaceful nuclear uses; Secure, safeguard, and/or dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological material; Detect and control the proliferation of related WMD technology and expertise.
The Open Radiation Monitoring Project seeks to develop and demonstrate a modular radiation detection architecture designed specifically for use in arms control treaty verification (ACTV) applications that will facilitate rapid development of trusted systems to meet the needs of potential future treaties. A modular architecture can be used to reduce more complex systems to a series of single purpose building blocks, thereby facilitating equipment inspection and in turn building trust in the equipment by all treaty parties. Furthermore, a modular architecture can be used to control data flow within the measurement system, reducing the risk of "hidden switches" and constraining the amount of sensitive information that could potentially be inadvertently leaked. This report details the first revision of a prototype circuit that will convert analog pulses directly into a histogrammed data set for further processing. The circuit was designed with both spectroscopy and multiplicity analysis in mind but can, in principle, be used to reduce any raw data stream into a histogram. The number of output channels is limited, and the histogram bin ranges are user configurable to allow for non-uniform and discontinuous bins, which makes it possible to restrict the information being passed down stream if desired. Pulse processing relies entirely on analog circuitry and non- programmable logic, which enables operation without the need for a central processor or other programmable control unit. The circuit remains untested under the Open Radiation Monitoring project due to the closure of the sponsoring program. However, further development and testing is scheduled to take place in support of a purpose-built trusted verification system development effort known as COGNIZANT, which demonstrates the potential benefit of developing a suite of modular trusted system components.
The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization (M 3 ) has developed and is pursuing an integrated approach to address the persistent threat posed by unintentional proliferation of nuclear materials. The NNSA M 3 approach reduces the risk of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium falling into the hands of non-state actors by minimizing the use of and, when possible, eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material around the world. In this geopolitical context, most research and test reactors, both domestic and international, have completed or started a program of conversion from the use of HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) as fuel. Conversion of civilian research reactors from HEU to LEU, and the return of the HEU to the country of origin, are important components of the NNSA non-proliferation program. Worldwide, 71 reactors have been converted to the use of LEU fuel, and an additional 32 have been confirmed to be permanently shut down. The U.S., with 20 reactor conversions, is among the 39 countries on six continents where conversions have occurred. With recent conversions in Ghana and Nigeria, an important milestone was reached in completing conversion of all reactors on the continent of Africa to LEU fuel. Africa thus becomes the third continent to have completed conversion of all HEU reactors to LEU, following Australia and South America
Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for staffing reduction. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Having the minimal possible number of access points and methods to completely block access from these points if a threat is detected will greatly help us justify staffing reduction.
Abstract not provided.
With the increasing international interest in using nuclear material as sources of energy, comes the growing concern that we may see an increase in proliferation threats. Uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) is used in the nuclear fuel cycle for uranium enrichment. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitor the enrichment levels of UF 6 stored in transportation cylinders, to ensure the enrichments match that of a facility operator’s declarations. However, only a characteristic subset of UF 6 cylinders can be measured by inspectors from the IAEA during these inspections. In turn, the inspector may not identify a cylinder whose enrichment levels do not match the facility declarations. Therefore, our team attempts to develop a machine learning network that could determine the enrichment percentage of cylinders as they enter and exit facilities. The machine learning model must be robust against spectral variations due to factors that are internal and external to the UF 6 cylinder. Such factors include but are not limited to the speed and distance of the moving vehicle, cylinder type, cylinder orientation, and fill level. Many features in the spectral continuum can be used to identify and correct for some of these variations. As a consequence, the model must extract numerous features in the continuum. We investigate new approaches in continuum subtraction to verify enrichment percentage: interpolation and extrapolation of lines at the notable characteristic spectral peaks. It was determined that there was no clear answer on which method proved superior, therefore the decision was made to implement both new methods into the current codebase. We currently rely on synthetic training and testing data to analyze the results and fine tune our models but hope to test the system on measured data soon.
This presentation provides an overview of key concepts in arms control, a history of nuclear arms control agreements, some of the contemporary challenges and opportunities in the field, a discussion of the process for negotiating arms control agreements, and updates on recent developments.
The International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) harnesses the expertise of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories to assist partners internationally in implementing and adopting strategic trade control measures that can effectively counter WMD procurement efforts. This presentation includes discussion of work with LANL INECP technical leads to update the engagement plan for Turkey, which involved researching Turkey’s WMD related legal framework, relevant export control agencies, and WMD-relevant industries (e.g. advanced manufacturing and aerospace).
Our mission is to develop new technologies that detect and deter nuclear proliferation activities while training the next generation of nuclear professionals. The three technical thrust areas are: 1. Fundamentals of nuclear and particle physics, 2. Signals and source terms for nuclear nonproliferation, and 3. Nuclear explosion. There are opportunities for collaborations with university faculty, possible student and post-doc work, and posting job ads. Further, MTV hosts various workshops, symposiums.