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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 433 records · Page 24
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2015

The Prospective Search for Highly Ionized Technetium in Hot (pre-) White Dwarfs

The discovery of technetium (Tc) in the atmospheres of red giants by Merrill (1952, ApJ, 116, 21) constituted convincing proof that s-process nucleosynthesis is indeed occurring in evolved stars. In principle, Tc should still be present in the atmospheres of hot post-AGB stars and (pre-) white dwarfs although, due to radioactive decay, it should be present in decreasing quantities along post-AGB evolution. The recent discovery of a large number of trans-iron group elements in hot white dwarfs with atomic numbers in the range A = 30-56 (Zn to Ba) raises the prospect that Tc (A = 43) may also be detected. However, this is currently not feasible because no atomic data exist for ionization stages beyond Tc ii. As an initial step, we calculated atomic energy levels and oscillator strengths of Tc iv-vi and used these data to compute non-local thermodynamic equilibrium (NLTE) model atmospheres to estimate at which minimum abundance level Tc could be detected. We show that Tc lines can be found in ultraviolet spectra of hot white dwarfs provided Tc is as abundant as other detected trans-Fe elements. We find that radiative levitation can keep Tc in large, easily detectable quantities in the atmosphere. A direct identification of Tc lines is still not feasible because wavelength positions cannot be computed with necessary precision. Laboratory measurements are necessary to overcome this problem. Our results suggest that such efforts are beneficial to the astrophysical community.

prospective↗
NASA NTRS2015

Subscale Validation of the Subsurface Active Filtration of Exhaust (SAFE) Approach to NTP Ground Testing

Brief History of NTP: Project Rover Began in 1950s by Los Alamos Scientific Labs (now Los Alamos National Labs) and ran until 1970s Tested a series of nuclear reactor engines of varying size at Nevada Test Site (now Nevada National Security Site) Ranged in scale from 111 kN (25 klbf) to 1.1 MN (250 klbf) Included Nuclear Furnace-1 tests Demonstrated the viability and capability of a nuclear rocket engine test program One of Kennedys 4 goals during famous moon speech to Congress Nuclear Engines for Rocket Vehicle Applications (NERVA) Atomic Energy Commission and NASA joint venture started in 1964 Parallel effort to Project Rover was focused on technology demonstration Tested XE engine, a 245-kN (55-klbf) engine to demonstrate startup shutdown sequencing. Hot-hydrogen stream is passed directly through fuel elements potential for radioactive material to be eroded into gaseous fuel flow as identified in previous programs NERVA and Project Rover (1950s-70s) were able to test in open atmosphere similar to conventional rocket engine test stands today Nuclear Furance-1 tests employed a full scrubber system Increased government and environmental regulations prohibit the modern testing in open atmosphere. Since the 1960s, there has been an increasing cessation on open air testing of nuclear material Political and national security concerns further compound the regulatory environment

Test Facilities↗
NASA NTRS1973

Lidar Measurements of On-Shore Wind Diffusion

The concept to place electric power generating stations on the oceans off the coast of the United States has instilled new efforts in research for improved understanding of the diffusion properties of the atmosphere in the ocean-air interface. The Atomic Energy Commission has instigated a program by the Meteorology Group at Brookhaven National Laboratory to investigate the low level, on-shore wind systems that dominate many of the coastal regions. Analytical techniques and specialized instrumentation from previous studies at Brookhaven are being used in this new program. The Brookhaven Lidar system is used to measure some of the physical properties of the oil-fog plume originating from a portable smoke generator on a boat off the coast. The oil-fog plume is used as a tracer which can be observed, photographed and measured to determine the diffusive power of the atmosphere associated with the ocean-air interface and the discontinuities found in the ocean-land boundary. This paper will describe the program rather briefly and the oil-fog scattering measurements that have been made with the Lidar system.

Brown, R. M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Being NASA – Where Do You Fit on the Meatball?

This talk will provide some insight into the key contributions and dynamics of the communities that makes up the NASA “meatball”. Everyone has a part to play on the NASA Team. Everyone. Whether you are in Science, Technology or Mission Support, each person is an integral part of the NASA family. The meatball has been described as a ball of engineering wrapped in a thin veneer of Science. It is important to remember that just because you live in the thin veneer, it does not mean the rest of the meatball does not exist. The same goes for living in the ball of engineering/technology! For that matter, the red pulse and atomic energy of the mission support community is what gives the meatball life and is just as important as the rest of the community. Orienting where you fit on the meatball will provide insight and awareness into what it takes to be a part of the amazing NASA Team and what role you play in its success.

Karen C Bradford↗
NASA NTRS2023

Experimental and Semiclassical Stark Widths and Shifts for Spectral Lines of Neutral and Ionized Atoms (A Critical Review of Experimental and Semiclassical Data for the Period 2008 through 2020)

This Review Article compares new experimental and corresponding semiclassical Stark broadened data for non-hydrogenic spectral lines of neutral atoms and positive ions. This Review covers the period 2008 until the end of 2020 and presents the continuation of previous critical reviews from 1976 (two), 1984 (two), 1990, 2002, and one from 2009. This Review reports the Stark broadening parameters of 1665 spectral lines belonging to 35 elements with 61 different atomic and ion species. The data are taken from 60 papers. Experimental data are arranged by elements and spectra, and these are reported in tables in alphabetical and numerical order, respectively. Each experimental Stark broadening parameter is followed with estimated accuracy. The experimental Stark broadening and shift data presented in the tables are compared with the corresponding semiclassical results available in the literature. In addition, for comparison experiments versus semiclassical theoretical Stark broadening parameters, a numerically improved theoretical approach developed based on Griem and co-workers’ theory is used to evaluate Stark widths and shifts of all studied lines whenever required atomic energy levels data and transition probabilities are available. At the end of the text report, for each analyzed neutral or ion species, the information about the location of the same species data in preceding reviews is given.

Plasma line broadening↗
DOE OSTI2020

SUSTAINING NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIMES THROUGH CONTINUOUS LEARNING EXPERIENCES

As Member States plan, implement, and ultimately sustain their nuclear security regimes, human resource development supporting these regimes are paramount. Human resource development broadly includes programs addressing education, training, and knowledge management. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Implementing Guide, Sustaining a Nuclear Security Regime, highlights the importance of national-level support for assigning resources that help ensure States are able to develop and retain sufficient human resources in the short, medium, and long term. Determining the resources needed to support education, training, and knowledge management is not an easy task, and knowledge management is a practice often overlooked when States plan for and allocate human resources for a nuclear security regime. The paper highlights the importance of implementing knowledge management practices as part of sustaining a nuclear security regime. Given the availability of secure web-based knowledge management tools, a nuclear security human resource development program should not depend solely on direct human interactions. To that end, the paper will offer an approach for planning and implementing a knowledge management system by using the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Knowledge Management Website as a case study. This example offers useful lessons learned for States considering or actively developing their own nuclear security knowledge management efforts and human resource development.

Tremonte, Matthew M.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Regulatory Development Challenges and Opportunities for the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials

Drafting regulations for transport safety and transport security achieve two separate objectives, which can lead to divergent outcomes. With transport safety, the principle goal is to protect the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, while in contrast, the principle goal of transport security is to protect the material from malicious actors. While many Member States may have transport safety regulations for radioactive materials, transport security regulatory development is still in its nascent stages globally. Trying to develop harmonized transport safety and transport security regulations could lead to challenges ranging from differences in terminology used in transport safety versus terminology uses in transport security, roles and responsibilities for the variety of stakeholders involved in transport, and finally, the possible role of multiple competent authorities in governing the transport of dangerous goods, which includes radioactive material. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently developing a process of a methodology for drafting transport security regulations, any process must address both safety considerations and security requirements. (As the most vulnerable part of the life cycle of radioactive materials, the need for harmonized transport safety/transport security regulations is essential.) This paper investigates the regulatory elements of the safety-security interface for nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Examining challenges including use of terms, the role of multiple competent authorities, and practical challenges involved in the safe and secure transport of radioactive material, the paper analyzes the need for integrated regulatory development for the safe and secure transport of these materials.

Anderson, Kimberly↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Science Training for Secondary School Teachers at Argonne National Laboratory - 2019

In continued support of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) project RAS/0/079, with its stated goal to educate 1 million students on the topic of nuclear science by 2021, Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) hosted its second two-week nuclear science and technology training course for secondary school teachers in October 2019. A modified course format was adopted based on experience from the first course held at Argonne in 2018, along with similar project workshops held across the world. The results of the course, in terms of both technical knowledge retention and teaching capabilities, demonstrated the benefits of the revised approach.

Grabaskas, David↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Floating Chameleon: Floating Nuclear Power Plants and the Nexus of Maritime and Nuclear Security Law

During the 63rd regular session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, as part of Norway's statement to the General Conference, Mr. Auden Halvorsen, State Secretary for Norway, made the following statement about transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs): "Deployment of transportable nuclear power plants—TNPPs—demands our attention. The Agency must intensify its conversations of all aspects of the safety and security of such facilities. . . . The scope and applicability of existing requirements and instruments need to be clarified and developed including dialogue with the International Maritime Organization [IMO]." Ensuring the security of TNPPs is essential for their deployment and implementation. TNPPs may be floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs), which bring together elements of nuclear security related to the nuclear power plant with elements of maritime security. Insofar as an FNPP weds the principles of nuclear and maritime security, it also weds the two domains, the ancient traditions and contemporary practices of maritime law with the contemporary practices of nuclear law. Fundamentally, this raises the question, what are the legal requirements for the security of a FNPP? Although both maritime law and nuclear law have established regimes for security through various legal instruments, does an FNPP expose gaps between the current international legal instruments? The previous question of whether international legal regimes define requirements for the security of FNPPs, but a threshold question remains: what is an FNPP? For purposes of nuclear and maritime security, is an FNPP a facility, is an FNPP a vessel and therefore a transport, or does an FNPP change its status based upon temporal and spatial considerations such as when it is docked at a port generating power or in transit to its destination? This set of questions, and others addressed later in this article, highlights that the issue is not merely a question about security but intersects elements of safety whether an FNPP is in uncharted waters of the international regime for both nuclear and maritime law. Here, this paper addresses many of the questions posed above related to the security regulations for an FNPP.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗
DOE OSTI2020

Autonomous Monitoring of Nuclear Repositories: Current State of the Art and Future Directions

Geological repositories for nuclear waste, including spent nuclear fuel, present a significant challenge for traditional International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards tools due to their inaccessibility and demanding operational conditions. The IAEA has been working closely with Member State organizations currently involved in repository construction and planning, including Euratom, the Finnish and Swedish regulatory authorities, and relevant facility operators. However, the verification challenge remains unsolved, and there persists an out- standing need for tools and approaches that will help the IAEA verify that no nuclear material is diverted from a repository environment. The challenge is also not static. Activities must encompass verification of the design, prior to and during the construction/operation phase, and post backfill. Throughout these various phases, it is imperative that the IAEA maintains a continuity of knowledge (CoK) of all material including information on material inventory and flow. This paper highlights these challenges and outlines how they might be addressed by using remote or autonomous vehicles. Specifically, we discuss the current state of the art in robotic autonomy for known or partially known environment mapping and patrolling, as well as shared autonomy, where humans collaborate with closed-loop autonomation to complete tasks. We explore the feasibility of using rovers for these verification tasks, along with the challenges associated with system implementation. Hardware and software suggestions are provided based on the adoption of similar technologies in other comparable areas and ability to close technical gaps. Lastly, human-robotic interactions are considered based on the challenges of the environment of the repository and effective deployment and continued operation of the robot system.

geologic repository, safeguards, IAEA, Robotics↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safeguards Technical Objectives for Thorium Molten Salt Reactor Fuel Cycles

China, Denmark, France, India, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, among others, are exploring commercial thorium fuel cycles for domestic power production and/or international export. For any thorium fuel cycle facilities built and/or operated in a non-nuclear weapon State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, those facilities and any associated nuclear material would be subject to international nuclear safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thorium fuel cycle facilities offered for the application of safeguards under a voluntary offer agreement by a nuclear weapon State would also be subject to safeguards, if selected by the IAEA. Compared to uranium/plutonium fuel cycle facilities, thorium fuel cycle facilities are comparatively diverse from an inspection and accounting perspective, differing greatly in material type, form, and design from uranium/plutonium fuel cycle facilities and also from each other. Of these, the most complex thorium fuel cycles – and therefore likely the most challenging to the implementation of international nuclear safeguards – are those that include thorium molten salt reactors. With thorium fuel cycles approaching near-term commercial deployment timelines, it is imperative that the international nuclear safeguards community begins to think about how to adapt existing international nuclear safeguards concepts and approaches to thorium fuel cycles, as well as mitigate any gaps that may exist. This paper focuses on the development of recommended safeguards technical objectives for efficient and effective application of international nuclear safeguards measures (e.g., containment / surveillance, non-destructive assay, destructive assay, environmental sampling) to thorium molten salt reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Minimum Detectable Quantity Calculation for Radiation Portal Monitors

The minimum detectable quantity of a radiation portal monitor is the smallest amount of radioactive material that can be detected passing through the monitor (with a specified detection probability). The minimum detectable quantity is a function of many factors, including isotope, velocity, distance between pillars, height of portal and vehicle, source distribution and position, background radiation, background suppression, detector volume and positions, detector efficiency, decision metrics and algorithms, the presence of NORM (naturally occurring radioactive material), and alarm thresholds. Experimentally testing a radiation portal monitor to failure for all combinations of these factors is extremely time-consuming and often cost prohibitive. This document outlines a straightforward method for quickly estimating the minimum detectable quantity for moving sources over a large variety of conditions with a minimal number of static measurements. The document also describes a proof of concept software application that the International Atomic Energy Agency has designed based on the described method that can be used by Member States to estimate a monitor’s minimum detectable quantity.

Blessinger, Christopher S.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Using Machine Learning to Track Objects Across Cameras

Video surveillance is one of the most important technologies used by the International Atomic Energy Agency in international safeguards. At large, complicated facilities, multiple surveillance cameras are deployed to monitor the transfer of safeguards-relevant objects across the site. During inspections, all surveillance videos are reviewed to ensure the objects are not manipulated or diverted during transfer, a laborious, time-consuming task. This work describes using deep machine learning algorithms to track objects automatically across multiple cameras, greatly improving the efficiency of the review process. The fundamental problem in this object tracking task across multiple cameras is how to associate the same object, which may show extreme intra-class variations, such as viewpoints, occlusions, and various scales, in different and even non-overlapped cameras. Object re-identification (Re-ID) in nuclear facility video surveillance is even more challenging than classic person or vehicle Re-ID problems because different instances in the same category may display an identical appearance. One observation from nuclear facility surveillance videos is that all objects must be carted (e.g., via forklift) to move. Therefore, the spatial context information of an object, which provides the feature from the carrier, is critical for the object Re-ID task. This work proposes a two-stream convolutional neural networks model that takes features of objects and their surrounding regions into account. Moreover, the custom videos usually are gleaned from different scenes from the training data, which may have extreme variations in illumination changes and/or cluttered backgrounds. Directly applying the trained model to custom videos will dramatically decrease the performance. To tackle this problem, an advanced domain adaptation technique is proposed to mitigate the gap between the data taken from different scenes. The proposed framework will track objects of interest across a nuclear complex. The resulting tracks can be used in further analyses, such as event/activity recognition, anomaly detection, etc.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

IAEA Facility-Level Safeguards and Implementation and Advanced Verification Technologies

IAEA Facility-Level Safeguards and Implementation - This presentation is intended to introduce the audience to the application of international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency at nuclear facilities around the world. It covers the State Level Approach, random statistical sampling processes, material balance area structure, non-destructive assay techniques, and inspection areas. Addition of advanced verification technologies for the IAEA

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Issue Summary of INL Phase IV Transient Results for IAEA CRP on HTGR UAM Benchmark

This report details the Parallel and Highly Innovative Simulation for Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Code System (PHISICS)/Reactor Excursions and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP5)-3D results obtained for the transient core exercises defined for Phase IV of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on high-temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR) uncertainty analysis in modeling (UAM). The Phase III models and results are linked to the earlier Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation (SCALE)/Sampler/New ESC-based Weighting Transport (NEWT) data generated for the lattice physics (lattice) stage Phase I of the CRP. The focus of this report is the Uncertainty/Sensitivity Assessment (U/SA) of the prismatic modular high-temperature gas cooled reactor (MHTGR)-350 design, and specifically for Exercises IV-1 and IV-2 of the benchmark: the Control Rod Withdrawal (CRW) and Pressurised Loss of Cooling (PLOFC) events. The statistical U/SA methodology is implemented and demonstrated using the RAVEN code, based on perturbed cross-section libraries obtained from the SCALE/Sampler sequence. Uncertainties in nuclear data (cross-sections and the average number of neutrons produced per fission, 235U[¯v ]) lead to standard deviations (uncertainties of one s) of approximately 0.5% in the core eigenvalues of the MHTGR-350 and core models. For the coupled neutronics/thermal fluid model, local power density uncertainties up to 3.6% were observed in the colder regions of the core, while the local maximum fuel temperature uncertainties reached 1.5% for the models that included thermal fluid uncertainties. The addition of thermal fluid uncertainties dominated the impacts of nuclear data uncertainties in all cases. The main contributors to uncertainties in the power density and fuel temperatures during the transients were uncertainties in the reactor operating conditions (total power, inlet mass flow rate and inlet gas temperature). Variations in the bypass flows did not have significant impact on any of the output variables. For the nuclear data uncertainties it was found that the 235U(¯v ) / 235U(¯v ) covariance produced the largest sensitivities in terms of its impact on the eigenvalue and peak reactor power. It was also observed that the impact of any nuclear data uncertainties on the maximum fuel temperature was much less significant that the impact on eigenvalue and power. Another important finding was that although the use of eight or more energy groups is recommended for best-estimate HTGR simulation, two-group models produced acceptable uncertainty and sensitivity results for most FOMs. Since the statistical U/SA methodology is computationally expensive, and most transient solver requirements will scale directly with the number of energy groups, two energy groups could be used by HTGR developers during the early stages of design when larger uncertainty margins can be tolerated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Enabling Computation on Sensitive Data in International Safeguards with Privacy-Preserving Encryption Techniques

Privacy-preserving machine learning is a field of study that explores how to protect and preserve the privacy of sensitive data while allowing the data to be used by machine learning algorithms. This field has had substantial industry investment due to heightened concerns about privacy in the technology industry, with a focus in two broad application areas: financial services and healthcare. Numerous privacy-preserving methods have also been proposed for international safeguards, but they have been difficult to enact because the data they require is con- sidered sensitive or proprietary by the nuclear facility operator. This work examines how current privacy-preserving approaches might be used to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use that data to contribute to a safeguards conclusion about a state while giving nuclear operators confidence that their sensitive data is adequately protected. This paper begins by exploring several broad categories of privacy-preserving techniques including homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, secure enclaves, and zero-knowledge proofs. Then we discuss some of the security considerations related to using these methods, potential use cases, and a conceptual system design for applying privacy-preserving methods in international safeguards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Optimization Of In-field Alpha Spectrometry For Uranium Enrichment Determination In Uranium Hexafluoride

In response to needs identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) research is underway to develop In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) as a method to allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to collect samples of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at processing facilities to assess and verify uranium enrichment. For sample collection, the IFAS method uses Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers, which contain thin zeolite coatings that trap UF6 gas and convert it to the safer, more stable form uranyl fluoride (as a dihydrate, UO2F2·2H2O). For alpha spectrometry, the IFAS instrument employs a large area silicon semiconductor transducer to detect and record alpha particle energy-deposition events. Over the past year optimization work has significantly increased the diameter of useful SUDA samples (from 12.7 mm to 48 mm), improved the manufacturability and reproducibility of SUDA samples, increased the area of the IFAS alpha spectrometer sensor from 1.2 cm to 3.1 cm, and improved source positioning within the IFAS. This paper will report on this optimization work, its impacts on IFAS performance, and future plans for IFAS miniaturization, improvements, and testing.

Chichester, David↗