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DOE OSTI2020

Integrating Commercial Ready Autonomous Robotic Platforms to Enhance Worker Safety and Efficiency - 20053

This paper will explore the challenges and triumphs of implementing advanced robotic systems and the supporting technology for the waste management industry. Deployment-ready solutions for autonomous robotic platforms are new to the radioactive waste management industry and have been slow to implement across the complex. Specifically, it will explore Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's implementation of ground-based autonomous robotic platforms to enhance workforce safety and efficiency. The first objective of the project is to demonstrate safe operation of autonomous instrumented robots, followed by a scaling up of capabilities for the platform to meet any additional requests of internal stakeholders. Autonomous robotics platforms offer a fantastic range of capabilities that will aid in decreasing long-term liability of radioactive waste management industry by enhancing clean-up efforts and worker safety. Over the past five years, deployment-ready solutions for autonomous robotic platforms have come a long way. Autonomous robotic platforms are increasingly available to purchase from many vendors, often for prices under $100,000. Additionally, the vendors who produce these products are efficient in accommodating customized solutions to unique challenges, such as those often found in the radioactive waste management industry. However, the newness of this technology to the radioactive waste management industry and has resulted in a slow implementation across the complex. This paper will explore the challenges and triumphs of implementing advanced robotic systems and supporting technology for the waste management industry. Specifically, it will explore Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's implementation of ground based autonomous robotic platforms to enhance workforce safety and efficiency. While the company has utilized robots in many parts of the tank farms mission, this was first attempted in the deployment of an autonomous platform that required no operator with only minor maintenance and created challenges not yet encountered. These challenges included stakeholder buy-in, operational safety, procurement uncertainties, adaption of 'off the shelf products, overcoming the 'Fukushima complexity' perception, security concerns, and the initial criteria down select. Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's management identified the need for a workforce protecting low cost robotics solution in the fall of 2017. The project scope generated was part of the response to the Tank Vapor Assessment Team recommendation to enhance the safety of the workforce by utilizing new technology. Since the projects inception, it has been incorporated into the Tank Stewardship Plan. This project was unique to Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, as the company does not frequently incorporate advanced technology for field deployment quickly. The project was also progressive to the Hanford Tank Operations Contractor as it functions as a partnership project with a local university. The first objective of the project is to demonstrate safe operations of autonomous instrumented robotics, monitoring and collecting data, and the wireless transmission of data to a central computing system. Following the completion of this first objective, the project will scale up capabilities of the platform to meet the requests of additional internal stakeholders throughout the tank farms - including completion of specific in-field tasks. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Ten-Year Review of US/German Collaboration in Salt Repository Research - 20069

A multinational collaboration on salt repository research, design and operation has enjoyed remarkable success since reinvigorating efforts in 2010. Nations now engaged in the shared salt repository research agenda include Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Poland. The scientific basis for safe and permanent disposal of nuclear waste in salt formations has been strengthened by annual workshops that recognize and address contemporary research, including breakout sessions to stimulate open discussion and focus planning for ongoing investigations. Collaboration not only identifies pertinent technical issues, but facilitates timely, expert, and cost-effective consideration. Contemporary workshops have been held annually since 2010 and are documented in yearly state-of-the-art Proceedings, which summarize content and conclusions. The Proceedings help preserve scientific understanding and provide timely source references. These workshops often produce valuable joint publications coordinated with the Nuclear Energy Agency and other suitable external forums for dissemination. Nuclear waste management programs face growing challenges, while permanent disposal in salt formations provides a robust, safe option for several nations. Workshop format and publications provide a cost-effective insurance against loss of scientific expertise and institutional memory. This paper summarizes ten US/German workshops since formal reinitiation, reexamines key technical issues, discusses the evolving research agenda, and highlights successes and challenges. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

The TRANSCEND University Consortium: An Overview - 20106

The UK government is committed to nuclear energy having an important role in delivering a secure, low-carbon and affordable energy future. Projections indicate that between now and 2035, ∼14 GW of new nuclear generating capacity may be built. Successful delivery of this strategy recognises the need for research and development, skills development and international collaboration as key enablers. One key area is the decommissioning and clean-up of all civil nuclear licensed sites and the implementation of geological disposal of highly active wastes, with a central component being a joined-up approach to nuclear R and D across government, industry and academia which benefits the UK economy and ensures the security of supply. Essential to public acceptance of this strategy remains a demonstrable ability to safely manage and dispose of waste, with acceptance directly linked to having scientifically robust routes for its safe clean-up and disposal. There therefore remains an ongoing need for further research in the areas of decommissioning, immobilisation and management of nuclear waste, and there is significant government and stakeholder support for such research. Given the needs of both new nuclear power generation and legacy wastes, there is a requirement to develop innovative approaches to waste management and decommissioning. Following on from earlier, highly successful projects supported by UK Research and Innovation's Energy Programme, the work of the TRANSCEND (Transformative Science and Engineering for Nuclear Decommissioning) consortium is part of the response to these needs, providing support to a strong and internationally leading group of researchers in this key technology area. The consortium is a collaboration between 11 universities, supported by 8 key industry partners, with a total funding of UK Pounds 9.5 M from the UK Engineering and Physical Research Council, the universities and key project partners. The research being carried out is multidisciplinary and covers both fundamental and applied topics, with 40 research projects clustered in four technical themes: integrated waste management; site decommissioning and remediation; spent fuels; and nuclear materials. Key aims of the consortium are to extend and further develop a relevant academic skill base in the UK associated with the needs of nuclear waste management and decommissioning, to train the next generation of UK researchers, equipping them with skills and experiences relevant to nuclear waste management and decommissioning issues, and to carry out cutting-edge research that has the potential to provide new and innovative pathways to better management of both legacy and future nuclear wastes. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

A Simple, Revolutionary Approach to Waste Packaging Utilizing Proven Technology - 20201

Historically, removing hazardous waste from gloveboxes involves the use of bags as the primary containment method. This method can prove tedious, repetitive, and time consuming to ensure the process follows all safeguards required to contain the waste and mitigate any breach of containment. Layers of bags, yards of tape, and multiple filters are added to the waste stream in order to transfer the hazardous waste from the glovebox safely into the drum package. Then, finally, it can be shipped and disposed of. The process to cut, tie, and tape each bag for disposal involves manual effort by multiple operators. Following Administrative Safety Controls, good operators are able to safely perform those tasks; but, since the bag is the only confinement layer, incidents can occur. Operators, in some cases, are also at close proximity to this waste which may increase the risk of radiation exposure. Once the waste is transferred out through these bags, it is nearly impossible to remove packaged waste that may contain higher dosage levels, thus increasing drum disposal costs incurred by the facility. Exceeding the allowable radiation levels, and drums not fully filled, both contribute significantly to excess disposal costs. Central Research Laboratories (CRL), based in Red Wing Minnesota, has developed the Waste Drum Transfer System (WDTS) building upon the proven technology and containment of the Rapid Transfer Port (RTP) as an alternate, more efficient method of waste transfer. This solution consists of an RTP Alpha port mounted inside a glovebox and Beta assembly unit composed of a drum liner fitted inside a standard 55 gallon drum. The use of the Beta drum liner bypasses the typical use of bags, sleeves or tape to provide leak tight containment. The process to connect and disconnect a drum from the glovebox is achieved by the self-docking and rotating system controls of the RTP Alpha, all done with only one operator standing in an upright ergonomic position. This system also allows for greater flexibility in available Beta connection options, expanding the overall functionality of the system. This system can be disconnected and reconnected multiple times to maximize volume containment. This will minimize drum disposal costs and reduce the overall volume of waste output by more efficiently filling the drums. Radiation levels inside each drum can be monitored and adjusted more efficiently by operators utilizing the reconnect option. Minimal As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) levels are also achievable with this system. This paper will show how highly efficient packaging and disposal of hazardous waste can be accomplished in a cost-effective manner utilizing the proven RTP technology. Maximized operator productivity and safety, as well as minimized radiation dose exposure, are all attainable through the system's engineered controls. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Retrieval of Transuranic Drums with Deflagration to Detonation Potential from a Vault at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory - 20207

During the final phase of a long-term project, a total of 80 TRU waste drums at ORNL have been retrieved from a below-grade storage vault in which they have remained untouched for about 25 years. The drums, which house material generated from past ORNL operations, are now stored and ready for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, located on Highway 95 in Oak Ridge. The Transuranic Waste Processing Center will process and ship the drums to WIPP in Carlsbad, New Mexico, for disposal. Workers lifted the drums one-by-one from the underground storage vault with a 110-ton crane over a one-week period in October 2017. Although the physical work was performed in one week, years of detailed planning preceded the fieldwork. A key obstacle needed to be overcome before the project could safely proceed. This obstacle involved the need to ensure controls were developed for the Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) potential. DDT refers to a phenomenon in ignitable mixtures of a flammable gas and air (or oxygen) when a sudden transition takes place from a deflagration type of combustion to a detonation type of explosion. Basically, these drums, under certain circumstances, have a potential to detonate and overpressurize. Extensive analysis of the drums verified that detonation, while unlikely, was possible. Of the total 103 drums that were retrieved or moved in preparation for retrieval, 18 had DDT potential. Extensive security requirements were also necessary, due to the nature of the material, and this added another layer of complexity to the fieldwork. Prior to retrieving the drums from the underground storage vault, space needed to be made for them within the various above-grade facilities. Inventory and security requirements dictated what could be stored where, and the first step of the field work involved a number of drum movements in preparation for storage of the newly retrieved drums. This effort involved moving 21 drums already in the storage area to facilitate the addition of the newly retrieved ones. The retrieval project required a total of 107 critical lifts using the 110-ton crane, under 3 critical lift plans. The TRU waste storage facility is a Category 2 Nuclear Facility and is managed under an extensive Documented Safety Analysis. The TRU retrieval project was conducted in accordance with DOE Order 425.1D and included three Implementation Verification Reviews, two Management Assessments, one Readiness Assessment, and seven mock-ups in preparation for the field work. Despite being stored for 25 years, the drums were in good shape due to the integrity of the facilities where the drums were stored. Of the 80 drums that were retrieved, 12 were placed in special containers called 'overpacks' based on their content. The drums were removed safely and without incident, thanks to a lot of preparation and the efforts of a highly skilled team. Lessons learned through the DDT control development and the drum retrieval and overpacking process could be beneficial to others having to manage similar drums of TRU waste. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

In-situ Detection of Glovebox Glove Degradation Prior to Glove Failure; Effects on Safety, Waste, and Operational Costs - 20402

Glovebox glove pressure decay leak testing and analysis of the data can greatly improve glovebox safety, minimize Transuranic (TRU) glove waste, and minimize operational cost. It is well known, the weakest point of containment on a glovebox is the glove. Mitigating unplanned openings in gloves is critical to minimizing operational and safety costs in glovebox operations. Mitigating unplanned glove openings due to glove failures will be discussed in this paper. The lack of an engineered solution to determine a gloves operational life in nuclear operations, has lead to use of theoretical and manual subjective methods to determine the life and safety of a glovebox glove. Whether the glove is inspected visually prior to use, or gloves are changed regularly to theoretically avoid failure, both the operators PPE and the room are being exposed to contamination, or un-necessary amounts of TRU glove waste are being generated. Millions of dollars yearly in operational costs are spent on glove failures due to loss of production, incident analysis, regulatory audits, clean up, and paperwork. In a nuclear application, a glove failure could contaminate an operator and laboratory, shut down the operation for weeks, potentially create a regulatory audit, and potentially create a media frenzy; the damages to the organization can be astronomical. Elimination of glove failures is possible by tracking glove material degradation and setting limits to allow glove change when it becomes necessary, prior to glove failure. Analytical pressure decay leak testing allows the detection of material degradation, and in turn the ability to limit operational glove failures. A German based company called MK Versuchsanlagen, e.K., has developed an advanced Glove Integrity Testing System. The system, with its use of proprietary RFID and special software technology, is unique in its capabilities. The system is capable to perform highly accurate regular glove testing on any size glovebox line in minimal time. The system records and can analyze a tremendous amount of system data that in turn can determine, for example, a safe glove change time prior to a glove material failure. This paper will show how an advanced Glove Integrity Testing System can detect glove material degradation and help determine a safe change point prior to glove failure. Pressure decay curves of new gloves and recorded effects of accelerated aging on the glove over time will be shown. The use of this technology in nuclear facilities can greatly improve glovebox operational safety, minimize glovebox glove TRU waste, and save organizations tremendous costs in downtime, clean up, documentation, and potential regulatory review. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Autonomous Radiation Mapping and Quantification using an Unmanned Ground Vehicle. Part II - Autonomous Navigation

Nuclear sites across the Unites States and other nations in the world, are prone to extreme radiation effects. To understand the radiation hazards, plan the cleanup efforts; and to meet the quality standards and guidelines, it is important to accurately characterize any nuclear facility. One of the current methods in characterizing facilities is the use of advanced autonomous systems. These are safe, efficient, and cost-effective tools, which can safely deploy state-of-the-art instrumentation without exposing workers to radiation risks. Conventional methods of taking radiation measurements by hand within or around the containment areas, and analyzing the collected data to obtain the result are: Ineffective, Puts scientists at risk of Radiation, Not cost-effective. The platform uses the Robotic Operating Systems (ROS) to integrate multiple sensors seamlessly. It can operate near real time by using a distributed processing system to handle large amounts of data: Surrounding cameras, A multi-channel 3D Lidar, Manipulator arm, High-performance gamma-ray spectrometer.

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DOE OSTI2020

Deep Isolation-Development of the Safety Case for Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in Horizontal Boreholes - 20028

Deep Isolation has developed a safe, secure, and permanent geological disposal method for high-level waste, including spent nuclear fuel as well as sealed sources and other highly radioactive materials. The method leverages well established directional drilling technology to create horizontal repositories deep underground. The combination of great depth (1-3 km) and the ability to precisely position repositories in a horizontal orientation provides access to geologic strata that are inaccessible for typical mined and deep vertical borehole repositories. A number of potential direct and indirect safety benefits accrue including:1) greater depth below regional freshwater aquifers; 2) increased flexibility and more geologic options for siting; 3) access to deep formations with persistent and sustained reducing conditions. In addition there are a number of safety elements related specifically to the horizontal repository geometry including: 1) passive direction of thermally driven fluid and radionuclide movement away from the vertical access hole and toward the 'dead end' portion of the repository; 2) mitigation of seismic hazards by orienting repositories parallel to local and regional fault structures. In this paper we explore and discuss some of the key technologic, geologic and hydrologic elements that support the deep horizontal borehole safety case. The stalemate seen across the globe on the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste can be broken. Deep Isolation offers a novel option for safe, secure, and permanent deep geological disposal of nuclear waste that can be developed as centralized repositories or adapted to smaller regional or site-specific repositories located near waste sources. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Spent Nuclear Fuel Exploratory Roadmaps - 20054

The U.S. Department of Energy manages nearly 2,500 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from several decades of research, testing, and production reactors [DOE 1995]. This SNF is managed at the DOE Hanford Site in Washington State (Hanford), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Savannah River Site in South Carolina (SRS). From 1995 to 2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) made several key programmatic decisions, supported by appropriate documentation in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for the management of SNF [DOE 1995]. These decisions have provided an overarching framework for SNF management, as well as site-specific and SNF-related management decisions for the past two decades. In the years since these decisions were made, with the notable exception of the successful drying and packaging of the production reactor fuel at Hanford, a majority of the decisions have been largely unimplemented. Also, since these decisions were made, a number of changes that bear on considerations relative to the path forward have occurred. A SNF Exploratory Road map activity, identified reasonable alternate pathways for DoE's inventory of SNF. Three fundamental pathways were identified in this activity for the long-term management and disposition of DOE SNF: Direct Disposal Pathway, Existing Processing Pathway and Alternate Processing Pathway. Further actions would be required (e.g., evaluation of NEPA analysis, technology maturity evaluations, refinement of cost and risks, benefits and advantages relative to other alternate paths) to define and inform many key decisions that will result in the selection of the disposition pathways that are most beneficial to the US Government in dispositioning DoE's SNF inventory. DOE is currently managing all SNF safely; however, the age of DOE-owned SNF and facilities for storing and processing SNF, coupled with the uncertainty of the storage duration, necessitates decisions and actions to ensure that the infrastructure will be in place to ensure continued safe and effective long-term management and eventual disposal. The identification of reasonable alternate pathways took these considerations into account in an effort to proactively manage conditions that could challenge the safety of storing and managing DOE SNF over the time periods now contemplated and also to ensure that flexibility is preserved to ensure that the DOE SNF remains compatible with final disposition pathways when they become available. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

The Corrective Maintenance Paradigm Shift at Hanford's Tank Farms - 20077

Hanford's Tank Farms facilities have been used to safely store waste for over 70 years, with the first single-shell tanks being constructed in 1943. Tank Farm facilities consist of 149 single-shell tanks, 28 double-shell tanks, an evaporator facility, and wastewater treatment facilities. Tank Farm facilities are aging, with a tremendous corrective maintenance burden on the Tank Farm contractor. The mission of Tank Farm facilities is soon changing from waste storage to waste staging for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). WTP operations will demand a significant increase in Tank Farm facility operations, in which corrective maintenance outage windows will shrink drastically. This realization has forced the Tank Farm contractor to consider a paradigm shift in Tank Farm facilities Maintenance planning, and the use of reliability Engineering tools. The Tank Farm Production Operations Engineering Cognizant System Engineering (CSE) organization has led the way in motivating this paradigm shift. This shift has been realized through the use of: 1) technical exchange with other Department of Energy (DOE) contractors to develop improvements in the CSE program, 2) a shift from the use of lagging to leading system health indicators, and 3) a Plant Health Committee to unite Engineering, Operations, and Maintenance personnel toward a productive maintenance strategy. The CSE organization has held several technical exchanges with other DOE contractors to discuss CSE concepts, and how to better maintain aging infrastructure. The technical exchange with other contractors has greatly reduced the time required to make improvements in the Tank Farm CSE program. Other DOE contractors have already faced issues surrounding aging infrastructure, and have vast experience in improving the reliability and usable life of structures and components in nuclear facilities. The past CSE program used lagging health indicators to determine the health of systems. The key lagging indicator used to determine system health was availability, which is the percentage of time that a facility was ready for operation compared to the time the facility was demanded for operation. Availability was a good indicator of health in the waste storage mission of Tank Farms, where safe storage was the most important function of the facility, and where maintenance outage windows were typically long-duration. In current and future operations, outage windows are reducing, resulting in the need for much more reliable systems. Systems that have had high availability may suddenly become inoperable due to a failed component or sub-system. In several instances, the use of availability as an indicator of system health failed to predict system/equipment failure before its occurrence. In discussions with other DOE contractors, a set of reliability tools, including leading indicators of health, has been implemented in the CSE program. This primarily involves the use of failure modes and effects analysis and the study of equipment failure to develop system monitoring plans that focus on trending data to detect oncoming equipment failure ahead of time. In addition, the use of a Plant Health Committee has added significantly to the paradigm shift from a corrective maintenance philosophy to the use of predictive and preventive maintenance. The Plant Health Committee is a chartered team consisting of Engineering, Operations, and Maintenance personnel. CSEs use this forum to present the results of their performance monitoring, including the presentation of health via leading health indicators. The most positive aspect of this committee is the communication that it creates within these critical organizations. The Operations and Maintenance organization benefit from focusing maintenance on the reliability-centered focus provided by Engineering. Engineering benefits from the operational experience of the Operations organization and from the failure data that can be provided by Maintenance personnel. The continued use of the Plant Health Committee is expected to further decrease maintenance outage times, in better support of oncoming 24/7 operations. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Update on Full-Scale Retrieval and Transfer System Testing for Pneumatic Conveyance of High-Level Calcine Waste - 20241

The Idaho National Laboratory processed spent nuclear fuel from 1953 to 1994. The process used solvent extraction to separate uranium, resulting in a liquid waste. A calcination process was used to convert the liquid waste to a high-level radioactive solid powder, referred to as calcine. The calcine is stored in stainless steel bins contained within concrete vaults called the Calcined Solids Storage Facilities. There are a total of seven CSSFs. The Calcine Retrieval Project is tasked with retrieving the calcine from the bins of CSSF 1 and pneumatically transferring it to the bins of CSSF 6. CSSF 1 was constructed to be a final calcine repository with no forethought of retrieval. It represents the greatest technical hurdle to calcine extraction of all the CSSFs. The challenges inherent with accessing the calcine, safely extracting it, and securely transporting it are copious and complex. Once the calcine is removed from CSSF1, that facility may be closed, reducing the footprint of waste storage at the INL. The same process for removing Calcine from CSSF1 may then be utilized to remove the calcine from the remaining CSSFs for final treatment and transport to a long-term storage facility. To overcome these inherent challenges with accessing CSSF 1 and extracting the calcine in a timely manner, a full-scale integrated mockup has been constructed. The mockup includes a full-size model of a concentric group of bins from CSSF 1 and a storage vessel representing CSSF 6. All essential elements of the transport design are represented in the Mockup, including motive and makeup air supply (air compressor), a replica of the CSSF6 cyclone, pre-filter, HEPA filter, vacuum pump, and retrieval control devices. Construction on the Mockup was completed in 2018 and testing began in February 2019. It has already proven very beneficial to the CRP. Experience in running the Mockup have aided in the development of retrieval and transport methodologies and the selection of process parameter values. It has also uncovered some unforeseen technological challenges and will continue to be valuable to the testing team as these hurdles are overcome and the process is proven effective. Operations personnel have also benefitted from its use as a training tool and will continue to use the Mockup as a simulator to reproduce problems encountered during extraction and transfer of Calcine from CSSF 1. The knowledge gained during this process will also be of continued benefit as future work is done to remove various types of calcine from the remaining CSSFs. The methodology of safe and secure transfer of radioactive material may be of benefit to others throughout the U.S. Department of Energy complex. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

DOE Hanford Tank Side Cesium Removal System (TSCR) Update: Fabrication and Factory Acceptance Testing - 20300

The Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) System is a modular, quickly-deployable, and passively safe system for efficiently removing solids and cesium from alkaline liquid waste raffinate created by fuel processing on the Hanford site. This paper provides an overview of the project with particular emphasis on completion of fabrication and factory acceptance testing (FAT). All TSCR System components are inside three enclosures known as the Process Enclosure, Ancillary Enclosure, and Control Enclosure. The Process Enclosure is seismic design category II (SDC-II) and built to withstand the rigors of transportation and lifting, high winds, volcanic ash fall, and heavy precipitation (snow) over a temperature range of -25 to 115 deg. F. The Process Enclosure and Control Enclosure were fabricated in AVANTech's Columbia, SC facility, while the Ancillary Enclosure was fabricated in AVANTech's Richland, WA facility. The design and preliminary documented safety analysis were completed in December 2019, with all work being performed in accordance with ASME NQA-1 quality assurance requirements. The Process Enclosure, Ion Exchange Columns (IXCs), and several other TSCR components have a nuclear safety function and are designated as safety significant structures, systems, and components (SS-SSCs). The NQA-1 Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD) process was used to identify critical characteristics in order to accept materials and items used for fabrication of several safety significant TSCR components. This paper also addresses unique aspects and challenges of implementing CGD in DOE facilities and systems. After fabrication and preliminary testing, the Process and Control Enclosures were shipped to AVANTech's Richland facility where the complete TSCR System was setup and connected in a represented layout and configuration that will be used on the Hanford site. Test tanks and pumps were put in place and connected to the TSCR Process Enclosure in a manner that mimicked interfacing Double Shell Tanks in the 241-AP Tank Farm. The TSCR System was then tested/operated under conditions equivalent to those planned for onsite operation. Testing was separated into five separate phases as defined below: - Phase 1: Confirmation of TSCR System readiness for the FAT; - Phase 2: Verification of TSCR System operation under standard conditions; - Phase 3: Demonstration of TSCR System operation under non-standard conditions; - Phase 4: Demonstration of ion exchange media removal from an IXC; and - Phase 5: Completion of TSCR System lift plans and site mobilization. The Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), participated in all phases of testing. Testing at AVANTech's Richland Facility allowed WRPS personnel to familiarize themselves with TSCR operations in a radiologically clean facility prior to onsite mobilization. Engineering and operations personnel gained valuable experience that allowed them to better refine onsite operational protocols and procedures - including handling and movement of IXCs with a forklift. This paper describes the technologies used by the TSCR System as well as how these technologies are deployed and operated to advance the Hanford mission of safely, efficiently, and effectively treating tank waste. It also provides detailed information on fabrication and FAT, including operational data from simulated tank waste runs. A project schedule for WRPS' planned construction acceptance testing, operational acceptance testing, and actual tank waste treatment is provided. This presentation should be of great interest to parties responsible for the design, testing, and mobilization of modular NQA-1 technologies for the treatment of raffinate and similar liquid wastes containing high concentrations of radioactive cesium. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Reactor Activation Modelling with Physical Characterization Data and the Impact on Long Term Assessments - 20303

Whiteshell Laboratories, located in Manitoba, Canada, provided research facilities for the Canadian nuclear industry since the early 1960's. The facility was centered on Whiteshell Reactor 1 (WR-1), an organically cooled, heavy water moderated nuclear reactor. WR-1 was safely shut down in 1985, defueled and drained, and has been in a safe Storage with Surveillance (Deferred Decommissioning) state until present day. In support of an Environmental Assessment for proposed in-situ disposal of WR-1, detailed characterization information regarding the reactor core components (calandria, calandria tubes, and pressure tubes) was necessary to provide confidence that the long-term impacts of the facility can be assessed adequately. A simplified estimate of the total activation of core components was completed in 1992 using conservative assumptions, expected reactor configuration and computer models built with WIMS-CRNL, ONEDANT and ORIGEN-S. Due to the simplification, and age of the work, there was considerable doubt that the modelled inventory estimate of the core components was sufficient to support long-term performance modeling of the planned in-situ decommissioning. Additional data would be required to provide this confidence. Several options were considered for characterizing the WR-1 core components, but it was decided to collect only a limited number of samples in an effort to validate the 1992 simplified estimate as bounding. The limited number of samples reduced risks to workers, both radiological and non-radiological, and significantly reduced the costs required to confidently define and bound the radiological inventory of activation products in the core. The results of the sampling were compared to the simplified activation estimation. There was good agreement between the modelled and sampled results, with all major contributors to total activity showing similar relative quantities. The samples were generally lower than predicted by the models, with few exceptions. Notable exceptions included Nb-94, which were higher in the sample results than the model. This was determined to be caused by the use of Niobium containing steel alloys in the stainless steel pressure tube that were not accounted for in the models. The comparison of results provided confidence that the original inventory estimates produced through the simplified model are conservative and bounding, and therefore suitable for use in the long-term assessment of in situ disposal of the WR-1 reactor. This paper provides details of the simplified computer model results, their comparison to results of the sampling, and the changes adopted in the assessment of the in-situ decommissioning of WR-1 as a result. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Effects of He Ion Irradiation in Simple Borosilicate Glasses for HLW Immobilisation - 20324

High-level radioactive waste (HLW) consists of fission products and minor actinides. Borosilicate glass is the host material of choice in most countries to safely immobilize HLW, followed by eventual geological disposal. HLW glasses will experience both self-heating and self-irradiation effects due to the decay of fission products and minor actinides present therein. During the first 500 years of geological disposal, beta-gamma decay will be the main source of radiation due to short half-lives of fission products, as compared to very long-lived actinides which will be responsible for irradiation over much longer timescales. High-energy alpha particles and alpha recoil nuclei can potentially have significant impact (stored energy, volume change, accumulated dose, chemical durability) on the performance of the wasteform over longer timescales. Thus, to ensure safe and economic disposal over geological periods (10{sup 4} - 10{sup 6} years), the assessment of performance and properties in terms of radiation effects becomes indispensable. This work aims to simulate the effects of alpha decay in radioactive waste glasses. Two international glasses, namely UK 'MW' lithium-sodium borosilicate and Indian sodium-barium borosilicate, which are being used as HLW immobilization matrices by the UK and India respectively, were prepared by a melt-quench method and annealed below their glass transition temperatures. Both glasses were irradiated with 650 KeV He{sup 2+} ions with doses ranging from 10{sup 15} to 10{sup 17} ions/cm{sup 2}. Structural analysis was carried out using electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) and Raman spectroscopies. First derivative continuous wave EPR spectra were recorded for all pristine and irradiated glass monoliths at room temperature using an X-band (frequency 9.6 GHz) EPR Bruker spectrometer. Results from EPR analyses showed the formation of irradiation induced paramagnetic centers at g ∼ 2.00 in all irradiated glasses. Raman spectra of pristine and irradiated samples were acquired, and showed notable changes in glass structure post-irradiation, with the emergence of a broad Raman band at 1560 cm{sup -1} upon irradiation with high fluences. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Treatment of Problematic Reactive Metal Wastes Using the GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV{sup TM}) Process - 20326

Decommissioning of sodium-cooled reactors and fast reactor technologies has generated a number of reactive metal waste configurations that are problematic to treat and typically lack cost effective treatment methods and disposition options. As a result, Veolia Nuclear Solutions, under contract with Idaho National Laboratory (owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC) demonstrated its GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV){sup TM} technology to safely convert sodium metal to a non-reactive vitrified oxide form. The demonstration project, supported by glass formulation and crucible testing, consisted of a series of ICV{sup TM} melts that processed elemental sodium into stable non-reactive glass. INL is currently implementing GeoMelt{sup R} technology as a means to safely and reliably convert radioactive reactive metal residues that contaminate sodium cooled reactor components into waste forms that comply with existing disposition pathways. Reactive metal wastes require treatment in order to remove the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) reactivity and ignitability characteristics to comply with land disposal restrictions. GeoMelt{sup R}, which is an alternative to other potential treatment approaches, provides a robust approach that chemically converts the reactive metals to an inert oxide while also immobilizing radionuclides in a vitrified waste form with durability equal to or better than vitrified nuclear fuel reprocessing wastes (very robust and inert waste forms). Most other treatment approaches generate hydrogen gas which is problematic. In 2016, Veolia Nuclear Solutions first demonstrated the effectiveness of the GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} process in deactivating reactive sodium metal. Crucible, bench-scale, and engineering-scale demonstrations were conducted on several surrogate waste configurations with various ratios of sodium metal and glass formers. Each ratio and configuration demonstrated complete deactivation of the surrogate sodium metal. Follow-on work in 2017 demonstrated the deactivation of reactive sodium by GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} at a higher waste loading relative to previously demonstrated work performed in 2016; the higher waste loading optimized glass chemistry while enhancing the economical full-scale treatment of reactive metals. Additionally, follow-on demonstration testing in 2018 and 2019 focused on more complex shapes and other reactive-metals (mocked up Experimental Breeder Reactor II [EBR-II] subassembly, sodium filled heat exchanger, and a can containing sodium potassium alloy) which were all performed at engineering scale. Veolia Nuclear Solutions designed, installed, and commissioned in September 2018, at Perma-Fix Northwest in Richland Washington, a 10-metric ton full-scale GeoMelt unit (GeoMelt{sup R} Richland) for the treatment of reactive metal wastes. As of September 2019, over 900 55-gallon drums containing a total of around 3,500 lb of sodium with low levels of radioactivity have been treated at GeoMelt{sup R} Richland, with resulting glass monoliths disposed at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). A full-scale radiological demonstration melt on an actual EBR-II subassembly has also been performed using the full-scale melter in 2019. The GeoMelt{sup R} technology is a proven radioactive waste treatment technology capable of immobilizing radioactive wastes, including bulk rubble such as drums and other steel vessels usually without pretreatment. Utilizing the GeoMelt{sup R} technology to treat reactive metals eliminates pretreatment steps resulting from having to separate the reactive metal from steel containers or jackets as GeoMelt{sup R} can easily operate at temperatures sufficient to melt the steel and expose the reactive metal for treatment. Eliminating handling steps of reactive metals is a significant safety advantage since reactive metals are pyrophoric. The results generated as a part of the 2018-2019 demonstration program are presented in the paper. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Use of the Manuela 3D/Radiation Scanning Tool at Nuclear Facilities - 20437

Licensees, facility operators and decommissioning contractors have a need for comprehensive, accurate and precise radiological and topographical data to plan and execute safe and efficient Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) projects. Traditional approaches rely greatly upon labor and administratively intensive data collection methods that require considerable time and effort to glean the relevant data to plan and perform work in a radiological work area. Orano Decommissioning Services has developed and utilized at French nuclear facilities a lightweight portable scanning instrument called MANUELA (Mobile Apparatus for Nuclear Expertise Localization Assistance). Recently Orano conducted demonstrations at two United States nuclear facilities using MANUELA that may prove useful in areas of the fuel cycle including: - ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) planning during facility operations; - Scoping and site characterization during the D and D planning phase; - Remedial action support during active decommissioning work; - Radiation and modeling planning for plant modifications; - Support Final Status Survey and demonstration of 'end state' compliance for license termination. MANUELA is currently being evaluated for use during decommissioning of nuclear facilities and could aide in demonstrating compliance with end state criteria after decommissioning. Of particular interest are decommissioning projects planned for various sites across the United States. Most of these sites present unique challenges and opportunities to safely and efficiently decommission in a regulatory compliant manner. The two demonstration site's current conditions of relatively low radiation levels inside containment proved to be ideal platforms to deploy the MANUELA instrument for evaluation of the complex geometries typically found in a nuclear facility. The MANUELA instrument was able to precisely identify local hot spots of the reactor system's primary equipment and was able to simultaneously overlay the dose information onto the scanned 3D images. Using data like this, a licensee would be able to make informed technical and personnel decisions on methods to remediate, shield or properly dispose of the radioactive source term. MANUELA can be used throughout the decommissioning process to validate progress and continue to refine the work activities to optimize the efforts of the crew which reduces downtime waiting for survey results, whereas traditional survey methodology relies on a physical survey to be performed and the data transcribed onto survey maps that are only two dimensional. The traditional format tends to be inaccurate and difficult to interpret the precise location(s) of hot spots or generalized dose rates. The resultant scan also allows the user to know the exact extent of the survey versus transposing information onto a map with only a portion of the map area scanned. MANUELA also compiles all of the relevant survey data into a downloadable table format which includes the measurement identification number, time stamp, point space location on the XYZ plane, and the dose rate value. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from the First Year of Property Remediation - 20475

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) is a federal environmental clean-up program. Its mandate is the remediation and local, long-term, safe management of approximately 1.7 million cubic metres of historic low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) in the adjacent communities of Port Hope and Port Granby in Southern Ontario, Canada. The PHAI is being undertaken by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) on behalf of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, a federal Crown corporation. It is currently one of the largest environmental remediation projects in Canada. The safety of workers, the public and the environment while delivering the PHAI compliantly, on time and within budget is CNL's number one priority. The PHAI is being carried out as two projects - the Port Hope Project and the Port Granby Project. The larger of the two PHAI scopes of work - the Port Hope Project - involves the cleanup of approximately 1.2 million cubic metres of historic LLRW from 18 major sites in Port Hope, the construction of an engineered aboveground mound where the waste will be safely contained and the long-term maintenance and monitoring of the facility. Construction of the waste water treatment plant, the first three of four cells in the mound and supporting infrastructure is complete, with construction of the fourth cell in progress. In 2017 with the movement of on-site waste at this facility began and is now complete. Waste excavation and transportation from off-site locations within the community began in 2018; the cleanup of four temporary storage sites is now complete and remediation at several other major sites is underway. The Port Hope Project also includes a survey of the interior and exterior investigation of approximately 4,800 properties, primarily residential, in the urban area of Port Hope for the presence or absence of historic LLRW. The current projection is that approximately 1,250 privately owned residential and commercial properties known as Small-Scale Sites (SSS) will be identified as having waste exceeding the PHAI clean-up criteria. This paper will outline some of the challenges and lessons learned from the first year of SSS remediation including contractual, data and design issues; interaction with and managing expectations of stakeholders; weather, site and structure conditions as well as municipal permitting, resourcing, transportation and remediation verification. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program for SNF Wet Storage Life Extension - 20489

Approximately 27 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management is stored in the L Basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). This 'DOE SNF' is comprised of approximately 12,000 aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel assemblies (∼7 MTHM), and approximately 2000 non-aluminum fuel assemblies (∼20 MTHM). A program is in progress to perform Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) of the fuel and their storage containers to characterize the materials' condition, and to evaluate the effects of service to enable continued safe wet storage of the SNF. The Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP), a two-part program to develop and implement remote underwater Non-Destructive Examination of the aluminum SNF, and of the containers of the non-aluminum SNF, respectively, is aimed at the characterization and evaluation of corrosion degradation of aluminum fuel and container materials. The predominant design of the aluminum SNF (ASNF) stored in L Basin is the Materials Test Reactor (MTR) equivalent design, a plate fuel design. These SNF are stored in 5'' diameter tubes or 5'' x 5'' squares (called bundles) that are nominally 12' or up to 14' long. The SNF is de-bundled and inspected using a custom-designed MTR Fuel Inspection Table. The inspection table provides for indexed fuel positioning for a video camera examination with controlled lighting. A total of 10 of the SNF originating from foreign research and test reactors were selected for examination based on burnup, enrichment, and prior damage caused by service/storage history. A special inspection campaign of these 10 assemblies is in progress. The observed corrosion damage included minor to moderate attack from general corrosion, pitting, crevice, end grain and galvanic corrosion. Example results from the completed inspections are shown and discussed. The focus is a comparison of the as-received condition versus the as-found current storage condition that will serve to validate Water Chemistry and Corrosion Monitoring Programs. The non-aluminum SNF (NASNF) stored in L Basin are of diverse design that includes various geometries with claddings of stainless steel, Zircaloy, and Hastelloy. The fuel core materials include uranium alloys, oxides/mixed oxides, and carbides. These SNF materials, originating from early experimental and test reactors, are in various physical forms including single fuel elements and cut pieces. The fuel is stored in L Basin in various configurations including in direct bundled storage in aluminum tubes and in isolation cans that are in the bundles or in a larger over-size storage container (OSC). Concern with inside-out corrosion and the potential loss of configuration control and ability to handle the storage containers prompted the development of remote NDE methods that include visual and UT technologies to assess the condition of the containers. Candidate stored materials were selected for a special inspection campaign; the development of the NDE methods for the inspection for galvanic, crevice and sediment-induced corrosion (inside-out) are discussed. A summary of the SNF storage in L Basin at the SRS, and an overview of the AMCAP to enable continued safe storage of DOE SNF are described. (authors)

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