Results for “risk objectives” — Page 23

NASA NTRS2022

Concepts for the Future Exploration of Dwarf Planet Ceres' Habitability

Dwarf planet Ceres is a compelling target for future exploration because it hosts at least regional brine reservoirs and potentially ongoing geological activity. As the most water-rich body in the inner solar system, it is a representative of a population of planetesimals that were likely a significant source of volatiles and organics to the inner solar system. Here we describe possible medium-class (around $1 billion) mission concepts that would determine both Ceres’ origin and its current habitability potential. Habitability is addressed through a combination of geological, geophysical, and compositional investigations by (i) searching for evidence from orbit of past and ongoing geological activity near landforms interpreted as brine-driven volcanic structures and (ii) probing the brine distribution below one of these regions with electromagnetic sounding (in situ). Two approaches were considered for compositional measurements, which address both habitability and origins: (1) in situ exploration at two sites and (2) sample return from a single site. Both concepts targeted material at Occator crater, which is one of the youngest features on Ceres (∼20 Ma) and a site rich in evaporites evolved from recently erupted brine sourced from a region >35 km deep. We conclude that a sample return architecture from these young evaporite deposits offers greater science return by enabling high-resolution analysis of organic matter (trapped in salt minerals) and isotopes of refractory elements for a similar cost and less science risk than in situ analyses. This manuscript describes the six science objectives and the two implementation concepts considered to achieve those objectives.

Julie Castillo-Rogez↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Having a Come-Apart: Lessons Learned from Additively Manufactured Hardware Failures

NASA has been engaged with additively manufactured (AM) process and component development since the 2000’s. AM offers various technical advantages, such as enhanced hardware design complexity, part consolidation, and processing of novel alloys in addition to programmatic advantages for reduction in processing time and cost. The focus of much of the AM development at NASA has been to mature the various processes, characterize material properties, develop standards, produce demonstrator parts, and integrate AM hardware in liquid rocket engines. These aspects have been demonstrated through process and design iterations using a methodical characterization, test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned. In addition to these fundamental demonstrations of the AM process and hardware development, alloys that provide performance advantages in the high temperature and high-pressure environments have been matured for use in rocket engines. These environments are challenging for any alloy and any design, and the AM process is required to fully meet the intended design requirements. The importance of proper AM process was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality resulted from an AM process issue. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. In part, such concerns motivate the AM certification approach that NASA has recently adopted in NASA-STD-6030 “Additive Manufacturing Requirements for Spaceflight Systems”. This presentation provides an overview of the previously mentioned failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. The objective of this presentation is to provide awareness to the community working critical and non-critical AM components and the lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

Additive Manufacturing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines: Successes and Failures

NASA has been developing additive manufacturing (AM) for various technical and programmatic advantages for complex rocket engine and aerospace components. This maturation has focused on various AM processes, new alloys, characterizing material properties, developing standards, producing demonstrator parts, and integrating AM hardware in liquid rocket engines through test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned of the AM lifecycle. The importance of proper AM processing was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. This presentation provides an overview of the development failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. This presentation with provide critical awareness to the community lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

L-PBF↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Successes and Failures of Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines

NASA has been developing additive manufacturing (AM) for various technical and programmatic advantages for complex rocket engine and aerospace components. This maturation has focused on various AM processes, new alloys, characterizing material properties, developing standards, producing demonstrator parts, and integrating AM hardware in liquid rocket engines through test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned of the AM lifecycle. The importance of proper AM processing was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. This presentation provides an overview of the development failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. This presentation with provide critical awareness to the community lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

Additive Manufacturing↗

NASA NTRS2002

Protecting Space Travelers from Kidney Stones: Renal Stone Risk During Space Flight

Renal stones, popularly known as kidney or bladder stones, are small rock-like objects formed in the kidneys or urinary tract by deposits of calcium and other minerals. The problem arises when the stones block the drainage of the kidney, resulting in urinary obstruction and pain. Passing these stones can be one of the most painful experiences a person will endure so doctors often prescribe pain relievers to ease the experience. Drinking plenty of fluids, which help flush waste out of the body, and eating a well-balanced diet are the first steps to preventing stones. For individuals at risk, this may not be enough, and a doctor may recommend a special diet and medications. Unfortunately, approximately 60 percent of people who have had a renal stone will experience a recurrence. This is particularly true of men, who are four to five times more likely to develop stones than women. Renal stones do not discriminate based on age; even children are at risk. Astronauts are particularly at risk of developing renal stones because they lose bone and muscle mass; calcium, other minerals, and protein normally used for bone and muscle end up in the bloodstream and then in the kidneys. Without plenty of fluid to wash them away, crystals can form and then grow into stones. This factor compounds the risk for astronauts, since they also perceive that they are less thirsty in space and will drink less than normal during the mission. To minimize all of these factors, doctors must instead treat the stone-forming compounds with medication. This study will use potassium citrate to reduce the risk of stone formation. Renal stones are never convenient, but they are a particular concern for astronauts who have limited access to treatment during flight. Researchers are examining how earthbound preventions for renal stone formation work in flight, ensuring missions are not ended prematurely due to this medical condition. During STS-107, earthbound preventions and treatments become astronauts' gain.

Whitson, Peggy↗

NASA NTRS1995

Probabilistic risk assessment of the Space Shuttle. Phase 3: A study of the potential of losing the vehicle during nominal operation, volume 1

This document is the Executive Summary of a technical report on a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of the Space Shuttle vehicle performed under the sponsorship of the Office of Space Flight of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It briefly summarizes the methodology and results of the Shuttle PRA. The primary objective of this project was to support management and engineering decision-making with respect to the Shuttle program by producing (1) a quantitative probabilistic risk model of the Space Shuttle during flight, (2) a quantitative assessment of in-flight safety risk, (3) an identification and prioritization of the design and operations that principally contribute to in-flight safety risk, and (4) a mechanism for risk-based evaluation proposed modifications to the Shuttle System. Secondary objectives were to provide a vehicle for introducing and transferring PRA technology to the NASA community, and to demonstrate the value of PRA by applying it beneficially to a real program of great international importance.

Fragola, Joseph R.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Safer Systems: A NextGen Aviation Safety Strategic Goal

The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), is charged by Congress with developing the concepts and plans for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). The National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan (NASSP), developed by the Safety Working Group of the JPDO, focuses on establishing the goals, objectives, and strategies needed to realize the safety objectives of the NextGen Integrated Plan. The three goal areas of the NASSP are Safer Practices, Safer Systems, and Safer Worldwide. Safer Practices emphasizes an integrated, systematic approach to safety risk management through implementation of formalized Safety Management Systems (SMS) that incorporate safety data analysis processes, and the enhancement of methods for ensuring safety is an inherent characteristic of NextGen. Safer Systems emphasizes implementation of safety-enhancing technologies, which will improve safety for human-centered interfaces and enhance the safety of airborne and ground-based systems. Safer Worldwide encourages coordinating the adoption of the safer practices and safer systems technologies, policies and procedures worldwide, such that the maximum level of safety is achieved across air transportation system boundaries. This paper introduces the NASSP and its development, and focuses on the Safer Systems elements of the NASSP, which incorporates three objectives for NextGen systems: 1) provide risk reducing system interfaces, 2) provide safety enhancements for airborne systems, and 3) provide safety enhancements for ground-based systems. The goal of this paper is to expose avionics and air traffic management system developers to NASSP objectives and Safer Systems strategies.

Darr, Stephen T.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Developing a Cybersecurity Architecture for Extensible Traffic Management (xTM)

This paper explores the development of a cybersecurity architecture tailored for Extensible Traffic Management (xTM) to address emerging challenges in managing diverse aerial vehicles within the National Airspace System (NAS). Driven by technological advances and the rise of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), urban air mobility (UAM), and high-altitude traffic (ETM), the NAS is undergoing a paradigm shift. Traditional air traffic management, reliant on traditional Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) control, will give way to decentralized coordination among autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. The proposed xTM Security Architecture, designed as a high-level framework, focuses on ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and operations in this evolving ecosystem. Utilizing threat modeling, the research identifies potential risks across key flight phases, operations and use cases to offer security control recommendations. Key objectives include analyzing interactions between novel airspace entrants and existing NAS traffic, cataloging vulnerabilities, and developing mitigative strategies to ensure safety, operational stability, and secure data exchanges. This research lays the groundwork for regulatory and industry adaptation, providing critical insights into managing cybersecurity risks in this complex, multi-domain environment.

UAM↗

NASA NTRS2001

Quantifying the risk posed by potential Earth impacts

Predictions of future potential Earth impacts by near-Earth objects (NEOs) have become commonplace in recent years, and the rate of these detections is likely to accelerate as asteroid survey efforts continue to mature. In this paper we describe the metrics introduced, and we give numerous examples of their application. This enables us to establish in rough terms the levels at which events become interesting to various parties.

asteroid impact hazard↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk-Reduction Autonomy Implementation to Enable NASA Artemis Missions

To achieve NASA’s Artemis program mission objectives a high level of autonomy and ubiquitous autonomy throughout the systems that are being developed will be necessary. The autonomous systems of Artemis will require a distributed autonomy capability, with autonomous systems organized functionally in a hierarchical architecture, where systems at higher levels of the hierarchy have authority over systems at lower levels. The challenge of developing autonomy technologies and concepts of operations for Artemis has been undertaken by the NASA Gateway Working Group. This group has developed requirements, architectures, concepts of operations, and interface control documents, in the context of a hierarchical distributed architecture that includes the following: a Vehicle System Manager (VSM) that autonomously manages the entire Gateway; Module System Managers (MSMs) that autonomously manage each module; and System Managers (SMs) that autonomously manage systems within a module(i.e. ECLSS).A substantially high level of autonomy needs to be achieved by each element of the hierarchy (VSM, MSM, SM)to meet requirements for uncrewed operations; this includes conditions that will have minimal and/or delayed ground intervention (i.e. requirements for sustainability for months of operation without crew or ground support). To advance an implementation of this autonomy design (Gateway Autonomy Design –GAD), a collaboration was established between the Autonomous Systems Laboratory (ASL) at NASA Stennis Space Center and Lockheed Martin. The objectives of this partnership were the following: (1)to implement autonomy at the VSM, MSM, and SM levels;(2) to implement communications among a VSM, 2 MSMs, ORION (a visiting vehicle somewhat equivalent to a module) and 1 SM (a power system), and (3) test autonomous operations with representative use cases. A SM backed by a high-fidelity simulation was created to facilitate demonstrations of use cases that originated in a system of a module. Communication between the VSM and MSMs was implemented according to Concepts of Operations and Interface Control Documents (ICDs). Demonstrations were conducted to address nominal and off-nominal operations and multi-module interactions with VSM. Additionally, user interfaces were created to provide awareness about ongoing processes and results while enhancing the demonstration. Demonstrations included the following use cases: (1)Orion as visiting vehicle registers with VSM;(2) VSM reschedules a module’s timelines when another module’s MSM task fails; and (3) a module’s Power System Manager (PSM) standalone demonstration that included component failure diagnostics, tracing component failure to effected components, which in turn, reports failure information up to the VSM for acknowledgement and display. This paper will describe the detailed technology and autonomous systems developed, and the integrated multi-module demonstrations conducted. Also, challenges that must be met to fully implement the GAD defined by Gateway will be addressed.

Autonomous Systems↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk-Reduction Autonomy Implementation to Enable NASA Artemis Missions

To achieve NASA’s Artemis program mission objectives a high level of autonomy that is ubiquitous throughout the systems that are being developed will be necessary. The autonomous systems of Artemis will require a distributed autonomy capability, with autonomous systems organized functionally in a hierarchical architecture, where systems at higher levels of the hierarchy have authority over systems at lower levels. The challenge of developing autonomy technologies and Concepts of Operations (ConOps) for Artemis has been undertaken by the NASA Gateway Working Group. This group has developed requirements, architectures, ConOps, and interface control documents (ICDs), in the context of a hierarchical distributed architecture that includes the following: a Vehicle System Manager (VSM) that autonomously manages the entire Gateway; Module System Managers (MSMs) that autonomously manage each module; and System Managers (SMs) that autonomously manage systems within a module (i.e. ECLSS). A substantially high level of autonomy needs to be achieved by each element of the hierarchy (VSM, MSM, SM) to meet requirements for uncrewed operations; this includes conditions that will have minimal and/or delayed ground intervention (i.e. requirements for sustainability for months of operation without crew or ground support). To advance an implementation of this autonomy design (Gateway Autonomy Design – GAD), a collaboration was established between the Autonomous Systems Laboratory (ASL) at NASA Stennis Space Center and Lockheed Martin. The objectives of this partnership were the following: (1) to implement autonomy at the VSM, MSM, and SM levels; (2) to implement communications among a VSM, 2 MSMs, ORION (a visiting vehicle somewhat equivalent to a module) and 1 SM (a power system), and (3) test autonomous operations with representative use cases. A SM backed by a high-fidelity simulation was created to facilitate demonstrations of use cases that originated in a system of a module. Communication between the VSM and MSMs was implemented according to Concepts of Operations and Interface Control Documents (ICDs). Demonstrations were conducted to address nominal and off-nominal operations and multi-module interactions with the VSM. Additionally, user interfaces were created to provide awareness about ongoing processes and results while enhancing the demonstration. Demonstrations included the following use cases: (1) Orion as visiting vehicle registers with VSM; (2) VSM reschedules a module’s timelines when another module’s MSM task fails; and (3) a module’s Power System Manager (PSM) demonstration that included component failure diagnostics, tracing component failure to effected components, which in turn, reports failure information up to the VSM for acknowledgement and display. This paper will describe the detailed technology and autonomous systems developed, and the integrated multi-module demonstrations conducted. Also, challenges that must be met to fully implement the GAD defined by Gateway will be addressed.

Fernando Figueroa↗

NASA NTRS2011

Defining the Relationship Between Biomarkers of Oxidative and Inflammatory Stress and the Risk for Atherosclerosis in Astronauts During and After Long-Duration Spaceflight

Future human space travel will primarily consist of long-duration missions aboard the International Space Station (ISS) or exploration class missions to Mars, its moons, or nearby asteroids. These missions will expose astronauts to increased risk of oxidative and inflammatory damage primarily from radiation, but also from psychological stress, reduced physical activity, diminished nutritional status, and, in the case of extravehicular activity, hyperoxic exposure. There is evidence that increased oxidative damage and inflammation can accelerate the development of atherosclerosis. PURPOSE The purpose of this proposal is to identify biomarkers of oxidative and inflammatory stress and to correlate them to indices of atherosclerosis risk before, during, and after long-duration spaceflight. METHODS To meet the objectives of the study, we will study astronauts before, during, and up to 5 years after long-duration missions aboard ISS. Biomarkers of oxidative and inflammatory stress, some of which we have previously shown to be elevated with spaceflight, will be measured before, during, and after spaceflight. Arterial structure will be monitored using ultrasound to measure carotid intima-medial thickness before, during, and after weightlessness. Carotid intima-medial thickness has been shown to be a better indicator than Framingham Risk scores for prediction of atherosclerosis. Arterial function will be monitored using brachial flow-mediated dilation before flight and after landing. Brachial flow-mediated dilation is a good index of endothelium-dependent vasodilation, which is a sensitive predictor of atherosclerotic risk. This is the first study to propose assessing atherosclerotic risk using biochemical, structural, and functional measures before, during, and immediately after spaceflight and structural functional measures for up to 5 years after landing. EXPECTED RESULTS We hypothesize that these biomarkers of oxidative and inflammatory stress will be increased with spaceflight and will correlate with increased carotid intima-medial thickness in- and postflight and with decreased flow-mediated dilation after the mission. Furthermore, we hypothesize that measures of oxidative stress will return to baseline after flight, but that biomarkers of inflammatory stress and vascular indices of atherosclerosis risk will remain elevated.

Lee, Stuart M. C.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Re-Entry Survivability Risk Assessment of the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE)

A reentry analysis of the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE) spacecraft was performed using the Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool (ORSAT) - Version 5.0. The analysis was done in response to a request by NASA Headquarters and Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) after a preliminary assessment using the NASA Johnson Space Center Debris Assessment Software (DAS) - Version 1.0 had shown that the EUVE reentry may produce a debris area greater than the limit set within the NASA Safety Standard 1740.14 guidelines. DAS predicted that an uncontrolled reentry of the EUVE spacecraft would result in a total casualty area of 12.41 sq m, which exceeds the 8 sq m limit set in the NASA standards and implies a potential human casualty risk of approximately 1 in 5300. The ORSAT model enabled a higher fidelity thermal analysis of the EUVE spacecraft, utilizing sophisticated material and thermal properties such as emissivity, heat of oxidation, thermal conductivity, and material thickness inputs, which provided a foundation for a more in depth analysis of the reentering objects. Due to the conservative nature of the DAS study, it was reasonable to run ORSAT for only the ten objects shown to survive in the original DAS analysis. The result of the ORSAT study was a reduced casualty area of only 5.95 sq m, well within NASA safety limits. With the risk to human life now acceptably low, NASA can avoid having to take mitigation measures and allow EUVE to reenter the Earth's atmosphere uncontrolled.

O'Hara, Robin E.↗

NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗

NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Investigation Into Transecting Satellites in Future Space Traffic Management Scenarios

The number of satellites expected to populate the near-Earth space environment is set to dramatically increase in the coming decade as new large constellations are approved and deployed. Current strategies for placing new batches of these satellites on orbit often involve launching into an initial orbit, and then performing apogee raising maneuvers to reach a target altitude. Similarly, end-of-life planning for these constellation satellites can consist of de-orbit burns that lower perigee to permit disposal via re-entry. Both the raising and de-orbiting maneuvers can result in the individual satellites traveling in high-eccentricity orbits that have the potential to transect other spacecraft trajectories. While individual large constellations may be able to coexist in separate altitude and inclination bands, having thousands of satellites moving between these bands as new satellites are replaced and old ones are removed could pose additional collision risks. Similar concerns have been raised regarding the impact that large numbers of university-class CubeSats might have in terms of their overall collision risk, especially as these satellites typically do not have propulsion systems for active maneuvering. To assess the impact that transecting satellites might have to future space traffic management strategies, this study explored a variety of future realistic scenarios using a high-fidelity simulation tool. The model can simulate the orbit of tens of thousands of resident space objects (RSOs) simultaneously, to include active satellites, debris, rocket bodies, or even future hypothetical scenarios, using a realistic force model that incorporates non-spherical gravity, atmospheric drag, solar radiation pressure, and more. As the model is run forward in time, various statistics and meta-data are gathered on any predicted conjunction event, providing insight into the nature and frequency of potential collisions, e.g., what size are the two satellites, who operates the satellites, are they active or passive objects, etc. Additional customization is available in terms of how probability of collision is computed, and how the probability ellipsoids and screening volumes are determined. The simulation tool also allows for rule-based maneuvers for active satellites, e.g, given an advance conjunction “warning,” one or both of the satellites can maneuver to a safe distance. A wide range of maneuvers can be implemented using impulsive or low-thrust methods, and the latencies can also be varied, e.g., using maneuver lead times of 48 hours, 24 hours, or 12 hours. Validation of the simulation results is performed against current and historical datasets available, to include comparisons to prior conjunction data messages (CDMs), object properties (mass, volume, etc.), and two-line-element records from both public and internal sources. Using the simulation environment, an assessment on the general risks that transecting satellites might pose for hypothetical future space object environments will be presented. This will involve the simulation of approximately 50,000 new large constellation satellites, in addition to the existing catalog of approximately 20,000 known resident space objects (RSOs), over propagation periods of one month to one year. A description of the simulation methodologies, scenarios evaluated, and validation methods will also be presented, as well as a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of several candidate maneuver strategies that have the potential to reduce collision risk between active satellites.

Brian Gunter↗

NASA NTRS2010

Use of a Pathfinder Optical Telescope Element for James Webb Space Telescope Risk Mitigation

A Pathfmder of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Optical Telescope Element is being developed to check out critical ground support equipment and to rehearse integration and testing procedures. This paper provides a summary of the baseline Pathfmder configuration and architecture, objectives of this effort, limitations of Pathfinder, status of its development, and future plans. Special attention is paid to risks that will be mitigated by Pathfmder.

Feinberg, Lee D.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Propulsion Risk Reduction Activities for Non-Toxic Cryogenic Propulsion

The Propulsion and Cryogenics Advanced Development (PCAD) Project s primary objective is to develop propulsion system technologies for non-toxic or "green" propellants. The PCAD project focuses on the development of non-toxic propulsion technologies needed to provide necessary data and relevant experience to support informed decisions on implementation of non-toxic propellants for space missions. Implementation of non-toxic propellants in high performance propulsion systems offers NASA an opportunity to consider other options than current hypergolic propellants. The PCAD Project is emphasizing technology efforts in reaction control system (RCS) thruster designs, ascent main engines (AME), and descent main engines (DME). PCAD has a series of tasks and contracts to conduct risk reduction and/or retirement activities to demonstrate that non-toxic cryogenic propellants can be a feasible option for space missions. Work has focused on 1) reducing the risk of liquid oxygen/liquid methane ignition, demonstrating the key enabling technologies, and validating performance levels for reaction control engines for use on descent and ascent stages; 2) demonstrating the key enabling technologies and validating performance levels for liquid oxygen/liquid methane ascent engines; and 3) demonstrating the key enabling technologies and validating performance levels for deep throttling liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen descent engines. The progress of these risk reduction and/or retirement activities will be presented.

Smith, Timothy D.↗