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NASA NTRS2024

Preliminary Medical Risk Estimates and Clinical Capability Needs for Late Artemis Missions

BACKGROUND Human exploration spaceflight missions to the Moon and Mars present unprecedented challenges for in- mission medical care. Compared with the ISS, the greater distance from Earth will mean increased mission durations, communication delays, limited to no resupply opportunities, and significant limitations on the evacuation of ill or injured crew. Spacecraft mass, volume, and power will be curtailed while higher demands will be placed on the crew’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. In this higher risk environment, it is important to: a) quantitatively estimate human system risk attributable to medical conditions, a process known as Probabilistic Risk Analysis, and b) use these estimates to inform medical system design. IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a PRA and medical trade space analysis tool developed by NASA to advance exploration mission medical system design. IMPACT v1.0 improves upon and will soon replace NASA’s existing tool, the Integrated Medical Model, with: a novel evidence base baselined to exploration environments; an expanded list of 119 medical conditions; a significant increase in the number of medical resources that can be utilized and in the flexibility of their use; and the modelling of time lost performing mission-specific tasks due to medical conditions. METHODOLOGY: This abstract will present IMPACT estimates of medical system risk and clinical capability needs for the Artemis IV mission. Artemis IV is currently scheduled for 2026 and will visit the Gateway space station in lunar orbit prior to the second lunar landing of the Artemis program. The baseline Artemis IV mission that was modeled was 28 days in duration with phases including Orion outbound, 4 days on the Gateway space station in lunar orbit, 2 crew on the surface of the Moon for approximately one week, an additional 5 days on Gateway, and then return to Earth. This baseline was compared to two alternative 34-day design reference missions (DRMs) that shifted the lunar sortie earlier or later in the mission profile. Assumptions included 2 female and 2 male crew and a notional medical system mass of 25 kg. Medical system risk estimates include loss of crew life (LOCL), consideration of medical evacuation (known as return to definitive care – RTDC), and an estimate of crew time lost due to medical conditions (Task Time Lost – TTL). The presentation will also describe the medical conditions that are the greatest drivers of risk as well as the clinical capabilities and resources that have the largest effect on risk. RESULTS: All three DRMs had very low probability of LOCL from medical conditions, primarily due to short duration. RTDC was also similar across the DRMs. In contrast, TTL was higher in the early lunar sortie DRM due to earlier occurrence of EVA-related medical conditions. Taken as a whole, there was no clinically significant difference in medical risk across the three missions. Results for clinical capabilities and an example medical equipment list will be discussed but were similar across DRMs.

D. Hilmers↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk Characterization Research for Artemis II: Human Factors and Behavioral Performance

BACKGROUND Artemis II will be the first time NASA astronauts go beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) since the Apollo era, and the first astronauts heading into space in the Orion vehicle. As such, it provides a critical opportunity to refine our understanding of the likelihood and consequences associated with the Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Team, Human System Integration Architecture (HSIA), and Sleep Risks, and prepare for future Moon and Mars missions. However, Artemis II research efforts are uniquely shaped by in-mission data collection constraints. There is currently no in-mission crew time available to complete measures. In-mission data will need to be collected unobtrusively from available data streams (e.g., audiovisual, existing records such as schedules, and actigraphy). Accordingly, the overarching goal of our research is to utilize Artemis II data to further define the likelihood and consequences of these risks, and to create an unobtrusive research infrastructure that can be expanded to include future Artemis missions. This goal spans four aims across three research phases: (1) identify and operationally define key performances metrics and constructs across the four aforementioned risks, (2) develop an unobtrusive methodology and coding scheme for in-mission data collection, (3) characterize performance decrements due to Bmed, Team, HSIA, and Sleep Risks, and (4) develop a data infrastructure for future Artemis missions. The following details results of Phase I efforts in which we address Aims 1 and 2 to develop an unobtrusive measurement plan and coding scheme to capture key constructs, contributing factors, and performance decrements across each risk area. METHOD As part of Phase I, we conducted an interdisciplinary literature review and consulted with SMEs to identify unobtrusive methodologies that leverage text, audio, and/or video data as well as conceptualize key performance metrics, contributing factors, and BMed, Team, HSIA, and Sleep risk constructs related to performance decrements. The Phase I effort resulted in a finalized pre- and post-mission protocol for Artemis II, along with a measurement and coding scheme for in-mission Artemis II data. Phase II will involve data collection from the upcoming Artemis II mission. Phase III will include data processing, coding, depiction, analysis, and report writing of the Artemis II data. RESULTS & DISCUSSION To date, we have completed Phase I efforts. Specifically, we identified BMed, Team, HSIA, and Sleep risk constructs related to performance metrics, summarized how these constructs can be measured using audiovisual data collected during the mission, and worked with NASA’s HFBP Element to finalize a data collection protocol that leverages audiovisual input from the Orion spacecraft system. Our protocol includes novel unobtrusive methodologies that adhere to in-mission data streams and subsequent constraints (e.g., limited storage space on GoPro cameras, ambient noise impeding audio files) to best capture in-mission phenomena across each risk area. We will present our results from Phase I efforts, namely best practices for unobtrusive measurement as identified through literature reviews and SME consultation as well as codebook excerpts for use in Artemis II. We will include a description of planned work as we prepare for Phase II and Phase III of this research plan and the Artemis II mission itself. SUMMARY We describe progress on our Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Research for Artemis II study.

behavioral health↗

DOE OSTI2025

Secure Route: Roadway Risk Mapping for Transportation Planners

The secure transport of sensitive materials across U.S. road networks pose unique challenges for local, state, and federal agencies. Threats range from random events (e.g., accidents, medical emergencies, mechanical failures) to opportunistic or organized tactical assaults. Although the probability of such attacks is very low, the consequences of material loss to foreign states or terrorists can be catastrophic, qualifying these scenarios as “grey swan” events—low-probability, high-impact occurrences that are predictable but difficult to quantify. Traditional risk assessments struggle in these contexts, necessitating a shift toward subjective risk perception to inform planning. Risk perception in transport planning is shaped by various factors, including knowledge of adversarial capabilities, vehicle defenses, manifest details, and geographic features along the route. Geographic features such as bridges, tunnels, roadside elevation, and gaps in cellular coverage introduce vulnerabilities, while mitigative features include safe havens, police stations, and medical services. Temporal variables such as congestion, accidents, and weather further complicate route planning. Despite their importance, existing routing tools like Google Maps and commercial software do not explicitly account for geographic risk features, requiring planners to rely on personal familiarity with routes—a time-intensive, non-scalable approach. This work addresses these gaps by: (1) developing datasets that catalog geographic risk features along U.S. roadways, (2) eliciting risk perceptions from experienced transportation security experts, and (3) linking these perceptions to roadway conditions and geographic data. We implement these capabilities within Secure Route a novel mapping tool for classifying route segment risks associated with roadway conditions. This system provides transportation planners with an intuitive interface to assess and contextualize risk along potential routes, improving decision-making for secure transport. We present current progress in this effort and identify next steps.

Stewart, Robert [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000281867559)↗

DOE OSTI2025

Risk of Mortality in Family Members of Men Seeking Fertility Assessment

Objective: To assess mortality in family members of men seeking fertility assessment. Subfertility serves as a biomarker for overall somatic health, and poor semen quality is associated with increased risk of hospitalization and mortality from chronic conditions. However, it is unclear if these risks extend to family members of men with low sperm count. Design: Retrospective cohort study. Subjects: Family members, up to third-degree relatives, of men in the Subfertility, Health and Assisted Reproduction and the Environment cohort who underwent a semen analysis as part of a fertility assessment 1996–2017. Relatives of men with a recorded total sperm count who lived in Utah for ≥1 year 1904–2017 were included in the analysis (N = 22,280 families). Exposure: Individuals were classified by family membership. Families were classified as relatives of azoospermic (0M), oligozoospermic (<39M), or normozoospermic (≥39M) men. The average total sperm count of the proband (male relative) with fertility assessment was also included as a continuous exposure measure. Main Outcome Measures: The main outcomes were all-cause and cause-specific mortality risk by sex, age, and degree of relation: first-, second-, and third-degree. Cox proportional hazard models were used to test the association between fertility classification and mortality, controlling for sex, race/ethnicity, and birth year. Results: A total of 666,437 relatives of men with fertility assessment (N deaths = 183,974) were included in the analysis. Relative to normozoospermia families, all-cause mortality risk increased in oligozoospermia families (hazard ratio [HR] oligozoospermia , 1.03; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.01–1.05). Close relatives, first- (HR oligozoospermia , 1.17; 95% CI, 1.07–1.28) and second-degree relatives (HR azoospermia , 1.11; 95% CI, 1.04–1.20; HR oligozoospermia , 1.05; 95% CI,1.01–1.09), of azoospermic and oligozoospermic men had the highest all-cause and cause-specific mortality risk, including death attributed to cardiovascular disease or congenital birth conditions. Conclusion: Our results suggest that familial all-cause and cause-specific mortality risk differ by fertility phenotype. Families of azoospermic and oligozoospermic men showed significantly increased risk, particularly for close relatives. This study provides further evidence that shared genetic and/or environmental factors could influence both fertility and somatic health.

Male fertility↗

DOE OSTI2025

TCCSP Task 6 Risk Assessment Report

For this Risk Assessment Plan, TCCSP has conducted a site-based risk assessment that quantifies the risk of CO 2 and/or brine leakage as a result of CO 2 injection at TCCSP. The risk assessment covers project planning, construction, injection, post-injection periods and closure of TCCSP. Key technical and non-technical Project risks are identified as part of the Risk Workshop and include a thorough evaluation of related scenarios. Mitigation strategies for the identified risk scenarios are defined to develop a scientifically sound, and community acceptable CO 2 storage Project.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS1994

Radiation protection issues in galactic cosmic ray risk assessment

Radiation protection involves the limitation of exposure to below threshold doses for direct (or deterministic) effects and a knowledge of the risk of stochastic effects after low doses. The principal stochastic risk associated with low dose rate galactic cosmic rays is the increased risk of cancer. Estimates of this risk depend on two factors (a) estimates of cancer risk for low-LET radiation and (b) values of the appropriate radiation weighting factors, WR, for the high-LET radiations of galactic cosmic rays. Both factors are subject to considerable uncertainty. The low-LET cancer risk derived from the late effects of the atomic bombs is vulnerable to a number of uncertainties including especially that from projection in time, and from extrapolation from high to low dose rate. Nevertheless, recent low dose studies of workers and others tend to confirm these estimates. WR, relies on biological effects studied mainly in non-human systems. Additional laboratory studies could reduce the uncertainties in WR and thus produce a more confident estimate of the overall risk of galactic cosmic rays.

NASA Program Radiation Health↗

DOE OSTI2020

A Tool for the Risk-Informed Management of Critical Mission Resilience

We describe a methodology and tool for the risk-informed management and planning of mission resilience. By mapping concepts of resilience onto the elements of a streamlined risk model we are able to tap the substantial portfolio of established risk concepts to provide rapid insights in the evaluation and high-level screening of prospective resilience enhancement measures. This provides a risk-informed, levelized basis for the comparison of disparate resilience solutions and the means of establishing preferences. The methodology begins with identification of critical missions met by a site, and establishment of the supporting physical assets. Scenarios that would result in failure of these assets are systematically identified. Each scenario comprises three elements: realization of a hazard or threat resulting in loss of resources (the current focus being on power, natural gas, and water) to the asset, failure of measures in place to protect the asset against those losses, and realization of the consequent impacts. These scenarios are quantified in terms of their probabilities of occurrence and the magnitude of the resultant consequences (mission outage time), allowing risk-prioritization to focus resilience enhancement considerations. What-If? analyses are conducted through adjusting elements of the risk calculation to reflect the deployment of prospective resilience measures, by which means the efficacies of each of those measures can be compared using common risk metrics across diverse resilience strategies. This paper will also describe the insights from example applications.

resilience, risk, risk assesment, energy, water↗

DOE OSTI2023

Adaptive changes in sexual behavior in the high–risk population in response to human monkeypox transmission in Canada can help control the outbreak: Insights from a two–group, two–route epidemic model

Monkeypox, a zoonotic disease, is emerging as a potential sexually transmitted infection/disease, with underlying transmission mechanisms still unclear. We devised a risk-structured, compartmental model, incorporating sexual behavior dynamics. We compared different strategies targeting the high-risk population: a scenario of control policies geared toward the use of condoms and/or sexual abstinence (robust control strategy) with risk compensation behavior change, and a scenario of control strategies with behavior change in response to the doubling rate (adaptive control strategy). Monkeypox's basic reproduction number is 1.464, 0.0066, and 1.461 in the high-risk, low-risk, and total populations, respectively, with the high-risk group being the major driver of monkeypox spread. Policies imposing condom use or sexual abstinence need to achieve a 35% minimum compliance rate to stop further transmission, while a combination of both can curb the spread with 10% compliance to abstinence and 25% to condom use. With risk compensation, the only option is to impose sexual abstinence by at least 35%. Adaptive control is more effective than robust control where the daily sexual contact number is reduced proportionally and remains constant thereafter, shortening the time to epidemic peak, lowering its size, facilitating disease attenuation, and playing a key role in controlling the current outbreak.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

A quantitative risk assessment framework for fault reactivation in underground hydrogen storage: Coupled simulation and deep learning approach

Underground hydrogen storage (UHS) is emerging as a critical solution for large-scale energy storage. However, like all subsurface fluid injection activities, UHS poses the risk of injection-induced fault reactivation. Accurate risk assessment is essential to ensuring the safety and efficiency of UHS operations. This study presents the development of deep-learning surrogate models for fault reactivation prediction in UHS, trained on a comprehensive database of fully coupled fluid flow-geomechanics simulations. Our findings reveal that analytical models often yield unreliable estimates, with errors up to 54% in the allowable injection pressure, potentially leading to a 40% reduction in UHS operational capacity. The developed surrogate models were incorporated into a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) framework, enabling probabilistic evaluation of fault reactivation risk while accounting for uncertainties in the input variables. Site-specific features, such as horizontal stress gradients, fault’s dip and strike angles, and operational parameters like bottom-hole injection pressure and well-fault distance, were identified as the primary drivers of fault reactivation across various stress regimes. Whereas other hydraulic, geological, and poroelastic reservoir properties were found to have a secondary impact. Notably, we observed that the risk of fault reactivation for a critically oriented fault with a static friction coefficient greater than 0.55 remains below 10% in a normal faulting stress regime. However, the risk significantly increases as the stress regime transitions from normal to strike-slip and ultimately to reverse faulting conditions. These findings underscore the importance of rigorous site characterization and comprehensive QRA evaluations to optimize UHS performance and minimize geomechanical risks.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2023

Role of reinforcement learning for risk-based robust control of cyber-physical energy systems

Critical infrastructures such as cyber-physical energy systems (CPS-E) integrate information flow and physical operations that are vulnerable to natural and targeted failures. Safe, secure, and reliable operation and control of CPS-E is critical to ensure societal well-being and economic prosperity. Automated control is key for real-time operations and may be mathematically cast as a sequential decision-making problem under uncertainty. Emergence of data-driven techniques for decision making under uncertainty, such as reinforcement learning (RL), have led to promising advances for addressing sequential decision-making problems for risk-based robust CPS-E control. However, existing research challenges include understanding the applicability of RL methods across diverse CPS-E applications, addressing the effect of risk preferences across multiple RL methods, and development of open-source domain-aware simulation environments for RL experimentation within a CPS-E context. This article systematically analyzes the applicability of four types of RL methods (model-free, model-based, hybrid model-free and model-based, and hierarchical) for risk-based robust CPS-E control. Problem features and solution stability for the RL methods are also discussed. We demonstrate and compare the performance of multiple RL methods under different risk specifications (risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-seeking) through the development and application of an open-source simulation environment. Motivating numerical simulation examples include representative single-zone and multizone building control use cases. Finally, six key insights for future research and broader adoption of RL methods are identified, with specific emphasis on problem features, algorithmic explainability, and solution stability.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

Collagen Turnover in Relation to Risk Factors and Hemodynamics in Human Intracranial Aneurysms

Determinants for molecular and structural instability, that is, impending growth or rupture, of intracranial aneurysms (IAs) remain uncertain. To elucidate this, we endeavored to estimate the actual turnover rates of the main molecular constituent in human IA (collagen) on the basis of radiocarbon ( 14 C) birth dating in relation to IA hemodynamics. Collagen turnover rates in excised human IA samples were calculated using mathematical modeling of 14 C birth dating data of collagen in relation to risk factors and histological markers for collagen maturity/turnover in selected IA. Hemodynamics were simulated using image-based computational fluid dynamics. Correlation, logistic regression, and receiver operating characteristic analyses were performed. Collagen turnover rates were estimated in 46 IA (43 patients); computational fluid dynamics could be performed in 20 IA (20 patients). The mean collagen turnover rate (γ) constituted 126% (±1% error) per year. For patients with arterial hypertension, γ was greater than 2600% annually, whereas γ was distinctly lower with 32% (±1% error) per year for patients without risk factors, such as smoking and hypertension. There was a distinct association between histological presence of rather immature collagen in human IA and the presence of modifiable risk factors. Spatial-temporal averaged wall shear stress predicted rapid collagen turnover (odds ratio, 1.6 [95% CI, 1.0–2.7]). Receiver operating characteristic analysis demonstrated a good test accuracy (area under the curve, 0.798 [95% CI, 0.598–0.998]) for average wall shear stress with a threshold ≥4.9 Pa for rapid collagen turnover. Our data indicate that turnover rates and stability of collagen in human IA are strongly associated with the presence of modifiable risk factors and aneurysmal hemodynamics. Finally, these findings underline the importance of strict risk factor modification in patients with unruptured IA. Future should include more detailed risk factor data to establish a more causal understanding of hemodynamics and the rupture risk of individual IA.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of the Los Alamos Nuclear Material Packaging Risk Ranking Method

Repackaging nuclear material into robust containers to protect workers and the public has been ongoing at LANL and around the DOE complex for nearly two decades. The number of containers at LANL is around 5,000; limited resources for repackaging material has led to extended repackaging campaigns and the need to prioritize repackaging. Various methodologies have been used to prioritize the repackaging efforts and to demonstrate progress in risk reduction over time (e.g., Boerigter, 1997). The 2000-1 DNFSB recommendation recognized the limited DOE resources for repackaging, and acknowledged the need to “prioritize and schedule tasks to be undertaken with available funds according to consideration of risks.” Later, in DNFSB recommendation 2005-1, in addition to recommending that DOE develop a packaging standard, the Board recommended that “Characterization information should also be used to develop a surveillance program prioritized according to expected material and container risk (including, for example, material type, material form, and the age and type of container).” In response to requests and recommendations from the DOE and DNSFB to prioritize according to worker risk, a risk ranking method based on the potential consequence of dropping a container from 3 meters was developed in 2007 (Smith, 2007) and updated in 2014 (Hoffman, 2014). Various LANL implementation plans for repackaging were developed over the years using this methodology (Stone, 2014). Currently, this method is utilized in conjunction with an algorithm to mitigate programmatic risk to prioritize container repackaging and material processing (Prochnow, 2015). The purpose of this study is to document how the current risk ranking method works, how it is used and potential limitations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Treatment of uncertainties for security-related design aspects of advanced reactors when using a risk-informed licensing approach

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2024

Large-scale Hydrogen Storage Risk Assessment

This project investigated risks involved in deploying a large-scale hydrogen storage system at the Port of Seattle (hereafter, the Port) for its on-terminal and maritime applications in an urban industrial setting. Alongside, the project attempted to address some of the barriers to risk assessment such as need for an exact system design for a systematic investigation, direct access to surrounding communities to gauge their perceptions, and an integrated software required to undertake a full-fledged risk assessment. These barriers were overcome using illustrative reference station designs, engaging with community-facing agencies through Port support, and pooling national laboratory capabilities available for risk assessments. The project identified relevant public safety risk metrics, compared various hydrogen carriers, engaged with community-facing agencies, and explored potential gaps in existing safety codes and standards. The primary impacts of this project include the development of risk assessment guidance for ports and utilities, informing them of the trade-offs in the choice of hydrogen carriers, and the ability to increase public capacity for dialog and engagement. This paves the way toward decarbonization of the Port activities, bringing about awareness around jobs in the market for risk assessments, and the need to ramp up community engagement long before any hydrogen system deployment is undertaken.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2025

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

42 - ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2004

Towards a systems approach to risk considerations for concurrent design

This paper describes the new process used by the Project Design Center at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the identification, assessment and communication of risk elements throughout the lifecycle of a mission design. This process includes a software tool, 'RAP' that collects and communicates risk information between the various designers and a 'risk expert' who mediates this process. The establishment of this process is an attempt towards the systematic consideration of risk in the design decision making process. Using this process, we are able to better keep track of the risks associated with the design decisions. Furthermore, it helps us develop better risk profiles for the studies under consideration. We aim to refine and expand the current process to enable more thorough risk analysis capabilities in the future.

concurrent design↗

NASA NTRS2013

Security Risk Assessment Process for UAS in the NAS CNPC Architecture

This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper

data links↗