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At least 415 records · Page 23

Remediation of Occupied Commercial Property Subject to Widespread Radium-226 Contamination - Confidential Client in the South-West of England - 12570

AMEC was contacted by a company that managed commercial office space in 2010. High Rn- 222 measurements had been observed throughout the facility and the landlord had been advised to commission a radiological survey of the site. The site had been purchased by the client in the 1990's. Initial desk studies found that the building had operated for around 50 years as a compass factory. Non-intrusive investigation identified widespread Ra-226 contamination. Ra-226 was found in the fabric of the building, in attic spaces, buried under floor boards and underlying car parks. Intrusive investigation was undertaken to estimate volume(s) of waste, waste categories, activity concentrations and the total inventory of radioactive materials on site. This work identified the presence of 180 GBq of Ra-226 on site. A programme of work is currently underway to remediate the site tackling areas posing the greatest risk to site occupants as a priority. We have worked closely with Regulators, our client, and tenants, to decontaminate the fabric of the building whilst areas of the building remain occupied. The radiological risk, from irradiation, ingestion and inhalation (of Ra-226 and Rn- 222) has been assessed before, during and after intervention to minimise the risks to site occupants. Tenants were moved from areas of unacceptable radiological risk to areas unaffected by the presence of radioactive materials. Rn-222 mitigation measures were installed during the remedial operations to minimise the hazard from Rn-222 that was liberated as a result of decontamination activities. Decontamination techniques were required to be sympathetic to the building as the ageing structure was in danger of collapse during several phases of work. The first phase of remediation is now complete and the decontaminated building is being returned for use as office space. The radiological risks have been significantly reduced and, in areas where decontamination was not possible (e.g. due to concerns over the structural integrity of the building), mitigation measures have been installed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Traditional Forensic Examinations on Bulk Special Nuclear Material

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory at Quantico, Virginia is responsible for the forensic examination of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. Due to these unique hazards and the necessary specialized safety protocols, the FBI has developed a network of Partner Laboratories (PLs) across the United States of America to support conventional forensic examinations of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. In support of this, the FBI Laboratory has established the Hazardous Evidence Analysis Team (HEAT), a group of qualified forensic examiners, scientists, technicians, and photographers who can deploy to laboratories outside of the FBI Laboratory at Quantico, VA to perform conventional forensics on evidence containing/contaminated with hazardous materials. One of the FBI’s PLs, the United States Department of Energy’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in Los Alamos, New Mexico, has unique facilities, personnel, and procedures to secure, safely handle, and process significant quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). While LANL’s procedures for working with SNM are well established, working with SNM under evidentiary controls is not. Close cooperation between LANL and FBI HEAT is required due to FBI policies on evidence handling, as well as the challenges associated with the exploitation and preservation of conventional forensics (fingerprints, trace evidence, and photography) on SNM evidence.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Radioactive Waste Minimization - Clearance for Reuse, Recycling and Disposal - 19598

Virtually all activities related to radioactive materials and to the utilization of nuclear energy generate radioactive waste. Due to limited storage facilities and waning public acceptance for long-term disposal of radioactive waste as well as the associated cost, implementation of strategies and methods for its effective reduction are mandatory. Clearance of materials is one possible concept to reach this goal. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines the process of clearance as 'the removal of radioactive materials or radioactive objects within authorized practices from any further regulatory control by the regulatory body.' Thus, these materials are no further treated as radioactive waste and may be recycled or disposed of conventionally. In quantitative terms, clearance is generally related to the '10 μSv-Concept' This means that the effective dose expected to be incurred by any member of the public due to cleared materials is of the order of 10 μSv or less in a year. A combination of appropriate clearance concepts, methods and measurement techniques, following an integrated clearance strategy for a project, allows the return of up to 97 % of the mass of a decommissioned NPP to the conventional waste cycle. This includes the concept of clearance for a specific purpose, often referred to as 'conditional clearance', i.e. the case where a certain condition has to be fulfilled before the act of clearance has been completed. As a technical expert organization, TUV NORD EnSys accompanied the development, implementation and execution of clearance procedures in more than 13 nuclear power-plants and installations, either operational or in various states of decommissioning. Thus, TUV Nord EnSys has abundant experience in and a comprehensive overview on the implementation of different clearance strategies and procedures. Considering the increased waste-volumes and additional waste-streams to be handled during decommissioning, the transition to a decommission-focused clearance system is of vital importance for successful waste-minimization. This paper provides a view on the perspective of a technical support organisation (TSO) towards implementation of a holistic clearance strategy into the decommissioning concept for radioactive waste minimization. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

INL Reactor Technology Complex Out-of-Service Buried Piping Hazards

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Reactor Technology Complex (RTC) buried piping and components are being characterized to determine if they should be managed as hazardous waste and subject to the Hazardous Waste Management Act /Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). RTC buried piping and components involve both active piping and components from currently operating nuclear facilities, such as the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and inactive lines from facilities undergoing D&D activities. The issue exists as to the proper methods to analyze and control hazards associated with D&D activities on facilities collocated with existing operating nuclear facilities, or future collocated facilities being considered with the resurgent nuclear industry. During initial characterization activities, it was determined that residual radioactive material in several inactive RTC lines and components could potentially exceed hazard category (HC) 3 thresholds. In addition, concerns were raised as to how to properly isolate active nuclear facility piping and components from those inactive lines undergoing RCRA actions, and whether the operating facility safety basis could be impacted. Work was stopped, and a potential inadequacy in the safety analysis (PISA) was declared, even though no clear safety basis existed for the inactive, abandoned lines and equipment. An unreviewed safety question (USQ) and an occurrence report resulted. A HC 3 or greater Nuclear Facility/Activity for the buried piping and components was also declared in the occurrence report. A qualitative hazard assessment was developed to evaluate the potential hazards associated with characterization activities, and any potential effects on the safety basis of the collocated RTC operating nuclear facilities. The hazard assessment clearly demonstrated the low hazards associated with the activities based on form and dispersiblity of the radioactive material in the piping and components. The hazard assessment developed unique controls to isolate active RTC piping and components from inactive components, and demonstrated that existing safety management programs were adequate for protection of the worker.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Radiological issues associated with the recent boom in oil and gas hydraulic fracturing

As the worldwide hydraulic fracturing 'fracking' market continued to grow to an estimated $37 Billion in 2012, the need to understand and manage radiological issues associated with fracking is becoming imperative. Fracking is a technique that injects pressurized fluid into rock layer to propagate fractures that allows natural gas and other petroleum products to be more easily extracted. Radioactivity is associated with fracking in two ways. Radioactive tracers are frequently a component of the injection fluid used to determine the injection profile and locations of fractures. Second, because there are naturally-occurring radioactive materials (NORM) in the media surrounding and containing oil and gas deposits, the process of fracking can dislodge radioactive materials and transport them to the surface in the wastewater and gases. Treatment of the wastewater to remove heavy metals and other contaminates can concentrate the NORM into technologically-enhanced NORM (TENORM). Regulations to classify, transport, and dispose of the TENORM and other radioactive waste can be complicated and cumbersome and vary widely in the international community and even between states/provinces. In many cases, regulations on NORM and TENORM do not even exist. Public scrutiny and regulator pressure will only continue to increase as the world demands on oil and gas continue to rise and greater quantities of TENORM materials are produced. Industry experts, health physicists, regulators, and public communities must work together to understand and manage radiological issues to ensure reasonable and effective regulations protective of the public, environment, and worker safety and health are implemented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Intrinsic dosimetry of glass containers: A potential interrogation tool for nuclear forensics and waste management

Intrinsic dosimetry is the method of measuring total absorbed dose received by the walls of a container holding radioactive material. By considering the total absorbed dose received by a container in tandem with the physical characteristics of the radioactive material housed within that container, this method has the potential to provide law enforcement officials or waste management personnel with enhanced pathway information regarding the history of the container and its radioactive contents. We report the latest in a series of experiments designed to validate and demonstrate this newly developed tool. Thermoluminescence (TL) dosimetry was used to measure dose effects on the raw stock material of borosilicate container glass with time up to 60 days after gamma ray, x-ray, beta particle or ultraviolet irradiations at doses from 0.15 to 20 Gy. Two peaks were identified in the TL glow curve when irradiated with 60Co, a relatively unstable peak around 120°C and a more stable peak around 225°C. Signal strength of both peaks decayed with time. The minimum measurable dose using this technique was measured to be 0.15 Gy, which is roughly equivalent to a 24 hr irradiation at 1 cm from a 50 ng source of 60Co. After fading, this dose would still be observable approximately 1 year post-irradiation. Similar doses with beta particles and x-rays produced TL glow curves of lower intensity. The TL glow curves were separated into five peaks centered at approximately 120, 160, 225, 300, and 340°C. Differences in TL glow curve shape and intensity were observed for the glasses from different geographical origins. These differences can be explained by changes in the intensities of the five peaks. EPR results showed production of BOHC and E’ silica centers.

Clark, Richard A.↗

Intrinsic dosimetry. Properties and mechanisms of thermoluminescence in commercial borosilicate glass

Intrinsic dosimetry is the method of measuring total absorbed dose received by the walls of a container holding radioactive material. By considering the total absorbed dose received by a container in tandem with the physical characteristics of the radioactive material housed within that container, this method has the potential to provide enhanced pathway information regarding the history of the container and its radioactive contents. The latest in a series of experiments designed to validate and demonstrate this newly developed tool are reported. Thermoluminescence (TL) dosimetry was used to measure dose effects on raw stock borosilicate container glass up to 70 days after gamma ray, x-ray, beta particle or ultraviolet irradiations at doses from 0.15 to 20 Gy. The TL glow curve when irradiated with 60Co was separated into five peaks: two relatively unstable peaks centered near 120 and 165°C, and three relatively stable peaks centered near 225, 285, and 360°C. Depending on the borosilicate glass source, the minimum measurable dose using this technique is 0.15-0.5 Gy, which is roughly equivalent to a 24 hr irradiation at 1 cm from a 50-165 ng source of 60Co. Differences in TL glow curve shape and intensity were observed for the glasses from different geographical origins. These differences can be explained by changes in the intensities of the five peaks. Electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) and multivariate statistical methods were used to relate the TL intensity and peaks to electron/hole traps and compositional variations.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Examining the Risk of Nuclear Trafficking

The need to stop illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials around the world is undeniable and urgent. This issue is particularly evident due to the highly dangerous consequences of the risks involved, the known interest of terrorist groups in acquiring such materials and the vulnerability of theft and diversion of such materials. Yet the phenomenon of nuclear trafficking remains a subject where the unknown dominates what is known on the subject. The trafficking panel at the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Workshop on Reducing the Risk of Radioactive and Nuclear Materials that took place in Albuquerque, New Mexico, March 10-11, 2009, dealt with some of the issues associated with nuclear trafficking. Different points of view on how to better address trafficking and thwart perpetrator efforts were discussed. This paper presents some of these views and addresses practical measures that should be considered to improve the situation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Data Fusion for a Vision-Radiological System for Source Tracking and Discovery

A multidisciplinary approach to allow the tracking of the movement of radioactive sources by fusing data from multiple radiological and visual sensors is under development. The goal is to improve the ability to detect, locate, track and identify nuclear/radiological threats. The key concept is that such widely available visual and depth sensors can impact radiological detection, since the intensity fall-off in the count rate can be correlated to movement in three dimensions. To enable this, we pose an important question; what is the right combination of sensing modalities and vision algorithms that can best compliment a radiological sensor, for the purpose of detection and tracking of radioactive material? Similarly what is the best radiation detection methods and unfolding algorithms suited for data fusion with tracking data? Data fusion of multi-sensor data for radiation detection have seen some interesting developments lately. Significant examples include intelligent radiation sensor systems (IRSS), which are based on larger numbers of distributed similar or identical radiation sensors coupled with position data for network capable to detect and locate radiation source. Other developments are gamma-ray imaging systems based on Compton scatter in segmented detector arrays. Similar developments using coded apertures or scatter cameras for neutrons have recently occurred. The main limitation of such systems is not so much in their capability but rather in their complexity and cost which is prohibitive for large scale deployment. Presented here is a fusion system based on simple, low-cost computer vision and radiological sensors for tracking of multiple objects and identifying potential radiological materials being transported or shipped. The main focus of this work is the development on two separate calibration algorithms for characterizing the fused sensor system. The deviation from a simple inverse square-root fall-off of radiation intensity is explored and accounted for. In particular, the computer vision system enables a map of distance-dependence of the sources being tracked. Infrared, laser or stereoscopic vision sensors are all options for computer-vision implementation depending on interior vs exterior deployment, resolution desired and other factors. Similarly the radiation sensors will be focused on gamma-ray or neutron detection due to the long travel length and ability to penetrate even moderate shielding. There is a significant difference between the vision sensors and radiation sensors in the way the 'source' or signals are generated. A vision sensor needs an external light-source to illuminate the object and then detects the re-emitted illumination (or lack thereof). However, for a radiation detector, the radioactive material is the source itself. The only exception to this is the field of active interrogations where radiation is beamed into a material to entice new/additional radiation emission beyond what the material would emit spontaneously. The aspect of the nuclear material being the source itself means that all other objects in the environment are 'illuminated' or irradiated by the source. Most radiation will readily penetrate regular material, scatter in new directions or be absorbed. Thus if a radiation source is located near a larger object that object will in turn scatter some radiation that was initially emitted in a direction other than the direction of the radiation detector, this can add to the count rate that is observed. The effect of these scatter is a deviation from the traditional distance dependence of the radiation signal and is a key challenge that needs a combined system calibration solution and algorithms. Thus both an algebraic approach as well as a statistical approach have been developed and independently evaluated to investigate the sensitivity to this deviation from the simplified radiation fall-off as a function of distance. The resulting calibrated system algorithms are used and demonstrated in various laboratory scenarios, and later in realistic tracking scenarios. The selection and testing of radiological and computer-vision sensors for the additional specific scenarios will be the subject of ongoing and future work. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Long-Term Stewardship Optimization for a Decommissioned Nuclear Reactor - 19579

The decommissioned Hallam Nuclear Power Facility (Hallam), located in Lancaster County, Nebraska, approximately 19 miles south of Lincoln, was developed as a prototype to investigate the technical and economic feasibility of a sodium-cooled, graphite-moderated nuclear reactor. As part of its Power Demonstration Program, the US Atomic Energy Commission (US AEC), a predecessor agency of the US Department of Energy (US DOE), operated the Hallam reactor from 1962 to 1964. The radiological surveillance of the Hallam site was established when the operating agreement between AEC and the Nebraska Public Power District was terminated. The US DOE Chicago Operations Office and the Nebraska Department of Health (NDH) agreed to install a shallow groundwater monitoring system as part of the environmental surveillance program. Surveillance at the site was scheduled to end in fiscal year 2005, with no further activities planned after that. At that time, the plan was to transition the site to the Nebraska Public Power District with future use of the facility to remain restricted. US DOE has title to and responsibility for the entombed radioactive materials. A surveillance and monitoring program was initiated in 1970 by NDH and was funded by US AEC. It included the analysis of samples from deep production wells (groundwater from the regional aquifer at depths greater than 55 meters [180 feet]) at the Sheldon Station. NDH was concerned in 1990 about the possibility of shallow groundwater coming in contact with the buried radiological materials along the buried walls of the reactor. Subsequently, DOE and NDH agreed to further characterize hydrologic conditions and establish a monitoring program in the shallow, perched groundwater zones. The current monitoring program focuses on the shallow, perched groundwater. Today, decades since facility decommissioning, site inspections and groundwater monitoring continue at this Cold War-era legacy site. The US DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) monitors groundwater as a best management practice in response to a request from the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). In 2006, LM recommended discontinuing groundwater monitoring because analytical results since 1970 demonstrated there had been no impact to shallow, perched groundwater and no current or anticipated unacceptable risk to human health and the environment. The State of Nebraska did not concur with the recommendation to stop monitoring but did agree to a reduction in sampling and analysis from once a year to once every 2 years--a schedule that began in 2008. An updated assessment of the groundwater monitoring effort was issued in 2016. The entire body of water-quality data continues to demonstrate that there have been no negative impacts to the shallow, perched groundwater from radioactive materials entombed at the site 46 years ago. LM, with concurrence from Nebraska DHHS, changed the sampling frequency, effective in 2018, as follows: once every 5 years from 2021 to 2041 and once every 10 years from 2041 to 2071. In summary, LM remains committed to its primary mission to protect human health and the environment at each of its 92 legacy sites. With results from groundwater sampling events demonstrating compliance for 48 years, the Hallam site was able to set an LM benchmark to optimize long-term stewardship and define an end-state strategy for other decommissioned reactor facilities across the DOE complex. Continued collaboration with local communities, stakeholder, and regulators often leads to outcomes of sound protectiveness without compromise to safety or compliance, as demonstrated by the optimization of the long-term stewardship at the Hallam site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radioactivity-in-materials lead for nEXO (Final Scientific Report)

Abstract, introduction, and summary of work completed and products produced by DOE award SC002466. Primary products were six peer-reviewed publications and two PhD theses. This award also supported the operation of an underground HPGe detector and several radioassay measurements: one in a stand alone publication in Phys. Rev. C and the others in an upcoming nEXO radioassay summary paper. The nEXO collaboration aims to demonstrate the Majorana nature of the neutrino by observing the neutrinoless double-beta decay of 136 Xe with a next-generation experiment. The University of Kentucky nEXO group (UKY) operates a world-leading ultra-low-background γ-ray spectrometer as part of the nEXO radioactive background control R&D effort. The nEXO project is a proposed ton-scale neutrinoless double-beta decay experiment. The UKY PI is leading the radioactivity content assessment for all materials required by the nEXO project. As a subset of this task, UKY is also responsible for project-wide management of all low-background γ-ray spectrometry measurements; material assays with these types of instruments, together with ICP-MS, neutron-activation-analysis, and α-spectrometry, are critical to ensuring that the nEXO project can achieve its design sensitivity

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Neutron Capture Measurements on Minor Actinides at the n_TOF Facility at CERN: Past, Present and Future

The successful development of advanced nuclear systems for sustainable energy production and nuclear waste management depends on high quality nuclear data libraries. Recent sensitivity studies and reports have identified the need for substantially improving the accuracy of neutron cross-section data for minor actinides. The n-TOF collaboration has initiated an ambitious experimental program for the measurement of neutron capture cross sections of minor actinides. Two experimental setups have been constructed for this purpose: a Total Absorption Calorimeter (TAC) for measuring neutron capture cross-sections of low-mass and/or radioactive samples and a set of two low neutron sensitivity C{sub 6}D{sub 6} detectors for the less radioactive materials.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Detection with Enhanced Energy Windowing Phase I Report

This document reviews the progress of Phase I of the Detection with Enhanced Energy Windowing (DEEW) project. The DEEW project is the implementation of software incorporating an algorithm which reviews data generated by radiation portal monitors and utilizes advanced and novel techniques for detecting radiological and fissile material while not alarming on Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material. Independent testing indicated that the Enhanced Energy Windowing algorithm showed promise at reducing the probability of alarm in the stream of commerce compared to existing algorithms and other developmental algorithms, while still maintaining adequate sensitivity to threats. This document contains a brief description of the project, instructions for setting up and running the applications, and guidance to help make reviewing the output files and source code easier.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL Radiological Response Training Range

This assessment uses screening-level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radiological Response Training Range (RRTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K2O, LaBr3, KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga2O3, NaNO2, Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program mixing-cell model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated assuming 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for a period of 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer-code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS). It is highly unlikely the test scenarios evaluated in this ECAR will adversely impact human health based on comparisons of calculated dose and concentration against regulatory standards and risk-based screening levels. Conservative estimates of dose to workers and the public from atmospheric transport of possible radionuclide releases are far below federal radiation protection standards. Conservative estimates of potential contaminant concentrations in groundwater are less than federal drinking water standards or screening levels. Predicted radionuclide concentrations in surface soils are below risk-based screening levels, except for Ge-68 (material Ga-68) for the worker. The Ge-68 soil concentration can be made less than the worker PRG, if the number of annual tests using Ga-68 is reduced from 12 to 6. However, the sum of ratios still exceeds one because of the high K-40 ratio. If the EF of the worker (number of days the worker is in the contaminated testing area) is reduced from 225 days/yr (default value for full time worker) to 112 days/yr, the Ge-68 ratio is less than one and the sum of ratios is less than one. Actual radiation doses and groundwater and surface-soil concentrations are likely to be much less than those calculated because of the conservative assumptions and parameters employed in the modeling. For example, atmospheric-transport calculations assume the entire inventory of each material type is readily released to the atmosphere and no plume deposition, depletion, or radioactive decay occurs during transport. The calculations also assume the same meteorological conditions (e.g., wind velocity, wind direction, stability class) that produce the maximum 95th percentile concentration (i.e., concentration representing the 95th percentile of a distribution of concentrations derived from 3 years of hourly meteorological data) at each receptor location are the same for all 12 tests during the year, and each receptor is assumed to be present during all 12 tests. The surface-soil assessment assumes the entire inventory of each test is deposited in the top 5 cm of soil. No atmospheric dispersal is assumed, and the radionuclides are subject only to leaching and radioactive decay. The groundwater-pathway modeling is conservative in that it is one-dimensional in the unsaturated zone (no lateral spreading/dilution) and assumes the entire inventory of contaminants infiltrates into the ground at the same location for every test. This is especially conservative for particulate radionuclides because they would have to dissolve or corrode first and some would be dispersed into the atmosphere. The groundwater receptor is also assumed to consume water directly from a hypothetical well positioned in the location of maximum concentration. In addition, conservative degradation rates were used, and volatilization was not considered for the nonradioactive chemical

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Metallic Low-Level Waste (LLW) Handling Options: An Optimal Life cycle-Based Approach for North American Operations - 19413

Daily activities associated with nuclear power plant operations produce large volumes of low-level contaminated waste. During operation, a small percentage of this low-level waste is metallic (< 1% by volume). However, this figure increases materially when a facility is finally decommissioned, with approximately 1000 m{sup 3} of contaminated metal waste generated for every 1 GW decommissioned (13% by volume). With global nuclear decommissioning efforts expected to increase until 2050, the amount of low-level metallic waste generated is expected to increase the global inventory by over an order of magnitude. The high cost of conventional surface storage and burial of radioactive metal, coupled with the projected increase in low-level metallic waste volumes provides strong incentive to identify cost-effective waste management solutions. Surface decontamination and thermal methods are proven options for decontaminating low-level metallic waste. Surface decontamination processes include chemical, electrochemical, or mechanical methods, which are used to remove contamination from exposed layers of metal. Surface decontamination is most effective when metal has low levels of activity localized on the outer layers. When the activity is more uniformly distributed in the metal (or the geometry is complex), alternative methods such as thermal decontamination are required. In the thermal decontamination process, contaminated scrap metal is melted in a furnace and held in a molten state for a period of time while the radioactive material is separated out through gravity. Radioactive material reports to slag which is handled separately, or to the exhaust which is handled using conventional gas handling technologies. Thermal methods of decontamination involving metal melting present an opportunity to reduce long-term storage cost with a reduction in waste volume, along with the opportunity to reuse the decontaminated metal. Methods for dealing with metallic low-level waste from nuclear facilities vary extensively across the globe. The approach employed at any given site may be set by a host of factors ranging from regulatory influence, public perception, local economics, available geology for underground storage and often, precedent established long ago by early operations. This paper examines several low-level metallic waste handling options including techniques for surface decontamination and metal melting, as well as a combination of both. The various methods are categorized according to their suitability for waste characterization and local/global installations. The effectiveness of each option is benchmarked against a range of criteria, including capital and operating costs, environmental impact, overall sustainability and risk management issues. The overall objective of this paper is to develop a methodology for determining the most beneficial low-level metallic waste management strategy for a facility once the quantity, type and nature of the waste is established on a long-term basis. It is the authors' hope that the methodology can be used as a tool to test a facility's current plans (which are primarily focused on long-term storage) and identify areas for optimization with an emphasis on overall cost and environmental footprint reduction. The trend towards long term planning to handle large amounts of contaminated metal, along with obtaining a social license to implement a sustainable waste management solution, are key decision-making variables that will be discussed in relation to the LLW handling options presented in this paper. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Assessment of Quality Management for Transport Packages Not Requiring Authority Design Approval - 18194

The majority of transports of radioactive materials are carried out in packages which don't need a package design approval of a competent authority. Low active radioactive materials are transported in such kind of packages e.g. in the medical and pharmaceutical industry and in the nuclear industry as well. In Germany the decision to phase out nuclear energy leads to a strong demand for packages to transport low and middle active radioactive waste due to the dismantling and decommissioning of nuclear power plants. According to IAEA regulations the 'non-competent authority approved package types' are the excepted packages and the industrial packages of Type IP-1, IP-2 and IP-3 and of Type A. For the packages of Type IP-2, IP-3 and Type A an assessment by the German competent authority is required for the quality management for the design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection. In general a compliance audit of the manufacturer of the packaging is required during this assessment procedure. Their regulatory level in the IAEA regulations is not comparable with the regulatory density for packages requiring competent authority design approval. The countries apply different approaches within the assessment of the quality assurance measures in the management system as well as in the quality assurance program of a special package design. To use the package or packaging in a safe manner and in compliance with the regulations a management system for each phase of the life of the package or packaging is necessary. In order to help manufactures, which measurements and documents are needed for the assessment procedure, BAM developed a guideline. The guideline BAM-GGR 016 [5] describes the needed quality management for the design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection of a packaging and the package. The poster to be presented will explain the different requirements of the quality assurance measures and give examples. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Application of the PHDS Germanium Gamma-ray Imager (GeGI) in Facility Decontamination Assessment - 19471

As part of a site wide investigation, U.S. EPA Region 5 had to assess the nature and extent of contamination in a former radioactive source manufacturing facility. This work involved verification of the radioisotope expected, ensuring no other radioisotopes were present, and quantification of the activity and areal extent of contamination throughout the facility. The device used to support this assessment work was the Germanium Gamma-ray Imager (GeGI) manufactured by PHDS Co. of Knoxville, Tennessee. GeGI is a germanium-semiconductor imaging detector system that provides identification, location, and quantification of radioactive materials within its field of view. GeGI provides the highest fidelity radiological assay information including the best gamma-ray energy resolution and spatial localization of any existing technology, including gamma-ray energy resolution of ∼0.3% full-width half-max (FWHM) at 662 keV and angular location resolution ∼ +/-1 degree. The GeGI is a mechanically cooled, portable system well-suited to field operations. PHDS Co. also provided on-site support during assessment operations and performed subsequent data analysis. Gamma-ray spectral data and associated images were collected with GeGI in six primary areas of the facility having significant residual contamination. A total of 61 gamma-ray spectrum/image sets were collected over the course of three working days (22 Compton images and 39 Pinhole/Compton images). During data collection, Compton imaging was used as the means by which to identify and prioritize hotspots. After contaminated regions were identified via Compton imaging, short-distance Pinhole spectrum/image sets were collected for additional analysis. All of the spectrum/image sets were analyzed to determine the radioisotope distribution within the GeGI field of view, as well as to provide an estimate of the activity associated with each hotspot. It was determined that the nature of residual contamination present was distributed across specific areas of elevated activity, where in some areas there was significant accumulation of contaminated material. It was also determined that no discrete sources of high-activity were present, as would be expected in the case of radioactive material product intended for sealed source manufacture. Results included the activity of residual contamination for each of the areas assessed, and an estimate of the physical area over which that contamination was distributed. It was anticipated by EPA that if decontamination were to be performed that it would involve some type of concrete scabbling or other means of physical removal of contaminated material. The GeGI data could be used to estimate the areal extent (square footage) of concrete removal that would be required for decontamination. Using the activity estimate data from the GeGI along with an estimated depth of concrete removal, planning could be performed for decontamination work (equipment and personnel), waste collection, packaging, transportation, and disposal, along with an associated cost estimate. With regard to health and safety, use of the GeGI reduced the radiation dose to the EPA R5 staff performing the assessment work. The GeGI is a non-destructive device that supports assessment of radioactively contaminated areas and sources from a distance, reducing the need for close contact to radiation, and the time necessary for personnel to operate near such hazards. Use of the GeGI in this facility assessment was our first attempt to apply this technology in what proved to be a quick and efficient decontamination assessment method. The GeGI can assess the nature and extent of residual contamination in a facility, first by quickly identifying the areas of elevated activity, followed by refined measurement and assessment of those elevated areas. The GeGI data can then be used to develop planning and a cost estimate of required decontamination and waste management activities. Since it's a non-destructive gamma identification and imaging device, it can reduce the distance of workers from radioactive sources and the dose incurred from assessment work. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radiation Control on Uzbekistan Borders - Results and Perspectives

The measures and actions on prevention, detection and response to criminal or unauthorized acts involving radioactive materials in Uzbekistan are presented. In frames of program of radiation monitoring to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials main customs border checkpoints were equipped with commercial radiation portal monitors. Special radiation monitors elaborated and manufactured in INP AS RU are installed in INP(main gates, research reactor and laboratory building) to provide nuclear security of Institute facilities. The experience of Uzbekistan in establishing radiation monitoring systems on its borders, their operation and maintenance would be useful for realization of proposed plan of strengthening measures to prevent illicit trafficking in Republics of Central Asia region.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗