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At least 415 records · Page 23

Performance of High Temperature Operational Amplifier, Type LM2904WH, under Extreme Temperatures

Operation of electronic parts and circuits under extreme temperatures is anticipated in NASA space exploration missions as well as terrestrial applications. Exposure of electronics to extreme temperatures and wide-range thermal swings greatly affects their performance via induced changes in the semiconductor material properties, packaging and interconnects, or due to incompatibility issues between interfaces that result from thermal expansion/contraction mismatch. Electronics that are designed to withstand operation and perform efficiently in extreme temperatures would mitigate risks for failure due to thermal stresses and, therefore, improve system reliability. In addition, they contribute to reducing system size and weight, simplifying its design, and reducing development cost through the elimination of otherwise required thermal control elements for proper ambient operation. A large DC voltage gain (100 dB) operational amplifier with a maximum junction temperature of 150 C was recently introduced by STMicroelectronics [1]. This LM2904WH chip comes in a plastic package and is designed specifically for automotive and industrial control systems. It operates from a single power supply over a wide range of voltages, and it consists of two independent, high gain, internally frequency compensated operational amplifiers. Table I shows some of the device manufacturer s specifications.

Patterson, Richard↗

The Future Impact of Much Lower Launch Cost

For decades, the high cost of space launch has been the greatest limiting factor on the nu ber and size of space missions. Recently commercial rockets have reduced launch cost to about one-twentieth of the space shuttle cost. This provides opportunities for a matching reduction in the cost of space systems and more and more massive missions. High launch costs greatly increase the cost of developing space systems, since the need to reduce mass forces the use of light materials, high packaging densities, and fragile structures that are difficult to manufacture and test. Lower launch costs allow the use of more robust and well tested off-the-shelf systems. Increased mass can be used to increase single string reliability and also to provide spares and redundancy. A crewed mission can benefit from lower launch costs by using mass to provide more accepted fully hydrated food, additional hygiene water, laundry, radiation shielding, and even artificial gravity. The crew can be made healthier, safer, more comfortable, and more productive. Lower launch cost makes every space activity easier, whether it is science, human exploration, commercial including communications, weather, surveillance, and geo-positioning services, or the defense of similar military services. Most of the solar system is empty space, with the energy of the sun’s radiation passing through to the cold of deep space. The missing mass needed to support human activities is now much easier to provide.

Jones, Harry W.↗

Testing of the Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS)

The Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS) is being designed to provide a secure container tag that can be used to optimize chain-of-custody monitoring for packaged nuclear materials as they are being stored, processed, and transported. ACTS is an active device that uses an almost-universal core platform that can be appropriately configured to provide the necessary data acquisition, data logging, and communications functions needed for 21st century material accountancy, monitoring, and tracking applications. The core design supports active monitoring of containment, movement, and location and provides secure data transmission via selectable communication methods that can be used throughout the world. This core architecture enables appropriately designed modules to be easily interfaced to the basic system, thus providing an integration path for current and new technologies. ACTS contains a built-in set of sensors but also supports an expansion bus for up to six additional communications, tracking, or sensing modules that may enhance monitoring and tracking of particular containers for specific applications. ACTS stores events in memory, communicates activity to Argonne National Laboratory’s ARG-US TransPort tracking and information server, and provides options for data encryption and authentication. We are currently beginning a testing phase that will field five devices outdoors in a controlled environment to allow evaluation of the functionality of the systems and the hardness of the devices to outdoor conditions. Partners for this system are Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Savannah River National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and commercialization partner The Aquila Group.

Britton Jr, Chuck↗

Advancing the Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS)

The Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS) is an extensible secure container tag that can be used to optimize chain-of-custody monitoring for packaged nuclear materials as they are being stored, processed, and transported. Based on the ultra–low power TI MSP430 mixed-signal microcontroller, ACTS is an active device that uses an almost-universal core platform that can be appropriately configured with expansion modules to provide the application-specific data acquisition, data logging, container sealing, and communications functions needed for 21st century material accountancy, monitoring, and tracking applications. This core architecture enables appropriately designed modules to be easily interfaced to the basic system, providing an integration path for current and new technologies. ACTS contains a built-in set of sensors and supports an expansion bus for up to six additional communications, tracking, authentication, encryption, sealing, location, or sensing modules that may enhance the monitoring and tracking of designated containers for specific applications. To date, testing has used an IEEE 802.15.4-2011 ultra-wideband–compliant wireless transceiver module that has additional capabilities for indoor positioning and proximity location. Proximity-based location (i.e., where an ACTS tag knows where it is relative to other ACTS tags) will be explored as a continuity-of-knowledge mechanism to determine unauthorized movement of containers in storage arrays of many items. Partners for this system are Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Savannah River National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and commercialization partner the Aquila Group.

Younkin, Jim↗

Advancing the Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS)

The Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS) is an extensible secure container tag that can be used to optimize chain-of-custody monitoring for packaged nuclear materials as they are being stored, processed, and transported. Based on the ultra–low power TI MSP430 mixed-signal microcontroller, ACTS is an active device that uses an almost-universal core platform that can be appropriately configured with expansion modules to provide the application-specific data acquisition, data logging, container sealing, and communications functions needed for 21st century material accountancy, monitoring, and tracking applications. This core architecture enables appropriately designed modules to be easily interfaced to the basic system, providing an integration path for current and new technologies. ACTS contains a built-in set of sensors and supports an expansion bus for up to six additional communications, tracking, authentication, encryption, sealing, location, or sensing modules that may enhance the monitoring and tracking of designated containers for specific applications. To date, testing has used an IEEE 802.15.4-2011 ultra-wideband–compliant wireless transceiver module that has additional capabilities for indoor positioning and proximity location. Proximity-based location (i.e., where an ACTS tag knows where it is relative to other ACTS tags) will be explored as a continuity-of-knowledge mechanism to determine unauthorized movement of containers in storage arrays of many items. Partners for this system are Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Savannah River National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and commercialization partner the Aquila Group.

Younkin, James↗

Synthesizing, Compounding, and Characterizing a Heat Labile Polyurethane Foam

ABSTRACT A need exists for a packaging foam material that can be converted from solid to gaseous degradation products at reasonably low energy levels or temperatures, such as 100O C. This paper will primarily discuss the approaches currently being used to synthesize and characterize such a material. These approaches include the incorporation of novel polyols such as azo containing diols, polycarbonate diols, and polypropylene carbonate polyols into polyurethane foams. Characterization methods include NMR, FTIR, TGA, finite element analysis, impact strength, and others. This project will be funded for a duration of three years. Year 1 focused on developing the proposed test methods and producing an initial rigid polyurethane foam. Year 2 focuses on refining the materials and test methods. If appropriate, design of experiment (doe) techniques will be used to optimize components, component levels, density and other variables to attain required final material properties (TGA weight loss, impact strength, etc.). Year 3 focuses on scaling up to larger engineering quantities. The application for this material is in load securement for transportation of low level radioactive waste materials within the US Department of Energy (DOE) complex. Foam in place process equipment and operators will be shielded using this novel method over current practice. Current practice can involve time consuming methods of load securement in low level radiation environments. This new technique would eliminate exposure time securing the load and greatly improve the As Low As Reasonably Attainable (ALARA) conditions. The objective is to progress to higher Technical Readiness Levels (TRL) and larger pilot scale quantities. This paper discusses methodologies and presents current results to date.

Kranjc, Mark D.↗

Mark-18A Target Material Recovery Program: Initial Hot Startup

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has been tasked by the National Nuclear Security Administration to recover highly valued isotopes from irradiated Mark-18A (Mk-18A) targets. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has sixty-five Mk-18A targets available for the recovery of the high valued materials. The Mk-18A targets were manufactured with Pu-242 then irradiated under high neutron flux in K-Reactor at the SRS from 1968 to 1978. The sixty-five Mk-18A targets are currently stored in the SRS L-Area Basin and will be removed one at a time and individually transported to SRNL. Upon receipt at SRNL, the Mk-18A target material will be removed from the confinement, dissolved, chemically separated, and calcined to a stable oxide. The flowsheet is designed to recover the plutonium as well as the trivalent actinides. The original targets were manufactured with varying quantities of Pu-242, ranging from 5.2 grams to 121.5 grams. Taking a graded approach to process start up, the lowest loaded target (FT-80-03) was selected as the first target to be received and processed at SRNL. As operational experience and knowledge is gained from processing targets, higher loaded targets will be selected for processing to increase the quantities of valuable isotopes recovered. Due to dose concerns, the receipt and processing of the Mk-18A targets is performed in the SRNL Shielded Cells Facility. The targets are stored in a double J-can confinement in the L-Area Basin. A specially designed cask was procured for transport of the targets from L-Area to SRNL. Once received at SRNL, the targets are loaded into the back of Cell 7 and resized as they enter the cell. The resized targets (1/4 length) are then processed one at a time through the following processes: caustic dissolution and filtration, acidic dissolution and filtration, elutable Reillex anion exchange, diglycolamide (DGA) resin extraction, and DGA calcination. This processing results in two product streams. The first is an aqueous plutonium solution which is removed from the shielded cells and taken to a glovebox for further purification and conversion to an oxide. The second is a calcined oxide product containing the Am and Cm as well as other lanthanide fission products which is removed from the shielded cells using a bagless transfer system. Both materials are packaged for shipment to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This paper will discuss the operating experience, lessons learned, and results from initial process hot startup.

Armstrong, Christopher [Savannah River National La↗

Review of Fissile Material Exemptions and General Licenses in 10 CFR Part 71 - 14578

Title 10 of the United States (US) Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material includes requirements for the transport of fissile material in packages. These regulations provide requirements for packaging that is certified by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to transport fissile material, but the regulations also include provisions that allow for shipment of fissile material in packages that are not required to be certified by the NRC. These provisions include criteria for exemptions from classification as fissile material (10 CFR 71.15) and permit general licenses for limited quantities of fissile material and plutonium-beryllium special form sources (10 CFR 71.22 and 10 CFR 71.23, respectively). These regulations were revised by NRC as part of a broad rulemaking effort in 2004. These regulations are used frequently for a wide-variety of fissile material shipping operations and shippers must interpret the regulations for particular shipping situations. The quantity of fissile material that presents a criticality safety risk depends on the other materials in the system that might absorb neutrons emitted from fission or moderate (slow) those neutrons to lower energies where the probability of them creating an additional fission is highest. Besides the absorption and moderation of neutrons, other parameters that must be considered to ensure criticality safety are: the mass, concentration, or isotopic distribution of the fissile material; and the system geometry and neutron reflection of the package from surrounding materials. These parameters were carefully considered in developing the requirements for the exemptions from the classification of fissile material and the requirements for general licenses for fissile material. This paper will review the technical basis, intent, and anticipated usage of each of the fissile material exemption and general license provisions. Additionally, this paper will discuss the recent regulatory history of the Part 71 fissile material exemptions and general licenses, including the 2015 rulemaking effort. Finally, this paper will outline an upcoming NUREG/CR document regarding the fissile material exemptions and general licenses, and discuss recommendations that are being formulated for potential future revisions to the regulations. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

System-Level Thermal Management and Reliability of Automotive Electronics: Goals and Opportunities Using Phase-Change Materials

Abstract Electronic packaging for automotive applications are at particular risk of thermomechanical failure due to the naturally harsh conditions it is exposed to. With the rise of electric and hybrid electric vehicles (EVs and HEVs), combined with a desire to miniaturize, the challenge of removing enough heat from electronic devices in automotive vehicles is evolving. This paper closely examines the new challenges in thermal management in various driving environments and aims to classify each existing cooling method in terms of performance. Particular focus is placed upon emerging solutions regarded to hold great potential, such as phase-change materials (PCMs). PCMs have been regarded for some time as a means of transferring heat quickly away from the region with the electronic components and are widely regarded as a possible means of carrying out cooling in large scale from small areas, because of their high latent heat of fusion, high specific heat, temperature stability, and small volume change during phase change, etc. They have already been utilized as a method of passive cooling in electronics in various ways, but their adoption in automotive power electronics, such as in traction inverters, has yet to be fulfilled. A brief discussion is made on some of the potential areas of application and challenges relating to more widespread adoption of PCMs, with reference to a case study using computational model of a commercially available power module used in automotive applications.

Engineering↗

Pressure Build-Up During the Fire Test in Type B(U) Packages Containing Water - 13280

The safety assessment of packages for the transport of radioactive materials with content containing liquids requires special consideration. The main focus is on water as supplementary liquid content in Type B(U) packages. A typical content of a Type B(U) package is ion exchange resin, waste of a nuclear power plant, which is not dried, normally only drained. Besides the saturated ion exchange resin, a small amount of free water can be included in these contents. Compared to the safety assessment of packages with dry content, attention must be paid to some more specific issues. An overview of these issues is provided. The physical and chemical compatibility of the content itself and the content compatibility with the packages materials must be demonstrated for the assessment. Regarding the mechanical resistance the package has to withstand the forces resulting from the freezing liquid. The most interesting point, however, is the pressure build-up inside the package due to vaporization. This could for example be caused by radiolysis of the liquid and must be taken into account for the storage period. If the package is stressed by the total inner pressure, this pressure leads to mechanical loads to the package body, the lid and the lid bolts. Thus, the pressure is the driving force on the gasket system regarding the activity release and a possible loss of tightness. The total pressure in any calculation is the sum of partial pressures of different gases which can be caused by different effects. The pressure build-up inside the package caused by the regulatory thermal test (30 min at 800 deg. C), as part of the cumulative test scenario under accident conditions of transport is discussed primarily. To determine the pressure, the temperature distribution in the content must be calculated for the whole period from beginning of the thermal test until cooling-down. In this case, while calculating the temperature distribution, conduction and radiation as well as evaporation and condensation during the associated process of transport have to be considered. This paper discusses limiting amounts of water inside the cask which could lead to unacceptable pressure and takes into account saturated steam as well as overheated steam. However, the difficulties of assessing casks containing wet content will be discussed. From the authority assessment point of view, drying of the content could be an effective way to avoid the above described pressure build-up and the associated difficulties for the safety assessment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Materials for high-density electronic packaging and interconnection

Electronic packaging and interconnections are the elements that today limit the ultimate performance of advanced electronic systems. Materials in use today and those becoming available are critically examined to ascertain what actions are needed for U.S. industry to compete favorably in the world market for advanced electronics. Materials and processes are discussed in terms of the final properties achievable and systems design compatibility. Weak points in the domestic industrial capability, including technical, industrial philosophy, and political, are identified. Recommendations are presented for actions that could help U.S. industry regain its former leadership position in advanced semiconductor systems production.

Source record↗

Determining Compression Characteristics of Honeycomb Material - 19674

The objective is to determine compression test characteristics of stainless steel honeycomb material to be able to represent honeycomb structures accurately in analytical models used to simulate hypothetical accident scenarios of shipping packages. Honeycomb is a material used primary in the aerospace industry due to its high strength-to-weight ratio. Because it doesn't have a shelf life and can withstand high heats, it is an excellent candidate for a structural material in package designs. Honeycomb has orthotropic material properties. The honeycomb currently being evaluated is made of metal ribbons spot welded together to form hexagon pattern between metal plates. The hexagon ribbons are brazed to the metal plates. The complexity of the honeycomb significantly lengthens the simulation time, which is further complicated when the brazing, welding, and imperfections of the material is considered. This means to affectively represent the honeycomb in simulation programs, such as Abaqus, the material needs to be approximated as a uniform orthotropic material. This requires material properties in each of the three directions, T, W, and L. The T direction is defined as the 'strong' direction, perpendicular to the honeycomb sheet. The L direction is parallel the ribbon and the W direction is perpendicular to the ribbon. Honeycomb has 3 different compression stages. Stage 1 is the initial compression where the honeycomb maintains its structural integrity and does not permanently deform from loads from normal operations. Stage 2 is when the initial buckling causes irreversible damage to the honeycomb. Stage 2 is the one we are most interested in because it absorbs the most energy from a hypothetical accident scenario. During Stage 2, the honeycomb fails layer-by-layer, indicating that the more layers, the longer material crushing is sustained, and thus the more energy that is absorbed. Stage 3 is final compression, similar to compressing solid metal. During stage 3 the stress increases with a diminishing rate of elongation and the honeycomb is completely failed where the plates between the honeycomb core sandwich the crushed honeycomb ribbon. The stress-strain graph bellow shows compression test of 3 different samples in the T direction. The red lines divide the three stages. The far left is Stage 1, the middle stage 2, and the right stage 3. The data collected is displayed in the table below. The expressions in the table represent the regression formula that represents each stage of the compression on a stress-strain graph. Stage 1 is assumed to intersect with the origin; data for stage 3 for the crush in W and L directions where unable to be gathered due to the nature of failure for those directions. Stage 1 and 2 are linear regressions while stage 3 is a degree 2, to best match the curve. Linear regression is used on stage 2 because ultimately that represents the energy absorbed. With more data, a degree n x 2 regression would be a more appropriate regression for stage 2, where n is the number of layers. The table below is the approximation of each scenario and stage. Each stage starts and ends at the intersection of the next stage. There where two main objectives for these tests: firstly to understand how honeycomb performs under extreme compression, and secondly to be able to numerically represent the honeycomb structure. Both of these where completed to varying degrees. It is important understood how the honeycomb fails. If it is crushed in the T direction it retains its integrity even after being crushed, however when crushed in the L and W crush direction, if it fails, it disintegrates, and loses all integrity. Also, the more layers the more time the material spends in stage 2. Failure is started by buckling, thus if there is any imperfection, the stress will not spike but transition straight into stage 2. The data collected and aggregated can be used for initial simulation of honeycomb used in packages. The initial testing has set the ground work for more data to be collected in order to verify results and to allow more confidence in the simulation results. This is only the initial data collected. The next steps is to continue to collect more data to verify results and to test more variants of honeycomb, with different brazing, layers, and shape.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Compilation of LLNL CUP-2 Data

The CUP-2 uranium ore concentrate (UOC) standard reference material, a powder, was produced at the Blind River uranium refinery of Eldorado Resources Ltd. in Canada in 1986. This material was produced as part of a joint effort by the Canadian Certified Reference Materials Project and the Canadian Uranium Producers Metallurgical Committee to develop a certified reference material for uranium concentration and the concentration of several impurity constituents. This standard was developed to satisfy the requirements of the UOC mining and milling industry, and was characterized with this purpose in mind. To produce CUP-2, approximately 25 kg of UOC derived from the Blind River uranium refinery was blended, homogenized, and assessed for homogeneity by X-ray fluorescence (XRF) analysis. The homogenized material was then packaged into bottles, containing 50 g of material each, and distributed for analysis to laboratories in 1986. The CUP-2 UOC standard was characterized by an interlaboratory analysis program involving eight member laboratories, six commercial laboratories, and three additional volunteer laboratories. Each laboratory provided five replicate results on up to 17 analytes, including total uranium concentration, and moisture content. The selection of analytical technique was left to each participating laboratory. Uranium was reported on an “as-received” basis; all other analytes (besides moisture content) were reported on a “dry-weight” basis. A bottle of 25g of CUP-2 UOC standard as described above was purchased by LLNL and characterized by the LLNL Nuclear Forensics Group. Non-destructive and destructive analytical techniques were applied to the UOC sample. Information obtained from short-term techniques such as photography, gamma spectrometry, and scanning electron microscopy were used to guide the performance of longer-term techniques such as ICP-MS. Some techniques, such as XRF and ICP-MS, provided complementary types of data. The results indicate that the CUP-2 standard has a natural isotopic ratio, and does not appear to have been isotopically enriched or depleted in any way, and was not contaminated by a source of uranium with a non-natural isotopic composition. Furthermore, the lack of 233 U and 236 U above the instrumental detection limit indicates that this sample was not exposed to a neutron flux, which would have generated one or both of these isotopes in measurable concentrations.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives include: • Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. • Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacturer, etc.), and assessment video feeds. • All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. • Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. • Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). • Automated creation of reports and data visualization. • Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: • For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” • For personnel safety needs: o Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. o Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual (Ref TBD). • For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives included: Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacture, etc.), and assessment video feeds. All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). Automated creation of reports and data visualization. Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” For personnel safety needs: Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual. For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗